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Abstract  
Despite September 11
th
 2001, many international airports are operating close to capacity, a 
problem that is likely to become more acute given the projected long-term growth in air 
traffic.  This growth is likely to have major implications on runway, terminal and surface 
access capacity, infrastructure which is already experiencing constraints. The area of surface 
access is as much, if not more an issue in terms of employees accessing the airport as it is for 
passengers.  Typically, one third of access traffic can be attributed to employees.  Employees 
represent a particular problem for airports in terms of surface access due to the frequent, peak 
hour nature of trips made and their higher usage rates of the car compared to passengers.  A 
range of initiatives exist to encourage the use of modes other than the private car by 
employees but overall these measures tend to be ‘soft’ in nature and one generally has to look 
to the non-airport sector to see examples of more innovative ‘harder’ initiatives such as 
financial incentive and disincentive car parking measures direct to employees.  
This thesis utilises a series of carefully selected interviews and focus groups at Heathrow 
Airport and three best practice non-airport organisations, underpinned by a process grounded 
in the concept and methodology of best practice benchmarking, to suggest areas where BAA, 
and potentially airport authorities around the world, could learn from other organisations in 
the area of employee surface access and specifically car parking . It is concluded that there are 
four key areas airports should focus on to explore the issues surrounding the implementation 
of a car parking charge or car parking cash out direct to employees, namely: the use of a 
package approach; a requirement for top management support; gaining acceptance from 
employees, and; the issues surrounding the process of implementation.  
The thesis contributes to knowledge in a number of areas, predominantly the use of 
benchmarking in the area of car parking and the airport sector, an industry which has thus far 
not adopted the technique to any great extent.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
1.0 The Problem of Surface Access to Airports  
Airport capacity is dependent on a number of factors including air traffic control, runway 
and taxiway, terminal and apron and surface access.  Constraints in any of these areas has a 
serious impact on the efficient functioning of the airport.  Long term projections in 
international air travel show continued growth of over three and four percent per annum 
(ACI Europe, 2005).  This growth is likely to have major implications on runway, terminal 
and surface access capacity, infrastructure which is already experiencing constraints to a 
greater or lesser extent.  
Surface access to the airport is a crucial part of the whole journey by air. Transportation time 
to the airport is one of the three most important factors affecting the choice of an airport by a 
passenger, the other two being the number of flights offered and the price of the flight ticket. 
It is not just passengers who use the surface access system however – employees, suppliers 
to the airport, meeters and greeters and other visitors also make use of it (Kazda and Caves, 
2000).  
The problems surrounding surface access are not a recent phenomenon, however.  In 1969 a 
report by the Committee on Transportation to and from Airports of the Technical Council on 
Urban Transportation (1969, p. 115) stated, “Airport ground access has long been recognised 
as a major inconvenience of air travel, if not a potential market constraint.”  In many 
metropolitan areas, increasing concern over the impacts of traffic generated by airports on 
the surrounding street and highway systems, as well as the emissions created by the trips, is 
forcing airports to pay more attention to strategies to reduce or mitigate ground access 
traffic.  (Caves and Gosling, 1999)  
The UK economy is increasingly dependent on air travel; one third of visible exports and 
eight percent of service exports go by air and 17 million foreign visitors arrive by air. The 
aviation industry also directly supports 200,000 jobs and up to 600,000 indirectly, 
demonstrating the important role of aviation and airports to the economy (DfT, 2003). The 
number of passengers at UK airports grew from 30 million in 1970 to 229 million in 2005 
(CAA, 2006) and terminal passengers comprising both international and domestic travel are 
forecast to grow by between 58 and 95 percent over the period 2005 to 2020 (DfT, 2005).  
The 2003 White Paper “The Future of Air Transport” (DfT, 2003) recognises the constraints 
airports are facing in the areas of terminal, runway and surface access capacity but also 
identifies the importance of growth for the benefit of the economy balanced with the 
environmental implications of adding extra capacity.  The issue of airport surface access is 
one which the UK Government has been keen to address in recent years, charging those 
airports with scheduled passenger services with leading Airport Transport Forums and 
producing an Airport Surface Access Strategy comprising targets and initiatives for 
increasing the percentage of surface access trips undertaken by the public transport (DETR, 
1998).    
The White Paper highlights that the South East is experiencing the most pressure on existing 
capacity.  Nowhere are the problems of surface access more apparent than at London’s 
Heathrow Airport, the UK’s largest airport and the busiest international airport in the world 
(DfT, 2003).  The scale and geographically constrained nature of Heathrow coupled with the 
pressure to expand from a business perspective and the external constraints placed upon it, 
as explored in section 1.1 below, mean that it is a leading example of a UK airport 
experiencing surface access problems.  It is also supported for further development by the 
UK Government which places further priority on addressing its surface access problems.  As 
such, Heathrow Airport and surface access is an appropriate and relevant case study for the 
research contained in this thesis.  
At medium and large airports, the number of employees who commute represents between 
one quarter and one half of the daily number of airline passengers (Kazda and Caves, 2000). 
Employees also account for two access trips to the airport each day, whereas most 
passengers will only make one access trip in a day.  For these reasons the employee surface 
access market is of the same order of magnitude as the passenger surface access market.  
Within the objectives of the Airport Transport Forums and Airport Surface Access Strategies 
mentioned above there are clear suggestions that airports should concentrate some efforts on 
commuting and business travel for all employees working there.  For these reasons, along 
with those detailed in section 1.1 below, the research presented in this thesis focuses upon 
the employee surface access market.  
1.1 Research Background: The Current Situation at Heathrow Airport  
1.1.1 Heathrow Airport Profile  
Heathrow Airport is situated in West London.  Figure 1.1 shows the dominant position of 
Heathrow in terms of passenger numbers at UK airports; in 2004 it handled 67.1 million 
passengers, accounting for 31.1 percent of all UK passengers, and 1.3 million tonnes of 
freight, accounting for 55.9 percent of all freight through UK airports (CAA, 2005). 
Heathrow, along with all the other airports shown in Figure 1.1, continues to grow despite a 
decline following the events of 11
th
 September 2001, with passenger numbers projected to 
reach 75.63 million per annum in 2008 and 91.95 million per annum by 2016 (BAA, 2004a).  
It is the fourth busiest airport in the world and has the highest number of international 
passengers of any airport in the world (DfT, 2003).  
Figure 1.1: Comparison of UK Airport Size and Growth since 1992  
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Source: Plotted from data provided by CAA, 2005  
Approximately 70,000 staff are employed at the airport, working for 350 organisations and 
in the region of 75 percent of staff at Heathrow are shift workers (BAA, 2004b). As 
passenger numbers increase over time, so too will the number of employees.  In addition to 
the jobs generated directly by Heathrow Airport, it is regarded as important to the national 
economy, supporting 30,000 jobs in the local area (DfT, 2003) and 240,000 jobs in the wider 
economy throughout the UK (BAA, 2004b). The Department for Transport (2003, p.12) 
state it is a “significant driver of economic growth…we recognise the immense value to the 
UK of Heathrow’s status as an international hub airport and we want to see that continue”.  
Current expansion at Heathrow Airport includes the development of a fifth terminal and the 
UK Government has also stated it’s support for the development of a third runway and 
further terminal capacity in the period 2015-2020 (DfT, 2003).  
1.1.2 Surface Access Constraints placed upon Heathrow Airport  
The scale of Heathrow Airport means that it has a significant effect on the surrounding area 
in terms of its environmental impact.  To this end, in its Surface Access Strategy the airport 
has set itself a target of achieving 40 percent of air passengers travelling to and from the 
airport by public transport by the end of 2007, with a longer term target of 50 percent (BAA, 
2002a).  In 2002, approximately 35 percent of passengers arrived at the airport by non-car 
modes (BAA, 2003).    
In November 2001, the UK Government approved the development of a fifth terminal at 
Heathrow Airport and this will open in March 2008 accommodating 30 million passengers 
per annum by 2016 (Caves and Humphreys, 2002).  As a condition of the development of 
Terminal Five, Heathrow is subject to a parking cap of 42,000 spaces. This cap is currently 
in place and must also accommodate the additional car parking demand when Terminal Five 
opens.  Within this cap, there is a limit of 17,500 spaces for employees (ODPM, 2001).  This 
clearly places a constraint on employee car parking. With reference to congestion on the 
roads surrounding Heathrow, the Terminal Five Public Enquiry report stated “bearing in 
mind that these problems would inevitably be greatest in the peak hours, employees should 
be encouraged to make greater use of public transport.” (ODPM, 2001, p 240).  
1.1.3 Air Quality Constraints placed upon Heathrow Airport  
The Government’s Aviation White Paper (DfT, 2003 p. 122) demonstrates the importance of 
managing air quality, “compliance with air quality limits for nitrogen oxides will require a 
concerted effort by the airport operator and the aviation industry to identify ways of 
reducing emissions from aircraft, from other airport activity and from airport-related road 
traffic.”  Heathrow is in an Air Quality Management Area, designated by the London 
Borough of Hillingdon, to manage the levels of nitrogen oxides and particulate matter.  A 
particular challenge for Heathrow will be complying with the mandatory air quality limit 
values for nitrogen oxides that will apply from 2010. Cars in particular contribute a 
substantial amount to the levels and as such are a target area to reduce the airport’s impact 
on local air quality (BAA, 2004b).  The Government White Paper “The Future of Air 
Transport” (DfT, 2003) suggests that a higher proportion of journeys should be made by 
public transport and also stipulates that air quality issues need to be resolved before a third 
runway is considered.  
1.2 Current Strategies at Heathrow Airport  
Several wide ranging strategies are in place at Heathrow Airport to reduce the number of 
people travelling to the airport by car, some of which such as the Heathrow Express direct 
rail link to central London, have been cited by the Department for Transport as “good” 
developments (DfT, 2003).  A comprehensive car parking strategy is in place, the overall 
objective of which is, “to ensure that car parking facilities are used as efficiently as possible 
by passengers and employees who are not able to take advantage of public transport services 
or other alternatives to the car” (BAA, 2004b, p 15).  
It is recognised by BAA in their ‘Airport Surface Access Strategy’, however, that for many 
passengers, “there will never be a sensible alternative to car and taxi use and the whole 
question of public transport can be undermined by events far from Heathrow.” (BAA, 2003, 
p.9). To this end, use of the private car, taxi and hire car have remained fairly constant in 
terms of modal split for a number of years at approximately 36 percent, 25 percent and three 
percent respectively (BAA, 2003).  
BAA suggest in documents such as their 2004-07 Travel Plan (BAA, 2004b) and Airport 
Surface Access Strategy (BAA 2002a, BAA 2003) that focusing on reducing the number of 
employees commuting by car is the most suitable way of operating within the imposed 
constraints detailed in section 1.1 and have set a target to reduce employee car use by one 
percent per year starting in 2002/2003 (BAA, 2003).  BAA’s strategies also have some 
specific focus on the issue of employee car parking, “many car journeys are essential, 
however car parking at Heathrow is a scarce resource. Heathrow businesses need to find 
ways to reduce the demand for car parking.”  Table  
1.1 details the current measures used at Heathrow to encourage a reduction in employee car 
use.  These measures are underpinned by a comprehensive communications strategy to raise 
awareness of the initiatives.  
Table 1.1: Measures in place at Heathrow Airport to Reduce Employee Car Use  
Alternative Modes  
Bus and coach – extensive network coverage and free travel on site Train and tube – good links to central 
London Interest free loans – to assist with buying Travelcards and season tickets Airports Travelcard – 
unlimited travel on designated public transport services with discounts for airport employees Cycling – 
promotion and provision of facilities Motorcycle/Scooter – dedicated parking at priority locations Walking – 
accessible routes Car sharing – dedicated car share programme in place  
Flexible Working and Recruitment  
Homeworking and teleworking Business travel and video conferencing Recruitment strategy – focused on local 
people  
Source: BAA, 2004b  
Table 1.2 details the modal split for employees at Heathrow Airport and indicated the  
high proportion of employees accessing the airport by private car.  
Table 1.2: Heathrow Airport Modal Split for Employees  
 
Car (including car share) 85 85.7 82.3  
Car Share --7  
Sole Car --75.3  
Bus/Coach 5.3 3.9 8.8  
Underground 2 2.4 4.2  
Heathrow Express 0.1 0.2 0.7  
Other Rail -1.5 0.1  
 
Total Public Transport 7.6 8 13.8**  
Motorcycle/Scooter 4.7 3.9 2.7 Bicycle 2.2 1.6 0.6 Walk 0.5 ?* 0.5 Works’ Transport 0.1 ?* 0.1 Taxi -?* 0.1 
Aircraft -?* 0.1  
Total 100.1 100 100.1  
*  In 2002 these modes together represented 0.8%  
** The substantial increase in public transport use is likely to be due to a combination of factors: 
 
 - the sample in 2003 was far more representative than in previous surveys as it was larger and better 
spread across various job functions.  
 - previous surveys probably under-represented certain categories (e.g. security workers) because of the 
difficulties involved in obtaining self-completion responses from such employees.  This may have skewed 
results towards those who were more likely to use private car (e.g. office workers).  
 
Source: BAA, 2003 In addition to the measures to reduce employee car use, a “Clean 
Vehicles Programme” is in place at the airport to reduce the impact of airport ground 
transport through the use of cleaner and more fuel efficient vehicles.  Peripheral 
‘Consolidation Centres’ are also in place for suppliers to deliver goods to, reducing their 
congestion and pollution impact. (BAA, 2004b)   
BAA Heathrow also produces a comprehensive sustainability strategy and a range of 
associated documents, such as the “Sustainability Report 2003/04” (BAA, 2004c) and “Air 
Quality Strategy and Action Plan 2001 – 2006” (BAA, 2002b), which detail their work to 
meet sustainable development targets.  
Overall, while the current initiatives at the airport to reduce car use by employees can be 
seen to have some positive impact on modal split, they can also be considered to have 
achieved limited success, given that in 2003 75.3 percent of employees commuted in single 
occupancy cars.  All of the initiatives currently in place which are designed to encourage 
employees to use public transport services and alternative modes to the car can be regarded 
as “soft” measures and as such a more draconian measure could possibly be introduced in 
order to achieve greater levels of modal shift, thus relieving pressure on car parks and the 
surrounding road network and also reducing emissions.  Employee car parking in particular 
is highlighted as an area which needs to be addressed and its emotive nature is recognised, 
“employee car parking continues to be a challenging and sensitive issue.” (BAA, 2004b).  
1.3 The Problem facing Heathrow Airport  
The three factors of passenger growth, parking cap constraints and air quality targets at 
Heathrow mean that the airport needs to be more proactive in terms of encouraging people to 
travel by modes other than the private car.  This is supported by Government publications 
such as ‘The Future of Air Transport’ (DfT, 2003) and the ‘Terminal Five Public Enquiry 
Report’ (ODPM, 2001) which states that congestion is worst during the peak hours when 
employees are commuting.  
The research contained in this thesis shows that, at present, managers at BAA who are 
involved with surface access issues recognise the impending problems brought about by the 
three factors detailed in section 1.1 and believe more needs to be done than the current 
strategies detailed in section 1.2 in order to bring about a modal shift away from the single 
occupancy private car.  Overall there appears to be a lesser level of recognition of the 
problems by employees from across the whole airport site and a lesser level of urgency, in 
terms of identifying initiatives to help address the likely future problems related to surface 
access, by top level managers within BAA.    
The literature review and an investigation into current car parking issues at four other 
airports identifies that targeting employees in order to reduce the number of surface access 
journeys made by private car, and the subsequent pressure on car parking capacity it creates, 
would be the most suitable approach.  While airports have introduced a number of ‘soft’ 
measures to achieve modal shift amongst employees, few innovative or ‘hard’ initiatives are 
currently being utilised by the airport industry as a whole. Therefore Heathrow Airport 
appears to be at the forefront in terms of the need for airports to consider innovative 
employee car parking initiatives. Organisations in other industries, however, have made 
advances with employee car parking measures such as direct charging and financial 
incentives.  Via the use of a benchmarking methodology, best practice examples of such 
initiatives from organisations in the non-airport sector will be investigated to enable BAA to 
learn how it might address its car parking and surface access issues.  
1.4 Outline of the Thesis  
This section provides an overview of each chapter of the thesis.  
Chapter 2: A Review of the Literature on Airport Surface Access, Car Parking at 
Airports and Car Parking Strategies in the Non-Airport Sector. A literature review is 
used to collate the current published knowledge on the areas being studied. The literature 
review is split into three parts.  Firstly airport surface access is considered, providing an 
overview of the main issues facing airport planners. Following this, more specific literature 
in the area of car parking at airports is reviewed with focus on employee car parking.  
Thirdly, car parking issues and the strategies used to resolve them in the non-airport sector 
are then explored.  
Chapter 3: Employee Car Parking at Airports: A Scoping Study of the Current Issues. 
The current issues facing airports are explored in the form of findings from four airports: 
London Luton; Nottingham East Midlands; Birmingham, and; Amsterdam Schiphol.  This 
chapter draws on interviews with surface access managers, documentation and site visits and 
acts as a scoping study regarding surface access and employee car parking specifically.  
Chapter 4: The Concept and Methodology of Best Practice Benchmarking.  Best 
Practice Benchmarking is defined and explored in terms of the underlying principles and the 
various typologies that exist.  Its use in practice is examined in depth and the benchmarking 
process is detailed along with vignettes of Post Office Counters, Royal Mail, Nationwide 
Building Society and in the air cargo industry.  The limitations of the best practice 
benchmarking approach are also recognised.  Finally, the benchmarking process to be used 
in the research is presented.  
Chapter 5: Research Design and Method.  The methodological approach taken in the 
research is detailed and justified including the selection of the case study approach, the case 
study organisations and the data collection methods to be used. The practical use of 
benchmarking specific to the research is also explored.  
Chapter 6: Heathrow Airport Case Study. The chapter details the findings from in-depth 
interviews with BAA managers and focus groups comprised of Heathrow employees.  The 
employee car parking situation at Heathrow Airport is examined in detail from both a 
management and employee perspective as to the potential introduction of financial incentive 
and disincentive employee car parking measure. Key areas of importance are generated 
forming a template to be used when conducting the benchmarking comparison in Chapter 8.    
Chapter 7: Findings of Non-Airport Case Studies. The findings from three non-airport 
case studies are detailed. The background to the organisations is presented along with details 
as to how each car parking strategy works, its objectives, employee attitudes, the impact it 
has and issues surrounding acceptance and implementation.  
Chapter 8: Benchmarking BAA Against the Non-Airport Organisations: A Discussion.  
The findings from the Heathrow Airport case study and the non-airport case studies are 
compared and analysed in terms of the areas regarded as being important to BAA Heathrow 
and Heathrow Airport.  The comparison and analysis is grounded in the benchmarking 
methodology and follows a template developed in Chapter 6. The relationship between the 
findings and the literature review is also explored.  
Chapter 9: Conclusions.  The important issues surrounding how BAA Heathrow could 
address employee car parking problems at Heathrow Airport are reviewed based on the 
findings presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. The additions to knowledge made by the thesis are 
considered, as are its recognised limitations and areas for potential further research.  
Chapter 2: A Review of the Literature  
Chapter 2. A Review of the Literature on Airport Surface 
Access, Car Parking at Airports and Car Parking 
Strategies in the Non-Airport Sector  
2.0 Introduction  
Despite September 11
th
 2001, many international airports are operating close to capacity, a 
problem that is likely to become more acute given the projected long-term growth in air 
traffic of over four percent per annum (ACI Europe, 2005).  Terminal passengers at UK 
airports comprising both international and domestic travel are forecast to grow by between 
58 and 95 percent over the period 2005 to 2020 (DfT, 2005). This growth is likely to have 
major implications on runway, terminal and surface access capacity, infrastructure which is 
already experiencing constraints.  The issue of airport surface access is one which the UK 
Government has been keen to address in recent years, charging those airports with scheduled 
passenger services with leading Airport Transport Forums and producing an Airport Surface 
Access Strategy comprising targets and initiatives for increasing the percentage of surface 
access trips undertaken by the public transport (DETR, 1998).  
At medium and large airports, the number of employees who commute represents between 
one quarter and one half of the daily number of airline passengers (Kazda and Caves, 2000). 
Employees also account for two access trips to the airport each day, whereas most 
passengers will only make one access trip in a day.  For these reasons the employee surface 
access market is of the same order of magnitude as the passenger surface access market.  
Within the objectives of the Airport Transport Forums and Airport Surface Access Strategies 
mentioned above there are clear suggestions that airports should concentrate some efforts on 
commuting and business travel for all employees working there.  For these reasons, along 
with those detailed in section 1.1, the research presented in this thesis focuses upon the 
employee surface access market.  
This chapter reviews the literature in three areas:  
 Surface access to airports;  
 Car parking at airports;  
 Car parking strategies in the non-airport sector.  
 
The chapter is structured in these three parts, first focusing on the importance of surface 
access to airports and the nature of surface access traffic.  Specific focus is placed on the 
characteristics of employee surface access for the reasons detailed in Chapter 1. Secondly, 
the various aspects of car parking at airports are explored including the types and design of 
car parks, car park users, the importance of car park revenue generation for an airport and 
strategies in place to manage car parking demand at airports.  It is found that there is a dearth 
of literature in the airport sector as to how to reduce employee car parking demand and that 
much of the literature is somewhat dated.  As such, the third part of the chapter reviews 
literature from the non-airport sector in order to determine what strategies are being used in 
other sectors. Various parking policies are considered, along with an investigation of the 
problems of offering free parking to employees and the issues surrounding the 
implementation of a new parking instrument are also considered.  Finally, conclusions are 
drawn and gaps in the literature identified.  
PART 1: AIRPORT SURFACE ACCESS  
2.1 Introduction to the Problem of Airport Surface Access  
Airport capacity is dependent on a number of factors including air traffic control, runway 
and taxiway, terminal and apron and surface access.  Constraints in any of these areas has a 
serious impact on the efficient functioning of the airport.  Terminal passengers at UK 
airports comprising both international and domestic travel are forecast to grow by between 
58 and 95 percent over the period 2005 to 2020 (DfT, 2005). This growth is likely to have 
major implications on runway, terminal and surface access capacity, infrastructure which is 
already experiencing constraints to a greater or lesser extent.  
Surface access to the airport is a crucial part of the whole journey by air. Transportation time 
to the airport is one of the three most important factors affecting the choice of an airport by a 
passenger, the other two being the number of flights offered and the price of the flight ticket. 
It is not just passengers who use the surface access system however – employees, suppliers 
to the airport, meeters and greeters and other visitors also make use of it (Kazda and Caves, 
2000) and the relative importance of each group is considered in section 2.2.1.  
In many metropolitan areas, increasing concern over the impacts of traffic generated by 
airports on the surrounding street and highway systems, as well as the emissions created by 
the trips, is forcing airports to pay more attention to strategies to reduce or mitigate ground 
access traffic.  (Caves and Gosling, 1999)  
The problems surrounding surface access are just not a recent realisation, however.  In 1969 
a report by the Committee on Transportation to and from Airports of the Technical Council 
on Urban Transportation (1969, p. 115) stated, “Airport ground access has long been 
recognised as a major inconvenience of air travel, if not a potential market constraint.”  In 
the 1970’s it was realised that inadequate road capacity would limit airport capacity and the 
potential growth in air travel.  Los Angeles International Airport is a good example of this; 
projections made in 1967 concluded that access to the airport using existing freeways and 
streets was approximately 24 million passengers and that surface connections would have to 
be increased to enable additional capacity at the airport (Moore, 1976).  
Over time the emphasis of the surface access “problem” appears to have shifted. Research in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s appeared to focus on increasing speed and reducing access times 
(Wohl, 1969) while more recent work is focused on relieving congestion and reducing 
pollution.  
2.2 The Nature of Airport Surface Access Traffic  
2.2.1 The Airport Population and Surface Access Users  
Four categories of people who use the airport surface access system can be seen to exist, 
each of which has its own specific characteristics.  They are:  
 Originating and terminating passengers;  
 Employees;  
 Supply, delivery and other commercial vehicles, and;  
 
• Visitors to the airport. Transit and transfer passengers also exist and form part of the 
“airport population” but do not use the access system as they arrive at and depart the airport 
by air. (Humphreys, 1996, Ashford et al, 1997, Kazda and Caves, 2000, de Neufville and 
Odoni, 2003)  
Kazda and Caves (2000) state that at medium and large airports, the number of employees 
who commute to the airport represents between one quarter and one half of the daily number 
of airline passengers. They add that visitors to the airport, also referred to as “accompanying 
persons” or “meeters and greeters” account for five to ten percent of total journeys. The 
definition of what a “visitor” is can dramatically affect the importance of this category.  In a 
report by the Committee on Transportation to and from Airports of the Technical Council on 
Urban Transportation (1969), the category “visitors” includes groups such as sightseers, 
salesmen and service and repair personnel while de Neufville and Odoni (2003) do not 
consider the category “visitors” in their assessment of the surface access market at all. They 
state that the split between the other three categories in terms of total trips to the airport is at 
least 20 percent for each category.  This potentially leaves a further 40 percent unaccounted 
for. Ashford et al (1997) separate “senders and greeters” from visitors.  They also appear to 
discard suppliers as being less important although de Neufville and Odoni state that they 
generate a comparable number of trips to passengers and employees.  All of the varying 
accounts highlight that there can be considerable variations within each category attributable 
to local conditions and characteristics.  
Table 2.1: Proportion of Passengers, Employees, Visitors and Senders/Greeters at 
Selected Airports  
Table 2.1 details the split of the airport population for a number of international airports. 
Although dated, the figures highlight how the size of each category can vary widely between 
airports.  
Airport  Passengers  Senders and 
Greeters  
Employees  Visitors  
Frankfurt  0.60  0.06  0.29  0.05  
Vienna  0.51  0.22  0.19  0.08  
Paris  0.62  0.07  0.23  0.08  
Amsterdam  0.41  0.23  0.28  0.08  
Toronto  0.38  0.54  0.08  Not included  
Atlanta  0.39  0.26  0.09  0.26  
Los Angeles  0.42  0.46  0.12  Not included  
New York JFK  0.37  0.48  0.15  Not included  
Bogota  0.21  0.42  0.36  Negligible  
Mexico City  0.35  0.52  0.13  Negligible  
Curacao  0.25  0.64  0.08  0.03  
Tokyo  0.66  0.11  0.17  0.06  
Singapore  0.23  0.61  0.16  Negligible  
Melbourne  0.46  0.32  0.14  0.08  
U.S. Airports  0.33-0.56  - 0.11-0.16  0.31-0.42 
(includes senders 
and greeters)  
 
Source: Ashford et al (1997, p.413)  
The airport “population” differs to the number of “access trips” made to and from the 
airport. In a day, each passenger generally accounts for a trip to or from the airport whereas 
employees and visitors account for a trip to and from the airport.  Suppliers and visitors will 
also typically make a trip to and from the airport. As each employee, visitor or supplier 
accounts for two access trips, their importance in the access system is more pronounced than 
it is when looking at the airport population.  (Committee on Transportation to and from 
Airports of the Technical Council on Urban Transportation, 1969)  
The proportion of trips that each category of surface access user contributes to the total 
number of surface access trips depends on the local conditions present.  For example, the 
proportion of surface access trips made by passengers may be reduced at large airports 
where there are more transfer passengers and the proportion of surface access trips by 
employees may be greater when an airline maintenance or training base is located at an 
airport. (Humphreys, 1996, de Neufville and Odoni, 2003)  
Generally, as the usage of an airport increases, the rate of ground access vehicle trips 
decreases. Research carried out at airports in California highlights this and is shown in Table 
2.2. Airport usage can be defined as the number of passengers boarding aircraft or million 
annual passengers.  Further studies at other U.S. airports supports the trend that the largest 
airports generate the fewest vehicle trips per passenger, while the smallest generate the most 
vehicle trips per hour.  The figures in Table 2.2 only relate to passenger trips.  Extra trips are 
also generated by employees and the movement of goods.  At large cargo handling hubs, 
such as Los Angeles and San Francisco in the California study, an extra 40 percent of trips 
can be generated by these two categories.  (Higgins, 1994)  
Table 2.2: Million Annual Passengers and Passenger Vehicle Trips per Day at 
Californian Airports  
Airport  Million Annual Passengers  Passenger Vehicle Trips per Day  
Los Angeles  45.81  1.36  
San Francisco  30.39  1.10  
San Diego  11.10  2.11  
San Jose  7.13  1.82  
Oakland  5.51  1.81  
Ontario  5.42  1.70  
John Wayne  4.59  1.92  
Sacramento  3.63  1.86  
Burbank  3.49  2.10  
Fresno  0.89  2.70  
Santa Barbara  0.62  3.20  
Bakersfield  0.27  3.73  
 
Source: Adapted from Higgins (1994, p. 104)  
2.2.2 The Employee Surface Access Market  
Passengers are only part of the airport access problem and there is often a misplaced focus 
on this segment of the market.  This misplaced focus is often because of the large numbers 
of air passengers using the airport relative to the population of the urban area served by the 
airport.  At the same time the relative number of employees is low, typically less than 0.8 
workers per 1000 passengers (de Neufville and Odoni, 2003). This is shown in Table 2.3 
which relates to U.S. airports.  Table 2.3 also includes the average daily number of 
employees as a percentage of daily passengers. This column highlights the differences which 
exist at airports.  For example at San Diego the proportion of employees is low at 6.2 percent 
while at San Francisco/Oakland it is high at 41.6 percent. The majority of the airports lie 
within 12 and 30 percent range although this still gives scope for considerable variation.  
Table 2.3: Sample Data on the Number of Employees at U.S. Airports  
Airport  Average 
daily 
employees  
Employees/1000 
total annual 
passengers  
Average daily 
employees/Average daily 
passengers (%)  
Dallas/Fort Worth  48,000  0.80  29.2  
Chicago/O’Hare  40,000  0.57  20.8  
Los Angeles/International  40,000  0.65  23.7  
San Francisco/International  31,000  0.79  28.8  
Phoenix  23,700  0.76  27.7  
St. Louis/Lambert  19,000  0.66  24.1  
Denver/International  17,400  0.47  17.2  
Boston/Logan  14,500  0.57  20.8  
Houston/Bush  14,400  0.46  16.8  
Salt Lake City  13,000  0.65  23.7  
Seattle/Tacoma  11,400  0.44  16.1  
San Francisco/Oakland  10,500  1.14  41.6  
Tampa  8,200  0.59  21.5  
Las Vegas  7,500  0.37  13.5  
Portland (Oregon)  5,000  0.38  13.9  
San Francisco/San Jose  3,500  0.34  12.4  
San Diego  2,600  0.17  6.2  
Sacramento  2,300  0.32  11.7  
Median Value   0.57  20.8  
 
Source: Adapted from de Neufville and Odoni (2003, p.698)  
A different perspective is offered by Bonnet (1980) who suggests that the number of 
employees required at an airport is a function of the number of passengers using the airport 
and that as the number of passengers increases, the relative number of employees decreases.  
While this may be true for passenger terminal operations it does not consider that the 
number of employees also varies depending on the local conditions at the airport, for 
example as stated earlier if an airline has a maintenance base or there is a large cargo 
facility.  
Although the share of the airport population accounted for by employees is generally less 
than 30 percent of the number of passengers it is important to consider the frequency of 
travel when looking at the airport surface access market.  Each originating or terminating 
passenger only makes one surface access journey and the average number of journeys per 
passenger is usually less than one because people share car journeys to the airport.  For 
example, a family of four will travel to the airport together meaning that each of the 
passengers only accounts for 0.25 journeys. Employees, however, make at least one round 
trip every day which accounts for approximately 500 trips per employee per year.  The 
frequency of employee trips compensates for the low number and therefore makes it the 
same order of magnitude as passenger traffic. For example an airport with ten million 
passengers annually will have between seven and nine million passengers making trips to 
and from the airport because some passengers will be transferring and not making use of the 
surface access system.  This implies approximately 20,000 – 25,000 passenger trips to and 
from the airport each day.  If 5,000 people work at the airport every day, which is consistent 
with a ratio of about 0.5 employees per thousand passengers as shown in Table 2.3, then the 
number of employee trips accounts for 10,000 a day on average.  This highlights the 
importance of employee access journeys.  (de Neufville and Odoni, 2003)  
The importance of the employee in surface access terms is stated by Caves and Gosling 
(1999, p.161) in that, “Much of the local traffic generated by an airport is associated with the 
workers rather than the passengers…” but they also recognise that airports tend to focus on 
passengers where surface access is concerned, “…but the competitive nature of airports 
requires attention to the passengers’ quality of service.”  
2.3 Modal Choice of Surface Access Users  
For passengers, the following factors are considered to be the most important in determining 
the mode used to access the airport:  
 Convenience, including convenient terminating points at both ends of the journey;  
 Availability and relative attractiveness of the mode including issues such as safety 
and privacy;  
 Cost, although this is regarded to be a secondary concern to passengers by de 
Neufville and Odoni (2003);  
 Reliability of transport;  
 Comfort and quality of transport;  
 Distribution and distance of passenger origins and destinations. (Humphreys, 1996, 
Ashford et al., 1997, Kazda and Caves, 2000, de Neufville and Odoni, 2003)  
 
Speed is not regarded as a primary concern for passengers, particularly if they have to wait 
for a long time once at the airport, although the frequency and reliability of the access mode 
should be high.  (Bonnet, 1980)  
While the six factors listed above relate directly to passenger they are also relevant to other 
groups of surface access users although accompanying persons, employees and visitors will 
each rank the factors differently in terms of importance (Kazda and Caves, 2000). The 
choice of surface access mode is not so relevant to suppliers to the airport who will 
predominantly use cars, vans and lorries.  
Caves and Gosling (1999) consider that improvements in access may also be determined by 
airport size.  For medium sized airports, improvements will normally be in the form of 
contributing towards the costs of improvements in the local road network, while larger 
airports should aim for a progressive shift towards public transport.  
Table 2.4 details the modal split of passengers and employees at selected UK airports. The 
data suggest that the private car is the preferred mode of travel for both employees and 
passengers.  At the smaller and medium sized airports such as Bristol, Nottingham East 
Midlands and Norwich, the percentage of trips made by public transport modes is below five 
percent, a key reason for this being the lack of public transport alternatives available 
(Humphreys and Ison, 2005).  
Table 2.4: UK Airport Surface Access by Public Transport for Passengers and 
Employees  
Airport  Million  Passengers  Employees  
 Passengers per 
annum  
Car, Taxi 
and Hire Car 
(%)  
Rail and Bus 
(%)  
Car and Taxi 
(%)  
Rail and Bus 
(%)  
Heathrow  63,495,367  65.3  34.4  77  17  
Gatwick  30,005,262  67.5  32  84.5  11.3  
Manchester  19,699,256  79.9  20.1  87  8  
Stansted  18,722,112  66.2  33.8  96  2  
Birmingham  9,079,172  87  13  87  13  
London Luton  6,797,175  70  30  84  6  
Nottingham 
East Midlands  
4,258,965  98  2  93.8  3.5  
Newcastle  3,920,204  88.7  11.3  87.3  11.6  
Bristol  3,915,072  92  5  96  0  
Liverpool John 
Lennon  
3,177,009  95.2  4.5  77  9  
Leeds 
Bradford  
2,017,649  98  2  N/A  N/A  
London City  1,470,576  79  2  74  21  
Southampton  1,218,634  88.4  10.7  N/A  N/A  
Norwich  448,971  95  4  86  3  
 
Source: Humphreys and Ison, 2005  
2.3.1 Modal Choice of Employees as Surface Access Users  
From the employee perspective, the private car is the most convenient and flexible mode of 
access to an airport.  Higher modal splits in favour of the private car have been found for 
employees than for air passengers.  The main reason for this is because all employees start 
and finish their trips from their place of residence (Humphreys, 1996, Ashford et al., 1997).  
Research conducted at Paris airport cited three reasons why 80 percent of employees used 
private cars for their access journey.  The reasons were:  
 Most employees live in the suburbs where there is a lack of public transport links to 
the airport;  
 The dispersal of work locations on the airport site is often not closely related to the 
public transport terminus, making the mode inadequate for many employees;  
 Public transport does not serve many employees whose shift times fall outside the 
hours of public transport operation. (Bonnet, 1980)  
 
While now a little dated, the small amount of more up to date research may suggest that the 
reasons still hold true. Such findings are, however, mirrored by more recent research by 
Humphreys and Ison (2005) who state that a complex situation exists in terms of changing 
employee parking behaviour because of dispersed origins and destinations, shift patterns 
which are incompatible with public transport timetables and the fact that at some airports as 
few as seven percent of employees may work for the airport company itself, thus making it 
difficult for the airport to persuade workers of tenant companies to change their travel 
behaviour.  
As long as such circumstances exist, there is unlikely to be any significant reduction in the 
use of the private car by employees.  The research by Bonnet (1980), however, only focuses 
on public transport as an alternative to the private car.  It does not consider measures which 
may encourage a more efficient use of the car, such as car sharing, or initiatives such as 
home-working and teleworking.  The idea of staggering work schedules is briefly mentioned 
but without much foundation.  While altering work schedules may have the impact of 
relieving some road congestion it may also reduce the number of employees who make use 
of public transport, thus generating more road based traffic at other times.  
Price is considered to be a more important factor for employees than passengers as they 
make round trips every day (Bonnet, 1980) although de Neufville and Odoni (2003) state 
that price considerations tilt both passengers and employees to use the private car to access 
the airport.  This comment would, however, appear to some extent to contradict a statement 
by the authors that cost is generally a secondary concern for passengers.  
Considering other modes of access, Humphreys (1996) discusses the use of demand 
responsive transport, where buses vary their routes to accommodate passengers who request 
to use the service. Such a scheme could be adopted by employers who could either provide 
“in-house” demand responsive transport for their employees or promote existing schemes.  
This is similar to the concept of car sharing.  Ashford et al (1997, p.427) state “Rail links 
seldom attract large percentages of airport employees. Because of the size of airports, 
employees’ destinations on the airport can be a long way from the passenger terminal; also 
employees will not necessarily select a residential location that gives a good public transport 
link to the airport.”  The effectiveness of rail will be dependent on the size of the network 
and on the location of stations at either end of the journey. National rail is likely to be 
unsuitable for employees but local and regional rail networks, such as the London 
Underground at Heathrow or the Tyne and Wear Metro at Newcastle International Airport in 
the UK may be more suitable for employees as they serve a wider area including the suburbs 
and they link into other transport networks well.  The attractiveness of rail timetables and 
their relationship to shift patterns can also make them a viable or unviable option. Similar 
arguments can be applied to buses.  Their usage by employees will be largely dependent on 
the location of the bus terminal at the airport and the coverage of the network.  
2.4 Distribution of Airport Surface Access Traffic  
Ashford et al. (1997) state that the origins and destinations of the air traveller must be 
understood in order to address the problems of airport surface access.  As detailed earlier, 
however, employees account for similar trip levels to passengers and as such a clear 
understanding of their travel patterns must also be obtained.  
In general, flows of passengers, meeters and greeters, employees and commercial vehicles to 
and from the airport site are widely distributed and while the central business district (CBD) 
is the largest single generator of airport traffic it is still small compared to the total market, 
accounting for only one tenth of journeys (Humphreys, 1996, de Neufville and Odoni, 
2003).  
As such, part of the problem with solutions to surface access problems over the past 30 years 
is that they have failed to address the fact that with the exception of a few large metropolitan 
areas with dominant CBD’s, air travellers do not generally begin or end their journeys in the 
city centre.  The same is true, and to an even greater extent, for employees.  Employee and 
commercial traffic goes primarily to the edges of the city to areas that are less expensive for 
housing and industry, and that only exceptionally is it connected to the city centre.  (Ashford 
et al., 1997, de Neufville and Odoni, 2003)  
Also the research is now dated, some justification for concentrating surface access resources 
on the CBD to airport corridor can be seen in the argument that the people travelling from 
the CBD have to travel along a narrow, crowded and often congested corridor while people 
coming from other places are spread through less busy areas. Many passengers from the 
CBD are also business travellers, whose economic value is considered to be greater than that 
of a recreational passenger.  (Committee on Transportation to and from Airports of the 
Technical Council on Urban Transportation, 1969)  
A further issue raised is that airline schedules closely mirror urban commute peaks generated 
by the typical eight-hour working day.  Passengers and employees accessing the road 
network face delay through congestion while those using public transport may face difficulty 
in finding seats and handling baggage.  In many cases it appears that the timing of peaks can 
be coincident with shift changes of airport employees and heavy metropolitan commuter 
movements.  Larger airports suffer from this coincidence of peaks more than smaller airports 
which is understandable given the greater numbers of people accessing or departing the 
airport site and the greater number of commuters wishing to use the road network in larger 
cities.  As such, it is often the roads to the CBD which are most heavily affected.  
(Committee on Transportation to and from Airports of the Technical Council on Urban 
Transportation, 1969, Ashford et al., 1997)  
2.5 Air Transport Forums and Airport Surface Access Strategies at UK 
Airports  
In the UK, the issues surrounding surface access have been addressed by the government 
through the requirement for airports with over 1000 air transport movements per annum to 
establish an Airport Transport Forum containing representatives from the airport, transport 
operators, local businesses and authorities, airport employees, cyclists, walkers and the 
disabled as well as other stakeholder groups. The setting up of Airport Transport Forums 
were detailed by the Government in the White Paper on the Future of Transport ‘A New 
Deal For Transport: Better For Everyone’ (DETR, 1998) and are tasked with developing 
targets and a strategy for achieving a reduction in surface access trips by private car which 
are contained in an Airport Surface Access Strategy document.  In the Department for 
Transport’s guidance on Airport Transport Forums it states that the Forums should “draw up 
and agree challenging short and long term targets for decreasing the proportion of journeys 
to the airport made by the private car at the same time as increasing the share of journeys 
made by other modes.” (DETR, 1999).  The need to increase public transport usage for air 
passengers and airport employees has also been reiterated in the UK Government’s White 
Paper ‘The Future of Air Transport’ (DfT, 2003).  
Humphreys and Ison (2005) and Humphreys et al (2005) investigated the role of Airport 
Surface Access Strategies and consider that the UK government support the range of policy 
instruments for employees presented in Table 2.5.  The authors conclude that both short term 
measures and long term strategies revealed a prevalence of incentive-based measures overall 
for reducing employee car use such as subsidised public transport, rewards for car sharing 
and improved public transport services. Larger airports displayed a wider and more elaborate 
range of schemes, but overall there was a reluctance to use a market-based approach to deal 
with the surface access problem.  
While several airports currently concentrate on the promotion of public transport and 
alternative modes to the car via the use of incentives, there has not been a great deal of focus 
on implementing measures which directly reduce the number of employees commuting by 
private car. An important area in reducing the number of employees commuting by car is to 
focus on car parking and the measures shown in Table 2.5 such as parking cash out, car 
parking charges and parking restraint.  Part 2 of this chapter explores car parking at airports 
in more detail and investigates the current strategies in place to manage it.  
 
Table 2.5: Policy Instruments: Incentives and Disincentives for Dealing with Employee 
Surface Access to Airports  
Private Car  Parking cash out  Road user 
charging Car 
parking charges 
Parking restraint  
Public 
Transport  
Concessionary fares Rail investment schemes   
 Accessible light rail and bus-based rapid transit 
schemes  
 
 Reallocation of road space to buses, coaches, taxis and 
private hire vehicles Taxi sharing schemes Improved 
marketing and wider availability of real-time 
information about public transport travel options 
Accessible park and ride  
 
Other  Improved cycling facilities Improved quality and 
security of the waiting environment  
 
 
Source: Humphreys and Ison, 2005.  
Within this thesis road user charging is not explored as a measure to be introduced at 
Heathrow Airport, or airports in general, as it was considered more appropriate to focus on 
instruments aimed more directly at employee car parking.  The potential use of road user 
charging has however been mentioned by the Mayor of London and the Government in the 
context of Heathrow and BAA have recognised the possibility of such a scheme at the 
Heathrow site.  (BAA, 2002a, BAA, 2003, DfT, 2003).  
PART 2: THE ISSUES SURROUNDING CAR PARKING AT 
AIRPORTS  
2.6 Introduction  
The provision of car parking is an essential element of airport operations.  The convenience 
and flexibility of the private car means that it is the principal method of accessing airports, 
particularly in developed countries.  As a consequence, airports must incorporate a large 
parking capability into their design and operation (Ashford et al, 1997, Psaraki et al, 2002).  
Parking facilities can be a primary criterion for passengers when choosing between airports 
and investment in parking can draw passengers away from other regional airports (Windle 
and Dresner, 1995).  
This section explores the issues surrounding planning car parks at airports, including the 
different types of car parks used and the users of those car parks. The importance of car 
parking as a revenue generator for airports will be explored and strategies that can be used 
by airports to manage car parking will be discussed.  Within each section, passenger car 
parking is first explored, followed by employee car parking.  
2.7 Types of Car Park at Airports  
For passenger parking, large airports have until recently operated two types of car park – 
short-term and long-term.  Short term parking is usually located close to the terminal 
building while long term is further away or even on a remote site, requiring a longer walk or 
shuttle bus service to transport passengers to and from the terminal.  At UK airports, the use 
of a third type of car park, medium-term, is now increasingly common, due in part to large 
growth in the number of passengers travelling with “low cost” carriers. The price 
mechanism is usually enough to ensure that passengers use the most suitable car park 
(Ashford et al, 1997, Kazda and Caves, 2000, Fantoni et al, 2000). The level of service and 
convenience offered to people parking their cars when car parks are operated in close and 
remote locations justifies higher charges for short-term parking than long-term parking.  
Passengers are also often able to pre-book parking spaces, enabling them to select the most 
suitable car parking option before arriving at the airport (Moran, 2002). Matthews (2003) 
states that at UK regional airports, the parking charges levied vary according to location, 
costs, size of airport, competition from local car parks, transport alternatives, environmental 
considerations and capital expenditure.  At London Heathrow, space is so constrained in the 
“Central Terminal Area” that parking rates are approximately four times greater than those 
for long-term parking to discourage parking there (Matthews, 2000).  
The short-term car parking category is further dissected by de Neufville and Odoni (2003) 
who describe a short-term car park limiting parking to just a few hours, used mainly to pick 
up arriving passengers, and additional ‘structured parking’ close to passenger buildings to 
serve persons on short trips or business travellers who can afford the more expensive 
facility.  
Some parking is also provided along the curb for dropping off and picking up passengers. 
Curb space is based on the principle that vehicles will only stop here for a few minutes and 
is used mainly by friends and relatives delivering or picking up passengers, car park and 
hotel shuttle buses and taxis (de Neufville, 1982).  
Additionally, space needs to be allocated for rental car parking which can sometimes be 
close to the passenger terminal building or at larger airports in a remote location served by 
shuttle buses (Kazda and Caves, 2000).  
Segregation between different car park types was not used until the mid 1960’s when the 
major US airports began to introduce such systems as space for parking close to the terminal 
became constrained.  Among the first airports to introduce different types of car park was 
Love Field at Dallas where parking types were split over different levels of a multi-storey 
car park and separate employee parking was introduced. Other airports among the first to 
introduce new parking strategies were O’Hare at Chicago, Friendship at Baltimore, Los 
Angeles International and San Francisco International (Lawler, 1964).  
In 1994, Manchester Airport used three types of car parking to accommodate the total peak 
demand – short/medium-stay, long-stay and staff.  The length of stay for car park users 
varied from approximately 30 minutes to a fortnight and longer.  Short and medium term 
parking was catered for on the airport site, as well as staff parking and some long-stay 
parking.  The long-term parking which could not be accommodated on the airport site was 
connected to the airport by shuttle buses and maximum walking distances from any parking 
space to a bus collection point was set at 80 metres.  (Heather and Edge, 1994)  
In 2003, Amsterdam Schiphol Airport had 16,000 passenger parking spaces, 6,000 of which 
were for short-term parking and located close to the terminal building and 10,000 long-stay 
places which were in more remote locations and required the use of shuttle buses to reach 
the terminal.  There were also “luxury” parking facilities available for paying members and a 
valet service.  9,000 employee parking spaces were available for the 38,000 strong 
workforce.  3,000 of these were located close to the terminal building and the other 6,000 
were located remotely and used a shuttle bus to access the terminal.  (BEST, 2003)  
2.8 Car Park Users at Airports  
As mentioned in section 2.7, the price mechanism is used to ensure passengers use the most 
appropriate car park. Hsu and Lin (1997) add that the total parking cost plays a major role in 
the choice of car park for travellers to the airport.  As well as price, value of time can be an 
important factor in determining the selection of a car park by the traveller. For example, 
business travellers are likely to have higher time values than leisure passengers and this may 
impact on the choice of remote or central terminal parking (Hsu and Lin, 1995).  Leisure 
passengers also travel for longer periods of time than business passengers.  This pattern 
increases demand for long stay parking and the overall parking need (Robertson, 1995).  
A market also exists for “premium public parking spaces”, defined by Fantoni et al (2000, 
p.1) as “innovative parking methods that offer extra convenience for fee-paying customers”.  
Premium parking includes services such as valet, reserved and business parking.  This 
additional customer service can generate additional profits.  It can also have the effect of 
encouraging passengers to park at the airport for the duration of their trip rather than being 
dropped off and picked up, thus reducing the degree of airport congestion (Fantoni et al, 
2000).  
Much of the literature relating to parking at airports focuses on passengers and does not 
consider the importance of employees  (Stafford, 1966, Robertson, 1995). Stafford (1966, p. 
132) states, “Because separate parking areas are normally provided for employees and 
special vehicles (taxis, rental cars etc), the public parking for passengers, companions and 
visitors is of primary concern.”  As detailed in section 2.2.2, however, employees account 
for a large proportion of the airport population and have a substantial impact on surface 
access and car parking (Kazda and Caves, 2000).  
Older research states that while the general practice is to provide separate parking facilities 
for employees, a total analysis of airport parking should include employee patterns. 
Employees’ arrival and departure times depend on shift changes and their parking duration is 
usually between eight and twelve hours.  The main exception to this is aircraft crews who 
may park for longer if they are not returning to the same airport within the same shift.  The 
accumulation of staff parking varies with the number of employees per shift and also 
changes in employee numbers due to weekly and seasonal fluctuations (Homburger and 
Eager, 1964).  
2.9 Planning and Design of Car Parks at Airports  
2.9.1 Passenger Car Park Design at Airports  
The design of parking facilities has traditionally focused on the issue of quantity and simply 
providing enough capacity to meet demand.  A lack of adequate parking capacity can result 
in periods where airport roadways and terminal curbs are congested, thus reducing the level 
of service offered by the airport.  Provision of excessive parking capacity, however, means 
that resources are wasted.  For passengers, the most critical elements in planning parking 
facilities at airports are regarded as being forecasting the number of spaces required and 
achieving a balance between short and long-term parking (Palmer, 1996, Psaraki et al, 
2002).  Where two or more airports are directly competing or where an airport is competing 
against another mode of transport, the quality of service in terms of car parking could give 
one airport a competitive advantage, particularly in the short haul market (Psarki et al, 
2000).  
The quality of service issue has been discussed since the 1960’s when it became apparent 
that airports were not able to meet all of the demand for parking with car parks in the 
immediate vicinity of the terminal buildings and hence multi-storey car parks and remote car 
parks are common at large airports.  Along with the design of the car park itself, 
consideration should be given to how to transport passengers from the car park to the 
terminal, particularly when parkers have luggage and when weather conditions are poor. 
(Lawler, 1964, Stafford, 1966, FHA and FAA, 1995).  A potential danger of remote long-
term car parks is that there may be an abundance of shuttle vehicles travelling between the 
car park and the terminal which can cause internal circulation problems.  This type of 
situation needs to be monitored and managed to check that vehicles are not operating with 
very few or no passengers, or conversely if larger vehicles are needed because the current 
ones cannot cope with the demand (Ashford et al, 1997).  
Airport car parks need to be able to cope with peaks in demand.  Peak vehicle parking 
periods occur during July, August and September at most airports which corresponds with 
the peak in the number of flights attributable to summer holidays.  “Average” parking 
months are May and October.  For airports in the UK a general trend is that the smaller the 
airport, in terms of the number of passengers, the larger the ratio between the maximum and 
the average numbers of cars parked per month (Robertson, 1995).  
Worldwide surveys have indicated that major airports typically provide between 200 and 
1200 parking spaces per million total passengers a year, with the largest U.S. airports 
providing between 200 and 1700 spaces (Robertson, 1995, de Neufville and Odoni, 2003). 
Table 2.6 shows on-airport parking provision for passengers at UK airports in 1993. While a 
little dated, the figures serve to highlight that the relationship between the number of 
passengers and the number of parking spaces provided is not simple.  Some of the figures in 
the table can be explained by local conditions specific to the airport. For example, the 
location of some airports such as Luton, Nottingham East Midlands and Bristol, which have 
a greater number of parking spaces per million annual passengers than larger airports such as 
Heathrow, Gatwick and Manchester, may do so because there is a lack of good public 
transport alternatives and so more parking is provided.  Stansted was designed for greater 
passenger numbers than those that had been attracted by 1993 when the survey was 
undertaken and hence it has a large number of parking spaces per million passengers per 
annum.  For many of the airports, however, there are no simple explanations and there are 
several factors which could influence parking provision including the number of transfer 
passengers, the mix of passenger type, the average length of trip and the quality of public 
transport links (Robertson, 1995).  The column in the table detailing the number of spaces 
per million passenger spaces per annum varies from approximately 450 up to 4000, which 
suggests that no relationship exists between the number of passengers and the number of 
parking spaces required.  While these figures may give some indication of the number of 
spaces required, the range of findings from the surveys is so wide that they can only be of 
limited use when trying to plan accurately for car parking.  
The data in Table 2.6 only shows on-airport parking and so does not reveal the full picture of 
airport parking, as some airports have a large amount of parking outside their boundaries. 
Examples of this type of parking are purpose built commercial car parks, which offer lower 
charges than the on-airport parking and hotel car parks, which offer guests free parking.  
Such car parks will usually be connected to the airport with shuttle buses (Robertson, 1995).  
Management of these car parks is often difficult because they are beyond the control of the 
airport and they can also impact on the rates which airports charge for their own spaces 
(Matthews, 2003).  
Table 2.6: On-Airport Passenger Parking Provision for UK Airports  
Airport  1993 Passengers 
(million passengers 
per annum)  
On-airport parking 
spaces  
Parking spaces per 
million passengers per 
annum  
Heathrow  47.60  24,600  517  
Gatwick  20.54  22,050  1074  
Manchester  12.83  12,150  947  
Glasgow  5.01  2,476  494  
Birmingham  4.03  6,950  1725  
Edinburgh  2.71  3,108  1147  
Stansted  2.67  9,588  3591  
Belfast  2.18  3,585  1645  
Aberdeen  2.29  1,065  465  
Newcastle  2.08  3,501  1683  
Luton  1.84  5,300  2880  
East Midlands  1.37  3,500  2555  
Bristol  1.11  4,350  3919  
 
Source: Adapted from Robertson, 1995  
The total parking requirement and the split between short and long-term parking also varies 
depending on the characteristics of the traffic and the local conditions at the airport such as 
the split of long and short haul flights, the passenger mix, levels of car ownership, the road 
access system, the public transport supply, the stage of development of the airport, the extent 
of off-airport parking and parking charges (Robertson, 1995, Kazda and Caves, 2000, 
Psaraki et al, 2002).  The changing nature of people’s travel habits also impacts on this split 
with more people now taking advantage of low cost airlines and undertaking more short 
breaks per year (Matthews, 2003). Research from a range of airports around the world shows 
that between 70 and 80 percent of vehicles park for less than three hours.  It is long-term 
parking, however that dominates the demand for space.  Short-term users can be served by 
10-30 percent of the spaces for public parking but long-term users, accounting for 
approximately 25 percent of all parkers may require up to 90 percent (Psaraki et al, 2002).  
The planning of airport car parking requirements is further confused by factors such as 
growing car ownership and demand for air travel.  There are also other factors to consider 
such as the growth in airport conference facilities which generates more traffic and hence a 
greater demand for parking.  Airports have also been seen to become increasingly popular as 
retail and leisure facilities with some airports, such as London Gatwick, becoming shopping 
destinations in their own right (Robertson, 1995). In addition, some large airports have 
become major transport interchanges in their own right for modes other than air travel; 
Heathrow Airport has the UK’s busiest bus and coach hub (BAA, 2002a) and Amsterdam 
Schiphol has the sixth busiest rail station in The Netherlands and one which is developing 
quickly (Hatch, 2004).  
2.9.2 Employee Car Park Design at Airports  
In addition to passengers, space needs to be allocated for employee car parking with 250-500 
spaces per thousand employees usually provided (de Neufville and Odoni, 2003). Some 
literature considers that a large amount of employee parking will be dispersed around the 
edge of the airport close to the facilities where people are employed.  Spaces are also 
required closer to terminal buildings for employees who work there.  Parking for employees 
may sometimes be in more remote locations with bus links (de Neufville and Odoni, 2003).  
One reason for this is that the land near the terminal can be used more profitably for 
passenger parking.  The issue of parking is not so great for suppliers to the airport who will 
typically be dropping off goods.  
With the exception of the basic model discussed by de Neufville and Odoni (2003), little has 
been written about the planning and design of car parks for employees. Robertson (1995) 
recognises that staff have high parking requirements largely due to shift working and that 
staff parking is related broadly to airport size and passenger throughput. Staff parking 
provision generally ranges from 25-45 percent of the number of airport employees, which 
correlates to de Neufville and Odoni’s model of 250-500 spaces per 1,000 employees, 
although there can be exceptions to this.  For example, surveys carried out in the mid 
nineties showed that only three percent of parking at Glasgow airport was for staff 
(Robertson, 1995).  
2.10 Airport Car Park Revenue Generation  
The revenues generated from public car parking facilities are an important source of income 
for an airport and have been reported to be in the region of one-fifth of total revenue at the 
largest airports (Russell and O’Flaherty, 1969c, Ashford et al, 1997, Maise, 1997). In 
America, parking revenues at the biggest airports can be similar to those generated by 
landing fees.  As airports increase in size the relative importance of the contribution of the 
parking revenues to overall revenue also increases (Ashford et al, 1997). This means that 
airport operators have to find a balance between car parking as a commercial venture while 
trying to control or reduce surface access congestion.  
Airport revenue is usually classified into two main categories: aeronautical and non-
aeronautical and is also referred to as aviation and commercial.  Revenues generated from 
car parking form part of an airports non-aeronautical revenue if the car parks are operated by 
the airport operator. Non-aeronautical revenues account for approximately 40 to 50 percent 
of total revenues at European airports.  Larger airports tend to be more suited to providing a 
range of commercial services than smaller airports and so often have a greater reliance on 
non-aeronautical revenues. Worldwide surveys conducted by ICAO found that on average 
airports with more than 25 million passengers per annum generated 58 percent of their 
revenue from non-aeronautical activities compared with the sample average of 36 percent 
(Graham, 2001). Recent directives introduced by the European Commission, which are 
targeted at opening up competition in the aeronautical side of the airport industry, have 
meant that non-aeronautical revenues have become increasingly important and the abolition 
of duty free sales for travel between countries in the European Union in 1999 has meant that 
parking revenues as a proportion of non-aeronautical revenues have increased in significance 
(Lutzel, 1997). After the abolition of duty free, car parking became the second most 
important retail revenue stream at BAA’s UK airports where previously it had been the 
fourth most important.  Retail outlets in the airports were the most important revenue stream 
on the non-aeronautical side (Dark, 2001).  
US airports generate far greater revenues from car parking than European airports. 
Approximately 38 percent of non-aeronautical revenue at US airports is from parking while 
European airports generate about 14 percent from parking.  In 2000, BAA generated £105 
million through car parking revenues, approximately 15 percent of total retail revenue made 
by the company (Dark, 2001).  European airports generate greater revenues from retail and 
real estate than US airports do however.  Table 2.7  
shows the parking revenue accounted for by car parking at US and Canadian airports. Small 
and medium hub airports generate a greater percentage of revenues from car parking than 
large hubs or non-hub airports in the US. This is because of the management of car parking 
at US airports.  Approximately 85 percent of airports in the US with scheduled services 
contract out parking to other firms.  Smaller airports which operate their car parking under a 
concession agreement pay on a sliding scale and so make more from car parking on a 
relative basis.  Larger airports have a management agreement whereby they pay costs and a 
management fee or percentage (Canaday, 1999). It is also likely that larger airports will 
make more money from retail and other commercial ventures, thus reducing the impact of 
car parking overall.  
 
US Non-hubs  15%  
US Medium-hubs  25%  
US Large-hubs  15%  
US Small-hubs  24%  
Canadian Airports  11%  
Source: Canaday (1999)  
 
 
An interesting point is raised by Kazda and Caves (2000) who state that constructing multi-
level car parks in the vicinity of terminal buildings is costly and takes up space that could be 
better used for commercial purposes.  This has to be contrasted with the fact that parking 
generates substantial revenues and highlights the issue that parking policy is not just about 
coping with current and predicted levels of traffic but also includes considerations about the 
most efficient, economical and profitable use of land at the airport, particularly land in prime 
locations such as that close to the terminal.  That such competition exists between profitable 
passenger parking and other forms of development would suggest that airports who allow 
employees to park in the vicinity of the passenger buildings are losing out on substantial 
revenues.  
Interviews with surface access managers in the UK found that for employees, almost all 
employers paid parking charges for their employees and also absorbed any price increases 
rather than passing them onto the employees (Humphreys and Ison, 2005). Research on car 
parking at London’s Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted airports, all of which are operated by 
BAA, found that BAA Heathrow imposed a levy on staff parking of £400-1000 per annum 
depending on location but that most employers bore the cost rather than passing it onto 
employees.  At Gatwick, employers using BAA managed car parks paid £192 per pass per 
annum and at Stansted there was no levy on employee car parking (Matthews, 2000).  
2.11 Strategies to Manage Car Parking at Airports  
“Parking programmes are aimed at providing as much parking as possible, as close as 
possible, to the terminal building” (Lawler, 1964 p. 69).  This view from 1964 is probably 
the ideal situation from the airports perspective as it allows the highest level of service and 
convenience to be offered to both passengers and employees.  The growth in air transport 
following the publication of the paper and the predicted future growth, however, means that 
providing car parking is now much more complicated that providing as much as possible, as 
close as possible.  This section sets out a number of ways in which parking can be managed 
by airports.  
There is a wide range of instruments that can be used to manage car parking.  Many of these 
are associated with using the current facilities more efficiently or making modifications to 
them.  Other strategies may use measures which can be classified as “incentives” and 
“disincentives”.  Such measures may encourage people to use their cars more efficiently or 
indeed use alternative modes of transport, thus reducing the demand for car parks which are 
at or over capacity.  Incentives would be the encouraging factor and could involve some 
kind of financial incentive while disincentives would discourage people from parking, for 
example by increasing parking charges or not permitting certain groups to park.  
The main options for improving airport parking conditions using measures which use 
existing facilities more efficiently or improve capacity include:  
 Space reallocation to match parking demand;  
 Modifications to parking operations or rates;  
 Redesign and/or construction of facilities to improve capacity.  
(FHA and FAA, 1995)  
 
 
Sometimes an airport will have enough total spaces but too many are allocated to one user 
group, such as passengers, employees or rental cars, and not enough to another. In such 
situations it may be necessary to reallocate parking from one use to another. Different 
parking durations such as long-term and short-term could also be reallocated, as could 
different levels of service such as self-park or valet parking (FHA and FAA, 1995).  
The pricing mechanism can be used by airports to manage the demand for parking. Charging 
more to park in short term car parks as opposed to long-term car parks has been discussed in 
section 2.7. The effects of parking cost on parking demand can also vary with passenger 
type.  Business passengers are to a large extent insensitive to the cost of parking, while non-
business passengers are more sensitive (Psaraki et al, 2000). This suggests that airports could 
use the pricing mechanism to target specific groups of passengers with the aim of reducing 
car parking demand.  For this to work, however, there must be satisfactory alternatives to the 
private car available.  
Off airport parking is a solution which many airports use to add extra capacity.  The 
consolidation of car rental facilities away from the terminal is also seen as a way of 
expanding the landside capacity of the airport (Caves and Gosling, 1999).  Off airport 
parking is sometimes seen by some drivers to be “second best” because it is further away 
from the terminal.  This can often cause extra circulating traffic on the surface access system 
as drivers first drive close to the terminal to search for parking before going to off airport 
facilities.  However, off airport parking can also reduce vehicle trips to the airport if people 
drive there directly.  Off airport parking can result in lost revenues for the airport so from the 
airport’s perspective the most suitable forms of off airport parking are long-term public 
parking with regular transportation to the terminal  (FHA and FAA, 1995).  
Airport parking is currently most likely to be constrained by planning regulations.  In the 
UK, Government Policy contains measures which could potentially reduce demand for 
airport parking and restrict new parking provision at or around airports. Government 
Planning Policy Guidance Note PPG13 on Transport calls for reduced parking requirements 
for new development in locations with good access via modes other than the private car and 
for parking requirements in general to be kept to the operational minimum (Robertson, 1995, 
DETR, 2001a).  This is the case at London Heathrow Airport where the Inspectors Report 
following a Public Inquiry into the development for a new fifth terminal constrained the 
number of parking spaces that could be developed. The report included limits for both 
airport employees and for passengers (DETR, 2001b).  
2.11.1 Strategies to Manage Employee Car Parking at Airports  
Airports regard employees as an easier group to target with strategies designed to reduce car 
use and parking because they have more information on them, their travel patterns are 
known and they do not have the inconvenience of luggage which passengers do. Airports 
may also be reluctant to dissuade passengers from travelling by car because of the revenues 
generated from passenger car parking and because it would lower the quality of service 
offered by the airport possibly giving advantage to a competing airport.  (de Neufville and 
Odoni, 2003).    
Car parking policy where employees are concerned is, however, still recognised as a 
sensitive issue for airport managers, most notably in terms of raising charges or removing 
spaces (Humphreys and Ison, 2005).  Generally, however, almost all employers, at UK 
airports at least, do not pass parking charges onto their employees. This results in employees 
not appreciating the cost of driving to work and hence not altering their travel behaviour.  
Off airport parking may be suitable for employees who are unable to park near to the 
terminal or their place of work.  Research suggests that employees more readily accept 
remote parking because the uncertainty of shuttle bus schedules from the car park to the 
airport is less critical for them than passengers and because they do not have the hassle of 
luggage or the anxiety of making their flight (FHA and FAA, 1995). While it may be true 
that employees do not have luggage to transport, the other reasons must be questioned.  For 
many, particularly those working shifts or aircraft crew, the certainty of arriving at the 
airport on time is critical and their employment may depend on it, hence anxiety levels could 
also be high and staff need to be confident in the shuttle buses.  
One example of a more innovative approach exists at Amsterdam Schiphol airport where the 
main employer KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines) introduced an employee car parking scheme.  
KLM is the dominant employer at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam, employing 25,000 staff, 
half of whom work in the central terminal area.  Rapid growth in airport activity in the mid 
to late 1990’s created serious parking problems and KLM introduced a charge for employee 
parking.  Prior to the scheme’s introduction in 1995 a free parking place had been 
guaranteed for every employee.  In 1995 each employee received a one-time salary increase 
equivalent to approximately 20 Euros a month, which was equivalent to the amount the 
KLM had paid Schiphol Airport each month for employee parking passes, and was required 
to pay for their own parking. This had no impact on single occupancy vehicle drivers but 
staff who used other modes of transport or car shared with other employees made financial 
savings as they did not have to pay to park but still received the 20 Euros monthly salary 
increase. The scheme was also expected to have a greater impact in the future as parking 
rates were gradually increased, further benefiting those who used alternative modes. 
Coupled with the parking charges were improvements to other modes of transport, most 
significantly cycling, where a new bicycle campaign was introduced, and the provision of a 
“limited use” parking pass which could be used in the event of bad weather or personal 
reasons for commuters committed to cycling. The main advantage for Schiphol was that by 
implementing the programme, more spaces were available in the summer when passenger 
demand was greater (Schreffler and de Vreede, 2000).  
2.12 Reflections on the Airport Surface Access and Airport Car Parking 
Literature  
The majority of research carried out in the field of airport surface access and airport car 
parking has tended to focus on passengers rather than employees.  Where employee parking 
is mentioned, or indeed other parking types such as rental car parking, they are often 
considered to be of secondary importance.  The relative importance of employees as surface 
access users must not be understated however. Employees have been shown to have high 
levels of private car use and are frequent travellers, particularly at peak times, creating a 
demand for surface access and car parking capacity that is of the same order of magnitude as 
passenger demand.  
The central role of the surface access system to overall airport capacity and the predicted 
growth in air travel for the foreseeable future means that surface access and car parking 
issues need to be addressed if airports are to continue expanding.  That the UK Government 
charge airports over a certain size with the formation of an Airport Transport Forum and 
Airport Surface Access Strategy demonstrates that they perceive there to be issues regarding 
surface access which need to be addressed.  
As commercial organisations, airports generate large revenues through passenger parking 
and need to offer a high level of service to passengers to help achieve a competitive edge 
over rivals.  Airports are likely, therefore, to be more willing to focus on employees with car 
reduction strategies because they are an easier group to target in terms of the information 
airports have on their staff, their known and recurring travel patterns and because they can 
be communicated with more easily than passengers.  
The literature shows that airports already use a range of measures to manage employee 
surface access and car parking including the promotion of various public transport and 
alternative mode initiatives, separating employee parking from passenger parking and often 
placing it in more remote locations and charging employers for car parking permits.  From 
the literature, however, there does not appear to be a great number of initiatives in place to 
more actively and directly discourage employees from using their cars to access the airport, 
for example through the use of car parking charges or financial incentives not to drive.  If 
airports are to continue expanding, while at the same time conforming to air quality targets 
as set out by local Government and European Union Directives and constraints on parking 
provision as contained within Planning Policy Guidance’s such as PPG13 then it is likely 
they will need to begin considering ways of reducing the demand for employee car parking.  
The dearth of literature and experience in the airport sector suggests that knowledge should 
to be sought from other sectors, as explored in part 3 of this chapter.  
PART 3: STRATEGIES USED TO MANAGE CAR PARKING IN THE 
NON-AIRPORT SECTOR  
2.13 Car Parking Strategies in the Non-Airport Sector  
Car parking in the urban sector is an area which has received a large amount of academic 
attention.  A great deal of the research focuses on commuters, in particular the congestion 
problems that arise during rush hour and the parking strategies available to help address car 
parking issues.  The most serious traffic-related issue in urban areas of the UK are perceived 
to be morning and evening peak period congestion. As this is the time when commuters are 
using the road and adding to congestion, then successful strategies targeted at reducing the 
number of commuters who park at work, particularly solo drivers will significantly reduce 
this problem (Ison and Wall, 2003). In the UK, administrative traffic control measures, and 
in particular parking policies, have occupied a central place in transportation plans since the 
publication of the Buchanan report in 1963 (Gwilliam and Mackie, 1975).  Local authorities 
are encouraged to seek a balanced approach to implementing parking policies, which 
recognises the legitimate need for parking but sets it against the negative effects of more 
traffic (Palmer, 1996).  
This section of the literature review will explore the strategies available to manage car 
parking and attempt to address the issue of whether car parking measures are an effective 
way of tackling traffic issues and their level of effectiveness.  The issues associated with 
offering free parking to employees are also explored and the issues surrounding the 
implementation of car parking measures will be discussed with relevant examples provided.  
2.14 Types of Parking Policy  
In general, two types of parking policy exist – economic and regulatory policy instruments.  
Parking charges are an economic policy instrument and are used to ration the demand for 
parking spaces.  Parking controls are a regulatory instrument and include things such as 
physical limits on the number of parking spaces available, bans on parking during certain 
time periods and land use planning controls which restrict the number of places.  A further 
regulatory control is that of enforcing parking measures.  Enforcement also applies to 
parking charges as well as the adherence to limits. (Feeney, 1989, Acutt and Dodgson, 1997, 
Ison and Wall, 2000)  
2.14.1 Parking Pricing  
In relation to traffic congestion in urban centres, it is acknowledged among transportation 
planners that pricing policies are needed to cope with the problem. Expansion of the road 
network in such areas would be both extremely expensive and would encounter large public 
opposition. Also, efforts to get people who commute by car to switch to public transport or 
car share have only achieved partial success (Arnott et al, 1991).  
To address the problems associated with parking it is important to look briefly at the 
economics behind charging for parking.  In the first instance a parking pricing policy is 
needed to allocate existing spaces efficiently in the short run and to provide guidelines for 
investment in the future.  However, parking prices can be raised above this level with the 
aim of deterring traffic beyond the optimum parking space allocation level. The fee structure 
typically favours modes other than drive-alone, long-term parking and off-peak usage.  
There is a possibility that an optimal flow will result but a more likely outcome is a decrease 
in the use of car parks.  While this may at first seem to have the desired effect, one drawback 
is that because only stopping traffic is subject to a parking charge, there may be an increase 
in the amount of through traffic which is able to exploit the less congested street at no 
additional cost (OECD, 1994, Button, 1993). Button and Verhoef (1998) suggest that the 
congestionreducing impact of increasing parking charges has been mixed when put into 
practice, mainly because the peak hour commuters who contribute the most to road 
congestion are able to park at work for free.  
Parking charges are regarded as being a “first-best” solution for dealing with the issue of 
efficiently allocating a scarce number of spaces (Verhoef et al, 1995).  However, they and 
other parking instruments are often seen as a “second-best” measure in solving the problems 
created by excessive road traffic.  Road pricing is seen as the first-best solution because it is 
able to differentiate between lengths of trips and routes followed, whereas parking policies 
can only influence the number of trips.  Parking pricing is likely to be relatively insensitive 
to actual congestion levels as it is acting as a complement to road use rather than road use 
itself.  Parking charges can also have distributional consequences, particularly on those 
making shorter journeys because the parking charge makes up a larger proportion of their 
trip (Button, 1993).  Parking policies are unable to contain external costs such as air 
pollution, noise annoyance and issues of safety. The scope for useful regulatory parking 
policies is considered to be limited to containing congestion on urban road networks 
(Verhoef et al, 1995).  In many cases, the main aim may be to simply influence the number 
of trips and contain some of the congestion on the road network.  
The OECD (1994) state that parking pricing as an economic measure is a “significant 
application” for the urban environment, during peak times and is also useful for special 
events.  It is seen to have “some application” in the off-peak market.  In terms of the 
potential impact of parking pricing, it has a “significant impact” on promoting public 
transport and car sharing, shifting travel during the peak hour and shifting trips away from 
congested locations.  It has “some impact” on reducing the need to make trips, reducing the 
length of trips, promoting non-motorised transport and reducing traffic and traveller delays.  
Parking charges are relatively straightforward to collect although there are costs of doing so. 
The optimal system will depend on the balance between resources employed and penalties 
for non-payment (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997).  
2.14.2 Regulatory Parking Policies  
It is possible to manage car parking by restricting the number of spaces available. Parking 
charges and physical restriction on spaces are not mutually exclusive however, and usually 
complement each other. They are also interconnected with the enforcement of charges and 
regulations (Verhoef et al, 1995, Ison and Wall, 2000). The use of parking charges means 
that restrictions on the number of spaces supplied can be made.  Also, if parking restrictions 
are imposed then it is likely that a chaotic situation will emerge unless there is an associated 
pricing policy (Verhoef et al, 1995).  
Better enforcement can also be applied to existing parking situations without the need to 
alter the supply or price of parking spaces to make more effective use of the existing 
mechanisms.  Enforcement can be directed at either the driver so that rules and regulations 
are obeyed, or the supplier to ensure that the supply of parking remains within the set limits 
and is used in the way intended.  Over time, planning permissions could be enforced more 
rigorously and new legislation could be introduced although it is expected to take a very 
long period of time before any substantial reductions in traffic congestion are witnessed 
(Gwilliam and Mackie, 1975, Coombe et al, 1997a).  
There are a number of potential drawbacks with regulatory parking instruments. Parking 
restraint primarily affects terminal traffic and so there is a danger that it makes it easier for 
road space to be occupied by through traffic which can be inefficient and inequitable.  In 
large conurbations there may be so much uncontrolled private off-street parking that the 
impact of any parking policy would be greatly reduced. Parking policies are also not suited 
to dealing with specific routes which may be heavily congested in the same way that a direct 
pricing policy would be. (Gwilliam and Mackie, 1975)  
Examples of regulatory parking policies for employees can be found at hospitals in the UK. 
The relocation of 1,400 staff from “The Radcliffe Infirmary” in Oxford to “The John 
Radcliffe Infirmary” in Headington was accompanied by a scheme that allowed 1,680 staff 
to park on site for a workforce of approximately 8,000.  A model of journey options was 
used to determine a 45-minute journey by public transport as the cut-off point for staff trips.  
Only staff within this area who met certain criteria were able to obtain a parking permit and 
parking restrictions were set up around the hospital to prevent staff parking in residential 
streets.  The scheme was supported by public transport improvements.  (Moran, 2001).  
Southampton University Hospitals Trust faced similar problems when a cancer centre was 
relocated from another hospital.  The move saw an extra 250 staff and 60,000 outpatients a 
year using the site to be followed by further future increases.  A strict staff permit scheme, 
supported by various initiatives to improve public transport and alternative mode usage, was 
adopted and generated a decrease in staff parking by 1,000 spaces as well as reducing local 
traffic congestion (Moran, 2001).  
Parking permits, as mentioned in the context of Southampton University Hospitals Trust 
above are a method of managing the supply of parking spaces by only allowing those in 
possession of an administered permit to park (Verhoef et al, 1995).  
2.14.3 The Impact of Parking Pricing  
A number of questions regarding charging for car parking need to be considered before a 
scheme is implemented.  These include:  
 Are further parking controls needed?  
 Who will actually be deterred from driving?  
 Who will gain from the charge and who will lose out?  
 What will the effect be on land uses in the controlled area?  
 What proportion of traffic is likely to be affected by parking control measures?  
 What will be the impact on traffic in congested areas?  
(Coombe et al, 1997a)  
 
 
Motorists can respond to decreased availability and increased costs in five ways:  
 Change their parking location;  
 Change the starting time of their journey;  
 Change the mode used;  
 Change their destination; or  
 
• Abandon the last trip. For commuters, however, the last two of these effects are 
unlikely to occur (Feeney, 1989).  
Extra factors can be added to Feeney’s list such as a change of parking type (in an urban 
context this could be from off-street to on-street for example), a change in car occupancy, a 
change in frequency of trip making and a change in route taken.  Small reductions in car 
ownership, fuel consumption and kilometres travelled by car may also be seen.  The 
reactions are not discrete in nature and tend to interact with each other (Acutt and Dodgson, 
1997, Bates et al, 1997, Ison and Wall, 2000).  
Changing parking charges influences the price of parking directly.  Imposing some type of 
regulatory policy can also influence the price of parking, but it does so indirectly, for 
example by changing the time costs associated with searching for a space. In terms of 
causing a change in the mode of transport used, studies on the parking price elasticity of 
demand have suggested that out-of-vehicle costs, either time or money, are more influential 
on mode choice than in-vehicle costs.  For commuters, most parking price elasticity 
estimates are less than (-) 1, however, suggesting a relatively inelastic response in terms of 
mode choice (Ison and Wall, 2000).  
It is important to remember that parking strategies will have no impact on some people. 
Gantvoort (1984) introduces the concept of “captives”.  They are people who have to use 
their car either because there are no public transport alternatives or because they need the car 
for other reasons.  A survey carried out in The Hague in The Netherlands found that 45 
percent of people affected by a car park closure were captives, meaning that 55 percent of 
people had a “free choice” over their mode of travel.  The number of captives will always 
influence the impact of any traffic restraint measure as a greater number of people who must 
use their car will reduce the schemes impact.  
From an economic perspective, the use of parking pricing overcomes two main issues 
associated with restricting parking supply.  First, the use of parking fees does not require 
such a large flow of data whereas physical restrictions require real-time information on the 
level of occupation of the car park.  Secondly, charging for parking discriminates according 
to the willingness to pay.  These arguments are slightly different if they are considered from 
the perspective of the commuter.  If commuters face physical parking restrictions then they 
may alter the time of their trips to arrive earlier to secure a space.  In this situation the space 
restriction acts as a substitute for the pricing mechanism and an efficient allocation may 
result.  The information argument may also not be so strong if commuters know the 
likelihood of finding a car parking space at certain times (Verhoef et al, 1995).  
Experience suggests that policies which aim to make more effective use of the existing road 
capacity are the most appropriate.  These include policies which include pricing or which 
use staggered and flexible working hours.  Regulatory measures such as restricting parking 
supply results in people searching for parking spaces for long periods of time, thus adding to 
congestion and benefiting those who have private parking spaces (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997, 
Arnott et al, 1991).  
The literature suggests that parking pricing and other methods of parking control are both 
extremely useful instruments for managing car parking in a more efficient manner.  While 
parking pricing appears to be the more effective of the two policy types, they are both 
heavily interconnected and a successful parking strategy is likely to include them both.  
2.14.4 Parking Cash Out  
In the US in 1991, a transport subsidy ordinance in Los Angeles required that any employer 
offering free or subsidised parking had to offer each employee that did not drive a $15 
monthly transport subsidy to be used for commuting to and from work.  
Although the sum was lower than the cost of providing parking and did not have much 
impact on mode choice it was a first step towards offering employees an alternative to 
having to accept subsidised parking at work (Shoup and Willson, 1992).  
By 2001, a similar ordinance covered the whole of California which required some 
employers to offer commuters the option to take the cash equivalent of any parking subsidy 
offered. This option to “cash out” employer-paid parking raises the effective price of 
commuter parking without charging commuters for parking and rewards those who do not 
drive to work alone. This in turn increases the share of employees who car share, use public 
transport, walk or cycle to work (Shoup, 2001).  
Case studies of parking cash out in California showed that employers’ spending for parking 
declined by almost as much as their cash payments in lieu of parking increased.  Overall, 
total spending to subsidise commuting rose by $2 per employee per month.  Employers 
praised the system for its simplicity and fairness and said that it helped to recruit and retain 
employees (Shoup, 2001).  
Other studies have shown that ending employer paid parking greatly reduces solo driving 
although the degree of influence is dependent on local conditions.  The reduction in solo 
driving achieved by ending parking subsidies is also usually greater than the reduction 
achieved by providing subsidies to public transport and car sharing when parking continues 
to be subsidised (Shoup and Willson, 1990).  
Many examples of successful parking cash out schemes can be found in the US (Shoup and 
Willson, 1990).  Many of the schemes, however, have been implemented in the central areas 
of large cities and in businesses such as banks, insurance houses and civic centres, where 
there are high concentrations of employees who are more likely to be use alternative modes 
of transport or car share than in less accessible areas. This raises the question of whether 
similar levels of success in terms of reducing car use and solo drivers can be achieved by 
smaller urban employers and by different types of businesses. With airports, there is a vast 
range of different types of employers, different workers and different shift patterns all on 
one site which adds to the complexity of the problem.  
The principle of parking cash out is becoming increasingly popular in the UK, although the 
results of schemes introduced so far have been mixed.  Four types of parking cash out 
scheme can be seen in the UK: buying back car parking spaces for good; annual schemes; 
monthly schemes, and; daily reward schemes (Enoch, 2002).  
Derriford General Hospital in Plymouth bought back employee car parking spaces 
indefinitely. In 2000, Derriford General Hospital offered employees a one off payment of 
£250 plus an extra amount to cover VAT but only seven people out of 3,500 accepted the 
offer.  BAA Heathrow introduced a similar scheme in 1997, offering employees £200 to 
give up their car parking space. 33 people accepted the offer, equivalent to approximately 
one percent. At BAA Stansted, employees were offered £110 per parking space but very few 
took up this offer (Enoch, 2002).  
Annual schemes are operated by Southampton General Hospital and “Orange” in Bristol. 
Southampton General Hospital introduced its scheme in 1995.  Employees were given a 
£150 initial payment and then annual payments of £96.  By 2001 approximately 9 percent of 
the 5,900 workforce had taken up the scheme.  At Orange, the planning constraints of an 
office relocation limited parking to 105 spaces for 700 staff. Staff who worked at the 
previous office were offered a four year package to give up parking at work.  In the first 
year, staff received £1,200, then £900 in the second year, £600 in the third and £300 in the 
fourth.  The scheme cost Orange in the region of half a million pounds in the first year, 
equivalent to approximately 400 staff (Enoch, 2002).  
At “Vodafone” in Newbury, Berkshire, a monthly scheme was introduced whereby any 
member of staff who opted out of parking received an extra £85 in their monthly wage. 
Approximately 1,500 staff from a workforce of 4,500 enrolled in the scheme. However, as 
parking is extremely constrained, once an employee gives up their space it can take some 
time before they are able to get it back again (Enoch, 2002).  
The UK examples outlined above would suggest that the two elements which bring about the 
greatest take up of parking cash out schemes, and hence are the most effective, are the 
amount of money offered and the flexibility available within the system.  It may be that staff 
are able to give up their parking spaces for one or two days a week but are not willing to 
completely relinquish their parking permits.  It is also important to make sure that 
alternatives are available for those who do reduce or give up their car use, as is the case with 
the Pfizer scheme.  
Parking cash out is well suited to providing part of a solution to addressing a parking 
problem at a specific site but as a solution to solving the whole problem of congestion on the 
roads it may not be so suitable (Enoch, 2002).  Airports fall into this category and thus 
parking cash out could potentially be a suitable measure to address car parking issues.  
Employers can be seen to favour parking cash out because it can help with the recruitment 
and retention of staff.  They would rather pay money to solve the parking problems than 
charge employees or remove the ability to park.  Parking cash out is also considerably 
cheaper than paying to construct new car parks.  
2.15 The Problems Associated with Offering Free Parking to Employees  
Shoup (1997) investigated the extent to which free parking subsidised car use in the US by 
comparing the cost of providing free parking to the price commuters paid for driving to 
work. The findings were that the subsidy for free parking at work was triple the vehicle 
operating costs for driving to work.  Further calculations based on the monthly cost of 
providing a parking space revealed that the driver’s variable cost of commuting by car 
without free parking was quadruple the cost of commuting with free parking.  This creates a 
problem because it means that commuters do not consider the cost of parking when choosing 
their travel mode and thus they drive alone more frequently, creating more congestion.  
Several studies carried out in the US have revealed that approximately 90 percent of 
American commuters who drive to work do not pay for parking (Willson and Shoup, 1990, 
Shoup and Willson, 1992, Willson, 1992, Shoup, 2001).  
Employers often choose to subsidise employee parking because it offers sound economic 
benefits.  If offered as an employee benefit, the subsidised car parking space is cheaper than 
giving the employee a larger salary because it does not incur tax or social security liability. 
Using an example from Williams (1992) in relation to subsidised parking spaces in 
Washington D.C., if an employer wants to provide an extra $2,000 to an employee then to 
do this through his or her salary would actually cost the employer in the region of $4,400 
after tax, social security and employment contribution.  Offering the parking space, 
however, would only cost $2,000.  
There are other reasons why employers offer free parking.  Firstly, it might enable staff to 
work extra and more flexible hours.  Secondly, any increase in an employee’s salary 
increases the base against which future living cost adjustments are applied. Fringe benefits 
such as free parking do not increase the base.  Finally, non-salary benefits such as free 
parking are easier to cut than salary (Williams, 1992).  
A problem with parking which is paid for by the employer is that it is usually a “take it or 
leave it” offer and employees are not offered any alternative if they do not take the parking. 
Employees who value the parking at less than it costs the employer to provide it will often 
take the parking subsidy rather than nothing.  Many employees, however, do not think that 
their parking spaces are worth what it costs their employer to provide them because studies 
show that when employees have to pay for their own parking many stop driving to work 
alone (Shoup and Willson, 1992, Williams, 1992).  
A mode choice survey carried out in Los Angeles using 5,060 employees and 118 employers 
found that free parking significantly increased the probability of solo driving. After a charge 
was introduced the proportion of people driving to work alone fell from 72 percent to 41 
percent. It was also found that as parking costs increased, the probability of using the car 
(either for solo driving or car sharing) decreased.  No relationship was found to support the 
hypothesis that responsiveness to travel cost varied inversely with income (Willson, 1992).  
The relationship between the cost of parking and the mode share accounted for by solo 
driving, car sharing and public transport use is shown in Figure 2.1.  The data from this 1986 
survey shows that commuters respond to parking charges by reducing car use and that there 
is a linear relationship between parking price and mode choice. Public transport share 
increases more than car sharing because car sharers still bear the parking cost, although it is 
divided between the vehicle occupants (Willson, 1992). It is questionable whether a linear 
relationship would exist in all situations where a parking charge was introduced as there are 
several other factors which could change the demand for the different modes, such as the 
availability and cost of public transport, the ability to car share with other employees and the 
location of the place of employment.  
 
Figure 2.1: The Effect of Parking Charges on Mode Share (Predictions)  
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Source: Adapted from data in Willson, 1992.  
Studies carried out at a number of case study sites in Los Angeles and Ottawa showed a 40 
percent decrease in the number of solo drivers when commuters were made to pay for 
parking and an associated 27 percent decrease in the number of cars driven overall. The 
price elasticity of demand for the various sites in the study ranged from –0.08 to –0.23 with 
an average of –0.16 indicating a 1.6 percent decrease in the number of cars driven for every 
10 percent increase in the price of parking (Shoup and Willson, 1992).  
Parking subsidies can clearly be seen to encourage single occupancy car use thus creating a 
greater amount of traffic.  The research shows that making employees pay for parking 
reduces the number of solo drivers and the number of cars on the roads. Therefore the 
logical solution would seem to be to charge employees to park at work.  
2.16 Acceptance of a Parking Strategy and the Package Approach  
With urban traffic problems many people accept that there is a need for something to be 
done. A UK survey conducted in 1991 found that 95 percent of respondents agreed with the 
statement “traffic congestion and pollution is a serious problem in our larger towns and 
cities” and 92 percent of respondents agreed that “urban traffic problems are going to get 
worse, and something major needs to be done about them” (Jones, 1991).  
While it is one thing to recognise a problem, it is another to put a strategy into place to 
address the problem.  The instruments regarded as being the most effective at reducing 
traffic congestion, such as road pricing, parking charges and placing physical restrictions on 
the number of car parking spaces, are also those which people are most opposed to.  This 
unpopularity makes the measures difficult to introduce (Enoch, 2002). Research carried out 
in Newcastle and Cambridge found that people were far more opposed to measures of 
restraint (road-user charging, increased parking charges and zone access controls) than they 
were to public transport improvements. In Newcastle, over half of the survey respondents 
found the three restraint measures to be either “fairly” or “totally” unacceptable, while the 
figures were slightly lower in Cambridge (Thorpe et al, 2000).  
Schade and Schlag (2003) state that reducing parking space gains low levels of acceptability, 
but the least accepted measures are those incorporating fees for either parking cars and to an 
even greater extent, fees for driving cars either through the use of distance based pricing or 
congestion pricing.  Button and Verhoef (1998) add that there is little evidence of public 
acceptance of high parking fees and they tend to be evaded except in the face of heavy 
policing and transactions costs. Interviews conducted by Rye and Ison (2005) highlighted 
several key issues regarding the introduction of employee charging.  The importance to staff 
of a parking charge cannot be understated. One interviewee said “from the staff side it is 
more emotive than pay”. It is also argued, however, that because parking policies already 
exist in many cities, the extension to regulatory parking policies may be easier than 
introducing a completely new system, for example electronic road pricing (Verhoef et al, 
1995).  
It is important to remember that varying levels of acceptance can be found in different places 
because of local conditions and the impact of any potential schemes on a specific area. 
Different people travelling for a range of purposes in varying circumstances may well react 
to parking controls in different ways (Coombe et al, 1997a). Varying levels of acceptance 
and effectiveness were found in the research comparing Newcastle and Cambridge (Thorpe 
et al, 2000).  
A potential way around this difficulty is to utilise a traffic restraint measure as an integral 
part of a wider package of measures to deal with problems (Jones, 1991, Thorpe et al, 2000, 
Ison and Wall, 2002).  Jones found that this approach significantly increased public 
willingness to contemplate traffic restraint and highlighted three elements to the package 
approach:  
 A simple but fair method of vehicle restriction;  
 Improvements in public transport, and;  
 Some re-allocation of road space (e.g. new cycle or bus facilities, extra space for 
pedestrians or for residents’ parking).  
 
Four elements to a package of proposals to deal with congestion were identified by Palmer 
(1996) as being:  
 Constructing additional road space;  
 Using existing road space more efficiently, including better information for drivers 
and better enforcement of parking restrictions;  
 Shifting demand to alternative modes, by increasing investment for public transport 
and by implementing changes to increase the relative cost of cars, including increasing 
parking charges;  
 Restraining and managing the demand for transport, of which a parking policy is 
seen to be an increasingly important instrument.  
 
The surveys in Newcastle and Cambridge also investigated the perceived acceptance and 
effectiveness of packages of measures.  The four packages of measures investigated were:  
 Road-user charging and increased parking charges;  
 Zone-access control and improved public transport;  
 Improved public transport and road-user charging;  
 
• Increased parking charges and improved public transport. In both Cambridge and 
Newcastle the two most acceptable packages were improved public transport and road-user 
charging and increased parking charges and improved public transport (Thorpe et al, 2000).  
Research carried out across four European sites (Athens, Como, Dresden and Oslo) 
investigated the perceived acceptability and effectiveness of a “strong” package and a 
“weak” package of traffic reduction strategies.  The strong package contained measures to 
charge motorists by implementing a toll cordon, increasing parking charges and increasing 
fuel taxes as well as allocating the revenue to lower labour taxes and to invest in capacity 
extension of known bottlenecks.  The weak package was designed to be more acceptable and 
included the same charging mechanisms, but to a lesser extent and used the revenues to 
lower fixed vehicle taxes, invest in known bottlenecks and improve the quality of public 
transport.  The surveys found that the weak package was significantly more acceptable than 
the strong package at all four of the case study sites but high levels of acceptance were not 
found for either package. In terms of perceived effectiveness there was no significant 
difference between the two packages overall (Schade and Schlag, 2003). The research does 
not however, enable the perceived acceptability of effectiveness of each element of the 
package to be identified so the impact of increasing parking charges on their own or with 
revenue allocation cannot be seen.  
Another important element of the package approach is that the finance raised should be used 
to improve alternative modes and the physical environment (Jones, 1991, Ison and Wall, 
2002).  This is also recognised by the Government in the 1998 White Paper on the Future of 
Transport in reference to workplace parking levies.  The DETR (1998, p.117) state that “a 
vital element in the effectiveness of the policy will be the use made of the proceeds to 
improve transport choice.”  
In surveys in Newcastle and Cambridge the level of acceptance when increasing parking 
charges was much greater when there was a guarantee that the revenue generated was 
allocated to projects which improved transport.  Such projects included improving public 
transport, improving the urban environment, improving cycling facilities and maintaining 
and improving existing roads (Thorpe et al, 2000).  
Ison and Wall (2002) found that improvements to public transport, including improving 
reliability, increasing the frequency of provision and reducing fares, formed the three most 
popular responses when respondents to a survey were asked to hypothetically allocate 
revenues raised through a workplace parking levy.  
Other important uses of revenue from workplace parking charges are related to improving 
the standard of the car parks at the site, for example through CCTV investment, car park 
refurbishment, better lighting and signage, barriers and card readers (Rye and Ison, 2005).  
Rye and Ison (2005) offer six factors to assist the implementation of parking charges at the 
workplace.  They are:  
 There need to be clear, site specific reasons for introducing parking charging.  
 Consultation will take some time but it should not be expected that it will resolve all 
opposition; however, opposition will reduce, after the scheme is introduced.  
 Significant investment is required in parking control systems, but this will be 
recouped through the revenue raised within one to two years.  
 Charges are low, income related and applied with few exemptions.  
 Those exemptions that are made are justified by clear and transparent criteria.  
 The funds raised are ring-fenced for improvements in parking, security and 
alternative transport to the site.  
 
Linked to Rye and Ison’s first point is the situation that parking strategies are often only 
introduced when there is a problem to be addressed.  In terms of a parking charge, the 
authors add that it appears to be important that there is the existence of a significant catalyst 
for change for implementing a charge for car parking at the workplace. This is supported by 
Enoch and Potter (2003), in relation to Travel Plans in the UK, when they state that 
companies often only begin to consider changing employee travel behaviour when faced 
with a situation such as congestion or a lack of parking spaces, or indeed when pressured to 
do so by a Local Authority.  
The research identifies that the package approach is both the most effective and acceptable 
way of introducing a new policy incorporating a measure such as parking pricing. 
Acceptability and effectiveness can be seen to be related – if a scheme is accepted by the 
users then it is more likely to work well than a strategy with strong opposition.  
2.17 Conclusions  
The literature review has shown that surface access at airports is central to overall airport 
capacity and that any constraint on surface access can impact on the efficient functioning of 
an airport. Therefore, as airports continue to grow it is important that the surface access 
system does not hinder their expansion. Airports also need to address surface access issues 
in order to conform to air quality limits and car parking constraints which may be imposed.  
The impact of employees on the surface access system must not be underestimated; the 
number of trips they make is of the same order of magnitude as passenger trips and a higher 
proportion of employees than passengers have been found to drive to airports.  When 
addressing surface access issues airports are aware that they exist in a competitive market 
and need to offer a high level of service to passengers.  As such they may be more willing to 
focus on employees with initiatives designed to reduce car use, not least because employees 
are ‘easier’ for the airport operator to target given that they have information on them, can 
communicate directly with them and their recurring travel patterns are understood.  
As was stated in section 2.11, airports use a range of measures to try and reduce the number 
of employees travelling to the airport by private car but they tend to focus on ‘softer’ 
measures such as the promotion of public transport, car sharing and alternative work 
practices such as teleworking.  While such strategies can be successful their impact is often 
reduced due to the nature of working at an airport in terms of the high proportion of shift 
workers who need to access the airport at unsociable hours when public transport may not be 
in operation and the fact that many job functions need to be performed at the airport and 
cannot be carried out from a remote location.  It is only in the non-airport sector where 
‘harder’ initiatives such as car parking charges or financial incentives direct to the user have 
been implemented and reported in research. As such, airports may be able to learn from the 
experiences of the non-airport sector.  
The literature from the non-airport sector has shown that companies who offer free parking 
encourage their employees to drive to work and also drive on their own.  This was reported 
to be the case in the airport sector where employers generally absorb the parking charges 
imposed by the airport operator rather than passing them on to staff.    
A number of car parking instruments are available to help manage the demand for car 
parking including parking pricing, regulatory policies and parking cash out.  Parking pricing 
is regarded as being a ‘first-best’ solution for reducing the number of people wishing to park 
and also has some impact on tackling traffic issues such as congestion, but the most effective 
solutions can be seen to be when pricing and regulatory measures are used together.  Parking 
cash out can also help to overcome the problems of offering employees free parking if they 
are designed with flexibility and the amount of money offered is enough of an incentive.  
Overall parking cash out is regarded as being more effective at reducing the number of 
people parking when it is combined with other measures.  
In terms of acceptability both parking pricing and regulatory measures are perceived as 
being unacceptable, both by key decision makers and by those who will be affected by the 
measure.  They become more acceptable when combined with other measures to provide a 
package approach.  
One thing which is apparent in many of the examples is that parking strategies are only 
introduced when there is a problem to be addressed and there is the existence of a significant 
catalyst for change such as congestion, a lack of parking spaces or the need to address 
transport issues in order to gain permission for development.  The parking instruments 
addressed in this chapter are best suited to tackling specific parking problems rather than 
being a solution to wider issues such as network congestion and environmental pollution.  
Overall, car parking measures can be seen to be an effective way of reducing the number of 
people travelling by car and they have a direct impact on the number of people parking, 
something which is of importance to Heathrow Airport given the parking cap of 42,000 
spaces of which 17,500 are for employees.  
One drawback of the literature was that some of the research into airport surface access is 
dated.  As such a scoping study of four airports was conducted in order to assess the current 
situation at airports.  This scoping study is contained in Chapter 3.  
Chapter 3. Employee Car Parking at Airports: A Scoping 
Study of the Current Issues  
3.0 Introduction  
This chapter investigates the current situation at four selected airports regarding surface 
access and car parking.  The findings from in-depth interviews conducted with surface 
access managers at four airports are detailed and cover the current extent of car parking 
problems at those airports, the important areas surrounding how airports manage employee 
car parking and views towards the use of more innovative initiatives to manage staff 
parking.  The scoping study was conducted due to the limited amount of up to date literature 
on surface access and car parking, particularly related to employees, in the airport sector.  
This chapter enables the findings from the literature review to be supported and added to by 
real and current experience from the airport sector. This will assist with the development of 
the methodology for the original research to be carried out at Heathrow Airport and the non-
airport organisations by identifying and further supporting important issues.  
3.1 Methodology  
In order to assess the issues surrounding airport surface access and car parking, in-depth face 
to face structured interviews were undertaken between January and May 2004 with surface 
access managers responsible for all surface access issues at four airports, namely Amsterdam 
Schiphol, London Luton, Birmingham International and Nottingham East Midlands.  Each 
interview lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and all were recorded.  An additional interview 
was conducted with the Deputy Director of Airport Development at Schiphol which 
provided some additional information and a discussion group was conducted with the 
Surface Access Working Group at London Luton which was attended by representatives of 
five companies located at the airport.  
All of the interviews detailed various issues relating to surface access and car parking and 
were structured around the questions presented in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1: Questions Used at Airport Interviews  
1. Airport Information a) Car 
Parking Overview  
How many passengers does the airport handle per year? 
How many car parking spaces do you have for passengers/visitors/employees? 
How are these distributed (long term/short term split etc)? 
Are car parks at or near capacity? 
Roughly, how much revenue is generated from passenger/visitor parking? 
How is this revenue utilised? 
Do you plan to construct any more car parks in the future? 
 
2. Employee Car Parking a) 
General  
How many people are employed at the airport? (airport and other companies on site)  
What proportion of staff drive to work? (single occupancy/sharing/lift split)  
What is the split for other modes? 
Where are staff permitted to park? Are staff car parks separate to passengers/visitors or combined? 
What proportion of staff car parks are controlled by the airport 
Are any members of staff allocated a reserved parking space? 
 
b) Enforcement  
How do you control access to staff car parks? 
Is a permit system used? How are permits allocated? Are there different types of permits? 
Technology used? If so, what technology? 
Have you experienced any abuse of this system? 
 
c) Administration and costs  
Roughly, how much does it cost to provide parking for staff? 
Capital costs, maintenance costs, administration costs…? 
Are any staff dedicated to car parking or travel planning for employees? 
Does the airport charge companies on-site for parking? If so, what is the charge and how much revenue  
is generated? 
Do any members of staff pay to park? Do any companies pass on car parking costs to staff  
 
d) Reducing car use  
What strategies are in place to reduce car use? 
How many commuters car share? How is car sharing monitored? 
 
e) Effectiveness  
How effective are your current car parking strategies for staff/ASAS? Is 
effectiveness measured/targets set? If so how/what targets etc?  
f) Future  
Are any enhancements/changes planned to the current car parking strategies? 
Is there a limit on the number of spaces that can be developed? 
Have any targets been set for future progress? 
Are any new strategies to reduce car use and car parking under consideration for the future? 
Would you consider using disincentives to discourage people driving to work? 
What is the likely impact of a second runway on car parking? 
 
Additional questions to incorporate if not covered during interview  
What are the main issues facing the airport with regard to car parking (for passengers or employees)? 
Do you see any issues becoming more important in the future? 
What do you think the staff reaction would be if they had to pay to park?  Would this raise any issues  
for the airport? 
Has charging staff directly been considered? 
 
3.2 Characteristics of the Four Airports  
Details of the four airports are presented in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2; a range of airport types 
were visited including a small regional airport, a medium sized regional airport with 
international operations, a medium sized international airport and a large international 
airport with worldwide operations.  Each airport selected was different in terms of the 
number of employees, its location, the market it serves, the number of passengers it handles 
and several other characteristics.  The inclusion of Amsterdam Schiphol Airport allowed for 
international experience to be investigated; Schiphol was of particular interest due to the 
innovative parking cash out scheme operated by KLM, as mentioned in section 2.11.1.    
 
Table 3.1: Passenger and Employee Numbers at the Four Airports  
Nottingham East 
Midlands  
4 million +  6,600 employees on site.  
  10 core tenants employ 95% of all employees  
London Luton  7 million +  8,000 employees on site.  
  450 of all staff are employed directly by the airport  
  company  
  80-100 other companies on site.  
Birmingham  8 million +  6,200 employees on site.  
  700 of all staff are employed directly by the airport  
  company  
  50-80 other companies on site.  
Amsterdam Schiphol  42 million + 54,000 employees on site.  
  2,000 of all staff are employed directly by the airport  
  company  
 
500 other companies on site. Source: Interviews with Surface Access Managers  
Table 3.2: Parking Provision at the Four Airports  
 
Nottingham  
East  
9,000, of which 4,000 are long 
term,  
600 (not  
including 
 
a  
large  cargo  
Midlands   4,000 are medium term and 1,000 
are  
handling facility).     
  short term.      
 
London Luton 10,500, of which 9,400 are long term 1,300 +  
and 1,100 are short term.  
An additional 2,200 off-site spaces are  
managed by a private operator. Birmingham 10,200 1,800 Amsterdam 
18,500, of which 10,000 are long term 13,500, of which 7,000 are in remote Schiphol and 
8,500 are short term. locations.  
* Passenger parking at all of the airports use a tiered system of short and long term parking 
and the price mechanism to ensure passengers and visitors use the most appropriate car park.  
Source: Interviews with Surface Access Managers  
3.3 Key Issues Arising from the Interviews  
This section assesses the role of parking as a means of addressing the issue of employee 
surface access, based on the responses from the surface access managers. It also deals with 
the issues that would need to be addressed if the implementation of an employee parking 
charge or financial incentive were to be enacted. It is argued that “it is much simpler to 
control employee surface access [than passengers] but it is still difficult” (Luton).  It is 
however perceived as “one of the most emotive subjects there possibly is in employee 
relations” (Luton). The structure of the findings is derived from the key issues raised during 
the interviews and is detailed in Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3: Issues Surrounding Employee Car Parking at Airports  
 
Airport context The extent of the problem Shift working Alternative strategies for 
bringing about a mode shift  
Employee car parking  Dedicated employee car parking Permits system Use of a parking 
charge Passing on the charge Ring fencing the revenue  
Introducing a direct car parking Consultation charge Vision  
3.3.1 Airport Context  
The Extent of the Problem  
The extent of the employee parking problem varies between the four airports.  London Luton 
and Schiphol both have capacity issues; Luton to the extent that it is not currently allocating 
any new parking permits to employees.  Not all the surface access managers interviewed as 
part of the research, however, perceived their airport as currently having a major problem in 
terms of employee car parking.  At Nottingham East Midlands, in spite of a growth from 2.4 
million passengers per annum in 2001 to  
4.2 million passengers per annum in 2004, together with the fact that one new low cost 
service can generate an additional 250,000 passengers and in the region of 30 additional 
staff, parking did not appear to currently be an issue.  It was stated that “510 years growth 
can be contained within the current planning approval” and airport car parking facilities 
could be accommodated on land currently approved for the development of new car parks.  
At Birmingham, car parking was also not seen as a significant problem although it was 
stated however that “passenger demand peaks in August and September when there is 
significant holiday travel (in August) and a combination of significant business travel and 
holiday travel (in September). In 2002 it was getting critical and some of the long stay 
passenger parking was reallocated to staff parking.”  
Regarding the future growth in the aviation sector, the expendable nature of car parks as a 
land use was highlighted, “You can be sure as the airport expands it’s going be one of those 
land uses that comes under most pressure.” (Luton).  
Shift Working  
Shift working can create difficulties for the airport authorities particularly where shift 
changeovers are concerned; it was stated that, “In a 400 space car park, we have about 
1,500 permits registered to that car park which as a rule works, but on the change of shifts it 
can cause some problems sometimes.” (Luton). Other problems with shift workers were 
highlighted, “Some employees don’t have any choice because they are starting a shift when 
there is no public transport. It’s difficult because we require most of the concessions to open 
at five in the morning now and there are no  
buses at that time”. (Luton).  There is therefore a need to provide these employees with 
permits for the use of staff car parks.  
Before parking policy is considered in more detail the alternatives are briefly outlined in the 
following section.  
Alternative Strategies for Bringing about a Mode Shift  
There are a number of strategies in place at the four airports.  On the whole it was stated that 
“we are very much in the “carrot” area and we don’t have any explicit “sticks” to stop 
people using their car”. (Birmingham). On the carrot side the airports aim to make the 
alternative modes of transport more attractive.  It was also considered that the roll of the 
Surface Access Manager was “to co-ordinate and encourage people to use alternative 
modes”, (Nottingham East Midlands) rather than try to stop people from parking.  It was 
stated that the only “slightly stickish” instrument was charging companies for car parking 
passes and the fact that the car park is more remotely located.  
The various initiatives in place at the airports include investment in new infrastructure in 
order to make public transport more attractive to staff, promotion of public transport through 
discounted ticketing schemes, facilities to encourage cycling and the development and 
promotion of Demand Responsive Transport, the aim of which at Birmingham is to get 
people into work who otherwise wouldn’t be able to because they have no transport.  
With the exception of Schiphol, there did not appear to be an official car sharing scheme at 
any of the airports. At Birmingham this has been thought about but not given a high priority 
because:  
 Lots of people establish car sharing schemes but the use tends to be minimal because 
there is no incentive involved.  It was considered that any incentive needed to “either make 
parking expensive or give a benefit for car sharing.” It was stated at Nottingham East 
Midlands that there is no real disincentive because parking is free and there is no problem 
with space availability. Therefore there is little reason for people to want to car share.  
Equally, the staff car park is relatively close to the airport, therefore it is difficult to give 
people who car share the benefit of closer allocated spaces (within the staff car park).  
 The modal share target is related to public transport use and car sharing doesn’t help 
with achieving the target.  
 
3.3.2 Employee Car Parking  
Table 3.4 provides an overview of how each airport manages employee car parking and the 
following paragraphs explore the management techniques in greater detail,  
Table 3.4: Employee Car Park Management at the Four Airports  
 
Nottingham East • The car parks are managed by the airport company but operated by a 
Midlands 
contractor.  
 Permits are sold to companies at a standard rate, regardless of location.  
 A small number of companies are known to ass the charge onto employees, but the majority do not.  
 
London Luton  • The airport company manage and operate the three main employee car parks 
(1,300 spaces).  There are also an undefined number of spaces within leased 
sites outside the control of the airport company.  
 Permits are sold to companies with the price varying depending on the proximity of the car park to the 
terminal building.  
 Car parks are currently at capacity with no additional permits being allocated.  
 There is only one known example of a company passing the charge onto their employees.  
 2 car parks are close to the terminal building and one is in a remote location on the airport boundary 
served by shuttle buses.  
 
Birmingham • The car parks are managed by the airport company but operated by a 
contractor.  
 Managed to accommodate peaks in demand in the summer and passenger long stay car parks are 
reallocated if required.  Currently there is spare capacity.  Senior managers park closer to the terminal building.  
 Car parks are on the airport boundary served by shuttle buses.  
 Permits are issued free to employees of the airport company and sold to other companies for £165 per 
year.  The cost is rarely, if ever, passed onto the employee.  
 There is additional uncontrolled parking at some outlying locations such as a maintenance base.  
 
Amsterdam Schiphol • 7,000 spaces are managed by the airport company and 6,500 are owned by 
separate companies.  
 Permits are allocated to staff for a specific car park based on the company they work for and their job 
role.  
 Most employers pay for the parking permit, although KLM and Martinair pass some of the charge 
onto employees.  It was also believed some of the handling companies may pass charges on to staff.  
 A planning regulation also exists in The Netherlands which allows only one car parking space per 70 
square metres of office building.  Organisations have to manage their parking within this constraint.  
 
Source: Interviews with Surface Access Managers  
Dedicated Employee Car Parking  
At all four airports staff have dedicated car parks, some conveniently located and others 
more remote. The more remote sites are generally near to the passenger long stay car 
parking provision or on the airport boundary with shuttle buses being used to transport 
employees to the terminals.  In general no staff are allocated a reserved parking space 
although at Birmingham senior members of staff are provided with preferential parking, the 
“argument being that they need their cars for business use”.  
Permits System  
A car park permit system is in use at all four airports.  At Nottingham East Midlands and 
Birmingham car parking permits are relatively easy to obtain.  At Nottingham East Midlands 
the reason for this is primarily because “there is a lack of alternatives to get to the airport, 
and the airport and airlines can’t afford to have staff not being able to park.”  At Luton, 
however, the situation is somewhat more critical in that “we are at a situation where we’re 
saying all car parks are full so at the moment we’re not issuing new cards and what you get 
is the churn in business, and because car parking passes are such valuable commodities now 
if a staff member leaves invariably the company continue to pay for it rather than hand it 
back and not potentially have one to give to a new employee. They are almost a currency in 
themselves.”  
At Schiphol, employee parking is managed entirely by the airport operator, including the 
allocation of parking permits to companies at the airport and the setting of permit prices. 
Nottingham East Midlands and London Luton (from April 2004) retain control over the 
permit price but the permit allocation and management of car parking is contracted out. At 
Birmingham the issuing of permits is handled by the airport operator and a third party is 
contracted to run a bus service from the car parks to the terminal and man the barrier system.  
At Luton Airport the surface access manager stated, “What I would like us to move to is a 
three tier system, where you have your essential user such as people with kids, non-essential 
user and then your non-essentials would go in the remote car park or wouldn’t get a permit 
at all” and at Schiphol there was consideration of a scheme whereby employees working 
night shifts had permits which enabled them to park in  
passenger car parks nearer to the terminal building due to the spare capacity at that time.  
Use of a Parking Charge  
The price of a permit varies from airport to airport, and from car park to car park at some of 
the airports.  Depending on the airport they range from £165 to £440 with the price related to 
the proximity of the car park to the terminal building.  At Birmingham the airport company 
staff obtain their passes for free.  At Luton the price of permits is increased above the RPI on 
an annual basis and the additional revenue generated is hypothecated, promoting public 
transport and travel cards.  The Surface Access Manager at Luton stated, “Interestingly, the 
policy we’ve adopted in the last few years of significantly increasing prices has dampened 
down demand, so price has worked for us.”  
The introduction of a direct car parking charge for employees is seen to be an interesting 
idea and is discussed in more detail later, but has been essentially put to one side because of 
difficulties, not least in terms of the issue of recruitment and staff relations.  It was stated 
that “In terms of transport it does make sense to charge people because you’ve then given 
them a choice.  The trouble is although we could do that conceivably for our own staff, it’s 
what you do for all the other people who don’t work for the airport company.” 
(Birmingham).  As such an issue with the introduction of a direct car parking charge is that it 
is not possible to do this for the vast majority of people who do not work for the airport 
company.  In addition  
“parking charges are a possibility but it’s not yet become a big enough issue for the senior 
managers to decide something needs to be done about it – but this may change.” 
(Birmingham).  
Passing on the Parking Charge  
A small number of companies are thought to pass parking charges onto their employees but 
on the whole, with the exception of the innovative scheme used by KLM at Schiphol 
described below and in section 2.11.1, employers generally absorb the permit costs.  
“Essentially, the vast majority of people don’t pay for their parking”. (Birmingham).  In fact 
the overriding philosophy has been “it’s up to you whether you want to pass that cost on or 
not.” (Luton). One of the main reasons given for companies not passing on parking charges, 
at Luton at least, is the fact that a number of the larger more traditional companies on-site 
are still quite heavily unionised. In addition it was stated that “the problem lies in the whole 
issue of recruitment and staff relations” (Birmingham).  
On the whole surface access managers interviewed would favour the charge being passed on 
to employees.  One airport surface access manager stated that “ideally they would like to 
move away from an annual scheme to a daily charging scheme using swipe card/smart card 
technology. This would make people realise that car parking is part of the cost of running a 
car.  However, there needs to be a strong business case for this and there has been 
management opposition in terms of cost.” (Nottingham East Midlands).  It was stated by 
another surface access manager that “the ideal position would be we [the airport operator] 
could put our money where our mouth is and lead by example. At this stage it’s not going to 
happen because we have the same issues with recruitment and retention as other 
companies.” (Luton).  
At Schiphol Airport, the largest employer, the airline KLM operate a financial incentive 
scheme to encourage employees to travel by modes other than the car.  
“They said to the employees, “we will charge you 65 Guilders each month for a permit, but 
at the same time we will increase the money you get for transport to and from the airport to 
65 guilders.”  It’s then up to the employee to say “well then I’ll bring my pass back.”.”  
This meant that employees continuing to drive were in a finance neutral situation, until car 
park charges were increased at least, while those who switched modes were able to benefit 
financially.  Approximately five percent of employees were thought to have given up their 
parking passes. In addition to KLM it was thought that Martinair and some of the cargo 
handling companies may operate similar schemes.  
At Schiphol the idea of a mobility budget for all employees was raised, whereby employees 
were given money to use on transport, “that is what we would like to do maybe later with 
our staff, to give them a mobility budget then they can choose whether they use it to come in 
by public transport, to park in remote spaces or to park nearer to the office.”  In a similar 
fashion to the KLM scheme, depending on the level of the mobility budget, the prices of 
public transport and the charges for different car parks would mean that those using public 
transport benefited financially while those choosing to park would lose out.  
Similarly, at Luton the surface access manager suggested a scheme whereby charges were 
passed onto employees but at the same time they were given a financial incentive, “I’ve 
suggested that we give people money not to drive to work here but got short shrift. What I 
would like is for the first year we give a one-off payment to all staff and those that choose to 
spend it on car parking spent it on car parking and those that choose to spend it on public 
transport spend it on public transport and from then on in you pay for it yourself whatever 
your choice.”  
There is also an issue where staff are concerned that while the “obvious solution would 
appear to be to concentrate on staff and make parking less attractive”  
(Birmingham), there are a number of problems with doing so.  The following list of issues 
relates to Birmingham International Airport, but several of the underlying factors are 
consistent with all of the airports:  
 The airport exists in an extremely competitive employment market and in an area 
with relatively low unemployment.  The employment market surrounding the airport is 
buoyant and there is a lot of competition for jobs.  
 The Airport is adjacent to a shopping development and is competing in the same 
market for jobs, but working at the airport can be seen as less attractive than these other 
developments with working hours (retail and catering starting at 5am whereas in the retail 
sector it starts at 9am)  
 Accessing the airport is more difficult by public transport than other places of work, 
especially at the hours some people have to work.  
 There are also security issues which are much more important since September 11
th
 
2001. The Government has tightened up on the issuing of passes, particularly airside passes 
and applicants need a 5 year employment history to get an airside pass, something which 
takes time and can result in the applicant finding another job in the mean time.  
 Therefore, and crucially to surface access issues, the one thing the airport can offer 
as an enticing factor is free car parking.  
 
Ring Fencing the Revenue  
At all of the airports revenue from car parking all goes into general airport revenue and any 
public transport or car park improvements are funded from this; no revenue is ring fenced.  It 
was stated that “All the income of airport goes into one big pot and is spent on whatever 
needs to be done.” (Birmingham) and “It is all general gross income, there’s no ring 
fencing.” (Schiphol).  
3.3.3 Introducing a direct charge  
In interviewing the surface access managers the question was asked as to what they 
perceived to be the main issues if the implementation of a direct charge for employee 
parking was to be considered. Two main issues were raised, namely the need for 
consultation and vision.  One of the surface access managers said that it was important to 
“sell the idea to senior management and get the HR department on board as well as the 
union. So the aspiration is there but unfortunately we haven’t put our money where our 
mouth is just at this stage, but I’m sure it will come.”  
(Luton).  
Consultation  
Consultation on the implementation of an employee car parking charge is no different was 
regarded to be important.  At Luton, it was stated that the Airport Transport Forum or 
Surface Access Working Group is seen as an effective forum with respect to consultation, 
“We talk about anything from a minor change to a footpath on site to major schemes on a 
regional or national level that are being brought forward and impact on the airport. We talk 
about all those issues and in addition, employee parking is always the big issue on the 
agenda.” (Luton).  
Vision  
In terms of employee car parking charges it was suggested that there needs to be vision at 
the top. “Top level management needs to be targeted before any change will occur. There 
needs to be a business case for staff charging.” (Nottingham East Midlands). If change is to 
take place then the airport authority themselves need to lead by example.  The opinion at 
Luton Airport was that ultimately a charge will  
come because if it doesn’t then the Council will introduce a measure, such as a workplace 
charge which will also apply to the airport.  It is therefore seen as being in the airports 
interest for them to be somewhat more proactive by introducing a charge in advance so as to 
get people into the habit of having to pay for their space.  Overall it was stated that “We’ve 
got a little bit of a way to go before we can persuade senior manager or director level that 
there’s any benefit in directly charging employees, but it will come.  It will have to.” (Luton) 
and, “The aviation sector is still quite heavily unionised and quite traditional in some ways; 
many people view parking as a right and a lot of people have been working here a long time 
and if that right is taken away it could cause difficulties.” (Luton).  
3.4 Conclusions  
The interviews conducted at the four airports support many of the findings from the 
literature review and offer some new insights.  Some airports, such as Birmingham and 
Nottingham East Midlands, are not yet experiencing any major problems in the area of 
employee car parking but it is likely that as they continue to grow it will become more of an 
issue, as it is at Schiphol and London Luton.  
Alternatives to a car parking charge are in place at all of the airports, but they tend to be 
based primarily on incentives rather than disincentives, encouraging the use of public 
transport, walking and cycling, and car sharing rather than discouraging car use directly.  All 
of the airport authorities impose a charge for staff parking, but this is a charge to obtain a 
permit to park and in the majority of cases this is not passed on to the employee.  As such, 
there is no change in employee travel behaviour which reflects many of the problems of 
offering free parking to employees explored in section 2.15. Shift patterns of work mean that 
employee car parking however is somewhat of a necessity, not least given the provision of 
public transport at certain times of the day and thus a direct charge in such a situation is 
more problematic. While some of the surface access managers would like to move towards 
directly charging employees, there are a number of barriers slowing any progress in this 
area, namely; recruitment and retention factors; having suitable alternatives in place and at 
unsocial hours; a lack of control on non-airport companies on-site, gaining support from top 
level management, and staff acceptance.  
The original research in these areas will be undertaken through the use of benchmarking 
methodology and the benchmarking process which is explored in detail in Chapter 4. The 
findings from the original research will then be used to conduct a benchmarking analysis, the 
outcomes of which will allow for recommendations to be made to BAA, based on the 
experience of good practice organisations, should they decide to introduce a ‘harder’ 
employee car parking measure such as a direct charge or a financial incentive.  
3.5 Aims and Objectives of the Research  
The literature review contained in Chapter 2 and the case studies carried out in Chapter 3 
provide a strong basis for further original research in the area of employee car parking at 
airports. As such the aims and objectives are set out as follows:  
The overall aim of the research is:  
To explore the issues surrounding the potential introduction of a direct employee car 
parking financial incentive or disincentive measure at Heathrow Airport, drawing on 
best practice from specific non-airport organisations.  
The research focuses on the issues that need to be addressed when considering the 
implementation of ‘innovative’ car parking measures, namely a financial incentive or 
disincentive direct to employees, within an airport context.  A detailed case study of 
Heathrow Airport has been conducted along with three case studies of organisations with an 
established car parking strategy from the non-airport sector in order to provide best practice 
experiences.  A benchmarking comparison has been undertaken in order to allow BAA 
Heathrow to learn from the best practice examples.  The objectives of the research are to:  
 investigate the current issues facing airports with respect to car parking;  
 determine the measures currently in operation at Heathrow Airport to reduce car use 
and the demand for car parking by employees;  
 explore the issues that need to be addressed if implementing a financial incentive or 
disincentive employee car parking measure at Heathrow Airport;  
 investigate the innovative strategies being used in the non-airport sector in order to 
manage the demand for employee car parking;  
 explore whether good practice in the non-airport sector can be transferred to an 
airport context and in particular Heathrow Airport.  
 recommend good practice from the non-airport sector that could be implemented at 
airports and in particular Heathrow Airport.  
 
This chapter and the literature review have addressed the following objective as set out 
above:  
 investigate the current issues facing airports with respect to car parking;  
 investigate the innovative strategies being used in the non-airport sector in order to 
manage the demand for employee car parking.  
 
The findings from this chapter, together with the literature review have enabled key areas 
relating to employee surface access and car parking to be highlighted which will be used 
when conducting interviews and focus groups at Heathrow Airport and the non-airport 
organisations. These key areas form the basis for the questions contained in Figures 5.1, 5.2, 
5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 and focus on the issues of implementation, consultation, staff acceptance, 
management support and leadership as well as the actual elements of the parking strategies 
being investigated in terms of what incentives and disincentives are used.  The original 
research to be conducted will fulfil the following research objectives as set out in section 
3.5:  
 determine the measures currently in operation at Heathrow Airport to reduce car use 
and the demand for car parking by employees;  
 explore the issues that need to be addressed if implementing a financial incentive or 
disincentive employee car parking measure at Heathrow Airport;  
 investigate the innovative strategies being used in the non-airport sector in order to 
manage the demand for employee car parking.  
 
Chapter 4. The Concept and Methodology of Best Practice 
Benchmarking  
4.0 Introduction  
The literature review and scoping study have highlighted that as airports grow, congestion 
becomes a major problem with pressure placed on the surface access system and car parking.  
Chapters 2 and 3 have shown that while passengers pay for car parking, it is rare for 
employees to pay, with most employers absorbing the charges imposed by the airport 
authorities.  Offering free parking to staff creates problems, not least because it means that 
employees do not calculate the true cost of driving to work. In the non-airport sector, certain 
organisations have begun to introduce more innovative measures to manage the demand for 
employee car parking. Examples include charging employees to park, restricting the number 
of spaces available and offering a financial incentive not to drive to work.  As airports have 
not yet begun to introduce such measures there are lessons that they can learn from the non-
airport sector.  
Best practice benchmarking is a tool which can help provide a link between the airport 
sector and the non-airport sector.  It is a performance improvement technique that allows 
businesses to improve by comparing processes with other organisations, both between 
industries and within the same industry.  This chapter is split into three sections as follows:  
Part 1 - Defines best practice benchmarking.  The types of benchmarking, namely internal, 
competitive, functional and generic, are described in detail together with relevant examples.  
Part 2 - Explores the potential applications of benchmarking by asking the questions ‘why 
use benchmarking?’ and ‘who uses benchmarking?’  This section also includes an 
investigation via literature of where benchmarking has been used in the airport sector.  
Part 3 – Details the methodology associated with benchmarking.  The link between the 
research and functional benchmarking is explored and the process used when carrying out a 
benchmarking exercise is examined.  The relevance of these adaptations to this research is 
discussed.  Other important considerations when conducting a benchmarking exercise, 
which are relevant to the original research, are explored and the limitations of benchmarking 
are detailed to highlight areas which have to be carefully considered when planning how to 
undertake the benchmarking exercise.  The way in which these issues will be overcome in 
this thesis is also considered. In the research, a benchmarking exercise will be conducted 
between BAA Heathrow and three non-airport sites identified as demonstrating best practice 
in the area of employee car parking.  The chapter concludes with the development of a 
benchmarking process, based on the chapter findings, which reflects the aims and objectives 
of the research. Appendix 1 also contains vignettes of how organisations have adapted the 
steps of the benchmarking process in practice to best suit their needs.  
PART 1: Overview and Introduction to the Concept of Benchmarking  
4.1 Definitions of Best Practice Benchmarking and Justifications for its 
use in the Research  
4.1.1 Definitions of Best Practice Benchmarking  
Best practice benchmarking is a performance improvement technique “through which 
organisations continually review the outputs from their operations and identify ways to make 
changes in their processes so that better outputs result” (Holloway et al., 1998, p.1). The 
essence of benchmarking can be traced to the Japanese word dantotsu, which means striving 
to be the “best of the best” (Camp, 1989).    
Camp (1989, p.10) suggests a formal definition of benchmarking derived from his 
experience and successes of applying benchmarking techniques in the manufacturing sector:  
“Benchmarking is the continuous process of measuring products, services and  
practices against the toughest competitors or those recognised as industry  
leaders.”  
This definition can be broken down and explained further.  To be truly effective, 
benchmarking should be a continuous process to reflect constantly changing industry 
practices. Only organisations who pursue benchmarking with discipline will achieve 
superior performance.  The term benchmarking implies measurement which can be 
accomplished by either comparing internal and external practices and documenting the 
significant differences to highlight the best practices that must be implemented to achieve 
superiority. Benchmarking can be applied to basic products and services and to the processes 
that make up the products and services.  It can be applied to all process practices and 
methods that support getting products and services to customers and meeting their needs, but 
as well as revealing what the industry best practices are it helps to give an understanding of 
how best practices are used. Benchmarking should be directed at functions within firms who 
are regarded as industry leaders and not just at sole product competitors.  The company 
serving as a benchmark partner is not always obvious and careful investigation is needed 
when selecting other organisations. (Camp, 1989)  
The critical characteristic of best practice benchmarking is the examination of processes 
(Francis and Holloway, 2006).  Improved performance can only be pursued effectively once 
there is an understanding of how the inputs are transformed into outputs (Holloway et al, 
1999). For example, having a league table of results does not enable an organisation to 
understand how a better performer achieved their higher position and hence how to move up 
the table (Francis and Holloway, 2006).  Targets are an integral part of benchmarking but the 
concept that there is a best way to do something and once a target has been achieved no 
further changes are needed, is at odds with the dynamic nature of benchmarking (Holloway 
et al, 1999, Francis et al, 2002). Benchmarking results rather than the processes behind them 
may be the right approach for the earliest applications of benchmarking.  Camp (1995, p.15) 
states, “benchmarking is used to improve performance by understanding the methods and 
practices required to achieve world-class performance levels.  Benchmarking’s primary 
objective is to understand those practices that will provide a competitive advantage; target 
setting is secondary.”  
Holloway et al (1999, p.1) offer the following definition which goes further and focuses on 
the importance of examining processes:  
“The pursuit by organisations of enhanced performance by learning from the 
successful practices of others.  Benchmarking is a continuous activity; key internal 
processes are adjusted, performance is monitored, new comparisons are made with 
the current best performers and further changes are explored. Where information 
about these key processes is obtained through a cooperative partnership with 
specific organisations there is an expectation of mutual benefit over a period of 
time”.  (Holloway et al, 1999, p.1)  
The UK Government definition from the Department of Trade and Industry for 
benchmarking is:  
“A systematic approach to business improvement where best practice is sought and 
implemented to improve a process beyond the benchmark performance”. 
(Partnership Sourcing, 1997, p.7 cited in Holloway et al, 1999, p.2)  
Benchmarking can help organisations to improve strategically important processes in theory, 
in practice the efforts are often directed to operational processes which may be easier to 
change, or perhaps even to simply comparing results without considering the processes 
behind them.  This may be a reflection of traditional work practices where the financial 
“bottom line” is the most important factor, as well as a lack of appreciation from managers 
on how to maximise the benefit from benchmarking. (Francis et al., 1999)  
The purpose of benchmarking is to:  
 Analyse the operation – organisations who benchmark must assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of their current work processes and spot areas for improvement.  
 Know the competition and industry leaders – organisations who benchmark must 
find out who is the ‘best of the best’.  
 Incorporate the ‘best of the best’ – organisations who benchmark must learn from 
leaders, uncover where they are and where they are going, learn from the leaders superior 
practices to understand why they work and emulate the best practices.  
 Gain superiority – organisations who benchmark must try to become the new  
 
benchmark.  (Camp, 1995) Benchmarking has many characteristics which are 
summarised into five points to show “what benchmarking is” and “what benchmarking is 
not” shown in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1: What Benchmarking Is and Is Not  
 
A continuous process A one-time event A process of investigation that provides valuable A process of 
investigation that provides simple information answers  
A process of learning from others; a pragmatic Copying or imitating search for ideas  
A time-consuming, labour-intensive process Quick and easy requiring discipline A viable tool that provides 
useful information for A buzzword or fad improving virtually any business activity  
Source: Spendolini (1992, pp. 33)  
Zairi and Leonard (1994) state that benchmarking is the best tool for introducing 
improvements in the strategic planning aspects of an organisation.  Benchmarking links well 
with the ethos of continuous improvement; it can be deployed at all levels within an 
organisation with differing focuses and enables a company to regularly review its 
effectiveness and competitiveness.  
Benchmarking is not only relevant to those companies who wish to become number one in 
their industry. Depending on factors such as the learning curve, the resources committed and 
the pace of achievements, benchmarking can lead to incremental improvements in existing 
performance standards, large improvements by implementing new practices or it can plan an 
important role in the “road to excellence” and “creating a learning organisation”.  (Zairi, 
1994)  
A benefit of benchmarking is that it involves a systematic set of steps (described later in 
section 4.6) which appeals to managers who like clear answers.  This systemised approach 
can make strategy formulation and deployment easier.  A benchmarking project, however, 
must also consider other factors such as organisational interactions before any changes are 
proposed. Organisations must be careful to manage the entire process of benchmarking and 
the area of the business in which it is being conducted and not just focus on following the 
correct series of steps in the process. Successful use of benchmarking within organisations in 
areas of difficult activity can lead to wider benefits in terms of change management and 
organisational learning.  (Zairi, 1994, Francis et al, 1999)  
The notion of “learning” in benchmarking is regarded as important.  The basic objectives of 
learning something new and introducing new ideas into an organisation are fundamental to 
benchmarking always lie behind the planning, organising and analysing activities that define 
the benchmarking experience (Spendolini, 1992). Organisations using benchmarking should 
also have a culture where there is comfort with the notion of comparison and also with using 
the information from benchmarking to understand rather than judge (Trosa and Williams, 
1996).  Hinton et al (2000) state that this culture should be characterised by a desire to 
change processes as well as outputs and there should be a willingness to look externally for 
ideas.  
4.2.2 Justifications for Using Benchmarking in the Research  
The decision to use best practice benchmarking as a methodology for the research was 
linked to the aims and objectives, as set out in section 3.5.  It was important to find a 
technique that allowed for Heathrow Airport to compare and learn from the best practice of 
organisations in other sectors.  Detailed information on processes within the selected non-
airport case study organisations and BAA needed to be gathered.  As such, the more 
traditional methodological techniques used in transport policy studies such as stated 
preference models and surveys were not applicable because they did not meet these 
requirements.  MacLean (2004) states that surveys rarely reveal the richness of information 
that may be available and that they do not probe and question in the same way that a 
benchmarking exercise does.  
An organisational performance improvement technique was required, of which 
benchmarking is one of a number, particularly in strategic areas and in terms of competitive 
advantage (Francis et al, 1999).  Benchmarking is regarded as one of the most effective 
performance improvement approaches currently available (Marie et al, 2005). It is often part 
of a wider quality improvement programme within an organisation and can give such 
programmes more impetus.  For example, Xerox, one of the pioneers of benchmarking have 
a quality programme called “leadership through quality” which consists of the three 
processes of quality, problem-solving and benchmarking.  Such programmes, often referred 
to as “Total Quality Management” (TQM) are considered to have helped the development of 
benchmarking because of their focus on the process and the consumer (Zairi, 1994).     
Successful performance measurement should focus on the means and the results, in other 
words, the processes and the outcomes (Zairi, 1994).  Focussing purely on results can be 
detrimental as an understanding of why different areas of the organisation are successful or 
unsuccessful can not be attained.  Benchmarking allows managers to ask questions about 
results, the performance and the behaviour of process whereas other performance 
improvement techniques do not always allow for this level of depth. In addition, Francis et al 
(1999) state that benchmarking is less threatening than other approaches to performance 
improvement but do not, however, give any reasons for this statement.  
Table 4.2 outlines the reasons for selecting the benchmarking approach as a methodology for 
the research, as opposed to other potential techniques.  
Ian Straker – Airport Car Parking Strategy: Lessons from the Non-Airport Sector Chapter 4: The Concept and 
Methodology of Best Practice Benchmarking  
Table 4.2 
Research  
Justification for Selecting Benchmarking as a Methodology for the  
 
Benchmarking  Rejected Approaches  
Justification for using best practice 
benchmarking • Focuses on processes and not 
just results • Allows for specific processes to be 
investigated in depth • Allows for comparisons to 
be made between organisations • Regarded as 
less threatening than other performance 
improvement techniques • Focuses on finding 
best practice examples  
Other performance improvement techniques – 
e.g. performance management, performance 
measurement • May only focus on results rather 
than processes • Does not focus on finding best 
practice examples “Traditional” transport 
policy techniques – e.g. stated preference 
modelling, surveys • Does not allow for the 
same depth of investigation into processes • Does 
not readily allow for comparisons between 
organisations • Does not focus on finding best 
practice examples  
 
In addition, benchmarking is also the most widely used performance improvement technique 
in airlines and airports (as explored further in section 4.4.1) although its use tends to focus 
on results rather than processes.  That it is used within the aviation industry already, 
however, helps to justify its use.  
4.2 Types of Benchmarking  
Benchmarking covers a range of activities and the purpose and effectiveness of these varies 
between organisations.  This range of practices means that a number of typologies exist. The 
most commonly used and accepted typology is that of internal, competitive, functional and 
generic benchmarking (Zairi and Leonard, 1994, Camp, 1995, Francis et al, 1999, Holloway 
et al, 1999, Hinton et al, 2000).  These four categories have subsequently been expanded 
upon by other authors and a wide range of typologies now exist. These include ‘results’ and 
‘process’ benchmarking (Trosa and Williams, 1996), ‘problem-based’ and ‘process-based’ 
benchmarking (Camp, 1995), ‘compulsory’ and ‘voluntary’ benchmarking (Helgason, 1997 
and Bowerman et al, 2002) and ‘strategic’ and ‘operational’ benchmarking (Camp, 1995).  
Francis and Holloway (2006) state that a range of further typologies and terminologies also 
exist including ‘lateral’ benchmarking, ‘implicit’ benchmarking and ‘co-operative’ 
benchmarking.  They surmise, however, that:  
“The proliferation of typologies is of limited use in helping us understand the 
purposes held for benchmarking, because it tends to lag behind practice. Indeed 
sometimes it is possible to gain the impression that writers are competing to provide 
the ultimate definition or approaching the field from completely separate viewpoints 
that are incapable of integration.” (Francis and Holloway, 2006)  
4.2.1 Internal, Competitive, Functional and Generic Benchmarking  
The commonly accepted typologies of internal, competitive, functional and generic 
benchmarking are defined below along with brief examples of where each has been used:  
 Internal – a comparison among similar operations within one’s own organisation. 
Centre Parcs, an organisation who run holiday parks, internally benchmark their different 
sites against each other on criteria such as occupancy rates.  
 Competitive – a comparison to the best of the direct competitors.  Fairgrounds swap 
safety information, as an accident on a ride at one park could lead to negative publicity for 
the whole industry.  
 Functional – a comparison of methods to companies with similar processes in the 
same function outside one’s industry. BAA (British Airports Authority) undertook a 
benchmarking exercise against Wembley Stadium and Ascot Racecourse as they had the 
shared activities of needing to park, move and feed large volumes of customers.  
 Generic process – a comparison of work processes to others who have innovative, 
exemplar work processes.  Southwest Airlines in the USA wanted to improve their 40 
minute aircraft refuelling time but found they were already industry leaders. They looked to 
exemplar processes in other industries and  
 
benchmarked against Formula 1 motor racing, which led to refuelling times being cut 
to 12 minutes.  (Murdock, 1997, Francis, 2003)  
Surveys conducted by the Open University (Holloway et al., 1999) showed the percentage of 
companies using each of the benchmarking typologies.  The findings are shown in Table 4.2 
and highlight that competitive benchmarking is the most widely used of the four typologies, 
while generic benchmarking is used the least. This is because when looking to improve, 
companies will naturally look to their competitors to attempt to close the performance gap.  
As they are in the same industry their process are more readily transferable.  
Table 4.3: Nature of Benchmarking Activity  
 
Internal 25% Competitive 42% Functional 25% Generic 8%  
Source: Holloway et al., 1999  
The following four subsections give more detail on each of the four types of benchmarking, 
along with examples of where and how they have been used.  
4.2.2 Internal Benchmarking  
Internal benchmarking is when an organisation benchmarks against similar operations within 
the organisation and is often a starting point for any benchmarking project. Internal 
benchmarking assumes that there are different work practices within different parts of an 
organisation and that some departments’ practices may be more efficient and effective than 
others.  It can be particularly useful in large multi-national organisations where the same 
company in one country may be performing better than a sister company elsewhere.  Internal 
benchmarking also aids in documenting an organisation’s own work processes and can act as 
a baseline for any further investigations that may be done as competitive, functional or 
generic benchmarking. The advantages of internal benchmarking are that data can be easily 
obtained, it is reliable and there are no issues surrounding confidentiality, thus it is easier to 
gain cooperation of other departments.  These factors contribute to making the 
benchmarking exercise both effective and efficient. However, the practices found within 
one’s own organisation may not be best practice and care must be taken that any 
organisational bias does not affect the findings. There may be internal problems if certain 
departments are unwilling to share information and data because they believe they have an 
edge over other departments.  It may also be difficult to adopt a totally objective comparison 
through internal benchmarking and cultural differences between departments, customers or 
companies in different countries for example, may make comparisons more difficult.  
(Spendolini, 1992, Zairi and Leonard, 1994, Camp, 1995, Cox and Thompson, 1998, Francis 
2003)  
TNT Express (UK) are a distribution company with approximately 8,000 staff and 350 
locations in the UK who have used internal benchmarking.  Performance measurement is 
widely encouraged within the various depots on things such as invoice queries, credit notes 
issued, debtor weeks outstanding and sales ledger with the information being published in 
league tables.  There is a culture of competition at TNT Express and so league tables are 
regarded as the best way to encourage continuous improvement.  Within the company good 
performance is rewarded and crucially, from the perspective of best practice benchmarking, 
processes producing bad performance are improved through inspiration from the best depots.  
Once a depot becomes the benchmark they are given one star per item measured.  When a 
depot achieves five stars they are rewarded with small financial incentives and if they 
sustain the performance over an unbroken period they are given a further incentive. The use 
of internal benchmarking has contributed to TNT increasing the proportion of deliveries on 
time, reduced the volume of copy notes and reduced the number of misroutes.  (Zairi, 
1998b)  
Shorts, an aircraft manufacturer, represent another organisation who introduced internal 
benchmarking to improve internal work processes and improve cross-functional 
communication.  Benchmarking enabled the best aspects of different business units to be 
emulated throughout the company.  Shorts also used internal benchmarking as a stepping 
stone to further competitive and generic benchmarking as it helped increase familiarity with 
the concept within the company.  (Zairi, 1998a)  
The Nationwide Building Society in the UK began to use internal benchmarking when 
surveys revealed low customer satisfaction ratings in certain areas of the business and severe 
gaps in some of the process flows as its branches. Best practices within the organisation 
were located and catalogued and best practitioner managers were seconded to other branches 
to help bring about changes.  The improvements to the company’s processes resulted in 
savings of £17 million as well as benefits across the business in operational, financial and 
strategic areas.  (Zairi and Whymark, 2000b)  
4.2.3 Competitive  
Competitive benchmarking is when products, services, activities and processes are 
benchmarked against the best of direct competitors in the industry.  Ultimately an 
organisation wants to know its position in relation to its competitors and an understanding of 
work practices in other organisations can help to improve those work practices which do not 
measure up. Within an industry, competing organisations may have many things in common, 
such as the technology used, access to marketing channels, foreign suppliers and so on, and 
so any lessons learned from competitors can be easily translated from one organisation to 
another.  Competitive benchmarking is easier to carry out when information is readily 
available, but when it is not then it becomes dependent on the willingness of competitors to 
share information which may potentially damage their competitive advantage.  (Spendolini, 
1992, Zairi and Leonard, 1994, Camp, 1995)  
Often, the biggest barriers to competitive benchmarking lie within the organisation wishing 
to carry out the project and the fact they view competitors as untrustworthy when it comes to 
providing data.  Many companies realise however that competitiveness depends on carefully 
structured co-operation.  Co-operation between competitors on issues of safety is a 
particularly good example of why competitive benchmarking can be beneficial for a whole 
industry.  A drawback of competitive benchmarking is that other organisations may not have 
practices worth emulating or learning from and therefore care needs to be taken when 
selecting suitable comparator companies and processes.  Benchmarking in this instance will 
identify the competitive gap but to look for superior processes and innovative ideas, 
experience from other industries should be sought. With competitive benchmarking, if 
another organisation’s processes are simply copied then breakthrough actions might not be 
achieved. (Spendolini, 1992, Zairi and Leonard, 1994, Camp, 1995, Cox and Thompson, 
1998, Francis 2003)  
Britannia, a charter airline based in the UK, represent an example of an organisation who 
have begun to benchmark in both an internal and competitive manner.  The example also 
represents some of the concerns that organisations may have over indulging in competitive 
benchmarking.  Britannia introduced benchmarking to its maintenance division when it was 
realised there was a problem in controlling major costs. Initially, an internal benchmarking 
database was established to compare current costs to historical costs and this provided a 
starting point for further benchmarking activity.  Britannia considered talking to direct 
competitors in the UK to be too commercially sensitive so they looked to foreign airlines.  
While Britannia recognised that they did not carry out best practice benchmarking by 
comparing against “best in class” they claimed they learned valuable lessons from the 
process. They state one of the reasons for not carrying out best practice benchmarking is 
because they do not know who the best in class are.  In Britannia’s case, internal 
benchmarking has provided a useful learning experience and a starting point for further 
benchmarking.  (Francis et al., 1999)  
Further examples of competitive benchmarking can be seen in the public sector.  The Court 
Services, an executive agency of the Lord Chancellor’s Department in the UK, used 
competitive benchmarking and found that they focussed on targets rather than those who 
delivered them and their customers, that there was a lack of communication and that 
managers needed to improve their leadership skills to inspire and motivate staff. All of the 
points were taken into consideration and long term strategies were devised along with an 
action plan. Prince Charles Hospital in Merthyr Tydfil, Wales, used competitive 
benchmarking to improve the quality of their patient discharge process by comparing 
processes with four other hospitals to identify best practice. Reorganisation following the 
benchmarking project saved time for patients and their families and allowed resources to be 
used more efficiently.  (Magd and Curry, 2003) Within the air cargo industry, high growth 
rates and the development of integrated carriers has meant that the airline/freight forwarder 
partnership has been unable to keep up as pressure for faster delivery times has increased.  
Lobo and Zairi (1999a, b and c) undertook a benchmarking survey which looked at seven 
airlines and two integrators.  Criteria were set up to assess each company in the areas of 
leadership, strategic quality planning, human resources management, process management, 
quality results and customer satisfaction.  The survey established the leading companies in 
the different areas and some of the key practices used and offered a starting point for the 
companies involved to improve their processes.  
4.2.4 Functional  
Functional benchmarking is when a comparison is made to practices at organisations with 
similar processes in the same function but outside the industry.  With functional 
benchmarking it is the nature of the actual process or activity which is matched, rather than 
the organisation’s business. Benchmarking with organisations from another industry 
overcomes any problems surrounding sharing information with competitors so long as the 
activity is properly introduced and approached in a professional manner with discipline. 
Searching for benchmarking partners to share information within other industries is intensive 
because it is in this class of organisations that the most innovative practices are found. By 
examining practices with a fresh perspective from other industries, new solutions can be 
found to old problems and new innovative approaches can be developed. New practices 
found in other industries may also be easier to implement because their discovery is non-
threatening and they do not reflect badly on the organisation because they were unknown 
prior to benchmarking. Functional benchmarking may also lead to two-way partnerships 
being forged with other organisations, further increasing the opportunities for learning.  As 
functional benchmarking focuses on specific functions, however, then a wider benefit to 
other areas of the business may not always be seen.  Care should be taken when selecting 
companies as the nature of the comparison can be complex, for example cultural or 
demographic factors may have an impact.  (Camp, 1995, Zairi and Leonard, 1994, Cox and 
Thompson, 1998, Francis, 2003)  
One of the most famous examples of benchmarking is the comparison at Xerox of its 
practices to those of L.L. Bean, a company who made outdoor clothing and equipment.  The 
example highlights the role of functional benchmarking.  Xerox benchmarked against L.L. 
Bean because it was found to be a leader in terms of the picking process for assembling 
customer orders.  Although operating in a different industry, L.L. Bean was judged to have a 
similar process to Xerox because the products handled varied widely in shape, size and 
handling requirements.  Research into other companies as suitable benchmarking partners 
revealed that L.L. Bean’s order picking process was three times faster than that at Xerox, so 
they began to benchmark and learn about L.L. Bean’s warehousing and ordering processes.  
The comparison allowed Xerox to realise that the items would have to be picked manually 
and the process could not be automated as had been originally thought.  It also highlighted 
the way L.L. Bean located items within their warehouse to best match the random fashion in 
which they received orders.  This is something which Xerox did not do and which accounted 
for the productivity differences.  (Spendolini, 1992, Camp, 1993 and Camp, 1995)  
Kodak use a mixture of functional and competitive benchmarking in a range of areas, for 
example:  
 Achieving excellence in Quality Leadership Process deployment – Eastman 
Chemicals  
 Achieving ISO 9002 Accreditation – Arkansas Eastman  
 World class packaged goods marketing – Lehn & Fink  
 
• Articulation of the strategic framework – Sterling Pharmaceuticals. Kodak also 
benchmark with a number of other companies including Toyota, Dulux, Ford, BHP and 
Comalcos for specific purposes which range from the concept of “infull, on-time, 
accurately” to briefing processes through multi-layered organisations. The benchmarks aid 
in goal setting and planning.  (Zairi, 1996)  
Other organisations who have used functional benchmarking include Post Office Counters 
Limited, who benchmark internally first across their seven regions in the UK, before looking 
to external best practice organisations.  Post Office Counters Limited have developed a 
database of “best of breed” internal processes, “best of breed” external companies, 
benchmarking partners and benchmarking studies. Another example, Northern Telecom, had 
a primary corporate target of achieving the benchmark in customer satisfaction.  It embarked 
on a functional benchmarking project which surveyed 23 companies from a wide range of 
different industries including aviation, car rental, electrical goods manufacturing and 
packaging.  The survey covered issues of company culture, customer satisfaction policy, 
customer involvement, communications, organisation and people involvement, impact on 
performance and measurement of customer satisfaction. The survey responses highlighted a 
number of areas where Northern Telecom could seek to improve its processes and more in 
depth work was carried out with three of the companies originally surveyed to develop a 
new method of working to help improve customer satisfaction levels. (Zairi, 1996)  
At IBM, the Havant site chose benchmarking partners from other industries who 
manufactured similar electrical assembly products, who were recognised for their expertise 
in areas such as just-in-time production, quality, cost management and feature mix.  
Problems were encountered in selecting the partners, a lack of preparedness on the part of 
the partners and the data used for comparisons.  IBM was still able to gather some useful 
data, however, and the benchmarking exercise helped to improve customer satisfaction as 
well as preventing complacency within the organisation. (Zairi, 1996)  
4.2.5 Generic  
With generic benchmarking there is no search for direct comparability, instead an attempt is 
made to learn from others who have innovative and exemplar processes. The concentration 
of the benchmarking activity is strictly on the process.  The approach is to consider that 
organisations are run on their processes and that many of these processes must have similar 
requirements, no matter what type of operation the company performs or the industry it is in.  
Selecting benchmarking candidates requires thinking outside of the box and innovation 
when searching, thus “the process” has to be considered in its broadest sense.  A difficulty 
with generic benchmarking is that without some creativity and willingness to try and adapt 
new practices, they will be passed off as not readily transferable.  In some instances, 
competing companies from one industry may conduct joint benchmarking projects outside of 
their industry. This applies to functional as well as generic benchmarking. (Camp, 1995, 
Francis, 2003)  
Zairi and Leonard (1994) state that generic benchmarking is related to the processes at the 
very heart of a business and that until an organisation has gone through an evolutionary 
process of understanding and gaining experience from competitive, functional and internal 
benchmarking then it is unlikely that it’s mind set is capable of maximising the benefit that 
generic benchmarking can offer.  
An example of generic benchmarking can be seen in the Remington division of DuPont, a 
large US organisation operating in several markets.  The team from the Remington division 
were acting upon customer requirements for “smoother, shinier shells” for ammunition for 
their leading product, shotguns and rifles.  The benchmarking team developed some good 
candidates in the internal, competitive and functional fields, but decided to concentrate on 
the “smoother and shinier” aspect and highlighted the manufacturers of lipstick containers as 
being the leaders.  As well as being leaders in terms of smoother and shinier, the lipstick 
shells were similar in shape to those produced by Remington.  The team was then able to 
benchmark against lipstick case manufacturers to respond to the customers’ requests.  
(Camp, 1995)  
PART 2: Why do Organisations use Benchmarking?  
4.3 Reasons for Using Benchmarking  
“Benchmarking is emerging in leading companies as an information tool to support 
continuous improvement and to gain a competitive advantage.”  (Bhutta and Huq, 1999, 
p.259)  
A number of reasons exist as to why organisations use benchmarking.  These include: to aid 
strategic planning and develop short- and long-term plans; to aid forecasting and predict 
trends in relevant business areas; to help develop new ideas and enable thinking “outside the 
box”; to allow product and process comparisons and comparisons with competitors or best-
practice organisations, and; to aid goal setting and establish performance goals in relation to 
state-of-the-art practices.  (Spendolini, 1992)  
A survey by Coopers and Lybrand (1994) revealed that three quarters of large organisations 
regarded benchmarking projects to be successful and gave the following reasons:  
 Sets meaningful and realistic targets;  
 Improves productivity;  
 Helps gain new insights;  
 Gives an early warning of competitive disadvantage, and;  
 
• Motivates staff by showing what is possible. As stated by Holloway et al (1998a, p.12), 
“it highlights areas where others are more efficient and gives added impetus to improve 
because others have shown what can be done.”  
Zairi and Leonard (1994) state that organisations win through innovation, uniqueness, 
teaching and through a culture of continuous improvement and learning.  They suggest that 
the concept of benchmarking can act as a catalyst to success and superiority. Anderson and 
Petterson (1995) add that benchmarking emphasises achieving “breakthrough” 
improvements.  These accelerations in improvement and change are usually accomplished 
by introducing new practices to an industry or organisation.  
Benchmarking can be applied to almost anything that can be observed or measured. 
Spendolini (1992) highlights the most commonly explored areas for benchmarking as being:  
 Products and services – focused on the finished goods, product and service features 
of competitors.  
 Work processes – focused on how a product or service is produced or supported, 
rather than what the product or service is.  
 Support functions – focused on indirect labour not directly involved with actual 
production of products or services offered to consumers, such as finance or human 
resources.  
 Organisational performance – outcomes such as costs, revenues, production and 
quality indicators which define an organisation’s bottom line success.  
 Strategy – companies may benchmark organisational or functional strategies to 
understand how other companies gain competitive advantage.  
 
A number of reasons are cited as to why benchmarking is preferred to other performance 
improvement techniques.  Benchmarking can reveal a richness of information, particularly 
when face to face interviews are used.  Compared to other data collection methods such as 
surveys, benchmarking interviews can probe further, extract more sensitive information and 
identify problem areas.  In some cases the best information from a benchmarking study can 
be the lessons learned from failures (MacLean, 2004).  
In this thesis, there are two areas which will be involved in the benchmarking exercise. The 
first is the actual nature of the car parking strategy being used at Heathrow and the non-
airport case studies in terms of which instruments are used to reduce the number of people 
driving to work.  There will also be a focus on how the non-airport organisations have 
implemented employee car parking initiatives and how they have gained staff acceptance. 
Including these issues within the benchmarking exercise will allow Heathrow to learn from 
other organisations who have successfully introduced such strategies.  In this way the 
benchmarking exercise could be viewed as having two streams – one of ‘practice’, focused 
on the actual measures used in the strategy and one of ‘principle’, focused on the process of 
change, the reasons for the implementing the strategy and how it was implemented.  The 
organisations selected will be those identified as ‘leaders’ in terms of the car parking 
measures they have introduced and overall travel planning, although not necessarily as 
leaders in terms of implementing change.  It is believed that by selecting organisations who 
have proved successful in terms of their car parking strategy and travel planning, however, 
that they will provide valuable lessons to learn from not least in the areas of implementation 
and staff acceptance.  
4.4 Where Benchmarking Is Used  
Benchmarking has been used in a wide range of business sectors.  Surveys conducted by the 
Open University revealed the percentage of organisations claiming to be using 
benchmarking in the UK.  The findings, split by sector, are given in Table 4.3.  The figures 
reveal that 43 per cent of organisations in the transport sector claim to use benchmarking, 
which is just below the UK average.  This shows that benchmarking can be considered to be 
a suitable approach to take for the research as it is being used by other companies in the 
transport sector. It can also be viewed as suitable because benchmarking cannot be seen to 
be an exhausted practice within transport, particularly when compared to a sector such as 
utilities and therefore provides an opportunity for original research.  
Table 4.4: Percentage of UK Organisations Claiming to be Benchmarking per Sector  
 
Government  58% 
Education  62% 
Health  69% 
Manufacturing and construction  50% 
Transport  43% 
Financial services  33% 
Services and retailing  36% 
Utilities  78% 
Other  49% 
Average across all sectors  48% 
Source: Holloway et al., 1999  
 
Smith (2000) argues that the adoption of benchmarking techniques has been slower in the 
service sector. The figures in Table 4.3 confirm this to some extent with sectors such as 
transport and retail having the lowest take up of benchmarking.  Other service sectors, 
however, such as health, education and government can be seen to have above average take 
up of benchmarking.  It may be that these sectors are influenced by the regulatory 
environment in which they operate and are required to produce league tables of results 
which would impact on the number using benchmarking (Holloway et al, 1998b). Within 
these figures it must also be remembered that the distinction between benchmarking and best 
practice benchmarking must be considered.  While an organisation may state that they use 
benchmarking, they may just be comparing results rather than processes.  Holloway et al 
(1998a) confirm this, as their survey finds that many organisations place a greater emphasis 
on results rather than process benchmarking.  
When compared to manufacturing firms, service organisations have a number of differences 
which has made it harder to develop comprehensive quality management programmes.  This 
may explain why the take up of benchmarking has traditionally been slower in transport and 
other service industries.  These differences include characteristics in the service sector such 
as simultaneous production and consumption, heterogeneity, perishability and the 
intangibility of the output.  (Smith, 2000)  
Table 4.4 shows the relationship between the size of an organisation and the use of 
benchmarking.  The figures reveal that the larger the company, the more likely it is to 
engage in benchmarking activities.  This finding supports the use of benchmarking at BAA 
Heathrow, which has approximately 3,000 employees.  Other research has shown that more 
than 70 percent of the Fortune 500 companies use benchmarking on a regular basis (Bhutta 
and Huq, 1999).  
Table 4.5: Benchmarking Activity as a Function of Organisational Size  
 
26-99  25% 
100-250  42% 
251-999  53% 
>1000  78% 
 
Source: Holloway et al., 1999  
4.4.1 Benchmarking in the Airport Sector  
Francis and Humphreys (2005, p.99) state that in civil aviation, benchmarking may “offer 
the potential of:  
• providing information to meet the needs of managers and planners in a volatile  
market environment; • offering possible solutions drawn from best practice 
elsewhere in the industry; • offering a means of improving efficiency through learning 
both within  
organisations and between organisations;  
 facilitating effective economic and environmental regulation; and  
 maintaining and improving air transport safety through sharing information and 
knowledge.”  
 
In the airport sector, performance management techniques have long been used to measure 
efficiency, allow alternative strategies to be evaluated and to allow governments to regulate 
airport activity.  They are also used to enable managers to monitor operational performance 
and identify areas for improvement.  The techniques used are wide ranging and often 
quantitative with focus on cost performance, productivity and revenue (Humphreys and 
Francis, 2000).  In many cases they allow only for comparisons to be made rather than for 
the underlying processes to be investigated. For example, Lobo and Zairi (1999a and b) 
carried out a benchmarking exercise with cargo airlines which used qualitative comparisons 
to highlight key benchmarks the industry could use to compare performance.  The use of 
best practice benchmarking can allow airports to understand how better performing airports 
are achieving their superior status.  
Graham (2005) states that it is only within the last 15 to 20 years that benchmarking in the 
airport industry has begun to be accepted as an important management tool. This relatively 
recent take up is because of the increase in business pressures since privatisation and 
because benchmarking was previously viewed as a difficult undertaking due to the range of 
inputs, outputs and the operational environment. Airports no longer regard themselves as 
providers of infrastructure and recognise now the necessity for a wider range of business 
tools, which has led to a growing use of continuous performance appraisal and the use of 
benchmarking.  
Francis et al (2002, p.239) state that benchmarking “is of potential importance to airports 
because of the challenges they face…airport privatisation, commercialisation, congestion of 
airport infrastructure, rapid growth in traffic, the formation of global airport groups, airline 
market deregulation and alliances.”  The challenges posed by the congestion of airport 
infrastructure is an area being addressed in this research and, as such, the fact it has been 
considered by other academics provides justification for the use of benchmarking in this 
area.  
Research into the use of benchmarking by airports was conducted by Fry et al (2005) who 
identified benchmarking as the most commonly used technique for improving performance 
with 72 percent of airports revealing they used benchmarking.  Other techniques being used 
included quality management systems, balanced scorecards, activity based costing, business 
process engineering, total quality management, environmental management systems, value 
based management and business excellence models. As benchmarking allows organisations 
to look at processes rather than just results, this makes it more suitable to the research than 
other performance improvement techniques which would only allow BAA to compare 
results with other organisations and not the processes behind the results.  
The same survey found that the larger the airport, the more likely it was to use 
benchmarking; all responding airports with more than five million passengers per annum 
were almost twice as likely to use benchmarking than those with less than five million 
passengers per annum.  There was a stronger focus on performance measurement rather than 
process improvement with 65 percent using it for this reason. An even balance was found 
between whether benchmarking was used for the comparison of particular tasks and 
activities, or for more general business-wide comparisons.  
It was found that airports almost exclusively benchmarked with similar organisations, almost 
invariably other airports and that some stated that it was difficult to identify suitable and 
willing partners.  It was recommended by the authors that they should look to exemplar 
processes at dissimilar airports or other industries to extract full benefit from benchmarking 
(Fry et al, 2005).  In other research there are few examples of airports engaging in best 
practice benchmarking with organisations outside the airport sector. BAA, however, did 
undertake an exercise by benchmarking car parking processes and passenger throughput 
with similar processes at Wembley Stadium and Ascot race course (Francis et al, 2002).  In 
the airline industry, the “putting people first” strategy adopted by British Airways in the late 
1980’s is a well-documented use of benchmarking to achieve service improvement across 
different divisions of the airline (Francis et al, 1999).  
The use of benchmarking by airports against other airports at a strategic level has been 
reported. Ratings published by the International Air Transport Association allow cross-
airport performance to be compared in a range of airport service performance indicators.  
These ratings offer a starting point for airport management to begin analysing the processes 
generating the figures.  In Europe, the FLAP group (comprising representatives from the 
Frankfurt, London, Amsterdam and Paris airports) have used benchmarking to explore the 
performance measures which cover retail activity (Humphreys and Francis, 2000).  These 
comparisons tend to focus on results rather than processes however. Research has also been 
undertaken to assess the potential to use benchmarking techniques in the design of major 
airports worldwide, although it again focused on quantitative data and measurements rather 
than processes (de Neufville, 1998).  
The use of benchmarking in the airport sector lends support and justification to using it as a 
basis for this research. It is a well established performance improvement tool in the industry. 
The finding that most airports look for comparator organisations within their own industry 
means that the use of non-airport organisations as comparators in this research is a relatively 
innovative approach.  
PART 3: Applying Benchmarking to the Research  
4.5 The Use of Functional Benchmarking  
Functional benchmarking is the most suitable approach to benchmarking the processes 
surrounding employee car parking at BAA with the processes and experiences of non-airport 
organisations.  The organisations chosen from the non-airport sector represent examples of 
best practice in terms of travel planning and car parking strategies. As the processes being 
examined are within the same function of the business but the organisations are from another 
industry they fit the definition of functional benchmarking.  It could be argued that the non-
airport sites selected demonstrate innovative and exemplar processes and hence the nature of 
the benchmarking may be generic.  The distinction between functional and generic 
benchmarking is not always clear; some authors such as Spendolini (1992) consider them 
together.  
The use of functional benchmarking removes fears about sharing information with 
competitors and also allows for a wider range or organisations to be considered as potential 
partners (Holloway et al, 1998b).  This means that there is a greater chance at gaining access 
to the best companies and those that it is ideal to compare processes with.  
4.6 The Benchmarking Process  
This section explores the process of steps to be followed when conducting a benchmarking 
exercise.  A ten step process, which is split into four phases, is described by Camp (1995).  
This is shown in Figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1: The Formal, Ten-Step Benchmarking Process  
 
Source: Camp (1995) The ten steps in Camp’s model can be summarised as follows:  
 Decide what to benchmark – identify the largest opportunity to improve performance 
by identifying the key work processes and prioritising them;  
 Identify whom to benchmark – determine which companies have superior work 
practices that can be adopted or adapted;  
 Plan and conduct the investigation – determine the data needed and how to conduct 
the investigation. Superior practices should be observed first hand and best practices 
documented;  
 Determine the current performance gap – decide how much better the observed work 
practices are than current practices;  
 Project future performance levels – determine the amount by which the performance 
gap will narrow or widen in the near future and the repercussions for the organisation;  
 Communicate benchmarking findings  - to all those who have a need to know to gain 
acceptance and commitment;  
 Revise performance goals – convert findings into operational statements describing 
what is to be improved based on implementation of the best practices;  
 Develop action plans – develop implementation plans, measurements, assignments 
and timescales for acting on the best practices;  
 Implement specific actions and monitor progress – and report to key process owners 
and management;  
 Recalibrate the benchmarks – continue benchmarking and update work practices to 
remain up to date.  Determine the organisations position in its quality pursuit and how this 
impacts on benchmarking activities.  
 
Of the ten steps, Camp considers the first three to be the most important: identifying what to 
benchmark; who to benchmark, and; where to get the data and information. In order to 
identify what to benchmark and how to go about it an organisation must first have a detailed 
knowledge of their own processes and what they wish to achieve (Lee, 2004). Although the 
benchmarking exercise for this research is being conducted from an ‘outside perspective’, 
the work carried out at Heathrow and other airports has led to a detailed understanding of the 
issues surrounding employee car parking and the area to be focused on when benchmarking.  
The final step of Camp’s process is ‘recalibrating’ which is important because over time the 
benchmark will change and organisations must adapt to this.  Other benchmarking processes 
follow a similar pattern, but may not incorporate the 10 specific steps.  The number of steps 
is not important as long as a simple, logical sequence of activity is followed, a heavy 
emphasis is placed on planning and organisation, the benchmarking is customer focused and 
it is consistent within an organisation (Spendolini, 1992, Bhutta and Huq, 1999).  
In Spendolini’s (1992), 5-stage model, shown in Figure 4.2, he includes a step ‘form a 
benchmarking team’ to assign roles and responsibilities to team members so that each person 
is clear on the objectives and project milestones.  While this is not a specific step in Camp’s 
process, it is important at a strategic level to ensure that everything is done to enable 
benchmarking to be pursued effectively.  Members of the team should also ideally have 
benchmarking experience, as should members of the organisation being benchmarked 
(Holloway et al, 1998b).  Vasilash (1994) conducted interviews in which it was revealed that 
two or three was the optimum number of people to conduct a benchmarking exercise.  
Within this research it was not possible to have a whole team dedicated to planning, data 
collection and analysis.  This does not mean that the benchmarking exercise is discredited 
but care must be taken to be open and perceptive when collecting information.  Indeed, it 
may add consistency to the benchmarking exercise which could be lost by having a number 
of researchers.    
Spendolini places more emphasis on the planning, collecting and analysing stages of 
benchmarking and his fifth stage “take action” encompasses all of Camp’s steps from 6 
through to 10 at once. Both models emphasise that once the final stage is reached the 
benchmarking process begins again.  
Figure 4.2: The Five Stage Benchmarking Process  
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Source: Spendolini (1992, p. 48)  
A large number of organisations have followed Camp’s 10 step model when carrying out 
benchmarking. Xerox (the company for which Camp was employed and which is recognised 
as the pioneer of benchmarking) and Kodak both used the same 10 step process as described 
by Camp.  Many other examples including Post Office Counters Limited, the National 
Roads and Motorists Association, Royal Mail, Texas Instruments, IBM UK and BP 
Chemicals have used slight variations of Camp’s model (Zairi, 1996). In some cases, such as 
BP Chemicals, the order of the steps is a little different to that suggested by Camp and in 
others, such as Post Office Counters Limited and NRMA, more steps are allocated to the 
planning stages.  Westland Helicopters used an eight step process when benchmarking 
which was a hybrid of both Camp and Spendolini’s models.  
The process followed when conducting benchmarking is not as simple as copying what 
another company has done or adopting the same methodology.  Despite the development of 
models such as Camp’s and Spendolini’s it is important to recognise that benchmarking 
involves a number of factors such as good interdisciplinary working, top management 
commitment and realistic resources, as detailed in section 4.7, rather than a rigid adherence 
to a list of ‘instructions’ (Francis and Holloway, 2006). The benchmarking process should be 
adapted to each company’s style by considering circumstances specific to them (Bhutta and 
Huq, 1999).  Some companies conducting benchmarking seem to place emphasis on 
following the correct steps according to the textbooks, when more consideration should be 
given to elements such as the organisational culture, communications, personalities and 
competing priorities (Francis et al, 1999).  
Appendix 1 contains four example vignettes of benchmarking exercises all of which have 
been selected because they have relevance to this research.  Examples are chosen from the 
service sector and in one case from the aviation industry.  The examples help to highlight 
where organisations have adapted benchmarking models to best suit their own needs and 
where outside consultants or researchers have aided the benchmarking exercise.  
4.7 Aiding the Success of a Benchmarking Exercise  
In addition to the benchmarking processes detailed in section 4.6, there are a number of 
factors which aid the success of a benchmarking exercise, as explored below.   
4.7.1 Data Collection  
MacLean (2004, p.14) states, “The best benchmarking studies are those that use an initial 
screening technique and then face to face interviews with individuals at the highest and 
lowest levels within organisations.”  This allows the views of top level managers and 
directors, who may put some political spin on their responses, to be contrasted with the 
views of the “ordinary” workers.  It is also important to be able to deliver questions which 
follow up previous answers and then questions which subsequently follow up those answers 
in order to probe the subject area successfully.  
Gathering consistent data across all of the benchmarking visits is important. Developing a 
questionnaire to use during interviews is seen as a good way of ensuring consistent data 
(Anderson et al, 1999). This is something that was carefully considered when planning the 
benchmarking exercise and conducting the visits to the case study organisations and is 
explored in greater detail in Chapter 5..  
4.7.2 Consideration of the Organisation Being Benchmarked  
There are a number of factors to consider about the company being benchmarked, known as 
the benchmarkee, when planning and conducting a benchmarking initiative. Benchmarkees 
have to devote time and resources if they are to host a benchmarking visit.  Therefore, they 
need to gain sufficient value from the exchange.  There are several benefits that an 
organisation can exploit from hosting a visit including:  
 Improved relationships – where benchmarking partners are customers, suppliers or 
business associates, benchmarking exercises can promote relationships;  
 Process audit – being benchmarked allows the benchmarkee to validate the quality of 
its processes or identify areas for improvement;  
 Opportunity for reciprocity – hosting a benchmarking visit can lead to a reciprocal 
visit in the future;  
 Promotion of benchmarking – people inside the company being benchmarked are 
able to witness successful benchmarking in action, and;  
 Morale booster – morale can be increased by being considered as a leading 
organisation. (Langowitz and Rao, 1995)  
 
Langowitz and Rao (1995, p. 58) state that, “Gaining access is undoubtedly the biggest 
hurdle in the benchmarking exchange.”  Exploiting one of the areas listed above is a good 
way of delivering value to the benchmarkee and gaining access. Holloway et al (1998a, 
p.23) conducted surveys and interviews with organisations who had conducted 
benchmarking, in which one manager stated, “What we’ve found is that you’ve got to go 
prepared to trade information, in other words it can’t be a one way issue.”  
In the research, it is not possible to exploit all of the areas listed above, or offer any detailed 
exchange of information because of the outside viewpoint that is being taken. For example, 
it would not be possible to arrange a reciprocal visit to BAA and the opportunities to 
develop business relationships are somewhat limited.  Feedback was however given to 
participants in the research.  Other factors such as the promotion of benchmarking, boosting 
morale and facilitating a process audit could play a part in gaining access to organisations.  
These issues are discussed in more detail later in the chapter.  
4.7.3 The Importance of Consumers  
In the service sector particularly, the input of consumer perceptions to the benchmarking 
process is important.  Unlike a manufactured product, which can be seen and examined, the 
quality of a service is determined by the consumers perception of it (Smith, 2000).  In the 
case of the benchmarking exercise in this research, the consumers are the car park users at 
Heathrow and the non-airport case study sites. Some may choose to drive and use the car 
parking facilities, while some may choose other modes of transport.  Therefore their views 
are valuable to the benchmarking exercise and as such must be included.  
4.7.4 The Importance of a Benchmarking Champion and a Benchmarking Culture  
In an organisation it is regarded as essential to have a knowledgeable and enthusiastic person 
who represents support from top management for the benchmarking initiatives.  This person 
should also have the necessary resources and authority to enable all stages of the 
benchmarking exercise to be completed (Holloway et al, 1998b).  This is supported by 
Miller (2004, p.63) who states, “above all, managers must have heart for the work being 
done”. In terms of the research, there is no true product champion from within BAA, but 
there is strong support for the research being carried out and there will be opportunities to 
gain access to as much relevant data as required.  
This can be extended to the notion of a benchmarking “culture” within an organisation. 
Successful benchmarking is often aided by such a culture, the desire to change processes as 
well as outputs and the willingness to look externally for ideas. (Hinton et al, 2000)  
It is also argued that benchmarking must show direct support for an organisation’s 
objectives, priorities and mission that make up its raison d’etre.  If this is not present then the 
benchmarking activity is wasted effort and so early in the planning process for 
benchmarking, the company’s goals should be considered.  The benchmarking efforts should 
also be prioritised to show that it is focused on the vital few processes that will have greatest 
impact on the company goals.  (Zairi, 1994, Camp, 1995)  
Within the research it is difficult to discuss the importance of a benchmarking culture due to 
the outside viewpoint taken by the research.  It will, however, be possible to ask questions at 
BAA when conducting the benchmarking exercise to ascertain whether there is a willingness 
to look elsewhere to improve the processes related to employee car parking within the 
company.  The benchmarking exercise will show support towards the objectives of BAA, 
with specific attention being paid to the company’s need to reduce the number of people 
who travel to the airport by private car, specifically in the employee sector.  
4.7.5 The Importance of Employees  
It is important to involve employees in the benchmarking process as they are the ones who 
will ultimately use the information gathered (Bhutta and Huq, 1999).  This is something that 
can often be overlooked.  Francis et al (1999) conducted surveys which reported staff 
resistance to benchmarking as being an issue, particularly among larger organisations. In the 
research it is not possible to include employees in the benchmarking process as it is being 
conducted from an outside perspective, but it will be possible to examine employee views 
when conducting the exercise.  
4.8 Limitations of Benchmarking  
Benchmarking covers a broad range of activities and it is possibly for this reason that its 
popularity has been sustained. Some, however, see it as just another management fashion 
with little to indicate why they should adopt it.  Several limitations of benchmarking are 
argued to exist.  These are detailed in this section along with discussion of how they will be 
overcome or minimised in the research.  
There are a number of generic risks, which relate to whether benchmarking is appropriate or 
inappropriate.  They are:  
 Misunderstanding the appropriateness of benchmarking;  
 Selecting an inappropriate set of performance measures;  
 Selecting the wrong benchmarking partners;  
 Failing to gain access to appropriate benchmark data;  
 Misunderstanding the contingent circumstances which support benchmark data;  
 Inability to implement someone else’s best practice;  
 Failing to establish top management support;  
 Potential loss of control of information to competitors;  
 Over-reliance on quantitative data and misunderstanding the underlying reasons for 
the performance measures, and;  
 The benefits derived from playing “catch up” are less than the costs of the  
 
benchmarking exercise.  
(Cox and Thompson, 1998)  
 
The risks listed above and potential ways to overcome them are discussed throughout this 
section.  Most of the risks can be overcome with careful planning of the benchmarking 
exercise.  For instance, “selecting the wrong benchmarking partners”, “over-reliance on 
quantitative data” and “selecting an inappropriate set of performance measures” are all 
problem areas which can be addressed before conducting a benchmarking visit to another 
organisation.  
Surveys conducted by Holloway et al (1998a) asked why some organisations had decided to 
reject benchmarking as a potential performance improvement technique. The problems cited 
included issues of comparability, resource constraints, access, staff resistance and 
confidentiality.  Hinton et al (2000) cite the main reasons as being resource constraints and 
comparability of data.  They also found that those who had rejected benchmarking had made 
informed decisions based on their own unique circumstances and not because of the concept 
in itself.  
4.8.1 Finding “Best” Practice  
Cox and Thompson (1998) question the validity of benchmarking as a rigorous theoretical 
concept, arguing that “best practice” differs for each organisation depending on their 
individual commercial circumstances.  Similarly, by simply describing what companies are 
doing at a particular moment in time, there is no way of knowing whether what they are 
doing is indeed “best practice”, compared to what would constitute best practice in an ideal 
world.  They add that the questions of “what to benchmark” and “who to benchmark” do not 
address the more fundamental issues of “what is it that is wanted in terms of business 
improvement and which tools and techniques are most appropriate to deliver the 
improvement.”  Miller (2004) adds that unquestioning acceptance of ‘best practice’ is 
potentially dangerous and demonstrates a neglect of professional responsibility.  
It may be the case that some companies may not wish to partake in a benchmarking exercise 
and hence the “best” organisations cannot always be benchmarked against. For this reason 
the search for benchmarking partners may be focused on “better practice” rather than “best 
practice.”  Finding benchmarking partners can often be difficult particularly if searching for 
companies who are comparable in terms of size, market conditions and industry, while at the 
same time are sufficiently better to have something to teach others and are willing to share 
the information (Anderson et al, 1999). In the Britannia Airways example discussed in 
section 4.2.3, Britannia stressed that they had not done “true benchmarking” in terms of 
comparing against best in class because they did not know who the best in class were 
(Francis et al, 1999).  
In the benchmarking exercise undertaken in this research “best practice” organisations will 
be sought by consulting best practice guides in the area of travel planning and by talking to 
experts in the field.  It may be that the very best organisations cannot be used because it is 
not always possible to know who they are or because they are unwilling to take part.  It is 
expected, however, to be possible to find organisations demonstrating “better” practice than 
BAA from which BAA can learn.  The use of three non-airport case studies will also allow 
for a range of information to be gathered, thus reducing any potential problems if it is not 
possible to benchmark with the “best” organisations.  
4.8.2 Control of Sensitive Information  
Benchmarking is regarded as inappropriate in some circumstances because it carries risks 
such as the inability to control effectively against losing sensitive data to competitors.  
Surveys have found, however, that this is not viewed as a common problem, mainly because 
experienced benchmarkers are aware of the need to address such issues early in the process 
(Hinton et al, 2000).  From the viewpoint of the company conducting the benchmarking 
visit, it can be difficult to gain access to certain data, particularly sensitive information such 
as finances.  Many also see benchmarking as a mixed metaphor in that it may involve 
cooperating with competitors and if one organisation has an advantage then what is their 
motivation to share information (Cox and Thompson, 1998, Anderson et al, 1999).  This is 
something that will have to be carefully considered in the research.  By explaining that the 
benchmarking exercise is part of a research project not directly related to BAA, it should be 
possible to overcome such issues.  The fact that non-airport organisations are being targeted 
should also reduce any potential problems.  
4.8.3 Implementing Best Practices  
Once the data collection is complete and analysis has taken place there is still the risk of 
failure in implementing somebody else’s “best practice” effectively, usually at a financial 
cost. In reality it does not always follow that processes in one organisation will be readily 
applicable to another.  Benchmarking often assumes that this is the case and may go to the 
extreme of saying if something has worked in one instance, it will work in all circumstances 
(Cox and Thompson, 1998).  Hinton et al (2000a) conducted surveys which discovered that 
comparability of data was viewed as a common problem and that it was not always possible 
to know whether the data being collected would be easily transferable to one’s own 
company.  One respondent stated “are we comparing apples with apples, or apples with 
pears?”  
4.8.4 Playing Catch Up  
It may be the case that when a company attempts to close the gap on current best practice 
they may succeed in catching another organisation in the short term but in the long term they 
fail to stay ahead of the competition because they are unable to innovate or demonstrate 
continuous improvement.  The leading organisation may then improve further and hence the 
company using benchmarking is always in a position of catching up. Zairi and Leonard 
(1994, p.6) state “True leaders never rest. They believe that the more they learn, the more 
they realise how naïve they were.” McAdam and Kelly (2002) add that innovative 
companies thrive on change and the attitude that change is healthy is a key difference 
between leaders and followers. In this sense, market leadership and sustainable competitive 
advantage cannot be gained from benchmarking, it can only ever offer second best.  As 
benchmarking may unwittingly draw companies towards imitation and homogeneity, 
managers have gradually let the importance of operational effectiveness increase over 
strategy.  
There is an argument, however, that looking outside the boundaries of an organisation and 
comparing processes with others enables companies to acquire implied as well as explicit 
knowledge. When integrated with previous internal knowledge of one’s own organisation 
this creates new knowledge which can lead to improvements, creativity and innovations, 
perhaps not even directly related to the benchmarking area.  
4.8.5 Resources  
Elnathan et al (1996) suggest that benchmarking has hidden costs such as the time and effort 
required to coordinate the process and participants so that a comparable set of data is 
gathered and the costs relating to issues such as cultural change or resistance to change by 
those affected or involved. Such costs may be hard to measure and understand. Time is 
considered to be the greatest factor causing resistance to benchmarking (Hinton et al, 2000).  
In addition there are direct costs such as travel which can make a benchmarking exercise 
expensive (Bhutta and Huq, 1999).    
If company directors do not fully understand the time, money and resources associated with 
benchmarking and the benefits it can offer then it may be hard to justify using 
benchmarking.  Similarly, the benchmarkee may not be willing to devote lots of resources 
into hosting a benchmarking visit.  This can lead to problems where process are not 
investigated thoroughly enough, for example if interview time is restricted. (Anderson et al, 
1999)  
Costs can be controlled if benchmarking is approached one step at a time with focus being 
directed at narrow areas rather than wide ranging studies.  If benchmarking visits are well 
planned, there is a detailed understanding of the organisation’s own problem areas and it is 
clear what is wanted from the visit then costs can also be managed more efficiently.  (Bhutta 
and Huq, 1999)  
In the research any issues with getting the benchmarkee to devote resources to the exercise 
will be minimized by explaining to them what is required before conducting the visit. 
Careful planning of the data collection, structure and timing of the visit will further facilitate 
getting the benchmarkee to devote some time to the benchmarking exercise.  
4.8.6 Is Benchmarking the Appropriate Technique To Use?  
It is argued that for benchmarking to be the appropriate management technique to use, there 
must be an understanding of why somebody else’s processes are appropriate to one’s own 
organisation. Benchmarking detractors state that the circumstances that make benchmarking 
appropriate are rarely present and any general rules for benchmarking are unlikely to exist 
because all companies are distinct in their culture and standard operating procedures. As 
most comparative studies do not study similar companies operating within the same 
industrial context, they normally take cases with very different competitive forces in 
operation and where the business drivers are dissimilar (Cox and Thompson, 1998).  This 
limitation can be overcome with careful planning and selection of appropriate organisations 
at the outset of the benchmarking process by basing the selection on appropriate criteria.   
Benchmarking assumes that all organisations want to be the best, when in practice this may 
not always be the case.  Best practice also assumes that there is “a single best way” to 
improve, rather than looking for the most appropriate way depending on an organisations 
circumstances and characteristics (Cox and Thompson, 1998).  As has been mentioned, this 
limitation can be minimized by studying three non-airport organisations to give a wider 
range of findings than focusing on one company.  
On its own, benchmarking does not tell organisations what customers actually want. If a 
product or service becomes obsolete, then no amount of improvements in the production 
processes will make it competitive (Bhutta and Huq, 1999).  This is a limitation which does 
not really affect the research as the demand for employee car parking spaces is likely to 
remain for many more years.  
4.8.7 Specific Risks of Benchmarking  
In addition to the areas discussed thus far, there are specific risks of inappropriate 
benchmarking which may carry a greater severity than the generic risks.  These can be 
summarised as being:  
 The exercise fails to generate the desired business improvements.  
 Competitors play “catch up with you”.  
 Business “fads” are adopted.  
 Potential long term business decline, loss of market share and risks of succession by 
competitors.  
 Loss of credibility with senior management.  (Cox and Thompson, 1998)  
 
4.8.8 General Solutions to Benchmarking Limitations  
Anderson et al (1999) offer some general approaches to overcoming the challenges posed by 
benchmarking, namely:  
 Applying a systematic procedure to scan a large number of potential partners for 
relevance;  
 Seeking support from sources and institutions such as industry associations or the 
media that may be able to help highlight potential partners;  
 Making sure the offer made to companies is attractive, for example by informing 
about processes the benchmarkee is good at and offering return visits, and;  
 Requesting initial performance information about the processes in question before 
selecting partners to ensure that the performance will be sufficiently good enough to offer 
new insights.  
 
Where relevant, these approaches will be considered.  Selection of organisations by scanning 
at a large number of companies and seeking support from “experts” is important and will be 
adopted.  It is also a sensible approach to gather information on the benchmarkee before 
making a final selection decision or visit.  It may not be possible to offer attractive reciprocal 
visits, but it is thought that the outside perspective from which the benchmarking exercise is 
being conducted will remove many barriers in terms of gaining access to organisations.  
4.9 Conclusions  
Best practice benchmarking is a performance management technique which allows 
organisations to learn from other organisations, regarded as best practice, either in the same 
industry or in unrelated industries.  An advantage of best practice benchmarking over other 
performance improvement techniques is that it focuses on the processes which lead to better 
results.  Within the context of the research it is processes associated with the introduction of 
a financial incentive or disincentive car parking measure for employees which are explored.  
This chapter has shown that the concept of benchmarking is being used within the research 
to learn from “best” or “better” practice elsewhere in similar areas and processes. The 
chapter helps to achieve the following objective as set out in section  
3.5 from a methodological perspective:  
• explore whether good practice in the non-airport sector can be transferred to  
an airport context and in particular Heathrow Airport. Further original research and 
the benchmarking discussion and analysis contained in Chapter 8 with further address this 
objective.  
Best practice benchmarking can be seen to be more suited to the area being studied than 
other performance improvement techniques as it looks at processes rather than just results. 
Benchmarking as a technique has been used in the airport and wider transport sector, but at 
the same time its use has not been exhausted and there is still scope for original work.  In the 
airport sector specifically it has been stated that airports could learn from benchmarking with 
dissimilar airports or organisations from a different industry.  
Several benchmarking typologies exist, most notably the distinction between internal, 
competitive, functional and generic.  It is considered that functional benchmarking, whereby 
processes are compared between the benchmarking organisation and the best practice 
organisation, is the type most suited to the research being conducted.  
Additional considerations when conducting a benchmarking exercise have been discussed 
including data collection, consideration of the benchmarkee and the importance of 
benchmarking champions, culture and employees.  These will all need to be considered 
when conducting the benchmarking exercise.  Issues surrounding data collection are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 which addresses the more specific methodology for 
conducting the exercise.  Benchmarking has also been shown to have a number of 
limitations all of which will have to be carefully considered to achieve the maximum benefit 
from the benchmarking exercise.  These limitations are possible to overcome and should not 
restrict the findings of the research.  
Camp’s ten-step benchmarking process has been highlighted as a suitable base model. This 
model has been used by several organisations when benchmarking and has also been shown 
to be adaptable to individual circumstances and characteristics.  This is important for the 
benchmarking exercise in the research and as such a model has been developed based on 
Camp’s ten-step process, as described below in section 4.10.  The nature of the thesis means 
that the latter stages of Camp’s benchmarking process cannot be completed.  
Recommendations can be made to BAA based on the findings of the benchmarking exercise, 
but then the subsequent stages of the benchmarking process cannot be followed through 
within the scope of the research.  
4.10 Developing a Benchmarking Process for the Research  
The model developed by Camp, and variations of it, has been shown to be the most 
commonly used of the benchmarking processes.  A range of companies have taken Camp’s 
model and adapted it to best suit their own needs and individual circumstances.  Camp’s 
model contains more detail than other models, such as that developed by Spendolini, and the 
individual steps in the process appear more clear. For these reasons, Camp’s model forms 
the basis of the benchmarking process used to conduct the benchmarking exercise in this 
research.  Holloway et al (1998a, p.5) “reject the notion that there is a ‘single best way’ of 
developing processes.  This further helps to justify the adaptation of Camp’s model.  The 
adaptation of Camp’s model is shown in Figure 4.3.  
Figure 4.3: The Benchmarking Process Used for the Research  
1. Identify benchmarking subject  
Planning  
1 Identify benchmarking partners  
2 Determine data collection method  
3 Collect data  
4 Determine gaps   
 
 
Analysis  
6. Highlight where improvements could be made  
 
This benchmarking process can be seen to run through the whole thesis.  A great deal of 
emphasis is placed on the planning stages.  As has already been stated, Camp (1995) regards 
this phase to be the most important.  Step one, “identify benchmarking subject” has already 
been addressed in the literature review and findings from the work carried out at selected 
airports. The area of employee car parking and more specifically looking at the use of a 
financial incentive or disincentive measure direct to employees has been highlighted as the 
subject.  The next sections of the thesis, which looks at the choice of case studies and the 
methodology used to conduct them encompasses steps two and three.  The case study 
chapters will detail step four, “collection of data”, and will begin to help determine the gaps 
and highlight improvement areas, which are steps five and six.  Further analysis of the 
findings and analysis between the non-airport case study sites and Heathrow will further 
support steps five, six and also seven as it becomes possible to establish what could be 
improved.  The final recommendations and conclusions chapters will communicate the 
results and make suggestions to BAA, as seen in step eight.  
One thing that cannot easily be covered by the research is the “recalibration” step that 
usually forms the last part of the benchmarking process and includes activities such as 
monitoring benchmarking over time, conducting further exercises and keeping the 
organisation aware of developments elsewhere.  The nature of the research means that it can 
only be suggested that BAA follow this course of action after implementing any changes 
recommended due to the results of the benchmarking exercise; it cannot be carried out in the 
research itself due to time, resource and access constraints.  
Chapter 5. Research Design and Methods  
5.0 Introduction  
Based on the findings from the literature review and the scoping study at the four airports 
together with the process of steps developed from the concept and methodology of 
benchmarking it is possible to develop a research design to address the aim of the research.  
As stated in section 3.5, the research aim is:  
• To explore the issues surrounding the potential introduction of a direct employee car 
parking financial incentive or disincentive measure at Heathrow Airport, drawing on 
best practice from specific non-airport organisations.  
The research objectives are to:  
 investigate the current issues facing airports with respect to car parking;  
 determine the measures currently in operation at Heathrow Airport to reduce car use 
and the demand for car parking by employees;  
 explore the issues that need to be addressed if implementing a financial incentive or 
disincentive employee car parking measure at Heathrow Airport;  
 investigate the innovative strategies being used in the non-airport sector in order to 
manage the demand for employee car parking;  
 explore whether good practice in the non-airport sector can be transferred to an 
airport context and in particular Heathrow Airport.  
 recommend good practices from the non-airport sector that could be implemented at 
airports and in particular Heathrow Airport.  
 
In this chapter various research designs are compared and justification is presented for the 
selection of a multiple case study approach using multiple units of analysis.  The issues of 
quality, validity and reliability within case studies are addressed and the methods used to 
ensure all of these areas are maximised within the research is discussed.  
Details of the chosen cases, Heathrow Airport, Addenbrooke’s Hospital in Cambridge, The 
University of Bristol in Bristol and Pfizer in Sandwich and are presented and their selection 
is justified.  Heathrow is selected because of its position as the largest UK airport, as well as 
one of the largest in the world, coupled with the constraints it is facing in the areas of 
passenger growth, the car parking cap and air quality targets all of which are anticipated to 
create car parking problems in the future. The three non-airport case studies against which 
Heathrow Airport will be benchmarked have been selected because of their recognised 
position of demonstrating best practice in terms of car parking policy and travel planning in 
general.  
The selection of semi-structured interviews and focus groups as data collection methods is 
discussed, the interview and focus group questions are presented and the selection of the 
interviewees and focus group participants is described, both in terms of the individuals and 
the methods of selection.  The data collection methods are also reflected upon to highlight 
potential drawbacks of the research design and it is stated as to how these have been 
overcome.  
The links between the benchmarking process described in Chapter 4 and the research design 
is considered and the various steps of the data collection phase are stated with regard to the 
benchmarking process.  This is followed by a section describing how the collected data will 
be coded and analysed using an interpretative analysis approach, which then allows for the 
findings to be presented and the benchmarking analysis to be undertaken in the subsequent 
chapters of the thesis.  
5.1 Research Design  
5.1.1 Purpose of the Research Design  
The purpose of the research design is to help avoid the situation in which the evidence does 
not address the initial research question (Oppenheim, 1992).  It is the basic strategy of the 
research; a logical framework that guides the investigator in the process of collecting, 
analysing and interpreting observations (Yin, 2003).  The research design is concerned with 
making the problem researchable by setting up the study in a way that will allow for specific 
answers to specific questions.  It also defines whether the findings can be generalised to a 
larger population or to different situations (Bryman, 2001).  
A number of different research designs exist and choosing the best design is a matter of 
appropriateness (Oppenheim, 1992).  Research designs differ from research methods, which 
are focussed on the data collection techniques.  The research methods used are discussed in 
section 5.4.  
Yin (2003) states that the various research designs can all be used for exploratory, 
descriptive or explanatory purposes.  The most appropriate design to use is determined by 
three conditions:  
 the type of research question posed;  
 the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and;  
 the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events.  
 
Each of the main research designs identified by Yin is shown in Table 5.1 in relation to these 
three conditions.  Action research, not selected by Yin but widely accepted as another design 
type, is also included in the table.  They are then explored in greater detail along with an 
assessment of the appropriateness of each design to the research.  
Table 5.1: Relevant Situations for Different Research Designs  
Strategy  Form of Research 
Question  
Requires control over 
behavioural events?  
Focuses on 
contemporary events? 
Experiment  How, why  Yes  Yes  
Survey  Who, what where how 
many, how much  
No  Yes  
Archival analysis  Who, what where how 
many, how much  
No  Yes/No  
History  How, why  No  No  
Action Research  How, why  No  Yes  
Case study  How, why  No  Yes  
 
Source: based on Yin, 2003  
5.1.2 Rejected Strategies  
Experiments are typically conducted to test specific hypotheses about causal relationships 
between different phenomena (Orum et al, 1991).  An experiment requires the researcher to 
manipulate an independent variable in a direct, precise and systematic manner in order to 
determine whether it has an influence on the dependent variable. The use of experiments was 
not considered to be suitable for the research because the research question requires an 
investigation into how and why certain actions were taken, or need to be taken, within the 
organisations being studied without the researcher having any direct control over those 
actions.  In reality, organisations may not readily permit intervention within their processes.  
Experiments also take a bounded view of phenomena (Fellows and Liu, 1997) which could 
restrict the ability to view the organisations being studied in a manner consistent with the 
research question.  
Surveys are methods of collecting data from large numbers of people who represent a 
population, or a random sample of a population, and generally rely on a standardised set of 
questions (Orum et al, 1991).  The data is usually collected at a single point in time and is 
then examined for patterns of relationships between variables (Bryman, 2001). Within the 
research a high degree of understanding of the processes related to car parking and the 
introduction of a car parking charge is required to enable findings to be transferred from 
non-airport organisations to Heathrow Airport.  Due to their focus on “what” and “how 
many” type questions it was felt that a survey would not allow this depth of understanding to 
be generated or a diverse set of factors to be fully explored. It was also assumed that there 
would be relatively few people within Heathrow Airport and the non-airport organisations 
with a sufficiently great knowledge of the issues addressed by the research question to 
enable survey results to be of any real meaning.  
The analysis of archival records is advantageous when the research goal is to describe the 
incidence or prevalence of a phenomenon, or when it is to be predictive about certain 
outcomes (Yin, 2003).  It was considered unsuitable as a research design for the thesis as it 
does not allow ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions to be readily addressed.  
Histories rely on primary and secondary documentation as well as cultural and physical 
artefacts for evidence and are a preferred method of research design when there is virtually 
no access or control. Their contribution lies mainly in dealing with the “dead” past when 
there are no relevant people alive to report what happened.  The use of histories was not 
considered applicable to the research being conducted because of the lack of focus on 
contemporary events.  
Action research is an approach in which the researcher and a client collaborate in the 
diagnosis of a problem and the subsequent solution to the problem (Bryman, 2001). The 
researcher becomes part of the field of study and so action research can help to overcome 
any confidentiality issues.  The use of action research to address the research question would 
prove difficult, firstly because of gaining access to work within an organisation and secondly 
because it would require participation in multiple organisations all included in the research.  
5.1.3 Case Study  
Case studies allow an investigation to maintain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
real life events (Yin, 2003). It entails the detailed exploration of a case and can contain many 
methods of data collection (Orum et al, 1991; Bryman, 2001). Case studies are often 
associated with a location, such as a community, organisation, city or a role (Orum et al, 
1991; Bryman, 2001).  Exponents of case studies generally favour qualitative methods as 
they are regarded as useful in developing a detailed and intensive examination of the case 
(Bryman, 2001).  To this end, Orum et al (1991) define case studies as using only qualitative 
research methods, although do recognise that quantitative modes can play a useful role.  
Case studies can either be single-case or multiple-case (Bryman, 2001; Yin, 2003); this is 
discussed in section 5.2.3.  
As stated earlier, three types of strategy can be distinguished between with all the research 
designs: exploratory; descriptive, and; explanatory (Yin, 2003).  In terms of case studies, the 
descriptive case study is an attempt to describe something which has happened. It is often 
considered a less prestigious strategy as it is merely a matter of observation and reporting, 
but is also argued that there is no description without analysis and interpretation.  
Exploratory case studies are subject to the same arguments.  Explanatory case studies are 
viewed by some with extreme scepticism but can be extremely useful when studying 
processes in companies (Gummesson, 2000).  
The case study approach was selected as an appropriate research framework because of the 
following strengths:  
 Case studies have a high exploratory potential and allow “how” and “why” questions 
to be posed (Yin, 2003). This is important for the research being conducted with regard to 
understanding the reasons for change in employee car parking at Heathrow Airport, likely 
impacts of a change and the way in which changes to car parking strategy have been made at 
the non-airport organisations.  
 Their holistic approach allows for real life contemporary events and natural everyday 
events to be focussed upon (Orum et al, 1991; Cavaye, 1996; Yin, 2003).  
 They do not require control over behavioural events (Yin, 2003).  
 A case study allows for highly descriptive and in-depth investigations of situations 
and processes.  This is essential when focussing on the issues at Heathrow Airport and 
seeking to address them by analysing organisations in the non-airport sector.  
 They allow a range of data collection methods to be used to contribute to the overall 
case study and can be conducted over a period of time (Orum et al, 1991; Gummesson, 
2000; Bryman, 2001).  This aids the research because it allows the processes and issues 
under investigation to be fully explored and a more holistic study to be conducted. Decisions 
and the effect of the decisions over time can be observed.  
 Case studies, in a similar way to other qualitative research, lend themselves to 
theoretical generation as well as generalisation. They allow new interpretations and concepts 
to be suggested and can generate new ideas and theories (Orum et al, 1991; Cavaye, 1996).  
The benchmarking approach taken in the research and its integral use within the case studies 
is supported by the theory generation advantages of case studies.  
 
Case studies are not without their disadvantages however and there are some criticisms of 
this research design.  Case studies are sometimes regarded as having a lack of rigour and 
care has to be taken not to allow equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the 
findings (Yin, 2003).  This criticism is addressed in section 5.2, along with concerns over the 
validity of case study research.  They are often regarded as providing very little basis for 
scientific generalisation; this is particularly the case when there is only a single case study 
(Orum et al, 1991; Cavaye, 1996; Yin, 2003). The use and merits of single- and multiple-
case studies are addressed in section 5.2.3. Like experiments, case studies are generalisable 
to theoretical propositions but not to populations or universes. Case studies also take long 
periods of time and can result in large unreadable documents, although this does not have to 
be the case (Yin, 2003). Orum et al (1991) raise the concern that case studies may not cast 
light on propositions derived from prior research. The use of case studies in this research is 
not intended to test theory however, it is to facilitate a comparison of processes.  
5.2 Case Study Research Design  
This section explores in more detail the case study as a research design.  The influence of 
benchmarking on the research design is also documented.  
5.2.1 General Approach to Designing Case Studies  
As stated in section 5.1.1 the research design is a logical framework that guides the 
investigator in the process of collecting, analysing and interpreting observations.  For case 
studies, five components of a research design are particularly important:  
 A study’s questions;  
 Its propositions, if any;  
 Its unit(s) of analysis;  
 The logic linking the data to the propositions; and  
 The criteria for interpreting the findings.  (Yin, 2003)  
 
The nature of the study questions have already been addressed throughout section 5.1, with 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions highlighted as the most relevant to the research overall. The case 
study’s propositions direct attention to the areas that should be examined and begin to tell 
the researcher where to look for relevant evidence (Yin, 2003). Table 5.2 provides an 
overview of the case study propositions for both Heathrow Airport and the non-airport case 
study organisations.  These propositions facilitate the development of specific and more 
detailed interview and focus group questions presented in Figures 5.1 to 5.5.  The 
propositions also help to highlight the benchmarking process in that the situation at 
Heathrow Airport is to be compared to that at non-airport organisations. The unit(s) of 
analysis is related to defining what the “case” is, whether it be an individual, and 
organisation or a process (Darke et al, 1998). The tentative definition of the unit of analysis 
is related to the way in which the initial research questions have been designed (Yin, 2003).  
The initial questions for this research are related to the implementation of a car parking 
charge for employees and so the unit of analysis is the process surrounding such an 
implementation within the organisations being examined.  The choice of organisations to be 
examined and the individuals within those organisations are discussed in section  
5.3 and 5.4. Within this research the use of best practice benchmarking helps to shape the 
case studies and interpret the findings.  Similar areas are examined in a number of case 
studies which allows for an understanding of the best practices and ultimately their relevance 
to the situation at Heathrow Airport.  Finally, there are no set criteria for interpreting the 
findings of case studies but patterns arising from the case studies should reveal similarities 
and differences which allow for overall conclusions to be drawn (Yin, 2003).  
Table 5.2: Case Study Propositions  
 
Why is there a car parking problem? What is the current car parking situation? 
Why does the car parking situation need to be What was the original problem which required a  
improved? change in strategy? 
What is currently being done to rectify the How was the situation rectified? 
situation? 
 
What new strategies could be implemented? How was the new strategy implemented? 
How could new strategies be implemented? What problems had to be overcome? 
What impact would new strategies be likely to What was the impact of introducing the new  
have? strategy? 
 
5.2.2 Judging the Quality of a Case Study Research Design  
The quality of a research design can be assessed according to some logical tests. Four 
common tests are used to establish the quality of any empirical social research (Bryman, 
2001; Yin, 2003).  Three of the four tests relate to issues of validity which can be thought of 
as the extent to which researchers are able to use their method to study what they had sought 
to study (Gummesson, 2000).  The other relates to reliability which is the ability to repeat 
the study using identical procedures and obtain similar results; the main aim is to minimise 
the biases and errors in a study (Orum et al, 1991; Gummesson, 2000; Yin, 2003).  Yin 
(2003, p.34) summarises these four tests as follows:  
 Construct validity – establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being 
studied.  
 Internal validity – establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are 
shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships (for 
explanatory or causal studies only and not for descriptive or exploratory studies).  
 External validity – establishing the domain to which a study’s findings can be 
generalised.  
 Reliability – demonstrating that the operations of a study, such as the data collection 
procedures, can be repeated, with the same results.  
 
Case studies have some distinct advantages over other research designs in terms of validity.  
They enable the investigator to assemble complementary and overlapping measures of the 
same phenomena meaning that cross checks can be made to validate observations. This is 
known as triangulation (Orum et al, 1991; Stake, 1995). Triangulation can take the form of 
data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation and methodological 
triangulation (Fielding and Fielding, 1986). Within the research the triangulation of data 
sources is the primary type used and includes asking different interviewees the same 
question, incorporating alternative and independent sources of information such as external 
reports and by observing first hand some the areas under investigation.  Ultimately, 
triangulation increases the researchers confidence in the findings and helps when imparting 
information to a final audience (Fielding and Fielding, 1986).  
External validity, also referred to as generalisability, is one of the main concerns of case 
study research and questions surround the issue of how can one case study lead to general 
findings (Bryman, 2001).  This issue and the use of multiple cases studies in the research is 
addressed later in this section.  
Each of the tests is shown in Table 5.3 along with recommended tactics and the measures 
that were used for this research.  A case study database was developed to catalogue all data 
and communications to enable the case studies to be managed efficiently. This has not been 
formally included in the thesis as it was a mechanism to personally manage information 
rather than to be presented for any analysis. Confidentiality issues regarding the names of 
interview respondents and focus group participants also determined that this information did 
not need to be presented.  
Ian 
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5.2.3 Types of Case Study  
Yin (2003) identifies four types of case study, differentiated depending on whether they are 
single- or multiple-case and embedded or holistic, as depicted by Table 5.4.  
Table 5.4: Basic Case Study Designs  
 Single-Case Designs  Multiple-Case Designs  
Holistic (single unit of analysis)  
Type 1  Type 3  
Embedded (multiple units of 
analysis)  Type 2  Type 4  
 
Source: Yin, 2003  
Single and Multiple Cases  
Distinguishing between single- and multiple-case design is the primary decision to be taken 
in case study design before any data is collected (Yin, 2003).  A multiple-case study 
approach is most suited to the research being carried out in the thesis.  In total there are four 
organisations involved in the research.  The reasons for this and the selection of the four case 
study organisations is discussed in section 5.3.  The evidence generated by multiple-case 
designs is often considered to be more compelling, thus making the overall study more 
robust and providing greater analytic benefits. They overcome the problem of “putting all 
your eggs in one basket” which is often levelled at single-case designs. In studying more 
than one case, the external generalisability of the findings is far greater than with single-case 
designs (Darke, 1998; Bryman, 2001; Yin, 2003).  In addition every case should have a 
specific purpose within the overall scope of the investigation; this is discussed throughout 
section 5.3.  
Holistic and Embedded Case Studies  
Each individual case study may involve one unit of analysis, known as a holistic case study 
design, or it may involve multiple units of analysis, known as an embedded design. A unit of 
analysis is a subunit, or subunits, within a case which is given specific attention. A holistic 
design can be advantageous when no logical subunits can be identified, but can also lead the 
investigator to conduct the case study at an abstract level and the entire nature of the case 
study can shift during its course without the researcher realising. Embedded designs 
overcome such problems but problems can arise if only the subunit level is focussed upon, 
without an appreciation for the overall case. (Yin, 2003)  
At Heathrow Airport the reasons for requiring a change to the current car parking strategy 
are being investigated along with an examination of potential strategies and their likely 
impact. These areas are the units of analysis and so the case study can be seen to be 
embedded. At the three non-airport case studies, the focus is on how and why a new parking 
strategy was introduced, it’s impacts, with attention to areas such as consultation, the 
implementation strategy and staff acceptance.  This again highlights that the case studies are 
embedded.  
Overall, the basic design of the case study approach in the thesis is Type 4, as identified in 
Table 5.4. There are multiple cases, involving multiple units of analysis.  
5.2.4 Replication Logic for Case Studies  
Each case should be selected so that it either predicts similar results or predicts contrasting 
results, but for predictable reasons (Yin, 2003).  The three non-airport case studies selected 
to provide best practice lessons to Heathrow Airport were chosen because the output of each 
was similar, in terms of achieving a reduction in the number of employees parking their cars 
at the site, but the specific details of the strategies used at each site were different.   The 
identity of each individual case was rigorously maintained throughout the research, although 
the final recommendations will draw upon all case studies. The use of best practice 
benchmarking within the research means that an in-depth cross-case comparison between the 
non-airport case studies is not necessary because their role within the thesis is to provide 
best practice suggestions to airports based on their individual experiences.  
In terms of replication logic, each individual case study consists of a “whole” study in which 
convergent evidence is sought regarding the facts and conclusions for the case.  
The conclusions are then considered to be the information requiring replication by other 
individual cases (Yin, 2003). The framework utilised for conducting each individual case 
study in the research was the same in all cases to ensure that the same areas were 
investigated at each site to the same level of detail.  This is described further in section 5.2.6.  
The number of case studies to conduct in a multiple-case design is a matter of discretionary 
and judgemental choice (Yin, 2003) and depends firstly on how much is known about the 
phenomenon after studying a case and, secondly, on how much new information is likely to 
emerge by studying further cases (Cavaye, 1996).  The selection of Heathrow Airport and 
the specific three organisations chosen as non-airport case studies is discussed and justified 
in section 5.3. It is worth considering at this point, however, why three non-airport case 
studies were selected.  It was felt that three investigations into how organisations had dealt 
with employee car parking issues would allow for a range of lessons to be gathered and 
possibly to begin to show similarities in terms of the approaches taken.  Yin (2003) states 
that multiple-case designs facilitate more powerful conclusions because of replication logic.  
Selecting just one or two organisations may have led to the recommendations simply 
reflecting the strategies suitable for those particular organisations in isolation, but selecting 
three organisations revealed elements of commonality, or indeed demonstrated that there 
was no commonality at all and hence no overall recommendations of good practice. Within 
the resource constraints of the thesis, any more than three non-airport case studies would 
have presented financial, physical and time difficulties which would have outweighed the 
benefits of conducting the additional research.  
5.2.5 Case Study Research Design Flexibility  
While the design of a case study and the decisions to be taken at the outset are important, a 
case study can be modified by new information and discoveries during data collection 
without threatening the rigour with which procedures are followed. Where necessary this can 
allow for the original design to be altered as long as the nature of the alteration is 
understood; is it simply a selection of different cases or a more fundamental change to the 
original theoretical objectives.  
5.2.6 Case Study Action Plan  
The issues surrounding replication together with the tests for validity and reliability, as 
explored in section 5.2.2 and Table 5.3, necessitated a case study action plan to be devised. 
The structure of the plan, based on the literature and research propositions helped to focus 
the data collection and analysis within each case.  It ensured that the format, type and 
methods used between cases was consistent, so that any generalisation was more powerful 
and so that the benchmarking exercise was carried out in a fashion which reflected the 
benchmarking process developed.  By explicitly specifying the methods used in data 
collection, the action plan addressed concerns about repeatability and reliability.  
The plan was devised at the outset of the field work, although minor changes were made to it 
to reflect the actual course of events.  An outline of the plan is shown in Table 5.5. Creswell 
(2003) highlights the importance of the initial approach and seeking the acceptance of a 
‘gatekeeper’.  Discussions with this main contact person should focus on why the site was 
chosen, what activities will occur at the site during the research period, how results will be 
reported and what they will gain from the study. The selection of the interviewees and the 
‘gatekeeper’ at each organisation is detailed in section 5.4.2  
Table 5.5: Outline of Case Study Action Plan Developed for the Research  
Action Plan Elements Content / Actions  
Initial Contact • Make contact with individuals to enquire about the possibility of undertaking 
research within their organisations.  
• A “main” contact was generally highlighted.  
Data Sources  • Target the individuals within the organisation who were of interest to the 
study and approach them to gain their participation.  The  main contact was 
often central to this contact.  
Timetable • Establish a timetable for conducting interviews.  
• Establish a timetable for conducting focus groups (Heathrow Airport  
only).  
Main Interviews / Focus • Checklist of questions to be covered during the interview.  
Groups 
• Checklist of questions and areas to be covered in the focus groups  
(Heathrow Airport only). Documentation • Suggested documents to be sought 
from the interviewees.  
Source Material Log • Cataloguing and handling of all collected data to make them available for analysis.  
5.3 Research Cases  
This section details the selection of the case studies.  Four cases studies were chosen for 
investigation; Heathrow Airport and three non-airport organisations.  It is argued there are 
no ideal number of cases (Darke et al, 1998) although it is suggested that more replications 
give greater certainty (Yin, 2003).  While the three non-airport organisations were studied 
separately, the findings will be compiled so that Heathrow can use the benchmarking 
process to learn from a range of experiences.  Within each case study several interviews 
were conducted and at Heathrow Airport, focus groups were also conducted. The selection 
of interviewees is detailed in section 5.4.2.  
When approaching the organisations highlighted as potential case studies, the aims and 
objectives of the research formed the basis of the discussion as to what the study would 
entail. Creswell (2003) states, “the idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select 
participants or sites that will best help the researcher understand the problem and the 
research question”.  It was also recognised that the research questions need to be interesting 
to the participant organisations (Darke et al, 1998) and so this was also considered to some 
extent when selecting.  
5.3.1 Selection of Heathrow Airport  
As was detailed in the introduction to the thesis, Heathrow Airport is the UK’s largest 
airport and the world’s busiest in terms of international passengers.  It is also facing an ever 
increasing problem of demand outstripping supply for car parking.  This, combined with the 
Government imposed parking cap associated with the development of Terminal Five, the 
environmental pollution limits placed upon the airport and the pressure to grow, both from a 
business perspective and for the benefit of the national economy, means that the problems 
facing car parking are greater than at any other UK airport. Therefore, it was the prime 
airport for study.  Heathrow was also selected for some pragmatic reasons, namely that there 
was awareness of the problem among certain BAA managers and it was an area in which 
they were interested in research being conducted. It was also important to consider financial 
limitations, due to the numerous visits that were required to conduct the research.  As such a 
UK airport was more suitable than an overseas choice.  Even without this willingness for 
research to be conducted and financial restraints, however, Heathrow would have been a 
primary choice for this area of research.  
5.3.2 Selection of Non-Airport Organisations for Case Studies  
The literature review in Chapter 2 and scoping interviews in Chapter 3 revealed that other 
airports had not seriously addressed any issues to do with employee car parking. Therefore, 
three non-airport organisations that exemplified best practice in terms of car parking policy 
or travel planning were selected as case studies.  The decision to investigate three case 
studies was taken so that a range of experiences could be explored, but without the original 
research becoming too large and unmanageable. Criteria were drawn up to enable a 
structured selection as listed below.  These criteria were informed by the Department for 
Transport (DfT, 2000) for the selection of good practice case study sites and by advice from 
academic experts in the field of travel planning. Department for Transport employees and 
publications, academic experts in the field and industry publications “Travel Plan News” and 
“Parking Review” were consulted when selecting the non-airport organisations.  
The criteria developed stated that the organisations needed to:  
 Have monitored travel plan/parking strategy effectiveness;  
 Have achieved a reduction in car use;  
 Exemplify aspects of best practice in travel planning;  
 Have experience that is relevant to others;  
 • Be comparable to BAA Heathrow, in terms of:  
 o Confined space on site;  
 o Shift workers;  
 o Range of car park users;  
 o Size of organisation (employees);  
 o Commitment to travel plans.  
 • Where possible be recognised as being leaders, through:  
 o Awards gained;  
 o Inclusion in guides and document detailing best practice organisations.  
 Encompass a range of measures in their travel plan/parking strategy.  
 
Based on these criteria Addenbrooke’s Hospital in Cambridge, The University of Bristol and 
Pfizer in Sandwich were selected as suitable case study organisations.  All of the 
organisations are regarded as examples of best practice by the Department for Transport and 
both academic and non-academic experts in the field.  The three organisations also represent 
different approaches to dealing with their specific car parking issues, namely a direct daily 
charge to employees at Addenbrooke’s Hospital, a permit allocation system based on need 
coupled with a daily charge related to salary at Bristol and a financial incentive scheme at 
Pfizer.  All three of the selected case study organisations have different approaches to their 
car parking strategy and so having this range allowed for various measures to be 
investigated.  Pfizer was also regarded by the aforementioned experts to be the outstanding 
leading example in the UK in terms of its approach to travel planning and so from the 
perspective of learning from best practice it was regarded as a highly desirable comparator 
organisation. When approaching the organisations it was clearly stated that the research 
being carried out was for the purposes of an academic thesis so as to help overcome any 
issues surrounding the control of sensitive information.  
Table 5.6 explores in detail the similarities and differences between each of the three 
organisations and BAA Heathrow.  
Table 5.6: Organisations Selected and their Similarities and Differences to Heathrow 
Airport  
Similarities to BAA Heathrow  Differences to BAA Heathrow  
Addenbrooke’s Hospital  
 Constrained location  
 High proportion of shift workers  
 High proportion of relatively low paid “blue collar” employees  
 Range of users – staff, patients, visitors, suppliers  
 Range of different employers on site  
 Not footloose in terms of location  
 Time critical operation  
 Union representation of employees  
 Large number of employees  
 Operates in a competitive market  
 
The University of Bristol  
 Located in a residential area with good walking and cycling opportunities  
 Required by Government to introduce an employee parking charge, rather than voluntary decision  
 Public sector organisation  
 
 Constrained location  
 Planning constraints  
 Lack of car parking spaces led to action being required  
 Union representation of staff  
 Large number of employees  
 Not footloose in terms location  
 Different users – staff, students  
 Operates in a competitive market  
 Private sector organisation  
 
Pfizer  
 Only one major employer  
 Located in city centre with good walking and cycling opportunities  
 Only staff allowed to park  
 Staff working hours are relatively flexible  
 Low proportion of shift workers and “blue collar” workers  
 Operation is not time critical  
 
•  Relatively constrained location  • Only one employer  
•  Large number of employees  • Operation is not time critical  
•  Site has a large impact on the surrounding area  • 
Union issues not so prominent  
 and road network  • Employees account almost entirely for all  
•  Congestion and pressure on the transport   parking provision  
 network led to action being required    
•  Requires transport for most employees to reach  
  
 site    
•  High proportion of “blue collar workers”?    
•  Operates in a competitive market    
•  Private sector organisation    
 
5.4 Research Methods and Data Collection  
Research methods are the techniques used for data generation and collection (Oppenheim, 
1992). Within case study research there are those who view them as essentially qualitative 
studies (Orum et al, 1991) and those who highlight the mixture of both quantitative and 
qualitative data that cases can produce (Yin, 2003). Qualitative methods are an array of 
interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate and come to terms with the 
meaning, rather than the frequency, of phenomena (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991).  
5.4.1 Choice of Methods  
Table 5.7 outlines the range of research methods available within organisational research. 
Orum et al (1991) states that the instruments used should be appropriate, valid and reliable.  
Table 5.7: Main Research Methods in Organisational Research  
Methods  
 Self administered questionnaire  
 Interview – structured, unstructured and semi-structured  
 Participant Observation  
 Structured Observation  
 Documentation and archival records  
 Other minor methods e.g. simulation and physical artefacts  
 
Source: Adapted from Easterby-Smith et al, 1991; Bryman, 2001; Yin, 2003  
Self administered questionnaires and structured interviews were rejected on similar grounds 
to those presented for surveys in section 5.1.2 in that they would not allow for an in-depth 
understanding of issues or the ability to allocate more attention to specific areas during the 
interview.  Participant and structured observation was not feasible, as the issues being 
investigated required an understanding of the car parking processes specific to four 
organisations which would have been demanding on time and financial resources Heathrow 
Airport and the three non-airport case study organisations.  
Semi-structured interviews and documentation were identified as the main methods for 
providing relevant data.  The semi-structured interviews allowed for the flexibility required 
while also ensuring that the specific areas of interest were fully explored. This (see section 
5.2.2) enhanced the internal validity of the research.  Focus groups were also conducted at 
Heathrow Airport (see section 5.4.3) although not at the non-airport organisations as it was 
felt that the interviewees were able to give a comprehensive account of the staff reaction and 
feelings towards the car parking measures and because of pragmatic reasons, namely that 
BAA Heathrow were prepared to offer resources to assist in conducting focus groups at the 
airport.  
Documentation was used to provide scene setting information, statistics and to aid in the 
verification process. Ethnography, broadly defined as interpreting data from understanding 
the viewpoint participants at a site assign to a phenomenon (Cavaye, 1996), was not used in 
an analytic way. Although site visits occurred there was not any prolonged period of 
working alongside participants which could potentially have biased the objective position 
taken and hence the overall findings.  
A research diary was kept throughout the study, recording calls to contact persons and 
interviewees, interview and focus group bookings, dates and times of interviews.  All data 
collected, whether interview, focus group or documentation was catalogued.  
5.4.2 Interviews Semi Structured 
Interviews  
The interviews were semi-structured in nature.  In a semi-structured interview the 
interviewer has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered and hence some 
control, but the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to reply. Questions do not 
have to follow the exact way they are laid out in the interviewers schedule and additional 
questions may be asked throughout the course of the interview.  Generally all of the 
questions the interviewer has on their schedule will be asked and they will be fairly 
consistent from interviewee to interviewee.  (Bryman, 2001; Creswell, 2003)  
Semi-structured interviews differ from unstructured interviews where the interviewer may 
have a brief set of prompts or perhaps just one question and the respondent answers freely 
with the interviewer picking up on new avenues for questioning as they progress.  Structured 
interviews are more similar to a questionnaire or survey style approach whereby the 
respondent has relatively little leeway to discuss beyond the boundaries of specific questions 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1991, Bryman, 2001).  
The reasons for conducting semi-structured interviews were threefold.  Firstly because there 
was a clear focus on what should be investigated, as derived from the research objectives.  
Therefore specific issues needed to be addressed and a semi-structured approach allowed for 
them to be covered in a logical fashion within the course of the interview.  The second 
reason was because the interviewees needed to be allowed a certain amount of freedom to 
discuss certain areas and to elaborate on factors and discuss what they felt was most 
important.  Finally, a multiple-case approach was being used and hence comparability across 
cases was required.  Cross case comparability also reflects the nature of benchmarking, 
whereby the same processes need to be examined within each comparator organisation.  
The interviews were all conducted face to face at the interviewees place of work, which also 
allowed for a visit to the site.  Creswell (2003) states that qualitative research that takes 
place in the natural setting allows the researcher to develop a level of detail about the 
individual or place and to be more involved in the experience of the participants.  Interviews 
were recorded onto minidisc, this is discussed in section  
5.4.4. All lasted approximately one hour, the shortest was 45 minutes and the longest one 
hour and 20 minutes, and were split into various sections to be covered.  The same schedule 
of questions was used at each of the case study sites, with minor modifications being made 
to suit the individual characteristics of each site and the interviewees area of expertise.  The 
interviews were conducted by first introducing the research and its aim. The interviews 
began with some introductory questions about the respondents personal travel to work 
preferences and their role within the organisation, followed by more in-depth questions on 
specific themes.  These tended to be both direct and indirect in nature depending on the 
information requirement and were usually then supplemented with follow up, probing and 
specifying types of question (Bryman, 2001).  The interviews and meeting were conducted 
in a way which allowed for some social interaction, rapport and trust to be developed with 
the interviewee which enabled questions to be answered more freely and openly.  This is 
regarded as important by Jones (2004) who states that the interviewee should be able to trust 
the interviewer if they are to provide high quality data.  Care was taken to avoid bias when 
asking questions, often regarded as crucial in interviewing, although it was recognised that 
due to the complicated and shifting process that exists between two individuals there can 
never be exact replication between different interviews (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991; Jones, 
2004).  Where respondents had expertise in specific areas, more attention was given to these 
topics.  The interview questions for Heathrow Airport are shown in Figure 5.1, 
Addenbrooke’s Hospital in Figure 5.2, The University of Bristol in Figure 5.3 and Pfizer in 
Figure 5.4.  
Figure 5.1: Interview Questions for Heathrow Airport  
Travel to Work Questions  
General introductory questions about interviewees travel to work choices.  
1) Current Employee Car Parking Situation  
What are your views on the current employee car parking situation at Heathrow? (with regard to  
capacity, congestion, security, permit allocation) 
What do you perceive to be the main problems (if any) with employee car parking? 
 
2) The Future – Is there a need to change?  
Do you think more needs to be done to reduce the number of employees driving to work? Why? 
Do you think action needs to be taken to change the current employee car parking practices? Why? 
What are your views on the statement “the problem will sort itself out”? 
What are the main drivers to changing the current employee car parking strategy? 
What would you perceive to be the main barriers to any change? 
If there were no stringent restrictions on environmental pollution or an imposed parking cap, what do 
you think the airport would do? 
 
3) Parking Charge  
Do you think the introduction of a direct car parking charge for employees would be successful in 
reducing the number of people driving to work? 
What factors would contribute to its success or failure? 
Do you think the introduction of a parking charge would have any negative impacts? 
Do you think employees should have to pay directly for their car parking? Why? 
Do you think the current system, whereby most employers absorb parking charges, is sustainable? 
Do you think this system is equitable? (e.g. non-drivers do not get the same benefits)  
Would a charge have a big enough impact in order to achieve the T5 cap, and environmental pollution 
limits? 
What do you think would act as a greater deterrent to driving to work – a charge or a lack of available  
spaces? 
Are there any other measures you think would be effective in reducing the number of employees  
driving to work? Would a combination of measures work? 
 
4) Staff Acceptance  
What do you think the staff reaction would be if they had to pay to park?  
Do you think that the introduction of a parking charge would impact on recruitment and retention? 
Staff focus groups revealed that the high proportion of shift workers was likely to be a large barrier to  
any changes to the current car parking due to the lack of alternatives available, particularly at 
inconvenient times - how do you see any problems in this area being overcome? 
Do you think revenue hypothecation from employee car parking would help to gain staff acceptance? 
Do you think the alternatives in place at present are good enough to support the introduction of a direct 
parking charge? If no, how much improvement is required and in which areas? 
 
5) Implementation  
What would you regard as being the most effective way of introducing an employee parking charge at 
Heathrow? (e.g. gradual or big bang, all staff or only a selection of staff etc)  
Do you think it is possible for Heathrow to learn from “best practice” elsewhere? (either airports or  
non-airport companies, for example hospitals and universities)  
What factors have to be considered that are specific to Heathrow? 
If a strategic change such as the introduction of an employee car parking charge was decided upon,  
what would your role be in its introduction? 
How important do you think it is that top-level managers and directors fully support any new strategy? 
 
6) Consultation  
If an employee parking charge was to be introduced, how would the consultation process be organised? 
Who would need to be involved? 
Are there any similar examples of such policies that have required airport wide consultation? How  
have these worked? 
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Are there any established bodies to aid with such consultation?  
7) The Way Forward  
What do you think is the way forward in terms of the airport’s need to reduce the number of employees driving 
to work?  
Figure 5.2: Interview Questions for Addenbrooke's Hospital  
Travel to Work Questions  
General introductory questions about interviewees travel to work choices.  
1) The Travel Plan a) Overview of the 
travel plan:  
What is the main aim of your travel plan? 
What are the key elements of the travel plan? 
What is the scope of the travel plan? (i.e. does it include staff, visitors, patients, deliveries)  
When was the travel plan introduced? 
Was there any formal strategy in place before? 
What prompted you to develop a formal travel plan? 
 
b) Implementation of the travel plan:  
Were the different elements introduced all at once or in stages? 
If implemented in stages, in what order were they introduced? 
What was the reason for this approach? 
Who drove the introduction of the travel plan (top down)? 
 
2) Incentives – Sustainable Transport Modes  
What provision has been made as part of your travel plan for the following sustainable transport modes?  
a) Public Transport  b) 
Cycling c) Walking d) Car 
sharing  
What methods are used to encourage car sharing? (i.e. preferential treatment)  
Currently how many staff are involved in the scheme? 
How is the car sharing scheme regulated? 
Have you experienced any difficulties in regulating the scheme? 
How have these difficulties been dealt with? 
 
How are these sustainable transport modes funded? 
 
3) Disincentives - Car Parking Charges a) 
Overview of the car park system:  
How many people do you currently employ?  
How many staff parking spaces do you have?  
Where are staff permitted to park? Are staff car parks separate to visitors/patients, or combined? 
Are any members of staff allocated a reserved parking space? 
 
b) Parking charges:  
Why was it decided to use charges to manage the demand for car parking? 
Were other techniques considered? 
What is the actual charge and has it increased since it was first introduced? 
Is there an annual review of the charge amount? 
Does every member of staff pay the same? Or does it vary? (e.g. income related?)  
Is anybody exempt from the parking charge? 
How is the charge paid (e.g. cash, payroll deduction) and is it based on daily, weekly, monthly or 
annual usage? 
 
c) Revenue:  
How much revenue is generated through the parking charges and how is this money used?  
d) Enforcement:  
How do you control access to staff car parks? Specifically what technology is used? 
How is this technology used to enforce the parking charges? 
Have you experienced any abuse of this system? 
Are there penalties for non-payment of charges? What are they? 
 
e) The level of consultation involved:  
Who was consulted prior to the charge being introduced? How 
long was the consultation period?  
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Is there any on-going consultation?  
f) Acceptance:  
What was the staff reaction to the idea of parking charges prior to their introduction? 
What was the staff reaction to parking charges when first implemented? 
Did you encounter any unexpected issues? (e.g. off-site parking) 
How were any problems overcome? 
What is the staff reaction now? 
Are managers included in the scheme - do they support it? 
Can individual members of staff be monitored? 
Is this an acceptance issue? If so, how was it overcome? 
 
g) Administration and costs:  
How is the parking charge scheme administered? 
How much time does this take? 
How much does the scheme cost to administer each year? 
Capital costs, maintenance costs, administration costs…? 
Are there members of staff devoted to administering the parking strategy/travel plan? 
What are the staff time costs in terms of planning and implementation? 
 
4) Effectiveness  
How is the effectiveness of the travel plan measured? e.g. modal shift  
Since the introduction of the travel plan, what targets have been set? 
Have these targets been achieved? 
If the targets have not been achieved, what do you think the reasons for this are? 
If the targets have been achieved, do you know how much is attributable to parking charges, and how 
much to the introduction of other measures (e.g. improved public transport, car sharing etc)? 
Do you believe there still to be an issue of too many employees travelling to work by car? 
 
5) Future  
Are any enhancements/changes planned to the current travel plan elements?  
e.g. Are there any plans to reduce the number of staff car parking spaces? If so, when will this occur  
and by how many? 
What targets have been set for future progress? 
 
Do you have any recommendations that you would make to other organisations considering introducing 
parking charges?  
Figure 5.3: Interview Questions for the University of Bristol   
Travel to Work Questions  
General introductory questions about interviewees travel to work choices.  
1) Parking Overview  
Can you give a brief outline of how car parking permits are allocated, and the distinction between the 
different categories? 
Roughly what proportion of staff are included in each of the three categories? 
Are any members of staff allocated an individual/reserved space? 
Are all staff entitled to at least a category C parking pass? 
In terms of category B, how does the point system work whereby staff are judged on set criteria? 
Have you experienced any problems with the point system approach? (e.g. appeals)  
If so, how have these problems been overcome? 
Are these dealt with in an individual basis? 
How do other businesses/residents in the area fit in with your parking management? 
Do you share any car parks with other organisations? 
 
2) Parking charges and permits  
Why was it decided to use charges to manage the demand for car parking? 
Were other techniques considered? 
Is anybody exempt from the parking charge? (i.e. disabled) Why are these groups exempt? 
Why was a salary based charge adopted? 
How is the £10 annual charge paid? (cash or payroll deduction)  
Can you explain how the daily scratch card system works? 
Where are the scratch card permits bought from, and how are they paid for? (cash, payroll deduction -  
weekly, monthly, annually.) 
In what quantity can permits be bought? 
How are the scratch cards delivered to staff? 
 
3) Enforcement  
Do you control access to staff car parks in any way (e.g. barrier equipment?)  
How is the parking charge system monitored (e.g. manually – check correct parking category and proof 
of payment?)  
Have you experienced much abuse of the system? 
How are university staff found to be abusing the system dealt with? 
Do you have any issues with non-university staff parking in university car parks? 
If yes – how is this dealt with? 
Have you experienced any issues with off-site parking? Is this a major problem? 
 
4) Consultation  
What process of consultation did you go through prior to the charge being introduced? Who was  
consulted? 
How long was the consultation period? 
Is there any on-going consultation? 
What role does the Travel to Work Implementation Group (TWIG) play?  
How useful was the consultation process in gaining acceptance? Is there anything you would have 
done differently in hindsight? 
What was the most valuable outcome of the consultation? 
Did you experience anything unexpected? 
What recommendations would you give to other organisations introducing the charge in term of 
consultation? 
 
5) Implementation and Acceptance  
What was the staff reaction to the idea of parking charges prior to their introduction? 
What was the staff reaction to parking charges when first implemented? 
What were the advantages of a ‘big bang’ approach to introduction? 
in terms of its acceptance  
in terms of its ease of implementation 
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Were alternative modes of transport in place before the charge was introduced? How important was  
this to gain acceptance? 
What is the general staff reaction to the charge now? 
Do you believe the parking charge to be an issue for recruitment and retention? 
How have any negative attitudes been overcome? 
Do you think the salary based charge is more acceptable than a standard charge? 
What are the main factors in gaining acceptance from staff? 
Is the scheme supported by top-management? How important do you regard this to be? 
How important is the role of a ‘project champion’ in gaining acceptance? 
 
6) Targets and Progress  
What methods are used to conduct the staff travel survey?  How often does this take place? 
Do you have to achieve targets as part of your travel plan? 
What are these targets? How are they set? 
Have these targets been achieved? 
If the targets have not been achieved, what do you think the reasons for this are? 
If the targets have been achieved, do you know how much is attributable to parking charges, and how 
much to the introduction of other measures (e.g. improved public transport, car sharing etc)? 
Are the car parks currently at or near capacity? 
If parking spaces are in short supply, what acts as the greater deterrent to driving – lack of space or 
parking charges? 
Do you believe there still to be an issue of too many employees travelling to work by car? 
 
7) The Future  
Are any enhancements/changes planned to the current car park strategy? 
Are there any plans to reduce the number of staff car parking spaces? 
Will the percentage charge amount be reconsidered in the future? 
What targets have been set for future progress? 
 
Do you have any recommendations that you would make to other organisations considering introducing 
parking charges? 
 
Figure 5.4: Interview Questions for Pfizer  
Travel to Work Questions  
General introductory questions about interviewees travel to work choices.  
1) The Travel Plan a) Overview of the 
travel plan:  
What is the main aim of your travel plan? 
What is the scope of the travel plan? (i.e. does it include staff, visitors, patients, deliveries)  
When was the travel plan introduced? 
Was there any formal strategy in place before? 
What prompted you to develop a formal travel plan? 
 
b) Implementation of the travel plan:  
Were the different elements introduced all at once or in stages? 
Which elements of the travel plan were introduced first? 
What was the reason for this approach? 
Who drove the introduction of the travel plan (top down)? 
 
2) Incentives – Sustainable Transport Modes  
What provision has been made as part of your travel plan for the following sustainable transport modes?  
a) Public Transport  b) 
Cycling c) Walking d) Car 
Sharing  
What methods are used to encourage car sharing? (i.e. preferential treatment)  
Currently how many staff are involved in the scheme? 
How is the car sharing scheme regulated? 
Have you experienced any difficulties in regulating the scheme? 
How have these difficulties been dealt with? 
 
e) Other Strategies  
Local recruitment drives Home working/compressed working week Video conferencing Cash payments instead 
of company cars  
How are these sustainable transport modes funded?  
3) Parking Cash Out  
a) Overview of the car park system:  
 
How many people do you currently employ?  
How many staff parking spaces do you have?  
Where are staff permitted to park? Are staff car parks separate to visitors/patients, or combined? 
Are any members of staff allocated a reserved parking space? 
 
b) Parking cash out:  
Why was it decided to use cash out to manage the demand for car parking? 
Were other measured considered? (e.g. parking charges?)  If so, why were they discounted? 
How does the parking cash out scheme operate? 
Does every member of staff receive the same amount of money? 
Does the scheme differ for shift workers? 
Is anybody not included in the cash out scheme? 
 
c) Administration and costs:  
How is the parking cash out scheme administered? 
How much time does this take? 
How much does the scheme cost to administer each year? 
Capital costs, maintenance costs, administration costs…? 
Are there members of staff devoted to administering the parking strategy/travel plan? 
What are the staff time costs in terms of planning and implementation? 
 
d) Enforcement:  
Chapter 5: Research Design and Methods  
How do you control access to staff car parks? Specifically what technology is used? 
Does the car parking pass use the same technology as staff ID/security passes? 
How is this technology used to enforce the parking cash out scheme? 
Have you experienced any abuse of this system? 
Are there penalties for abuse? What are they? 
 
e) The level of consultation involved:  
Who was consulted prior to the cash out scheme being introduced? 
How long was the consultation period? 
Is there any on-going consultation? 
How is the staff travel survey conducted? 
How often are they carried out and how are the results used? 
 
f) Acceptance:  
What was the staff reaction to the idea of parking cash out prior to its introduction? 
What was the staff reaction to cash out when first implemented? 
Did you encounter any unexpected issues? (e.g. people parking in town then using shuttle buses?)  
How were any problems overcome? How was the scheme marketed? 
What is the staff reaction now? 
Are managers included in the scheme - do they support it? 
Can individual members of staff be monitored? 
Is this an acceptance issue? If so, how was it overcome? 
 
4) Effectiveness  
How is the effectiveness of the travel plan measured? e.g. modal shift  
Since the introduction of the travel plan, what targets have been set? 
Have these targets been achieved? 
If the targets have not been achieved, what do you think the reasons for this are? 
If the targets have been achieved, do you know how much is attributable to parking charges, and how 
much to the introduction of other measures (e.g. improved public transport, car sharing etc)? 
Do you believe there still to be an issue of too many employees travelling to work by car? 
 
5) Future  
Are any enhancements/changes planned to the current travel plan elements and the cash out scheme in 
particular? (e.g. cash for home working)  
Is the cash out scheme being extended to satellite sites? 
Are there plans to develop a parallel system for contractors to the site? If so, how? 
Are there any plans to reduce the number of staff car parking spaces?  If so, when will this occur and  
by how many?)  
What targets have been set for future progress? 
Is it intended at some stage to introduce car parking charges on site? 
 
Do you have any recommendations that you would make to other organisations considering introducing 
parking cash out? 
 
Selection of Interviewees  
Table 5.5, the Case Study Action Plan, detailed the elements involved in conducting the case 
studies.  The first two stages were to approach a “main” contact at each organisation and 
then target the individuals within each company who were of significance to the study.  At 
each of the case study sites the individuals listed below were selected to be interviewed.  The 
codes after their positions are to allow for attribution of quotes in Chapters 6 and 7.  
BAA Heathrow:  
 Head of Change & Communication, Planning & Environment (main contact) (BAA 
1);  
 Interim Human Resources Director (BAA 2);  
 General Manager Commercial Transport Team, Retail (BAA 3);  
 Planning & Environment Director (BAA 4);  
 Head of Group Accommodation, Property (BAA 5).  
 
All of these five individuals were considered to be central to the introduction of any new 
parking scheme at Heathrow and covered a range of key decision makers from different 
departments within BAA.  All of the interviewees, excluding the Interim Human Resources 
Director were involved in the current operation of car parking at the airport.  
Addenbrooke’s Hospital:  
• Service Development Manager (main contact) (Add 1).  
The Service Development Manager at Addenbrooke’s Hospital heads the Service 
Development team, within the Estates and Facilities Department, and is responsible for site’s 
strategic access planning. He also originally wrote the Hospital’s Travel Plan.  
The University of Bristol:  
 Assistant Director – Facilities (main contact) (UoB 1);  
 234 Car Share Manager (UoB 2);  
 Security Office Administration Clerk (UoB 3);  
 Energy and Environmental Manager (UoB 4);  
 Payroll Manager (UoB 5).  
 
The main contact at The University of Bristol is responsible for delivering the Travel Plan 
and its associated car parking strategy. The other four interviewees all play an important role 
in this delivery including security, administration and finance.   
Pfizer:  
 Consultant on Travel Planning (main contact) (Pfi 1);  
 Parking Cash Out Administrator (Pfi 2);  
 Community Relations Manager (Pfi 3).  
 
The main contact was previously employed full time by Pfizer to produce and deliver their 
Travel Plan and its associated car parking strategy.  He now works as a consultant to the 
company in this area.  The other interviewees roles include dealing with the day to day 
operation of the car parking scheme and with the local communities, councils and authorities 
to deliver the Travel Plan and parking strategy.  
Supplementary Staff Travel Interviews  
At the non-airport organisations, wherever possible, shorter interviews with staff were 
conducted to briefly discuss their travel to work habits and see what impact, if any, the 
introduction of a new car parking strategy had had upon them.  Again these interviews were 
semi-structured in nature, allowing some flexibility.  They comprised of only a few short 
questions and were conducted over the telephone or in person, taking approximately three to 
four minutes each.  While these discussions proved insightful, they must be treated with 
some caution. For example, at Pfizer the discussions were prearranged by the main contact 
and there was a strong respondent bias towards non-car modes of transport.  
It was not necessary to conduct such interviews at Heathrow as more formal focus groups 
were organised and covered similar issues in much greater depth.  
5.4.3 Focus Groups  
Focus groups are a method of interview which involves a group of interviewees. They often 
emphasise a specific theme which is explored in great depth (Punch, 1998; Kitzinger, 2004). 
They allow the interviewer to see how individuals respond to other responses from the 
group, follow up areas of interest and allow the group to discuss interviews amongst 
themselves.  This gives focus groups certain advantages over normal interviewing as 
respondents can be queried or supported by other group members and views may change 
throughout the course of the session as topics are discussed by the participants. Focus groups 
allow the interviewer to see how individuals collectively make sense of a phenomenon 
(Bryman, 2001).  They also allow large amounts of data to be collected from numerous 
respondents quickly and they are very flexible in their ability to cover a range of topics with 
a variety of individuals (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990).  
Focus groups should have some structure, but be more like a steered conversation. The 
interviewers skill as an initiator, facilitator and moderator is important when conducting 
discussions. The task of the group moderator is not to conduct interviews simultaneously, 
but to facilitate a comprehensive exchange of views in which all participants are able to 
speak their minds and respond to the ideas of others.  It should be remembered however that 
social pressures may affect the responses given and some participants may not be 
comfortable (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991; Punch, 1998). Prior to the focus group being 
undertaken an opportunity was taken up to observe “travel to work” focus groups being 
conducted at Heathrow Airport.  
Focus groups are not without their disadvantages however.  They give the researcher less 
control than in an individual interview situation and there can be problems with extracting 
the views of reticent speakers, particularly when compared to those who are more dominant.  
Focus groups also produce a large amount of data which can be difficult to firstly transcribe 
and secondly analyse.  They can also be difficult and time consuming to organise and there 
is no guarantee that participants will turn up (Bryman, 2001).  The generalisability of results 
can also be restricted by the focus group method, firstly because having a small number of 
respondents limits the applicability to a larger population and secondly because the 
responses of different individuals are not independent of one another and the group can be 
biased by some members (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990).  
The aim of the focus groups was to investigate staff opinions on the current car parking 
situation at Heathrow, whether they were aware of the pressures facing the airport and to 
explore their opinions on some potential new strategies to help resolve car parking problems.  
Focus Group Timetable and Arrangements  
Easterby-Smith et al (1991) state that care should be taken when choosing a venue and that it 
should be relaxing for participants so that they are fully able to air their views. As stated in 
section 5.4.2, conducting qualitative research in the natural setting allows for the researcher 
to develop a greater level of detail (Creswell, 2003).  The “Airport Commuter” bus, a 
refitted double decked bus, was made available for a period of two days by BAA for use 
when conducting the focus groups.  The bus allowed for up to 12 people to be seated and for 
refreshments to be served.  It also added a “novelty” value to the focus groups which was 
thought to help a little when recruiting and was especially useful when explaining to 
participants where the groups would take place. Using the bus also meant that focus groups 
could easily be conducted in different areas of the airport, thus helping to attract more 
people at times and locations when it was convenient for them.  The bus, it’s timetabling and 
locations were all organised by BAA.  
Over two days, seven focus groups were arranged, which was felt to be suitable to gain a 
wide appreciation of the main issues, while at the same time being a manageable number.  
There is also a view about focus groups that once it is possible to predict what the next 
group is likely to say then enough focus groups have been conducted (Stewart and 
Shamdasani, 1990; Bryman, 2001).  Six of these took place on the bus and a further focus 
group was conducted at Heathrow Point West with only BAA office staff. This group was 
conducted in a comfortable and relaxing medium sized meeting room.  Each group lasted 
between 60 and 75 minutes.  
Selection of Focus Group Participants  
Participants for the focus groups conducted on the bus were selected from a list of names 
provided by BAA which they collected while carrying out ongoing survey work for other 
purposes shortly before the focus groups were conducted.  In the survey, respondents were 
asked if they would be willing to participate in focus group discussions in the future. It was 
considered that these people would be a good population from which to draw participants 
because they had shown interest in taking part and because they had already answered initial 
questions in the survey on similar topic areas.  
Those who expressed an interest in participating were contacted by telephone three weeks 
before the focus groups were conducted.  Each person was contacted up to three times over 
the space of a week until a response was obtained.  A reminder telephone call was made two 
days before the focus group was scheduled.  Incentives were offered to those who attended 
in the form of £10 vouchers provided by BAA to be used in the shops at the airport as a 
method of increasing participation.  
It is stated that the typical focus group size should range from six to twelve participants 
(Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990; Morgan 1997; Bryman 2001).  It was the aim over the 
seven groups to attract an average of eight participants to each group. To allow for those 
who could not make it or forgot to attend, the aim was to enrol 16 participants for each 
group in the belief that approximately half would attend.  In total 98 people were signed up 
to attend the groups, of which 48 attended, an average of 7 per group. The smallest group 
comprised four people and the largest group ten.   
The members of each group are shown in Table 5.8 and the codes assigned to each group are 
to allow for the attribution of quotes in Chapter Seven.  Focus group members represented a 
range of organisations and professions across the whole airport site including BAA staff, 
both office based and front line, security companies, airlines, retail outlets, police, traffic 
wardens, passenger services and cargo.  The six focus groups conducted on the bus consisted 
of five groups for car users and one group specifically comprising public transport users.  
The groups were split in this way so that different opinions could be explored in greater 
depth.  Having one group dedicated to public transport users reflected the modal split of 
those who responded to the questionnaires. The focus group with BAA office staff at 
Heathrow Point West were recruited using internal email.  
 
 
IT (x2) Finance (x2)  
Planning Property (x2) 
Airport Commuter One person did not state role or company 
Human Resources  
 
The discussion questions used in the focus groups are shown in Figure 5.5.  A small number 
of questions were used in order to stimulate discussion and to allow the participants to fully 
explore each issue.  When necessary there was additional input from the facilitators to either 
move the discussion forward or to further investigate certain opinions and statements.  
Figure 5.5: Focus Group Discussion Areas for Heathrow Airport  
1a) Are you aware of BAA’s efforts to reduce car use? 
1b) For what reasons do you think Heathrow are trying to reduce car use? 
 
2a)  What are your views on the current employee car parking situation at Heathrow? 
2b)  Who pays for staff car parking provision at Heathrow? 
 
3) What is your perception of the following options that have been successful at other organisations in 
reducing employee car use? 
i)  Financial incentives for leaving your car at home? 
ii)  Car parking charges for employees? 
iii) Reallocation of parking permits based on employee need? 
 
It was decided not to conduct focus groups at the non-airport organisations because they had 
already gone through the process of introducing a new parking strategy while the main aim 
of the focus groups was to investigate the likely reaction to new parking schemes.  The 
opportunity to conduct focus groups also presented itself at Heathrow as BAA were looking 
to do research with employees in this area at the same time and so there was financial and 
administrative support from BAA.  At the non-airport organisations similar support was not 
available and the short staff travel interviews with individual employees were felt to 
complement the Heathrow focus groups.  
5.4.4 Reflections on the Data Collection Methods  
All research has options in terms of the methods and methodology used, as well as 
constraints of time, financial resources and the single researcher.  A selection of issues 
relating to the practical problems in research design and methods encountered in this 
research are discussed below.  
Research Design  
Although it is preferable that each case is conducted in identical fashion (Yin, 2003), in 
reality this is difficult.  The selection of cases, each displaying varying characteristics, 
results in inherent differences which do not allow for identical data collection. Within this 
research, factors which altered the strategy between cases included; the size of the 
organisation; the parking strategy adopted by the organisation; the rapport between the 
researcher and the interviewees, and; the setting in which the interview was conducted.  
At some organisations there were fewer members of staff suitable for interview but these 
few informants were generally better equipped to comment on the full process being studied 
than the interviewees of other organisations where individuals may only have had 
responsibility for certain areas. Therefore, fewer interviewees does not mean that there is a 
compromise in the quality of data collected.  The range of parking strategies used by the 
case study organisation means that different types of data are available. The structuring of 
the interviews, however, allowed for the areas investigated to remain common.  The rapport 
with the interviewees is dependent on the context of the meeting, characters and etiquette 
amongst other factors, and differs for each interview which can affect the flow of 
information.  Establishing an initial main contact who was then able to introduce other 
interviewees assisted in improving rapport with all interviewees.  The setting of the 
interview can also influence the gathering of information.  All individual interviews were 
conducted in private at the interviewees place of work, which helped to reduce any problems 
in that area.  Focus groups were conducted in a hostile free setting which allowed the 
participants to freely express their views and the other short supplementary staff travel 
interviews were conducted either in person or over the telephone, both at times when it was 
convenient for the respondent.  
Bias and Interpretation of Data  
Bias on the part of the researcher is a concern in any case study or qualitative research. One 
way to reduce bias on the part of the investigator is to use teams to conduct the research 
(Orum et al, 1991).  The same is said of benchmarking (Spendolini, 1992). Within the 
constraints of the research, however, it was not possible to employ a team of investigators 
but an objective stance was firmly taken throughout the data collection and analysis. This 
constraint is recognised by Darke et al (1998) who state that researchers must exercise 
judgement to ensure that an appropriate balance between the constraints and the research 
objectives is maintained.  
Key informants at each case study organisation were asked to review the written material to 
allow for any factual errors to be corrected.  This is often referred to as “member-checking” 
(Creswell, 2003).  The researchers interpretation and analysis of the data was not affected by 
this review process.  
Cases and Respondents  
The most enthusiastic interviewees were generally those who were the main contact at the 
organisation. As more preparatory time had been spent liaising with these interviewees they 
were more aware of the research objectives and so sometimes better prepared to provide 
information.  A similar phenomenon was witnessed in the focus groups with some 
participants leading discussions and others taking a more subdued role. Time restrictions 
imposed by work pressures limited the depth to which some interviews could be taken in a 
small number of cases.  Respondent perspectives and focus were important issues which 
impacted on the responses, for example at Heathrow Airport, the BAA Human Resources 
Director was able to give detailed answers when discussing employee reactions, but had 
much less detailed knowledge on the current car parking issues.  
Recording and Transcription of Interviews and Focus Groups  
All of the interviews and focus groups were recorded onto minidisc and transcribed. 
Recording in this way allowed for greater concentration when conducting the interviews and 
focus groups, rather than expelling effort trying to write everything down, ensuring that 
nothing was missed (Bryman, 2001).  Audio recording also allows for a much greater level 
of reliability and accuracy when the interviews are analysed (Perakyla, 2004).  Notes were 
also taken during the interviews to act as a backup should the minidisc recorder have failed.  
A downside of recording interviewees is that they may not relax when faced with a 
microphone, or may be more cautious about the information they provide, hence the quality 
of the information may not be so great.  All interviewees were first asked if they consented 
to the interview being recorded and only one respondent declined.  In this instance, 
comprehensive notes were taken.  The rest of the interviewees were recorded and it was not 
felt that any displayed characteristics to suggest the microphone presence was off putting.  In 
addition, poor quality recordings can affect the analysis (Perakyla, 2004). This was not an 
issue with the research as all audio recording were clear.  
The transcription of the minidisc recordings were all done by the researcher, allowing for a 
greater grasp of the data and the meaning in the interviewees responses (Perakyla, 2004). 
Highly detailed transcription conventions were not used, rather a simpler but accurate 
practice was adopted and because all recordings were transcribed and analysed first hand by 
the researcher, there was felt to be no compromise in the understanding of the data.  
5.5 Considerations of the Research Design with regard to 
Benchmarking  
In terms of terminology it should be reiterated that benchmarking generally takes place 
between organisations.  In the research the benchmarking organisation is BAA, who are 
responsible for car parking at Heathrow Airport. The focus groups, however, were 
conducted with employees from a range of organisations at the airport.  The terminology 
reflects this.  
The nature of the benchmarking process shows that in order for BAA to learn from the 
experiences of best practice organisations then the processes and issues at Heathrow Airport 
must first be understood.  To this end an initial meeting was held at BAA with the “main” 
contact.  Literature relating to Heathrow Airport was also used to understand the current 
situation and initiatives in place at the airport regarding car parking and commuting. This 
information is presented in Chapter 6 and gives a clear overview of the issues present at 
Heathrow in the area of the research.    
This initial information, together with the findings of the literature reviews and the scoping 
study at the four airports detailed in Chapter 3 were used to develop interviews to be 
conducted with key decision makers at BAA and a series of focus groups to be conducted 
with Heathrow Airport staff members.  It also enabled the development of interview 
questions to be conducted at the best practice non-airport organisations, based on the areas 
found to be of greatest interest to BAA and Heathrow Airport in general in terms of 
introducing a new car parking strategy.  The steps of the data collection are shown in Figure 
5.6.  
The interviews at the non-airport organisations were undertaken first to investigate the 
reasons why the organisation had changed its car parking strategy, the details of the new 
scheme that was introduced and issues surrounding staff acceptance, implementation and 
consultation.  These interviews were followed by staff focus groups and interviews at BAA, 
which explored in depth the current parking situation, the challenges facing the airport and 
attitudes towards the potential introduction of strategies similar to those witnessed in the 
non-airport organisations.  Several aspects surrounding these strategies including 
implementation, consultation and staff acceptance were discussed in the interviews.  The 
staff focus groups concentrated more on employee perceptions of current car parking and 
travel to work situation, whether they thought action was required and their thoughts on new 
strategies as used at the non-airport organisations.  
The comparison of the findings from the interviews and focus groups provides the basis for 
the discussion chapter and the lessons that BAA could learn from the non-airport sites. 
Conducting the interviews and focus groups at Heathrow Airport after those at the non-
airport organisations allowed for a more thorough investigation of the likely impacts of 
parking strategies similar to those used by the non-airport organisations.  
Figure 5.6: Steps of the Data Collection  
 
Interviews at non-airport organisations  
Range of interviews at the three non-airport organisations to elicit in-depth information on the car parking 
situation at the site, the introduction of a charge and its implementation, consultation, staff acceptance and 
other associated issues.  
Several shorter interviews with staff to explore reactions to the strategy implemented at that particular site.  
 
Focus groups at Heathrow  
Seven focus groups with employees drawn from different airport organisations to elicit detailed information 
about staff views on the current car parking situation, whether there was a need for change and attitudes 
towards different strategies, including direct employee parking charges.  
 
Interviews with key decision makers at BAA  
Five interviews with BAA staff to elicit detailed information on current car parking situation, whether there 
was a need for change, parking charges, implementation of a parking charge, staff acceptance issues and 
consultation.  
5.6 Analysis and Representation of Data  
Qualitative data from interviews and focus groups often take the form of large unstructured 
textual material and hence can be complicated to analyse.  Unlike quantitative data, defined 
rules and approaches to analysis have not been developed (Bryman, 2001).  Searle (2004) 
states that researchers often feel obliged to identify and name the analytic method they are 
using, when in fact the main focus should be on looking for interesting things in the data.  It 
is suggested that the term “qualitative content analysis” or “interpretative analysis” is better 
suited to the ultimate aim of analysing qualitative data. Such qualitative analysis begins with 
the coding of data.  
5.6.1 Interpretative Analysis  
Assuming that the problem is already established and relevant data have been collected, the 
general process of steps for conducting the analysis and interpretation stages in qualitative 
research are:  
1 Organise and prepare the data for analysis, including arranging and transcribing;  
2 Read through the data to develop a general sense of the overall meaning;  
3 Code the data (see section 5.6.2) to generate themes, categories and concepts;  
4 Explore relationships between categories in such a way that hypotheses about 
connections between categories emerge;  
5 Describe and discuss in detail the themes and categories using a narrative passage;  
6 Interpret the data with reference to the research question (see Chapter 8). (Bryman, 
2001; Creswell, 2003)  
 
5.6.2 Coding of Qualitative Data  
When developing codes, the researcher is looking for general categories and topics that 
items of data can be assigned to, identifying what is represented by items of data, what 
questions the data raises about topics, what answers they suggest as well as looking at what 
people are doing, what they say they are doing and what events or happenings there are. 
(Punch, 1998)  
Taking the following steps are suggested when coding:  
1 Read through the set of transcripts, field notes, documents and other relevant data 
and jot down general notes at the end about initial significant and interesting points;  
2 Select one document, which may be the most interesting, the shortest, or simply the 
one at the top of the pile and work though asking “what is the meaning?”, rather than the 
actual substance of the information;  
3 Read through again making as many marginal notes about significant remarks or 
observations as possible;  
4 Repeat the task for several informants and cluster together similar topics;  
5 Return to the data and use the topics to code the data  
6 Review the codes and look for similar areas which can be combined under one code, 
link codes back to the literature where relevant and look for links between the codes;  
7 Assemble the information belonging to each highlighted category and perform a 
preliminary analysis;  
8 Consider more general theoretical ideas in relation to codes and data, outline 
connections between codes and categories, consider in more detail how codes relate to the 
literature and develop hypotheses about any linkages.  (Bryman, 2001; Creswell, 2003)  
 
It should also be remembered that any one item of data can and often should be coded in 
more than one way.  Bryman (2001) states that in the first instance it is possible to think too 
many codes have been generated but this can be tidied up at a later time; it is more important 
to be imaginative and inventive.  Coding should also be kept in perspective; while it is an 
important part of analysis, it is not analysis itself and should be considered as a mechanism 
for thinking about the meaning of the data and helping to break it down.  
There is no one correct approach to coding qualitative data.  Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
distinguish between three types of coding:  
 Open coding – this is the process of coding which generates concepts, which are later 
grouped and turned into categories.  Open coding is done by breaking down, examining, 
comparing, conceptualising and categorising data.  
 Axial coding – a set of procedures following open coding that allows data to be put 
back together in new ways by making connections between categories. It is done by linking 
codes to contexts, to consequences, to patterns of interaction and to causes.  
 Selective coding – this is where the core category is systematically related to other 
categories to validate their relationship and filling in other categories which require further 
refinement and development.  The core category is the central issue around which the others 
are integrated.   
 
Bryman (2001) suggests different levels of coding.  The first level is very basic coding 
which picks out some main points.  The second level has greater awareness of the content of 
what is said, the language the interviewee uses and focuses more on key issues of 
importance to the interviewee.  The third level looks at broader analytic themes rather than 
close association with exactly what the interviewee is saying.  
5.7 Conclusions  
The aim of this chapter has been to describe the research design selected for collecting and 
analysing original data.  
It has explicitly documented the selection, planning and execution of the research design. 
The basis for selection of the multiple case study design was justified and it can be seen that 
a “Type 4” case study as defined by Yin (2003) will be used.  The selection of the cases 
within the research was also justified, with Heathrow’s car parking problems and the widely 
recognised best practice position of the three non-airport case studies providing a strong 
rationale for their choice.  
The collection of data within each case study was documented, along with an action plan for 
conducting the research which was adhered to throughout all of the case studies and data 
collection. Attention was paid to ensuring the validity of the results. Detailed information on 
the selection of interviewees and focus group participants, together with how the information 
was gathered from respondents was provided.  The design of the analysis procedures to be 
used were presented and the process of benchmarking followed within the research was 
considered.  This analysis and the process of benchmarking will be followed through 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
Chapter 6. Heathrow Airport Case Study  
6.0 Introduction  
This chapter investigates the current situation at Heathrow Airport with respect to employee 
car parking and surface access in general, drawing on a scoping interview, interviews with 
five key decision makers and focus groups with 48 employees.  
Chapter 1 of the thesis presented an overview of Heathrow Airport and the issues facing the 
airport in terms of growth, car parking cap constraints and air quality targets, as well as 
detailing the current strategies in place at the airport to reduce car use. The focus of car 
reduction strategies on employees was also discussed and supported by the literature review 
in Chapter 2 and findings from the airports contained in Chapter 3.  These issues are 
explored further in the first part of this chapter drawing on findings from an initial scoping 
interview with the Head of Communication and Change at BAA, as discussed in section 5.5.  
The aim of the first part of the chapter is to set the scene for parts 2 and 3 which more fully 
explore the issues relating to employee car parking at Heathrow airport based on interviews 
with key decision makers within BAA and airport-wide staff focus groups. Part 2 seeks to 
analyse the key issues arising from interviews undertaken with five key decision makers 
within BAA.  Key areas, derived from the coding and analysis of the interview transcripts as 
detailed in section 5.6.2 are explored.  Part 3 seeks to analyse the key issues arising from the 
focus groups conducted at Heathrow Airport and key areas derived from the coding and 
analysis of the focus group transcripts are explored.  
PART 1: Heathrow Airport: Background Literature and Scoping 
Interview  
6.1 Current Car Parking Provision at Heathrow  
There are a total of 22 car parks at Heathrow, including 13 dedicated staff car parks, four 
dedicated public car parks and five shared use car parks, including shared use of four of the 
terminal multi-storey car parks.  
BAA has an overall car parking strategy objective which is “to ensure that car parking 
facilities are used as efficiently as possible by passengers and employees who are not able to 
take advantage of public transport services or other alternatives to the car. This objective is 
consistent with the airport’s approach to sustainable development.” (BAA, 2004b).  
A number of car parking spaces are controlled by Heathrow Airport Limited and 
administered by BAA, while others are tenanted to other organisations at various locations 
around the airport. BAA market research conducted in 2003 revealed that Heathrow Airport 
Limited controlled a total of 34,603 spaces of which 17,556 were for the public and 17,047 
were for staff.  A further 11,411 spaces were tenanted. (BAA, 2004a)  
In addition there is parking available at hotels surrounding the airport and a presence of off-
airport car parks not controlled by Heathrow Airport Limited.  These car parks do not 
contribute to the total number at Heathrow, and are not knowingly used by any employees.  
(BAA Head of Communication and Change)  
Data from 2000 shows that approximately 37,000 employee car park passes were issued to 
450 companies for 12,000 spaces, a ratio of approximately three to one, and that the annual 
income generated from staff parking permits is approximately £13 million.  
Currently, BAA charges employers for each car parking permit they require, at the rates 
shown in Table 6.1. Almost all employers absorb the charge and only a very small number 
pass it on to staff.  The identity of these companies is not known by BAA; once they have 
issued passes they do not control what each individual company does with them.  Anecdotal 
evidence, however, suggests that some of the private security firms charge employees (BAA 
Head of Communication and Change).  BAA recognise that the consequence of employers 
paying for parking is that most employees are unaware of the real cost of car parking (BAA, 
2004b).  
Staff car parking at Heathrow is a “specified activity” due to the Competition Act and the 
subsequent regulated nature of the business.  As such it must be operated on a financially 
neutral basis.  
Figure 6.1: Map Showing all of the Public and Staff Car Parking Areas at Heathrow 
Airport  
 
Source: BAA, 2004c  
Table 6.1: Staff Car Parking Permits at Heathrow Airport  
 
Perimeter £491 Central Terminal Area £780 Group 60* £1008 
Group 50** £1298  
* Group 60 is a “Heathrow Rover” which allows access to multi-storey car parks 1B and 4.  It does not  
form part of the “specified activity” calculation.  
** Group 50 is a “Heathrow Rover” which allows access to multi-storey car parks 1B, 2, 3 and 4. It  
does not form part of the “specified activity” calculation.  
 
Source: BAA, 2004a  
6.2 Pressures Facing Car Use and Car Parking  
6.2.1 Terminal 5 Parking Cap  
In November 2001, the UK Government approved the development of a fifth terminal at 
Heathrow Airport. Terminal Five will open in March 2008 and accommodate 30 million 
passengers per annum by 2016 (Caves and Humphreys, 2002).  As a condition of the 
development of Terminal Five, Heathrow is subject to a parking cap of 42,000 spaces. This 
is currently active and must also accommodate the additional car parking demand when 
Terminal Five opens.  Within this cap, there is a limit of 17,500 spaces for employees 
(ODPM, 2001).  
The meeting with the BAA Head of Communication and Change revealed that if growth was 
to continue with no constraint then the 42,000 spaces would be hit in 2008. By 2016, there 
would be a shortfall of 4,600 staff car parking spaces with no growth constraints. BAA 
publicity aimed at employees states, “this cap allows for 8,500 more spaces – as you can 
imagine with the additional passengers this leaves no room for growth in staff spaces.  In 
fact, it requires us to reduce the amount of spaces allocated to staff on airport.” (BAA, 
2004d).  
6.2.2 Sustainable Development and the Environment  
Heathrow is in an Air Quality Management Area, designated by the London Borough of 
Hillingdon, to manage the levels of nitrogen oxide and particulate matter.  Cars in particular 
contribute a substantial amount to the levels and as such are a target area to reduce the 
airport’s impact on local air quality (BAA, 2004b).  This was reflected by the BAA Head of 
Communication and Change with reference to high car usage, “The sustainable development 
of Heathrow will be damaged if nothing is done.”. BAA Heathrow currently produces a 
comprehensive sustainability strategy and a range of associated documents, such as the 
“Sustainability Report 2003/04” (BAA Heathrow, 2004) and “Air Quality Strategy and 
Action Plan 2001 – 2006” (BAA Heathrow, 2002), which detail their work to meet 
sustainable development targets.  
The Government’s Aviation White Paper (DfT, 2003 p. 122) also demonstrates the 
importance of managing air quality, “compliance with air quality limits for NO2 will require 
a concerted effort by the airport operator and the aviation industry to identify ways of 
reducing emissions from aircraft, from other airport activity and from airport-related road 
traffic.”  A particular challenge for Heathrow will be complying with the mandatory air 
quality limit values for NO2 that will apply from 2010.  The White Paper also stipulates that 
air quality issues need to be resolved before a third runway is considered.  
6.3 Focus on Employees  
In the meeting with the Head of Communication and Change at BAA, the issue of BAA 
focussing efforts to reduce car use on employees, rather than passengers, was discussed. The 
reasons stated were that it was easier to target employees because of the information BAA 
hold on them and because they made regular repeating journeys, unlike passengers. BAA is 
a customer focussed business which was regarded as another important consideration and 
financial impacts were also highlighted as very important; it was explained that it cost 
approximately £2.5 million to generate a one percentage point decrease in passenger car use 
and £800,000 to generate a one percentage point decrease in employee car use.    
With reference to congestion on the roads surrounding Heathrow the Terminal Five Public 
Enquiry report stated “bearing in mind that these problems would inevitably be greatest in 
the peak hours, employees should be encouraged to make greater use of public transport.” 
(ODPM, 2001, pp 240).  
6.4 Future Strategies  
The meeting with the BAA Head of Communication and Change also highlighted some of 
the current thinking within BAA.  It was considered that forward thinking and planning for 
the future was generally not good within BAA.  Current strategies to reduce car use were 
thought of as “all carrot, no stick” and that a new strategy incorporating both incentives and 
disincentives was required.  Incentives were considered to be high cost but low impact while 
incentives were considered to be cost neutral with a larger impact. It was also regarded that 
any new strategy should be as equitable as possible.  
PART 2: Heathrow Airport Interview Analysis  
6.5 Introduction  
This section seeks to analyse the key issues that arose from the five interviews undertaken 
with key decision makers within BAA.  Fourteen key areas are explored which arose both 
from the direct questioning of interviewees and from the coding and analysis process which 
followed.  
Sections 6.6 and 6.7 are an account of the current situation at Heathrow Airport in terms of 
car parking and public transport.  Sections 6.8 to 6.19 are generated as a result of 
scrutinising the data in accordance with the coding and analysis process described in section 
5.6 and investigate the various issues which arose throughout the interviews.  External 
influences, most notably the parking cap associated with the development of Terminal Five, 
were regarded as having a major impact on the car parking situation impact and arose on 
several occasions in all interviews.  Such influences were seen as both positive and negative.  
Communication was regarded as a core construct because of the importance of needing 
every employee at the airport to understand the current situation and the need for a change in 
car parking strategy. Communication was also regarded as a key element in gaining 
acceptance for the introduction of an employee car parking initiative such as a parking 
charge or financial incentive.  Attitudes to change were addressed in three areas: the 
interviewees’ attitudes; attitudes of organisations within Heathrow, and; the attitudes of 
employees.  There was a positive attitude to change amongst the interviewees as they were 
aware of the situation and the need for a more radical approach to changing travel behaviour, 
but attitudes elsewhere were considered to be much more negative. It was recognised that 
such attitudes needed to be changed for new parking initiatives to be introduced successfully 
and hence it was a key theme arising throughout the interviews.  Linked to attitudes is a key 
theme of culture, both within BAA and with individuals.  Cultural factors were seen to be 
crucial by the interviewees and an area that needed to be carefully considered due to the 
bearing they could have on the introduction of any new parking strategy. Interviewees 
discussed at length the merits of various financial incentive and disincentive measures 
associated with car parking strategies.  This was central to the analysis as it would be likely 
to form the core of a new parking strategy. Four further themes which arose out of the 
analysis were a focus on individuals, recruitment and retention, equality and fairness, and 
flexibility and choice. These four themes all represented a focus by the interviewees on those 
who would be most affected by a new parking strategy and a view that the impact should be 
as minimal as possible.  This focus was regarded as important in terms of the mindset of the 
organisation.  Implementation, consultation and learning were three constructs which were 
investigated predominantly by direct questioning but which also elicited strong and varied 
views by the interviewees.  Implementation and consultation were seen as central to the 
introduction of any new parking strategy and as such were important areas upon which to 
focus.  Investigating the area of learning and benchmarking assisted in demonstrating BAA’s 
attitudes towards looking at other organisations to seek improvements which is integral to 
the methodology of the thesis. All of the issues investigated form the basis for the 
benchmarking exercise to be undertaken with the non-airport organisations.  
The codes associated with quotes throughout the interview analysis are as follows:  
 Head of Change & Communication, Planning & Environment (BAA 1);  
 Interim Human Resources Director (BAA 2);  
 General Manager Commercial Transport Team, Retail (BAA 3);  
 Planning & Environment Director (BAA 4);  
 Head of Group Accommodation, Property (BAA 5).  
 
6.6 The Current Car Parking Situation and the Need to Change  
6.6.1 Congestion and Pressure on Car Parks  
All of the interviewees stated that the car parks at Heathrow, and the road surface access 
system in general, were being placed under increasing pressure, “we’re just hanging in there 
to be honest” (BAA 1), “we just about get by although we do go bust on a number of 
occasions” (BAA 5), “it’s a pressure cooker in terms of car parking.” (BAA 2). At present 
the system is considered to be coping but there are times when congestion becomes a 
problem, “it’s being pushed to the limit and there are days when you get heavy rain and the 
car parks are chocablock, but most of the time people seem to be able to get a space.” (BAA 
1).  
The reasons for this pressure on the system were made clear by the interviewees,  
“we’ve got too much demand for being able to park outside your place of work and that’s a 
huge behavioural issue. Essentially we just don’t have the physical space.” (BAA 3). The 
interviewees said that as a result BAA is not able to provide the right number of spaces for 
the right number of people in a certain area and is having to fragment employee parking all 
around the airport.  This is recognised as a sensitive issue because many employees have to 
drive around the airport and past their place of work to park, before being bussed back to 
their final work destination.  
The creation of several projects around the airport site, most notably the current Terminal 5 
construction, generates a requirement for large numbers of contractors to be able to park. In 
addition, the preference of most airlines to operate into Heathrow, and the subsequent 
movement of airlines to Heathrow when opportunities arise, further increases the 
requirement for car parking space.  
Car parking can also be a particular problem at certain times of the day, “I would hate to be 
in that position of someone who gets in after half past eight every day because I think it’s 
just a lottery” (BAA 1), “there’s times where if you go out for a meeting and come back in 
that period between ten o’clock and two o’clock in the afternoon where everyone seems to 
be in the office it’s very very hard to find a space.” (BAA 3). Similarly, shift work patterns 
are seen to have a major impact on car park usage, particularly at changeover times when 
there is an overlap between the incoming and outgoing shift.  
These problems with car parking can be seen to have had some direct bearing on individual 
behaviour, “I know one person who used to get in at nine, that was her routine and then she 
just had enough of it because she couldn’t get a parking space, so she changed her routine; 
she now gets in early and doesn’t have any problems” (BAA 1), “Ten years ago if you got in 
at half past eight the car park would be virtually empty, if you come in now at eight o’clock 
the car park is probably three quarters full.” (BAA 1).  
With reference to the car parking cap at Heathrow, currently the airport is “around the low 
30,000 mark.” (BAA 3). The respondents said that this means there is capacity to build more 
spaces within the limit of the cap, but the decision has been taken not to increase car parking 
provision at present until maximum benefit has been extracted from controlling parking 
behaviour in other ways.  The expected growth in parking demand that will occur when 
Terminal 5 opens “means that we won’t have enough spaces to meet overall demand. So 
clearly it’s something that is quite serious.” (BAA 4). Other factors such as the general 
increase in the number of people flying and the introduction of larger aircraft were cited by 
the respondents to argue that the pressure on car parks would only increase over time.  
The allocation of permits can restrict demand management to an extent because of the 
legacy of the system, “essentially we have all these official or unofficial waiting lists for 
employees who want to park in our multi-storey car parks, certainly within the  
Central Terminal Area. We find there is a pecking order of the types of passes we 
authorise.” (BAA 3). Respondents said there is also a downside with issuing passes to 
company names rather than individuals, particularly larger organisations, because each 
company then sets up their own in-house allocation system which can undermine the central 
allocation system.  On a more general level, it is considered by some that getting a car 
parking pass is too easy and with the current pricing structure, even if individuals were 
paying directly for parking it would be unlikely to have much impact in terms of reducing 
car use.  
6.6.2 Targeting Employees for Change  
In order to reduce the demand for car parking spaces, respondents said the airport has taken 
a decision to target employee parking, as opposed to passenger parking.  One reason stated 
for this decision is that public car parking is a commercial entity and a large source of 
income for BAA.  One interviewee said that in an extreme situation, if the income from 
passenger parking was to decrease significantly then airlines would be charged more and 
there would be less investment in the infrastructure and services requested by the airlines 
which would then lead to a “downward spiral” (BAA 3).  
It was also recognised that it is easier to control employees because the condition of 
employment is that you are at a certain place at a certain time and hence movements are 
known. With passengers, there are many more people with whom to communicate and 
influence. The respondents also said that passenger journeys are not repetitive like those of 
employees and hence it is harder to provide alternatives to the car.  
The interviewees feared that restricting passenger parking could lead to a growth in off-
airport parking provision and “fly parking” in residential streets near to the airport, although 
they recognised this could also be a problem with employees.  They considered it would also 
be likely to lead to an increase in the number of people accessing the airport by taxi or being 
driven by friends or relatives which increases the number of trips being made to the airport, 
adding to congestion and pollution.  
At the same time it is recognised that a reasonable approach should be taken, “I don’t think 
you can push it too far, people have to come to work and it doesn’t have to be an impossible 
process either, but obviously you need to try and make as much change before you go to the 
public.” (BAA 2).  
6.6.3 Efficiency Improvements to Current Car Park Operations  
There was a strong feeling by the respondents that there are many improvements that can be 
made, particularly in terms of efficiency.  One such area for improvement is technology and 
information gathering to allow BAA to understand more accurately who is using the car 
parks and when. It is seen as important to more fully understand the current patterns of car 
park use before any new initiatives are introduced.  
There was a recognition that the times when passenger car parks are at their most busy is not 
the same time as when staff car parks are busy, but because the two types of parking are 
accommodated separately, the best use is not being made of parking space as a collective 
resource.  Linked to this is a consideration of the times when car parks are being used by 
shift workers or office based employees and the impact this has, “arguably it’s not the shift 
workers that are causing a lot of our problems.  If you’re starting at five in the morning the 
roads are clear so your vehicle isn’t sitting still polluting as much and there isn’t a car 
parking shortage.  Obviously by the time you’re ready to leave and colleagues are coming in 
there’s a knock on effect, but if we were to tackle the day workers then I think it’s much 
easier and could potentially be beneficial.” (BAA 1).  
The interviewees said that certain initiatives, such as the free bus service are currently in 
place and reduce the need for people to move about the airport during the day by car. 
Another strategy mentioned was that BAA often arrange meetings with third parties at local 
hotels within walking distance.  
The planning of car parking is also regarded as an area needing improvement, “we’ve got to 
get smarter about planning, we’ve got to get smarter about the right people in the right car 
park with the right pricing but we’re restricted by the physical capacity  
we have at certain geographical locations.” (BAA 3). The pricing structure is one specific 
area of planning interviewees said needed to be addressed, particularly the dynamics 
between the ‘employee preference’ multi-storey car parks and the perimeter car parks. 
Currently the difference is seen to be too close, thus making it attractive to keep the waiting 
list for the preference car parks very long.  
6.7 Public Transport and Alternatives  
Alternative modes of transport to the car, referred to by some interviewees as “soft issues” 
were regarded as being well publicised within BAA and across the airport as a whole, 
“we’re putting a lot of money into developing public transport links, we’ve done some really 
good things to incentivise use with travel cards and carnets and we’ve done lots on car 
sharing, video conferencing and that sort of thing.” (BAA 4). Car sharing in particular was 
highly regarded at BAA.  It was also noted that a number of the interviewees were actively 
involved in using other modes to the car or working from home on a regular basis.  
While the alternative modes of transport are “good enough in some parts” (BAA 4) they are 
“not enough on their own to tip the balance” (BAA 4) in terms of generating a substantial 
decrease in car use. There are many factors which mean that public transport is not suitable 
for all employees.  Heathrow was regarded by some as being “relatively inaccessible” (BAA 
2) and inconvenience is cited as a major problem, with not enough areas being served by 
public transport to an acceptable level.  A particular problem seemed to exist with public 
transport provision for shift workers arriving or leaving very early in the morning.  In 
addition, it was recognised that employee destinations at Heathrow are widely dispersed so 
while there may be options which get people to the Central Terminal Area, there is then a 
further leg of the journey to reach the workplace.  Time was cited as another major factor; in 
many cases public transport substantially increases the duration of journeys when compared 
to the car. The flexibility of the car, particularly for those with commitments outside of work 
and the need to travel during the day had an important bearing.  Price, particularly in 
comparison to the car and comfort factors such as waiting in the rain were also regarded as 
having an impact on the attractiveness of public transport.  
It was considered that even though alternative modes of transport are strongly supported by 
BAA, more effort could still be put into researching the most suitable way to exploit public 
transport opportunities and promoting them, “I think the alternatives in place at present, if 
they were used effectively, would make a substantial difference and I think we use as an 
excuse that we don’t have sufficient routes…there needs to be another push on public 
transport in appropriate places.” (BAA 1).  
6.8 External Influences  
Heathrow’s car parking situation is affected by a number of external factors.  The two most 
influential are imposed by Government and are the parking cap associated with the 
development of Terminal 5 and “The Future of Air Transport” White Paper. The parking cap 
is regarded as having both positive and negative impacts.  From a negative perspective it 
means that BAA has to invest time and resources into car reduction initiatives in order to 
operate effectively within the limits of the cap, “the T5 cap is paramount because we can’t 
exceed it and it would cause all sorts of problems for BAA if we were not seen to be taking it 
seriously.” (BAA 5). From a positive perspective the cap means that BAA is being pushed 
into addressing the problem before it escalates, “I think we are fortunate in that we’ve been 
given a ‘burning platform’ of 42,000 spaces. I think if we hadn’t been given that we would 
just continue to flounder and it would become an enormous problem that we wouldn’t 
recognise.” (BAA 3). When set against a trend of increasing passenger numbers there is 
recognition that even without the cap there would still be problems and the cap is actually 
helping to highlight them at an earlier stage.  
Even with external influences such as the parking cap it was still felt by some of the 
interviewees that another external driver is required to promote the importance of the car 
parking problems.  It was considered that this driver had to be something which directly 
affected BAA or their key customers, such as the opportunity to develop a third runway or 
sixth terminal.  “The Future of  Air Transport” White Paper is regarded as tentatively 
offering Heathrow such opportunities to expand on the condition that issues such as air 
quality, car parking and road congestion are tackled first. If these opportunities were to 
become more real then it is considered that the issues that need attention would become 
much more important to top level management.  It was felt by one interviewee that 
improvements to such areas would also lead to good publicity for Heathrow.  
Other external factors also have a bearing on car parking management.  One is that 
employee car parking is a “specified activity” (BAA 3) at BAA and as a regulated business 
no profit can be returned on it.  The interviewees stated that this causes some problems in 
managing employee car parks because if the price of passes is raised in the Central Terminal 
Area for example, then they have to be lowered by a proportionate amount in the perimeter 
parking areas.  The other factor is employee contracts; as most employers currently absorb 
the parking charges set by BAA as opposed to passing them onto staff, there is a concern 
that any change to the way charges were imposed would meet large barriers in terms of 
inflexible personal contracts  For instance if employees were directly charged, and this was 
not explicit in their contract, then there is a concern that they may need to be compensated in 
some way, perhaps through an increase in salary or a one-off bonus written into the contract.  
6.9 Communication  
Communication was a recurring theme throughout all of the interviews and can be seen to 
split into three areas: the communication of current alternatives to staff; the communication 
of change to staff should a new radically different strategy for car parking be introduced, 
and; the communication within BAA and between BAA and other organisations at the 
airport. Many of the communications issues relating to the introduction of a new scheme are 
specifically related to consultation and so are briefly outlined in this section and more 
thoroughly examined in section 6.18.  
Communication is considered central to achieving higher usage levels of alternative modes 
to the car and it is recognised that this may not have always been the case, “I think for a 
while we put a lot of emphasis on subsidising bus routes and that sort of thing, but not 
actually communicating it to people so we’ve been trying to redress the balance.” (BAA 1). 
There is now a stronger focus on telling people what alternatives are available, including 
stronger promotional drives on things such as car sharing and cycling as well as the 
development of ‘Airport Commuter’
1
 and the updated Travel Plan. An individual to individual approach is seen as a key 
way of achieving improved use of alternative modes to the car.  Employees are the main target for this improved communication because 
they are seen as a relatively easier group to target and affect behaviour due to their travel patterns, as mentioned in section 6.6.2.  
Communicating any new parking strategy incorporating an incentive or disincentive 
measure to employees is regarded as very important so that they fully understand what is 
proposed and the reasons for it. It was suggested in one interview that the message 
communicated was “this is about how we attempt to give equity to people in the choices that 
they make given the difficult situation that we’re in, in terms of our car parking.” (BAA 2). 
As parking is viewed as an individual and emotive issue, it is considered important that it is 
ultimately communicated to individuals rather than through more general measures.  While 
the initial communication would have to be initiated by BAA, there is a keenness for other 
more suitable people to spread the message, “I think that the people who do it need to be the 
real business owners; your terminal managers and all those people have to take 
responsibility for this, we can’t go “here’s a nice package, we’re just going to do it now”.” 
(BAA 1). There is also an appreciation that talking behind closed doors is one thing but the 
real issues will have to be faced once any scheme begins to be communicated more openly.  
A final strand of the communication issue is that which exists within BAA.  It was apparent 
from the interviews that communication in some areas was good, “we work closely to keep 
up to speed with where other teams are with those type of new initiatives” (BAA 5), but in 
other areas there was a lack of communication, “I couldn’t believe that we weren’t 
increasing the car park charges…the financial people have either not realised what we’re 
doing and seen the opportunity or alternatively we’ve  
1
 Airport Commuter is a BAA initiative offering employees information and advice on travel options as 
well as discounted public transport fares.  
increased in other areas to such an extent that they thought this was a sacrifice worth 
making.” (BAA 1).  
6.10 Attitudes to Change  
6.10.1 Interviewee Attitudes to Change  
Amongst the interviewees there was a positive attitude towards change and a strong sense 
that something needs to be done to address the car parking problems being faced at 
Heathrow, both for the good of the airport and the overall benefit of the environment.  
Comments included, “I don’t underestimate that we have to start working towards a better 
solution for the airport” (BAA 3), “the reality is we just cannot not intervene, we have to” 
(BAA 3) and “you can’t just create acres of car parking space, there has to be some other 
thought brought to the process.” (BAA 2). In one interview the issue of appealing against the 
Terminal 5 parking cap was raised and the response demonstrated the positive attitude 
towards dealing with the parking problems, “I would hate to think that we would appeal it 
and I wouldn’t be very happy. It would make me doubt the whole environment in which I 
work to be honest.” (BAA 1).  
Several potential initiatives were highlighted by the interviewees; throughout the interviews 
all respondents were receptive to new ideas and displayed a high degree of forward thinking 
in terms of appropriate solutions to help address the situation,  
“we’re keen on alternatives but equally some practical solutions like financial incentives for 
people to give up their car parking spaces” (BAA 5) and “I think it needs to be 
balanced…various incentives, disincentives, better route planning, better provision of how 
we get to work.” (BAA 3). New solutions such as more flexible working policies, a 
restructuring of the permit allocation procedure, matching car park location to where 
employees entered the airport and a restructuring of the pricing mechanism were suggested 
as potential solutions, or partial solutions to the car parking problems.  At the same time, it 
was recognised that emotive factors could impact upon finding the most straight-forward 
solutions, “I think if you were to take the emotive side out of it the answers are quite 
simple.” (BAA 3).  
There was also a feeling amongst the interviewees that BAA had to lead by example, put 
more effort in and build up some initial momentum to support any change before other 
companies could be expected to put more effort and resources into changing employee travel 
habits.  In a similar fashion it was felt that as landlords, BAA had to lead any change, 
“where you have a big site like this where you the company own the land then it’s down to 
you to sort out the problems.” (BAA 4). At the same time there was recognition that with a 
workforce of 68,000 across Heathrow changing from one system to another would not be an 
easy task.  
6.10.2 Third Party Companies’ Attitudes to Change  
A few of the interviewees said that some companies at Heathrow are beginning to show 
signs that they are interested in a new parking strategy to reduce the amount of money they 
have to spend on parking passes for their employees.  This is particularly the case with larger 
employers such as British Airways and American Airlines, who have approached BAA to 
discuss working together.  Respondents explained that at present, the way parking permits 
are allocated is a ‘take it or leave it’ system and organisations like American Airlines are 
keen to move to a more flexible system based on daily rather than annual charges, which 
means employees can drive when they need and use alternatives at other times.  At the same 
time as being positive towards changing to the current system, such companies are looking 
to BAA to lead its implementation so that BAA can be used as a scapegoat when 
communicating it to staff, due of the human and industrial relations sensitivities.  Achieving 
a change is considered to be affected by the engagement and willingness of each company.  
Many companies, however, are not so keen to see any change in the way employee parking 
is managed, “companies are reticent to do anything that might put people off coming to 
work at the airport.” (BAA 1). As well as recruitment and retention fears, there are other 
human resource concerns including employee unhappiness and the potential for industrial 
action, such is the emotive nature of car parking.  In some cases, companies were not felt to 
fully understand the car parking issues present at the airport and do not have a sense of 
urgency, or are simply avoiding the issue.  This reflects some similar views within BAA as 
explored in section 6.11.1.  Another possible reason cited for this unwillingness to change is 
that because car parking monies have been apportioned anyway, they are almost a sunk cost 
to the company and regarded as money that will be spent regardless.  Some companies have 
historical passes in the Central Terminal Area which poses particular problems for BAA 
because of the sensitivity of taking them away in such a desirable location.  
6.10.3 Employee Attitudes to Change  
Employees are considered by the interviewees at BAA to be very unreceptive to change and 
it is expected they would react negatively to any new parking system being introduced. In 
general, the idea of change is not favoured by people and car parking is an extremely 
emotive issue, even regarded to be as important as pay.  Long serving employees who have 
been used to parking for several years are highlighted as a particular group that would be 
very hard to communicate a change to.  Even within BAA, where it may be considered that a 
greater understanding of the car parking pressures should exist, there is evidence of some 
employees who are of the attitude “I won’t allow anyone to take my car parking space” 
(BAA 3) indicating that employee attitudes are not just particular to third parties where there 
could be expected to be a lesser understanding. There was also a feeling that when 
confronted with a survey or focus group, employees would often say they were willing to try 
alternatives but then never followed it up, or they would say “well I would if I could” (BAA 
1) but without ever investigating the options that were available to them.  Therefore it was 
viewed that people displaying some willingness to change, but then did not actually put their 
willing into practice.  
The introduction of a direct parking charge to employees was regarded as an especially 
unfavourable measure in terms of staff reaction, “a charge would be seen as very negative 
because it’s almost like a tax on your job.” (BAA 2). It was suggested that the reaction to 
such a charge would be uproar for two reasons, firstly  
“I’m not paying that, it’s not in my contract, I refuse to pay, what are you going to do, I’m 
going to strike” (BAA 3) and secondly an attitude of “BAA just wanting to make money out 
of us.” (BAA 3).  
6.11 Culture  
6.11.1 BAA Company Culture  
Large amounts of time in the interviews were spent discussing cultural issues and 
specifically the culture within BAA.  The interviewees felt that at present BAA was avoiding 
the issue where car parking was concerned, “I think there’s an element of sticking heads in 
the sand because it’s such a difficult issue and people are hoping it will go away, but it 
won’t” (BAA 5), “I have to say the company is nowhere near accepting it’s got a problem at 
the moment…I think a lot of people in the company think that it will just sort itself out.” 
(BAA 4). In terms of dealing with the car parking problems across the whole airport site, it 
was considered important that BAA first “live and breathe” (BAA 1) the chosen solution 
before they could realistically get other companies involved.  At the same time there was 
recognition that BAA was a small proportion of the overall population and had not even got 
it’s own company “on board” (BAA 4) as yet, thus making the cooperation of a further 350 
companies appear a large task.  
It was felt that serious attention would only be given to the problem when a “crisis point” 
was reached, “when the car parks get fuller and we start to have problems then I think we 
might take this issue more seriously…I think we’re shying away from some of these issues 
that will become business critical soon but because they’re not business critical we’re not 
dealing with them.” (BAA 1). It was also considered, however, that the cap of 42,000 spaces 
has helped to focus some thinking on car parking and made people more aware of the issues.  
These issues raised concerns with the interviewees about the companies “lack of 
preparedness” (BAA 1) for dealing with the car parking problems it was facing, “what 
worries me is that we don’t realise how big a job it is.” (BAA 1). Part of the reason for this 
lack of preparedness is thought to be that the company has in the past warned of imminent 
car parking problems which have subsequently not materialised and so current warnings are 
not taken so seriously, “I think in some ways we’ve created an environment that allows 
people to be comfortable because I think maybe we’ve cried wolf unintentionally.” (BAA 1). 
A further reason cited for the lack of preparedness was that the car parking is currently 
managed by a small group of people and the main responsibility is not seen to be with the 
airport at large.  Until that situation is resolved there it is contemplated there will continue to 
be an avoidance of tackling car parking problems.  
A major cultural factor was the lack of support that the interviewees felt was being provided 
by top level management in the area of car parking, “nothing seems to be moving quickly in 
those areas because it is a struggle to obtain buy in from the leadership.” (BAA 5). 
Questions which were not aimed at investigating cultural issues were often answered in 
terms of the lack of support and understanding from the top level. It was considered crucial 
that to progress with any new parking strategy would require total support from the top 
managers and directors of BAA and also from other key companies at Heathrow such as 
British Airways, “it’s absolutely vital. They shouldn’t be just fully behind it, they should live 
and breathe it as well and this is where I get nervous because unless you’ve got your MD, 
your Chairman, your Directors who are not bringing their cars two or three days a week, 
who are supporting teleworking, who are videoconferencing and all these things to support 
car use, unless they actually do it then you haven’t got a hope” (BAA 1), “it’s essential, I 
think in this day and age the idea you can tell people what to do is nonsense…the top people 
will need to change their own behaviours if you want other people to change theirs.” (BAA 
4). It was also felt that if one person from the senior management level, ideally the 
Managing Director, was to support the parking initiatives being proposed then it would 
make wider acceptance and support easier to gain, “you have to be leading by example to get 
change effected through the company” (BAA 5), “getting organisations to do things is quite 
hard work.  It’s easy if the top man thinks it’s a good idea because then it happens, it’s much 
harder if they don’t acknowledge that they’ve got a problem.” (BAA 4). It was anticipated 
that gaining this support could be slow, but would happen.  In certain cases it was 
considered that external factors such as the Government White Paper “The Future of Air 
Transport” and the potential development of a third runway or sixth terminal may be the 
factors required to make senior managers think more specifically about parking issues.  
Other general cultural issues within BAA were also explored.  It was considered that there 
was an overall lack of ‘joined-up’ thinking which was recently seen in a car parking context 
when charges were not increased at the end of the financial year, even though there was a 
drive to reduce car commuting.  Similarly, BAA has a company car policy, “it’s certainly 
not a disincentive is it!?” (BAA 4). There were also cultural issues surrounding the way 
people worked and whether it was necessary to always be at the office.  This was something 
that was recognised as changing with more people working from home, but further 
progression was considered necessary to promote a more flexible working culture which 
would relieve some pressure on car parks.  
There was also regarded to be a negative culture around the idea of change, as explored in 
section 6.10, with BAA not wishing to “rock the boat” (BAA 5) by introducing something 
that would require a change to the way people traditionally do things, “there is resistance 
internally of making these things happen because it’s a significant change and the company 
is focussed on a large number of other priorities so doesn’t really have the time or resources 
to deal with this.” (BAA 5).  
6.11.2 Culture of Individuals  
The general culture of individuals was expected to have a bearing on the introduction, and 
subsequent success or failure, of a new car parking strategy.  The lifestyle culture in Britain 
was considered to be one where people worked hard but also liked to make the most of their 
free time “and people just want their lives absolutely ordered so that they can fit in 
everything they want to do.” (BAA 1). To this end, the private car was regarded as the 
mechanism that allowed for this to happen.  For example, it was appreciated that a large 
number of people took their children to school before coming to work, a factor that would 
make shifting to other modes of transport difficult.  This precious nature of free time was 
further emphasised by one of the interviewees, “if it took ten minutes more by public 
transport it would be OK, but when it’s such a dramatic difference the impact of that on my 
quality of life would be so significant that it’s unattractive.” (BAA 2). The role of the car in 
people’s lifestyle balance was considered to be becoming more and more important, 
particularly when looking for a prospective employer, “the flexibility you have in your role, 
other things like pension,  
car parking, IT infrastructure, they’re equally part of the decision process now as what your 
basic pay will be.” (BAA 5). It was thought that other lifestyle factors such as increased 
affluence have allowed most people to afford cars, which they then do not think about the 
cost of using and more generally, “there’s personal issues, organisational issues, 
Government issues, environmental issues, there’s so many things that are stopping people 
behaving differently.” (BAA 1).  
The issues of status and expectations were also raised by the interviewees with respect to the 
culture toward car parking.  There is considered to be a “pecking order” (BAA 3) in terms of 
car park permit allocation at Heathrow, particularly for the Central Terminal Area.  Longer 
serving and senior members of staff, from all organisations, often feel they deserve the more 
conveniently located spaces.  The development of Heathrow over time was regarded by one 
interviewee to have been “quite car centric” (BAA 2), suggesting that Heathrow itself may 
be partly to blame for the expectations surrounding the car. Regarding the introducing of a 
parking charge there was a widespread belief that because direct charging of employees was 
so radically different and new, then the cultural change would be a difficult hurdle to 
overcome.  
There is also regarded to be a general lack of effort on the part of many people to make any 
change to the way they do things.  One interviewee stated that BAA surveys often reveal that 
people state they can not use public transport because it is regarded as taking too long and 
being too expensive, but other questions in the same survey reveal that they do not know the 
timetables or fares.  Another specific issue was highlighted as being that staff often drive 
from the Central Terminal Area to BAA’s Heathrow Point West office complex and take up 
parking spaces, even though there is a free bus service.  
6.12 Use of Financial Incentives and Disincentives  
When thinking of potential alternative measures that could be used to address the car 
parking problems at Heathrow, there were a wide range of potential solutions suggested by 
the interviewees.  This highlights the complexity of the problem and that there is no one 
straight forward route to take, but also that there is a substantial amount of thinking being 
given to the problem.  The views ranged from making more effective use of the current 
alternatives and the way they are managed, through to more radical financial incentive and 
disincentive measures.  Consideration was also given to the impact that certain approaches 
might have and how to approach introducing different measures.  
Overall there was a widespread view that the greatest deterrent to driving to work would be 
a physical lack of spaces available to people.  This, however, is not a position that BAA 
want to be confronted with and there is a determination on the part of some of the 
interviewees to find a solution to the car parking problems so that they will never reach a 
situation where those who wish to drive to work are not able to because of a lack of spaces, 
“I have worked at places where they’ve literally run out of parking spaces and it causes 
massive internal problems because they become quite highly prized thing…bartering spaces 
and using favours such as “well I’ll take the job if you give me a parking space” is a very 
unattractive route to take.” (BAA 2).  
There was unanimous agreement from the interviewees that some sort of intervention was 
needed and that the problem would not “sort itself out” (BAA 2). There was also a view that 
employees needed to be closer to the decision making process in terms of personally 
experiencing a parking charge or financial incentive if it was to have any real impact on their 
behaviour.  
6.12.1 Direct Parking Charges for Employees  
Parking charges paid directly by employees were considered by some of the respondents to 
be essential to finding a solution to the car parking problems at the airport, “fundamentally 
there has to be a charge built in.” (BAA 1). Other interviewees who were not so in favour of 
a charge also recognised that one may have to be incorporated at some stage, “I suspect at 
some point there’ll be a disincentive…there will come a time if passenger numbers keep 
increasing where this is going to be quite an acute problem.” (BAA 2). It was also 
considered that the charge had to be set at a level which deterred driving to work to a great 
enough extent to make people think about their commuting options.  The level of the charge 
was  
something that all respondents regarded to be fundamental to the success of a charging 
scheme, whether they agreed with the principle of charging employees or not. Some 
interviewees discussed in broad terms how the charge should be set, “it has to be sufficient 
that it does act as a disincentive to people to drive to work” (BAA 2),  although there were 
also views such as, “I don’t think it would have a huge effect…it will have to be a 
substantial cost to deter people.” (BAA 4). There was also a feeling by some respondents 
that it should be done in a fair way, “I assumed that if you put a charge in it would be the 
same for everybody but then that is not fair at all is it. It’s a much higher proportion of a 
junior member of staff’s salary than a more senior member of staff’s salary.” (BAA 2).  
It was also realised by the respondents that a reasonable approach had to be taken and that 
the charge could not just be continuously increased to enable continual management of the 
demand for car parking spaces, “if we’re still having lots of people driving and insufficient 
spaces then we’ve probably got something wrong with the mechanism.” (BAA 1). If parking 
was to be charged directly to employees then BAA recognise that they would need to turn it 
into more of a customer driven product. This is regarded as a positive aspect as it will 
increase the quality of the car parking and place greater focus on providing the “right 
services” (BAA 3).  
The idea of charging employees daily rather than annually was discussed and seen as an 
important characteristic to include in any charging scheme because of the increased 
flexibility and choice it gave.  Charging employees on an annual basis was regarded as 
encouraging them to drive everyday so as to extract maximum value from the permit.  
There was strong opposition to the introduction of direct employee charges from some of the 
respondents, “I don’t think there is anything that would facilitate employees being charged 
individually for their car parking.” (BAA 5). Employee reaction to any proposed charge was 
expected to be negative, “they would see it as a cut in salary I guess” (BAA 5), “it would be 
seen as very negative because it’s almost like a tax on your job and that would be quite 
detrimental from an employee relations point of view.” (BAA 2). In addition to this view it 
was felt that if charged, employees would expect an increase in their wages.  It was 
anticipated that current contracts would be  
inflexible to such a change and compensation would have to be offered either in the form of 
a one-off payment or an increase in salary.  The inflexibility of contracts, particularly in the 
airline industry was seen as a barrier to introducing a charge.  A potential negative impact of 
a parking charge was highlighted by some interviewees as being “fly parking” (BAA 4) by 
employees in nearby residential streets.  
Rather than directly charging employees, it was suggested by one interviewee that a change 
in the current system, namely an increase in the prices companies were charged for parking 
permits, could encourage some companies to make different decisions in terms of how many 
passes they bought.  Although the current regulation does not allow BAA to return any profit 
on employee car parking, it was thought that even a change to the price differential between 
perimeter parking permits and Central Terminal Area parking permits would discourage 
companies from buying permits in the Central Terminal Area.  The concept of charging 
companies daily as opposed to annually, in a similar fashion to charging employees in this 
way as discussed earlier, was also a favoured approach.  
The notion of hypothecation was discussed in relation to parking charges and whether 
reinvesting parking revenues into alternative modes of transport would increase staff 
acceptance of the charge. There were mixed views in terms of ring-fencing the revenue. The 
majority of respondents thought that it would be wise to hypothecate revenues as it would 
reflect positively on the scheme, “from a perception point of view it’s great” (BAA 3), it 
would show it not to be for the purpose of generating profit and “it might actually help to 
alleviate the argument with staff.” (BAA 2). If hypothecation was conducted transparently it 
was expected to further increase acceptance levels. Other respondents were not so 
favourable, stating that nothing could facilitate employees being charged and also that it 
could result in further disputes if it was felt the monies were being reinvested unfairly.  
6.12.2 Financial Incentives  
There was a positive response amongst the interviewees to the use of financial incentives, “if 
there was a significant financial alternative then I would seriously  
consider it” (BAA 5) and “you have to make it as positively attractive for people to stop 
using their cars, so there’s some sort of cost benefit to them to do it.” (BAA 2).  
It was considered by the respondents that a successful financial incentive scheme should 
include a high level of flexibility and be based on daily payments, rather than permanently 
taking away people’s parking permits for a one-off as had previously been trialled by BAA 
with limited success.  This attempt at “buying back parking spaces” (BAA2) was ended as it 
was not cost effective and had tax implications.  This increased flexibility was expected to 
encourage take-up of the scheme as it would help to assure people they could still park when 
they needed to or if their circumstances changed.  It would also need to be communicated 
clearly so that people understood how it worked and what the benefits were.  
Negative issues associated with offering a financial incentive were also highlighted. The cost 
of running a scheme, particularly over a period of time was contemplated, “I suppose you 
implement it and it’s fine, there’s a cost for the first year or second year but then it just 
becomes a big lump of money sitting on the balance sheet every year and after the emotion 
has worn off people start to question why it is being paid out every year.” (BAA 2). A further 
issue was that if large amounts of money had to be paid out to fund an incentive scheme then 
there may be fewer funds to improve alternative modes.  In some cases the use of incentives 
in isolation was not regarded as being effective enough to resolve the problems, “I don’t 
think it works if you just do a pure incentive.” (BAA 1).  
6.12.3 Adopting a Package Approach  
In many cases, it was considered that a mixture of incentives and disincentives should be 
used, “intuitively I’ve felt for a long time that a mixture of some sort of payout and some sort 
of charge would appear to be the best option because of the culture here” (BAA 1) and “I 
really favour a mix and match approach, you pay when you use it, you don’t pay when you 
don’t, maybe you get money back and you don’t.” (BAA 4).  
There was a feeling throughout all of the interviews that the first steps of any scheme should 
be to make more efficient use of the current resources available.  This included better 
management of current car parks and, in particular, making better use of public transport 
alternatives and initiatives such as car sharing, “there needs to be something to say “have we 
really exhausted all of that” before we move on to other things” (BAA 2). It was considered 
unfair to “…just slap a charge on and give nothing in return, I think that would be 
dangerous and I wouldn’t advocate it. I think the downside would be that it would be 
achieved in such an unacceptable way that unless you had all the other balances in place to 
make the charge something that employees could swallow.” (BAA 1).  
Shift patterns are regarded as posing a particular problem on change over periods and also in 
terms of providing public transport at unsociable hours; therefore a greater understanding of 
shifts and perhaps even some timetabling rearrangement were considered good initial 
approaches.  Another interesting area was that while there is a high proportion of “front line” 
employees at Heathrow, not everybody who works at the airport needs to be on the site 
everyday.  Therefore, some type of flexible working policy for non site-essential could go a 
long way to reducing the number of car commuters.  
Some interviewees thought that whatever scheme Heathrow undertook should link with 
other employers in the area so as to decrease overall road congestion in the surrounding 
catchment, as well as Heathrow’s specific car parking problems, “you have to take into 
account that we sit in a world around us and as a big entity it’s going to be very difficult for 
us to do one set of things if the local council, the town council, Stockley Park don’t change 
their ways too.” (BAA 4). To this end, the concept of area wide road user charging was 
mentioned as a potential strategy.  
It was also recognised that a greater level of information was needed to fully assess who was 
currently using car parks and when they were being used.  An increased level of control over 
permit allocation was also suggested.  
6.12.4 Additional  Issues Raised Regarding Financial Incentives and Disincentives  
There were a number of universal factors associated with introducing a new strategy 
containing a financial incentive or disincentive, which the interviewees considered to be 
important.  There was an appreciation of the likely impacts of making large changes to the 
car parking strategy, “trying to highlight that there is no more space is really hard because 
people don’t believe you” (BAA 3), “fundamentally there has to be a charge built in and that 
is going to be a big shock to the airport.” (BAA 1). There was also expected to be 
resentment towards the introduction of a parking charge and concerns, based on previous 
experiences at other places of work, that the emotions involved were so great as to cause 
arguments and staff unrest.  The large workforce of approximately 70,000 was expected to 
make change a difficult process.  
Stating clear reasons if introducing a charge was regarded as extremely important  
“the ultimate is getting employees to understand very clearly that we are not doing this to 
make commercial gain for the airport, we’re doing it to keep Heathrow growing.” (BAA 3). 
Flexibility in any design was another important consideration so that employees did not feel 
pressured in terms of their travel decisions and could use whatever mode was most suitable 
for them on a given day. There was also recognition that advances in technology were 
required if any scheme involving a financial element directly linked to employees was to be 
introduced.  
A potential side effect of any new strategy was mentioned, in that the political kudos would 
be considerable. It was thought that the Government would strongly favour a scheme such as 
employee charging or financial incentives and that Heathrow could be used as a leading 
example, which would in turn generate further public relations benefits.  
Whatever solution is favoured, it was considered that BAA had to look carefully at the 
population and determine which group they were trying to sway in order for any new 
strategy to be effective. In a similar fashion, it was suggested that certain groups who had 
better access to public transport could be targeted with different strategies.  
Throughout the interviews some of the respondents discussed the fact that BAA and 
Heathrow still had to operate efficiently and make money.  Therefore, while addressing the 
car parking problems and all of the factors associated with that, there is also the pressure of 
making Heathrow as commercially successful as possible. It is for this reason that BAA has 
decided to focus on employee parking rather than passenger parking. Without the employee 
parking regulations it is considered that BAA would be charging much more for parking 
permits.  
6.13 Focus on Individuals  
Throughout all of the interviews the respondents placed a strong focus on individuals. Much 
of this focus was on the emotive nature of car parking, “car parking is up there, it’s as high 
as how much someone gets paid” (BAA 3), “I think it plays a big part in people’s general 
state of happiness” (BAA 2) and how the implementation and consultation of any new 
scheme had to be done with a great deal of care so as not to create difficult human resource 
and industrial relations problems, “if it becomes a big issue for them then I think it can be 
damaging to harmony amongst the workers.” (BAA 2). It was also considered that car 
parking was something that would be “highly emotive while you’re in the mess” (BAA 3) but 
then once a change was introduced the opposition and bad feeling would decrease.  Shift 
workers and front line workers were thought to be those individuals who were likely to be 
most strongly opposed to a new scheme and that it was also these individuals who were 
likely to be most disadvantaged if a poorly designed strategy was implemented because they 
either would not have access to alternatives at unsociable hours, or the finances to pay for 
either car parking or alternative modes.  
Linked to this recognition of the emotional factors involved in car parking was a general 
understanding of the impact any new scheme would have on individual employees.  It was 
felt that as much effort as possible should be made to make the scheme fair and reasonable 
to individuals, “I think what you want to do is tie it to the way people feel comfortable living 
their lives” (BAA 4), while at the same time effectively tackling the issues facing the 
Airport.  In some cases it was considered that different approaches could be used with 
different sections of the employment population, or a mixture of options that allowed 
increased flexibility and choice could be used. Those in favour of parking charges thought 
that a non-discriminatory approach should be used as far as possible, perhaps with permit 
priority being given to those assessed to have the greatest need and parking charges based on 
salary.  
It was considered by the interviewees that employees should be central to the operation of 
any new strategy and also the process of introducing a new parking strategy, to ensure that 
acceptability was as high as possible and because it is the individuals who make the ultimate 
decision about whether they drive to work or use alternative means, “I think organisations 
can help us do what we’re currently doing but the real change does come from the 
individual” (BAA 1), “I think once you divorce the individual from the individual decision 
you lose impact.” (BAA 4). In terms of the planning of the new strategy then it is felt that 
employees should be heavily consulted and each individual should feel they have had the 
opportunity to feed in their views, thus a comprehensive communications strategy is 
regarded as being necessary.  
6.14 Recruitment and Retention  
Questioning on the likely impact of any new parking scheme on recruitment and retention, 
especially a parking charge direct to employees, extracted mixed responses from the 
interviewees.  Retention was regarded as being more of an unknown quantity because of the 
difficulties in knowing exactly how people will react to situations. Some interviewees felt 
that for front line staff who make up the majority of Heathrow’s workforce, and for whom 
salary levels were marginal, then the introduction of a parking charge could force many to 
consider working elsewhere. Managerial staff on higher salaries were not expected to be so 
affected by a parking charge and would realise they would struggle to get such good jobs 
and benefits elsewhere, but it was anticipated they would use collective bargaining to make 
their voice heard. The other view was that many staff enjoyed working at the airport and 
loved the environment.  Therefore there was a lot more to weigh up than just car parking 
when making a decision about potentially changing jobs. In addition to this was the 
consideration that changing jobs is a big upheaval; many factors have to be traded off, 
particularly if somebody has worked in a specific role at the airport for a long time.  The 
view that people are resilient was also aired.  Such viewpoints still recognised that some 
people might be put off, but that the impact may not be so large. It was considered that 
current employees would seek compensation in one form or another should a major change 
be introduced.  
Recruitment was seen as much easier to manage because newer staff wouldn’t know any 
different other than to accept the situation.  People interested in applying for a job were seen 
to be able to weigh up the situation they were presented with and then make a decision on 
whether to apply. While this does not entail the emotional issues surrounding changing the 
car parking strategy that would be experienced by the current employees, it was recognised 
that there is the issue that a car parking charge could act as a deterrent and increase the 
difficulties of recruitment.  Whichever way forward is chosen by BAA, there is a clear view 
that any impact on recruitment and retention must be reduced.  
6.15 Equality and Fairness  
The issues of fairness and equality were apparent in many areas covered by the interviews, 
from the fairness of the current system through to ensuring any new scheme was as 
equitable, transparent and reasonable as possible.  This attitude was often seen to come from 
the respondents’ own personal outlook, as opposed to them saying what they believed to be 
the politically correct response.  It was noted that the female interviewees in particular had 
stronger views that any scheme should be fair and even handed.  
Regarding the development of a new scheme, and specifically a parking charge direct to 
employees, there were strong views that its introduction should be done in as reasonable a 
way as possible which would in turn increase acceptance, “I don’t think you can push it too 
far, people have to come to work, it doesn’t have to be an impossible task to come to work 
either.” (BAA 2). Adopting this approach was a widespread opinion with consideration of 
individuals being high on most agendas.  
Staff were considered to be “reasonable people” (BAA 1) and hence the approach taken by 
BAA should also be reasonable, “people don’t actually mind stuff as long as they know and 
I think be fair, open and honest and it will be ok.” (BAA 1). This quote also highlights the 
perceived importance of communication and the need to be transparent.  General staff 
welfare was also considered, “if you want to retain your attractiveness as an employer then 
you owe it to your workforce to be reasonably careful about their quality of life and working 
environment.” (BAA 4). In addition it was thought that if employees were made to pay for 
their own parking then it would have to be viewed much more as a product, “you might not 
be happy about paying for it, but you would be willing to pay for it.” (BAA 3).  
It was also considered important to show that whatever scheme was decided upon, was the 
same for everybody, although it was recognised that this was not easy,  
“whatever route you take is going to be discriminatory in some way, I think it’s better to do 
one which isn’t status driven, but then you could end up in a situation where people work 
very long hours didn’t get a permit and that wouldn’t be desirable either…but doing it on a 
time served basis is also tricky so I think there are no straightforward answers.” (BAA 2). 
While this comment highlights some issues of fairness, it also highlights a level of confusion 
in terms of determining how a new parking strategy should work. This considered approach 
and questioning of how best to approach the problem was typical throughout many of the 
interviews and highlights some of the complexities in trying to find a suitable balance of all 
the contributing factors and ensure the solution is even handed.  
A transparent approach to introducing a new strategy was regarded as being an important 
part of its implementation, “I think the ultimate is actually getting all the employees to 
understand very clearly that we are not doing this to make commercial gain for the airport, 
we’re doing it to keep Heathrow growing.” (BAA 3). It was considered that this clarity in 
approaching any implementation should also be matched with clearly stated reasons and 
spelling out the problem that there are simply not enough spaces while also explaining that 
as equitable a solution as possible was being sought.  
There were mixed views when discussing whether the current system, whereby employers 
were paying for car parking, was equitable, particularly when considering that those who 
choose not to drive to work don’t receive a comparable benefit.  Some interviewees 
considered that there was equity because everybody was entitled to apply for a parking 
permit and those that chose to drive incurred petrol and maintenance costs, whereas non-car 
commuters did not.  It was also considered by some interviewees to be unreasonable to 
charge for parking at work, particularly in more inaccessible locations. Others thought that 
the scheme was not equitable and car drivers were getting a benefit that non-car commuters 
were not.  
6.16 Flexibility and Choice  
The issues of flexibility and choice recurred throughout the interviews and covered many 
different aspects of the areas discussed.  The flexibility of the private car was regarded as a 
major factor in people’s decision of how to get to work.  In some cases it was regarded as 
central to a persons ability to carry out their job effectively and it was also recognised that 
some people had no option but to use the car to travel to work for a number of reasons 
including where they lived, their start and finish times and public transport availability.  
Employee work lifestyle balances were also considered to be increasing in their importance, 
with the flexibility contained within a role becoming a larger part of the decision making 
process when considering where to work. Issues such as car parking were regarded as 
making up a part of this flexibility.  
Incorporating a large amount of flexibility into any new parking strategy was seen as crucial 
by the interviewees.  This had to be apparent in terms of the ability to opt out of a financial 
incentive or disincentive scheme when required, “you’re more likely to get buy in if people 
feel they have the flexibility to get the space back if they need it” (BAA 5), and also in terms 
of other transport options being available to complement the core element of the scheme and 
offer a real alternative to the car, “there would need to be other solutions in place that would 
give me and others as close to as much flexibility as I have now.” (BAA 5). According to the 
interviewees, some other companies at the airport are starting to talk to BAA about 
introducing more flexible systems, for example American Airlines have approached and said 
“we’d rather have  
a system where we could buy people a travelcard and pay for some of their parking rather 
than the whole thing.” (BAA 1). Under BAA’s current scheme the respondents said that 
there was not the flexibility available to do this.  
6.17 Implementation  
There were strong views from all of the interviewees that whatever strategy was chosen as 
the most suitable way forward for the airport to solve its car parking problems, BAA should 
lead by example, pilot the new measure and be the first organisation to adopt it. This was 
considered to be beneficial in persuading other companies at Heathrow to support the 
scheme, “you’d have to start with BAA first, that would then enable or facilitate buy in of 
some of the larger organisations.  You need to get a little bit of momentum…we have the 
power to make ourselves do these things and then start to get other people on board.” (BAA 
5). It was also considered that BAA could then help other companies out with their 
implementation, “we can go to other companies and say “this is what we’ve done, this is the 
hardship we went through, these are the lessons we learnt, we can help you here”.” (BAA 
3).  
Certain areas of BAA in particular were seen as offering good pilot opportunities. The 
“BAA Heathrow Point” complex of offices was regarded as a good pilot exercise location, 
“round here where you’re dealing with a management population in what is clearly a very 
attractive parking arrangement right next to the office is probably a good place to pilot it. It 
also has the advantage when you roll it out to other people of saying “we started with the 
most cosseted group of staff before we moved on to anybody else”.” (BAA 2).  
Human resource issues were also raised in relation to implementation.  It was clear in the 
minds of the interviewees that the introduction of a new car parking strategy, especially one 
including some direct financial elements, could be difficult to implement, “we’d need to 
ensure that whatever was decided could be implemented without causing too many 
repercussions.” (BAA 2). Staff communication was regarded as very important and it was 
also felt, “the important thing if you’re doing anything like this is you’ve got to make the 
employees feel like they’re part of it and that it’s not being done to them.” (BAA 5). It was 
considered that the more time people were given to come to terms with the change, coupled 
with a “fair, honest and open” (BAA 1) approach, then the more staff would begin to accept 
the change.  
Other implementation related issues discussed included who should be responsible for the 
roll out and introduction of a new strategy.  The general consensus, and the way the current 
structure is intended to be, is that BAA should develop and lead the strategy but then the 
“real business owners, terminal managers and those sort of people” (BAA 1) should take the 
responsibility for the actual administration of it.  The way any strategy would be phased in 
was also raised which generated two different viewpoints; some interviewees regarded a 
gradual implementation as being the most suitable way to progress in order to retain the 
support of the workforce whereas others favoured a meaningful initial change to create a 
larger impact, “give people loads of warning but on day one “this is what it is”.” (BAA 1). 
A gradual approach is already believed to be underway, according to the views of one of the 
respondents, “there’s been lots of gradual things, buses and car share, heightening the 
profile of Airport Commuter, “European Car Free Day”, “Bike to Work Week”, all those 
things have been happening. We’re doing survey work so people are now talking about it, 
we’ll soon be talking to the Unions so I think it’s all a very soft build up to start with, but 
there comes a point where you have to make it clear that this is real and begin a countdown 
to a time two years down the line when something will happen.” (BAA 1).  
6.18 Consultation  
The interviewees regarded the process of consultation associated with introducing any new 
parking strategy to be very important and also complex.  There were clear and unanimous 
views on who should be consulted, starting with top level management, then individual 
companies and finally employees.  For an issue as emotive as car parking it was regarded as 
important to ultimately target every individual employee. Suggestions for achieving this 
included the use of forums, presentations, focus groups, newsletters and mail shots to each 
employee.  It was considered that “in an ideal world all the employees would feel as though 
they had been consulted” (BAA 5) and “it needs to be so in your face that no one has the 
excuse to say “I didn’t know” or “I’ve not been asked.” (BAA 1). The groups to be initially 
consulted were considered to be major airlines and employers at Heathrow with assistance 
from the “Airline Operators Committee”, at the executive level in the first instance and then 
at a broader level. This high level of consultation and communication was felt to be 
important so that everybody understood the benefits of a new parking strategy, even if they 
felt uncomfortable with some of its components.  Various ways of achieving this were 
suggested and their appeared to be a structure in place which would enable such consultation 
to take place, “we’ve got the change management framework in place so whatever scheme 
was proposed, the framework and template is there…it starts from identifying the 
stakeholders, then depending on the stakeholder groups what is the appropriate means of 
communication.” (BAA 5).  
It was also recognised that the consultation would require a lengthy time frame, although 
estimations varied between respondents from six months to “at least two years, maybe 
three” (BAA 1). The perceived requirement for a long consultation was because of the likely 
negativity towards it from staff and the fact that several issues will have to be resolved 
before it can proceed, “the consultation process will be very very long, it will almost become 
a negotiation.” (BAA 3). It was thought that over time and as people began to understand the 
benefits then opposition and initial unhappiness would be overcome.  In one instance it was 
suggested that the consultation process should be approached in a different way, “what you 
want is people to actually volunteer in.  Maybe the consultation process would be saying 
“we’ve got a problem, how do you want it solved?” (BAA 4).  
The interviewees were also asked if there were any other experiences of similar consultation 
at Heathrow which could be drawn upon.  The only comparison made was with Terminal 5 
because of the impact it has on the community at large but overall the response was that 
there were no examples where something had been introduced that affected every company 
and every employee.  It was also considered that BAA and Heathrow could perhaps learn 
from the way other companies had approached the consultation process when introducing 
new strategies  
6.19 Learning and Benchmarking  
Interviewees were asked for their opinions on whether they considered BAA as being 
receptive to learning from other companies and whether the company was currently engaged 
in any activities that could be referred to as benchmarking, learning or best practice. The 
overall consensus was that BAA was definitely open to learning from other organisations, 
whether they be other BAA departments, other companies at Heathrow, other airports or 
from an unrelated sector.  
In some cases it was considered crucial that BAA looked to other companies to learn how 
they had tackled car parking problems, “I think it would be essential to learn from best 
practice elsewhere” (BAA 2) and there was real positivity towards the whole idea of learning 
from others, both to solve the problem and for the good of the Airport in general, “I see how 
many companies are dealing with this issue very seriously. They are companies doing it for 
the benefit of themselves and I wish I could find a way to help Heathrow to understand that 
this is for its own benefit.” (BAA 1). Some initial work has already started at BAA in terms 
of seeking out best practice in other organisations to deal with the car parking issues.  
Different stages of the process of introducing a new car parking strategy were considered 
with reference to learning from elsewhere, from the design of the scheme  
“I think that every company outside of BAA will have a piece of the answer to the car 
parking jigsaw but no one company has yet put the pieces together into one holistic strategy 
that works and that’s the challenge, identifying the pieces and implementing it” (BAA 5) to 
it’s implementation and consultation “or we could learn from examples of consultation that 
have been done within organisations or other parts of the airport. I don’t know if anything’s 
ever happened in cargo for example, so I’m sure there’s things we could learn from.” (BAA 
1).  
There was evidence of current benchmarking activity at BAA.  Examples included learning 
from colleagues at other BAA airports when writing documents such as Travel Plans and 
working with the nearby Stockley Park Business Park, Vodafone and Glaxo SmithKline 
Beecham on travel planning issues.  Such links are considered as important rather than 
“reinventing the wheel” (BAA 5) on similar transport issues. It was also considered that 
BAA should work together with neighbouring companies on commuting and parking 
strategies so that the whole area was benefiting.  
A downside of benchmarking within BAA was highlighted as being a lack of resources, 
particularly in terms of time, to fully understand what other companies were doing. This 
applied to both carrying out any initial learning and then taking the ideas, developing and 
using them, as well as a general lack of focus and priority given to such initiatives by top 
level managers.  
The concepts of uniqueness and arrogance were raised with interviewees, in the sense that 
because Heathrow was a one-off situation and also much bigger and more advanced than 
many other airports, then the situation at other organisations may not be transferable. On the 
issue of arrogance there was one opinion that Heathrow considered itself to be above other 
companies, but on the whole it was felt that the airport was willing to learn from others.  
There was some feeling that the situation at Heathrow was fairly unique in some ways, 
“there certainly isn’t another Heathrow out there that we can copy from” (BAA 1), 
particularly in terms of the size of the campus, the range and number of organisations on site 
and the number of employees. Other factors such as the large number of shift workers and a 
feeling that Heathrow was relatively inaccessible by public transport, were considered 
problems, but not problems that were just unique to Heathrow.  Overall, while there was 
recognition that there are some factors which make Heathrow different to other 
organisations, there was also considered to be several areas where Heathrow shared 
characteristics with organisations and hence could learn from them.  Some interviewees 
stated that they had originally considered that Heathrow was completely different to any 
other organisation, but after more consideration and research in the area of car parking they 
had realised that there were several similarities with other organisations, “if you’d have 
asked me a year ago I could have listed a whole load of things…but there is much more 
similarity than I had previously thought.” (BAA 1).  
The following statement sums up much of this, “We’re not unique but there are unique 
factors and that’s why I don’t think you’d pick up a template from one company and just 
move it here, you’re going to mix and match.” (BAA 4).  
PART 3: Heathrow Airport Focus Group Analysis  
6.20 Heathrow Airport Focus Group Analysis  
The findings from the focus groups are presented in a similar way to those from the 
interviews.  The analysis below is based on the range of discussion questions posed to the 
groups as shown in Figure 5.5 with key issues being picked out from the groups via the same 
method of coding used in the interview analysis.  Due to the nature of the focus groups 
predominantly comprising ‘shop floor’ employees, certain areas were covered in different 
levels of detail compared to the interviews.  For example, greater emphasis was placed on 
employee attitudes towards the current parking situation and their opinions on potential new 
strategies.  Overall, attention was targeted on perceptions of the current situation, whether 
there was a need to change and on attitudes towards strategies incorporating financial 
incentives and disincentives.  The respondents were also encouraged to discuss those 
strategies they felt would be more effective.  
The codes used with quotes throughout the focus group analysis are as follows:  
 Focus Group 1 – 6 participants (FG 1)  
 Focus Group 2 – 10 participants (FG 2)  
 Focus Group 3 – 4 participants (FG 3)  
 Focus Group 4 – 7 participants (FG 4)  
 Focus Group 5 – 6 participants (FG 5)  
 Focus Group 6: Bus Users – 5 participants (FG Bus)  
 Focus Group 7: Heathrow Point West Office Workers – 10 participants (FG HPW)  
 
6.21 The Current Car Parking Situation and the Need for Change  
The Current Situation  
The focus group participants displayed a wide range of views regarding the current car 
parking situation at Heathrow.  In general most people were happy with the level of car 
parking provision and had no difficulty finding a space, “I can’t complain really, the car 
park is conveniently located and there’s never any problems with finding a space.” (FG 3). 
Some respondents stated that their place of work was close to the car park which made it 
convenient to drive and there was praise for a scheme that allowed night shift workers to 
park in the Central Terminal Area at the weekend. Overall, it was felt that certain car parks 
were better situated than others, for example the Terminal Four employee car park was 
frequently referred to as being “good” (FG 1/2/4), with quick journey times into the 
terminal, but people who worked in the Central Terminal Area were generally less happy, 
having to endure longer journey times to get from car parks to their place of work.  The most 
common criticism was that employees often had to drive past their place of work to their 
designated car park and then get a shuttle bus to their final destination, adding what they felt 
to be unnecessary time to their journey, “my only issue is that from the car park to my place 
of work is three quarters of my journey time and driving to the car park is a quarter of my 
journey time.” (FG 3). Arriving at work on time was seen as a crucial factor, especially for 
front line staff, and something which managers would not tolerate.  To this end the shuttle 
bus service was not regarded to be sufficiently reliable at present, it was often overcrowded 
meaning it drove straight past stops and could not always be depended upon, particularly at 
peak times.  
In the group comprising BAA office workers more specific issues were discussed relating to 
the limited car parking outside the Heathrow Point West building.  The majority of 
participants in this group were dissatisfied with the lack of parking provision, often leading 
to problems finding a parking space. The ‘three days in, two days out’ policy was also 
mentioned, whereby all staff are permitted to park in the HPW car park for three days per 
week and for the other two days they have to park at the visitors centre car park over the 
road.  The majority of participants did not think this was solving the problem because the 
visitor car park is often at full capacity as well. One participant also thought that it was a 
safety concern when staff are asked to park elsewhere, firstly in terms of having to walk 
alone at night and secondly the security of cars being parked in car parks without CCTV.  
General congestion on the roads was often regarded to be more of a problem then the 
physical capacity of car parks, “on Monday mornings at 5:30 or 6:00 it’s very hard to get 
through the tunnel as traffic solid.” (FG 1).  
There was also a feeling that car parks were often abused in terms of who was using them 
and it was questioned whether parking permits were actually being monitored. Some 
participants said that the sharing of entry passes occurred between employees and that it was 
easy to obtain multiple passes for different car parks or vehicles.  
Almost all participants were aware that their employer paid for their car parking, although 
there was far less understanding of how much parking permits cost.  It was felt by the 
majority that their employer should be responsible for paying for their car parking. In focus 
group 6 there were two participants who had to pay for their own car parking, charged at £38 
per fortnight, and as a result they commuted by bus. Members of the bus user group thought 
it unfair that employers paid for car parking for their staff but did not offer any benefit to 
those that travelled by public transport.  
The Need to Change?  
When discussing the reasons as to why there was a need to reduce car use at Heathrow, the 
majority of participants were aware of the overriding issues of congestion, a lack of parking 
spaces as the airport grew and environmental issues such as air pollution. A minority of 
group members were aware that Heathrow was subject to a parking cap, but the details of 
this were generally unknown.  Some people thought that the cap applied only to passengers 
and not employees, while others thought the cap was only for traffic related to Terminal 
Five.  There was also a lack of awareness that the cap was imposed by National Government 
and not BAA itself. Another reason citied for why there was a need to reduce car use was to 
allow for future expansion. Amongst some participants there was suspicion surrounding 
BAA’s motives for reducing car use and they believed that the environment was being used 
as an excuse to hide financial objectives within the business, “it’s so BAA can make more 
money by renting parking spaces out to other companies” (FG Bus) and “it’s all about cost, 
if they can reduce staff car use they don’t have to pay out as much for passes.” (FG 5). A 
small number of participants also voiced the view that BAA was appearing to be “anti-car” 
(FG 1).  
In one group there was a comment that they did not think there would be a change to the 
current car parking strategies until the problem reached a critical level, “I don’t  
think there is a big enough problem yet. At the moment I think the car parking is okay and 
until it gets not-okay then you are not going to change people…people will keep their head 
in the sand until it gets really bad.” (FG 4). A further supporting statement was, “when it 
becomes painful for individuals it will focus the minds.” (FG 4).  
6.22 Perceptions of Current Car Reduction Initiatives  
A large amount of time in the focus groups was spent discussing car alternatives, which 
reflected the relevant importance of these issues to employees at Heathrow. Overall, there 
was an awareness of the efforts BAA was making to reduce car use; in particular car sharing, 
the free on-site travel service, the Airport Travelcard and the promotion of cycling were 
mentioned by focus group participants.  The role of public transport was recognised, “public 
transport has the potential to be of great benefit because it can go straight to our place of 
work and stop outside the terminal, but it doesn’t do that.” (FG 1), but there was a general 
feeling that currently these efforts did not really meet the needs of many employees, 
particularly where car sharing and public transport were concerned.  
There was a strong focus on the need for improvements to public transport throughout all of 
the groups and many said if public transport was better they would consider using it. Those 
who worked on shift patterns raised specific issues about a lack of public transport options at 
the times they needed to travel, “it’s non existent at four in the morning, even if you live 
relatively close, there is nothing to get you to work at that time.” (FG 1). Many people 
perceived central London to be well served but it was suggested that the majority of 
employees do not live there; they live in towns surrounding the airport.  
The issues of reliability and the non-tolerance of lateness were raised with respect to public 
transport. People wanted, “alternatives that are as reliable as I am.  If you can find that then 
I would certainly look at it” and “we need an alternative that’s solid, reliable and 
guaranteed.” (FG 3). The consensus was that current options were not good enough to meet 
these criteria.  Overall, the time taken by public transport was its main downside, 
particularly when compared to driving into work.  Faster public transport links were 
regarded as a necessary improvement to encourage more people to use it, “I’m quite happy 
to add 20 minutes onto my journey and leave my car at home, but when it’s more than 20 
minutes it becomes a non-starter.” (FG 1). In addition, it was felt by some that the buses and 
trains were dirty, uncomfortable and felt unsafe, all of which were large negative influences.  
Other issues with public transport on-site at the airport were raised.  It was seen as “not very 
encouraging” (FG 1) that staff were not entitled to free transport between the Central 
Terminal Area and Terminal Four, even though for some this was a regular journey they had 
to make.  
Problems with car sharing were discussed by several participants.  The principle behind 
sharing lifts was thought to be a good one, but the reality of car sharing was felt to be more 
difficult, “the problem with car share is the shift workers, my neighbours work at the airport 
and we all park in the same car park but our shifts never coincide” (FG 1) and “I’m shared 
up with two others but it’s maybe only once a month that we are on the same shift. And in my 
job we get a lot of double shifts offered to us so you might come in with someone then all of 
a sudden you’re doing a double shift and have to get yourself home.” (FG 2). High turnover 
of staff in some jobs at Heathrow also posed problems for finding regular partners and 
another highlighted problem was that it was too easy for single drivers to still park in 
designated car share bays without any repercussions.  Some group members also said they 
were unwilling to share a lift into work with someone they did not know.  
Other alternative options such as cycling and walking were generally regarded as dangerous 
around the airport site, particularly on the dual carriageway and through the tunnel to the 
Central Terminal Area, “I’ve cycled myself and it’s lethal.” (FG 1). While a small number of 
participants did cycle to work, the majority said it was something they would not consider.  
It was agreed between participants that greatly improved cycle priority and safety was 
required both on-site and off-site to generate an increase in cyclists. Improved shower and 
changing facilities were also regarded as essential, “I know probably 15 guys who would 
want to cycle in but there’s no shower facilities when you get here.” (FG Bus).  
6.23 Proposed Strategies and Attitudes towards Change  
There was an overwhelming negativity in all focus groups towards any proposed measure 
such as direct employee charging, financial incentives or permit allocation; specific 
responses to each of the initiatives discussed are below.  Another general finding was that 
many people perceived their travel to work as an ‘all or nothing’ scenario, with no medium 
in between; they either always drove to work or always came by another mode.  
6.23.1 Financial Incentives  
The majority of participants stated that a financial incentive, whether implemented as a daily 
payment or as a lump sum to give up parking permits, would have little effect on their 
decision to drive to work. The main reasons for this were the perceived lack of viable 
alternatives, “I don’t need an incentive, you don’t have to give me any money, if the bus was 
there I would use it.” (FG 4), and the increased time it would take to use public transport, 
“It’s not all about money, my time is more important. The way public transport is at the 
moment you could offer me £20 a day and I still wouldn’t use it, it just takes too long.” (FG 
HPW).  
Public transport was, however, viewed by many as being expensive and respondents said 
any financial incentive would have to be greater than the cost of public transport to begin to 
have any impact, “to get to work by bus costs £2 on the way and £2 on the way back so if the 
financial incentive was £2 per day for example, I’d be worse off.”. Others said the level of 
the incentive would have to be very high, “enough to get a taxi to work every day.” (FG 1).  
Also considered important was reliability, something which participants though the car gave 
a higher degree of when compared to public transport.  The lack of tolerance for late arrival 
was cited as a major factor when considering whether a financial incentive would encourage 
employees not to drive to work and it was concluded that employees would prefer to have 
the certainty of arriving at work on time, rather than risking being late by public transport, 
but receiving a financial payment.  Safety, security and comfort were also highlighted by 
group members as important factors that would not allow a financial incentive to encourage 
them to change using their car.  Throughout the discussions on financial incentives, there 
was a tendency for respondents to revert to the problems with public transport, rather than 
focus singularly on the impact the incentive could have.  It was suggested by some that the 
only way a financial incentive could work was if other modes of transport were improved, 
“it’s one bite of the apple, you need to introduce other improvements as well.” (FG 3).  
Participants in the bus user group were much more strongly in favour of a financial incentive 
scheme whereby those who did drive to work were rewarded.  For current public transport 
users this was seen as a way of subsidising their transport costs.  A small number of people 
did comment, however, that they felt a “stick” approach would be more likely to cause 
people to stop driving than a “carrot” approach, “I think it’s best to stay clear of the carrots 
and make it more expensive for people to drive their cars in – this is likely to have a much 
bigger impact.” (FG Bus).  
There was some awareness of a scheme once adopted by BAA whereby staff were able to 
sell their car parking permit for a fixed price.  Take up of this scheme was considered to be 
low because of the value of car parking to employees.  It was also felt that many people who 
had accepted the money in return for their car parking permits, still drove to Heathrow but 
parked in surrounding streets.  As mentioned in section 6.12.2 this scheme was ended by 
BAA due to it not being cost effective and its tax implications.  
6.23.2 Parking Charges  
There was strong negativity towards the idea of directly charging employees to park at 
Heathrow, “you pay enough road tax, MOT, insurance, it’s not right to have more costs” 
and “there’s no level that would be acceptable.” (FG 3). In general there were two main 
responses to the concept of direct employee charging.  
Firstly, a number of participants stated that a charge would have little impact on whether 
they drove to work. They said they would have no option but to pay the charge because there 
were no public transport options that would provide the level of service required. For this 
reason, one person stated that the charge would have to be very high to make him change 
and if it got to a certain level then he would instead park in the long stay passenger car parks 
and expect a much higher standard of service. It was also thought that introducing direct 
parking charges would impact on the surrounding area because people would continue to 
drive and park in nearby streets rather than pay the charge, thereby simply moving the 
problem elsewhere and creating further problems in the process, “people would park just 
across the road and walk through…all of a sudden people can’t park outside their own 
houses anymore.” (FG 1).  
The second response was that employees would not accept the charge and would seek 
employment elsewhere, “that would be a non-starter for a lot of people and they’d probably 
look for other jobs. The airport would no longer be an attractive employment point…I’m not 
paying to come into work, you’re paying me to be here.” (FG 1). In other cases, participants 
said they would expect to be reimbursed in some way by their employer, “a lot of our 
workforce would be looking to be compensated because they are already low paid so every 
pound you add on makes it almost unviable for them to come in here.” (FG 1).  
As with discussions about financial incentives, the importance of public transport was raised 
several times by group members, with participants stating that suitable alternative modes 
would have to be in place before any charge could be introduced to encourage greater modal 
shift and acceptance of the scheme.  
In the bus user group there was a more positive view taken towards direct parking charges 
and support shown towards the concept of using generated revenue to pay for public 
transport improvements.  The other groups were more circumspect with respect to 
hypothecation and said they would want noticeable improvements to both public transport 
and car parking facilities, “if I’m paying £3 a day what am I getting for it?  I would want a 
better service.” (FG 3). There was also concern that if a small charge was initially 
introduced then it would gradually increase to unacceptable levels.  
At the focus group comprising BAA office staff there was more willingness to discuss the 
prospect of a direct car parking charge in more detail.  Some participants said that a car 
parking space at work was not necessarily something they felt should be guaranteed, “it is 
not your employer’s responsibility how you get to work” (FG HPW). Some also considered 
that with a parking charge “you are penalising those that cannot afford to park and it 
doesn’t really affect the others.” (FG HPW). To this end the idea of a “fairer” parking 
charge based on income was raised as an approach which may be more easily accepted.  
The idea of a congestion charge was raised by some groups and many could relate it to car 
parking. It was the general view that if a congestion charge was introduced it was likely that 
staff would be exempt from it and if this was not the case they expected their employer to 
pay for it.  
6.23.3 Parking Permit Reallocation  
As with the other proposed solutions there was a general negativity towards a different 
method of permit allocation.  Some participants considered it would be difficult to enforce 
and would have to be reviewed annually generating high administrative costs.  In some cases 
group members said that if their parking permits were taken away then they would look for 
work elsewhere, park in surrounding streets or even pay to park in passenger car parks.  
Participants in one focus group thought that BAA may not have the power to take away 
parking permits, “if you’ve had something for quite a while isn’t it classed as a perk? I’ve 
had parking for 14 years so doesn’t that mean you can’t take it away?” (FG HPW). While 
still opposed to a new permit strategy the focus group participants were more willing to 
discuss different criteria they felt would make the scheme “fairer”.  
Shift workers were perceived to have a greater need for car parking than non-shift workers 
and should therefore take priority in any allocation procedure, “I think all of us who are shift 
workers need parking allocation at different times of the day and night” (FG 1), “it sounds 
awful but office workers should be targeted first because  
they work regular hours…people who start really early in the morning need a car, there’s 
no other way of getting to work.” (FG 1). There was a feeling from some people that those 
with caring responsibilities “I have to drop my son off at school so I need my car for that.” 
(FG HPW), and those that lived a long way from the airport should be treated as priority 
groups, but others disagreed, “we’re 24/7 here and you can’t say “you can’t have one 
because you only live ten miles down the road”; how am I supposed to get in at four o’clock 
in the morning then?” (FG 1). It was also widely agreed that status should have no bearing 
on permit allocation as it traditionally has done within some organisations at Heathrow.  At 
the group comprising BAA office workers there was a greater level of receptiveness towards 
a “fair” method of permit allocation.  Travel time and distance were seen as important 
criteria which could form the basis of a system based on “acceptable” levels access to public 
transport.  
The issue was raised in two focus groups that BAA could stop allocating permits to new 
recruits. It was thought that if potential employees were informed they would not receive a 
permit when applying for the job, they could make a decision whether or not to work at 
Heathrow based on this knowledge and were therefore likely to accept it, “if people are 
coming in with the perception that they are not going to get car parking, then they have 
nothing to complain about – they know from day one they need to get to work some other 
way.” (FG 5). A minority of participants believed there to be some problems associated with 
preventing new recruits from having access to car parking, particularly as recruiting staff for 
some areas of the business is difficult and because it could create tension between new 
recruits and current staff.  
Parking permits which only allowed access on a certain number of days per week were also 
discussed.  This approach was thought to have some potential if it was possible to select on 
which days you didn’t travel by car, “it would be nice to choose which days. What if I have 
to leave my car on a Friday then when Friday comes it’s pouring with rain and I get a call 
asking if I can come in to work an early shift but I have to say “no I can’t because my car 
park pass isn’t valid today”.” (FG 4).  
6.24 New Approaches and Solutions to Heathrow’s Car Parking Issues  
The focus group participants were asked how they personally would go about resolving the 
car parking problems facing BAA and Heathrow, given the constraints of a car parking cap 
and environmental pollution targets together with the growth of the airport. This generated a 
large amount of discussion.  
Many participants said that dedicated works buses, which ran to the same timetable seven 
days a week and covered all shift patterns would be a good solution and they would be 
willing to use them’ “We could introduce dedicated commuting buses and use our staff ID to 
get on…like the old works buses which were excellent, they were on time and direct, the 
stops were very good…you’d expect the company to contribute to that if they’re not 
contributing to parking spaces.” (FG 1). Further to this thought, it was suggested that BAA 
set up their own bus company and ran services to targeted areas. Off airport park and ride 
schemes were also a popular solution with dedicated shuttle buses or light rail links between 
the car parks and airport.  Some participants suggested that some more careful planning of 
where individual employees parked their car together with buses to certain terminals would 
work well.  Others, however, who worked in multiple locations across the Heathrow site said 
this could be problematic for them.  
Reallocation of Central Terminal Area parking space was suggested by many of the groups. 
One suggestion was to move all parking out of the CTA and use shuttle services to the 
terminals, another was to move all staff out of the CTA and only house passenger parking as 
they are the airport’s priority while a more radical suggestion by one participant was to only 
allow employees to park in the CTA and have all passengers park in remote locations.  
A number of participants suggested that the airport should reconsider exactly which 
companies and departments needed to be located at the airport site and relocate nonessential 
groups, “With some of the cargo companies and freight forwarders, they  
obviously need to be close to the airport, but many are taking cargo to all the airports round 
here so they don’t actually need to be on site.” (FG 2). In the group containing BAA office 
workers, several of the participants said that there was no real requirement for them to be 
based at the airport.  In a similar area, it was considered that home working should be 
encouraged where possible, “I could rearrange my diary to fit all site visits into two days, 
then for the other three I could work in an office anywhere or at home” (FG 3), “remote 
working is the way forward, there is often the perception that if you work from home you are 
skiving, but there are electronic methods that can overcome that.” (FG 3).  
Where public transport was concerned, the participants regarded those living closest to the 
airport as the employees most likely to be attracted to public transport, because of the shorter 
journey times.  Therefore it was thought that providing targeted public transport in the five 
miles surrounding the airport would be a beneficial strategy to pursue. The expansion and 
further promotion of car sharing was also considered to be a useful way of persuading more 
people not to drive to work on their own.  
6.25 Conclusions: Developing a Benchmarking Template  
This chapter has addressed the following two objectives of the research as stated in section 
3.5:  
 determine the measures currently in operation at Heathrow Airport to reduce car use 
and the demand for car parking by employees;  
 explore the issues that need to be addressed if implementing a financial incentive or 
disincentive employee car parking measure at Heathrow Airport.  
 
This section seeks to summarise the key elements of the interviews while also developing a 
benchmarking template to be used in the discussion and analysis contained in Chapter 8 
where the findings of the non-airport case studies are benchmarked against Heathrow 
Airport.  
It was clear from the interviews at BAA that the respondents recognised the scale of the 
impending issues facing car parking and were positive towards introducing a measure 
incorporating a financial incentive or disincentive direct to employees.  This was highlighted 
by the range of potential options that were discussed, all of which were seen to have 
advantages and disadvantages.  This wide range of thinking, however, means that BAA still 
has a considerable amount of work to carry out to define the most suitable way forward in 
terms of how the introduction of such a measure would operate.  
Within the focus groups, there was an overall lack of understanding regarding the issues 
facing car parking at Heathrow and a high degree of negativity towards any potential 
measure such as an employee direct parking charge or financial incentive. Similarly, the 
interview respondents also said that top level management within BAA was currently not 
appearing to recognise the car parking problem with any seriousness.  This would suggest 
that gaining acceptance is another key area where BAA has to devote effort.  
It can be seen from the focus groups that the alternative modes of transport and strategies in 
place to reduce car use are regarded to be lacking.  At the same time, there is a reluctance on 
the part of employees to change and as a result it is likely that more proactive measures are 
required if BAA are to resolve the car parking problems facing Heathrow Airport.  
Overall, it is apparent that the key decision makers in terms of car parking at BAA are aware 
that action is required. Exactly what that action should be and how to go about gaining 
acceptance for it, however, are areas which have not yet been fully considered within BAA. 
For these reasons, establishing a benchmarking template which has a focus on these two key 
areas will help to structure the learning from the non-airport organisations and will assist 
BAA in determining how best to proceed to address their car parking issues. It is also 
important to consider the implementation process and for Heathrow to learn from other 
organisations in this area; while this has some elements which are linked to gaining 
acceptance it is also an area which should be considered in its own right.  
The benchmarking template provides a set of areas which can be used to benchmark BAA 
against the experiences of the best practice non-airport organisations in order to learn from 
how these organisations have addressed their car parking issues and gone about 
implementing measures such as employee direct parking charges and financial incentives.  
The components of the benchmarking template are those areas discussed in the following 
sections and it is these areas that will be investigated in Chapter 8 when conducting the 
benchmarking exercise with the non-airport organisations.  Four key areas are highlighted, 
namely:  
 selecting the most suitable measures to deal with the car parking problems;  
 management support;  
 gaining acceptance;  
 implementation.  
 
6.25.1 Selecting the most Suitable Measures to deal with the Car Parking Problems  
A crucial element of addressing the car parking problems is determining the measures with 
which to do it. In the interviews the respondents displayed mixed opinions regarding what 
they believed to be the most suitable approach for Heathrow Airport. In all cases, however, 
they said that a solution which drew on a number of measures would be the most likely 
suitable solution.  In the focus groups, while there was strong negativity towards any major 
change to the current system parking provision, there were some instances where 
participants stated that the most effective way of dealing with parking at Heathrow was to 
use a range of different measures in combination as a ‘package approach’.  
At the centre of this package there was felt to be a need for a ‘core’ element such as a 
financial incentive or disincentive.  The issues surrounding this core element will form an 
important part of the discussion and benchmarking exercise.  Adopting a package approach 
was also considered by the interviewees to include ‘soft’ measures such as public transport 
improvements and initiatives such as travelcards, improved cycling facilities and car share.  
By looking at the components of the strategies used at the non-airport organisations the aim 
is to determine which could be transferable to BAA and hence allow it to address the car 
parking issues at Heathrow with the knowledge of how others have gone about it.  
Both the interviews and focus groups highlighted that flexibility and choice would be 
important to any car parking measure introduced.  The current parking strategy at Heathrow 
Airport offers little incentive for employees not to drive once they have a parking permit.  
The key decision makers at BAA were keen to move to a more flexible system whereby 
employees could drive when they needed to, but use alternative measures when convenient.  
They also said that other employers at Heathrow were approaching them to build more 
flexibility into the parking strategy. Although opposed to the introduction of measures such 
as direct employee charges or financial incentives, some employees in the focus groups also 
favoured a more flexible approach to car parking and said that it would make them more 
likely to try alternatives when possible.  
A flexible approach was also considered important in terms of whether certain employees 
needed to be at the airport site every single day.  It was thought that some people could 
effectively work from home or remote locations on some days, which would help ease 
parking congestion.  
It is anticipated that BAA decision makers could learn as to how best to build flexibility and 
choice into their parking strategy by looking at what the non-airport organisations have done 
in this area.  
In both the interviews and focus groups, there were strong opinions that whatever solution 
was favoured it should be as ‘fair’ and ‘even handed’ as possible and should not force 
people to have to either stop driving to work, or consider working elsewhere. Flexibility was 
thought to be an important way of achieving a fair solution. Others included charging based 
on salary, if a charging approach was adopted, or setting clear criteria for permit reallocation 
if that solution was favoured. Exemptions to any measures introduced were considered; in 
the focus groups there was a great deal of discussion on who should be exempted from 
schemes such as parking charges and in the interviews the majority considered that 
exemptions should be kept to a minimum.  
Introducing a scheme which is seen to be fair and equitable is likely to help in gaining 
acceptance for it, which is discussed in more detail in section 6.25.3.  The best practice non-
airport organisations could provide a number of lessons in the area of designing a fair and 
equitable scheme from which BAA and Heathrow can benefit.  
6.25.2 Management Support  
The consensus amongst the interviewees at BAA Heathrow was that top level managers did 
not yet fully appreciate the car parking problems facing the airport and their potential 
impact.  It was felt that managers were not willing to address the problem currently and it 
would be necessary for a major development at the airport, such as a third runway or a sixth 
terminal, to be granted planning permission before any serious consideration was given to 
addressing car parking problems via the use of measures such as financial incentives or 
disincentives.  It was also considered that convincing one senior manager of the problems 
may be useful in others also taking notice, but it was recognised that overall if there was not 
support from the top level then it would be very difficult to change the current parking 
strategy.  Therefore, it will be of benefit for BAA Heathrow to look at the level of support 
that was obtained from top level management at the non-airport organisations.  
6.25.3 Gaining Acceptance  
Perhaps more problematic than actually determining how best to address car parking 
problems is gaining the acceptance of those who will use it, in Heathrow’s case 
approximately 70,000 employees.  In the first instance the measures to be introduced will 
determine how acceptable or unacceptable they are perceived to be.  Several different 
strands exist within the overarching theme of acceptance.  
A current problem faced by those working in the area of car parking is the lack of 
recognition of the impending problem and any support in trying to address it.  The lack of 
support from top level managers was raised earlier.  Within the focus groups there was a 
clear view that in general the current parking situation was adequate and there were no major 
problems, particularly in terms of capacity.  This made it difficult for employees to 
recognise any future problems.  Within the interviews in particular, there was a feeling that 
nothing substantial would be done until a “crisis point” was reached.  In the focus groups 
there was also a large amount of confusion or even ignorance regarding the parking cap 
imposed by Government and what the details of it were.  
To this end, a greater level of communication is required, both with ordinary staff, top level 
managers in BAA and other major employers at Heathrow.  This is required to increase 
understanding of the impending problems and to gain support from top level managers, the 
latter of which was considered essential by the BAA interviewees.  
The interviews revealed an expectation that there would be difficulties in getting people to 
accept a parking measure such as a direct employee car parking charge or financial incentive 
because of cultural factors, predominantly the reliance people had on their cars and also a 
general dislike of change.  These feelings were confirmed in the focus groups by the strong 
negativity towards any proposed initiative.  The BAA interviewees also perceived there to 
be a general culture within BAA, and the airport at large, of not wanting to do anything 
which could potentially upset employees.  At the same time, however, it was felt by some 
that while the initial reaction was extremely negative, once a change had been introduced, 
the opposition to it would subside.  
Overcoming such widespread barriers, particularly across the whole airport site will prove a 
difficult task for BAA, but one which must be overcome if they are to implement an 
employee direct parking charge or financial incentive.  As such, it will be useful for BAA to 
look at the experiences of the non-airport organisations in terms of how they overcame any 
similar barriers and attitudes.  
In the focus groups a common reaction to discussions around parking initiatives such as 
financial incentives, financial disincentives or parking permit reallocation was that 
respondents said they would seek employment elsewhere.  In the interviews retention of 
employees was seen by some to be a concern, whereas others felt that there were many more 
factors to consider other than parking that would determine whether an employee would 
consider working elsewhere.  Recruitment of new staff was not seen as so much of a 
problem as applicants would be aware of the parking situation from an early stage.  There 
was, however, some concern that recruitment would become more difficult.  Overall, the 
impact a harder hitting parking initiative would have on recruitment and retention is a 
relatively unknown quantity at Heathrow, but BAA should be able to gain some indication 
of the likely reaction from the three non-airport organisations who have introduced such 
measures already.  
Communication was an issue which arose in the interviews on several occasions and was 
regarded as an area where improvements needed to be made.  In some areas communication 
was good, for example, almost all employees in the focus groups were aware of the different 
initiatives in place to reduce car use, although in some cases the details of how these 
initiatives worked were not fully understood. In other areas, communication was poor and 
was a problem within BAA, with other companies and also with employees. Poor 
communication with employees was clearly highlighted in the focus groups as almost all 
participants were unaware that the parking cap at Heathrow was imposed by Government, or 
what the details of the parking cap were. There was also a feeling in the focus groups that 
BAA was only trying to reduce car use because of other financial drives within the business.  
This is a perception that BAA needs to rectify if acceptance is to be gained.  
It is recognised that communication is vital to the introduction and subsequent success of 
any newly introduced car parking measure.  In the interviews it was apparent that the 
respondents thought that any new initiative should be explained to employees across the 
Heathrow site using clear and specific objectives and that the approach should be as 
transparent as possible so as to increase acceptability and trust.  To this end, BAA decision 
makers should be able to learn from the non-airport organisations in terms of how they went 
about communicating the change to staff.  
The interviewees at BAA recognised the importance of a lengthy and detailed consultation 
period, which ultimately included every employee.  This was seen as important so that staff 
were aware of the change and could see the reasons for it, even if they did not like it. A 
lengthy consultation period was also regarded to help increase acceptance.  There appeared 
to be a structure in place that would allow for this consultation to take place starting with top 
level management and forums such as the “Airline Operators Committee”.  There were also 
methods mentioned to allow for consultation with employees including road shows, forums, 
individual mail shots and focus groups, but at present no thorough consideration has been 
conducted to work out the details of this due to the early planning stages of dealing with the 
parking problem.  Therefore, BAA management could learn from looking at how the best 
practice non-airport organisations have gone about consulting with staff over the 
introduction of parking initiatives.  
6.25.4 Implementation  
There were clear opinions from the interviewees at BAA that implementation should be led 
by BAA itself introducing the new scheme and then rolling it out to the rest of the airport.  
At Heathrow this will be a difficult task due to the number of employees and organisations 
at the site. The interviews also revealed that nothing had been implemented at the Airport on 
such a scale before or which personally affected each individual employee.  
Therefore, benchmarking against organisations who have been through the implementation 
process when introducing a new parking strategy could provide many valuable lessons for 
BAA decision makers.  
Figure 6.2 shows the four main elements of the benchmarking template and sub-issues 
within each as have been discussed in section 6.25.1 to 6.25.4.  
Figure 6.2: Template of Areas to Facilitate the Benchmarking of BAA against the Non-
Airport Organisations  
Selecting the most Suitable Measures to deal with the Car Parking Problems  
 A Package Approach  
 The Core Element of the Strategy  
 Direct and Daily Charging  
 The Level of a Parking Charge or Cash Payment  
 Parking Permit Allocation  
 Alternative Working Practices  
 Availability of Car Parking Spaces  
 Flexibility and Choice  
 Equity, Fairness and Exemptions  
 
Management Support  
 Management Understanding  
 A Desire to Change  
 The Importance of a Project Champion  
 
Gaining Acceptance  
 Employee Recognition of the Problem  
 Overcoming Cultural Barriers and Attitudes to Change  
 Parking Hierarchy  
 Recruitment and Retention  
 Communicating Clear and Transparent Objectives  
 Consultation  
 
Implementation  
 The Process of Implementation  
 Implementation of the Core Element of the Strategy  
 
Chapter 7. Non-Airport Organisation Case Studies  
7.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents the findings from the three non-airport organisations: Addenbrooke’s 
NHS Trust, the University of Bristol and Pfizer.  Information is presented from the 
interviews conducted with the key personnel described in section 5.4.2, from short staff 
interviews carried out during site visits and from documents relating to each organisations 
Travel Plan and parking strategy.  
The categories used in this chapter follow, wherever possible, those used in Chapter 6.  This 
allows the areas highlighted as being important at Heathrow Airport to be explored at the 
‘best practice’ non-airport organisations and hence allow for an investigation into how 
similar issues were approached and addressed.  This directly facilitates the benchmarking 
comparison of the same processes at different organisations.  
The case studies begin by giving an overview of each organisation.  They then explore the 
reasons why a change to the parking strategy was necessary, including the presence of any 
external factors.  The specific details of the car parking measures implemented are 
investigated along with the reasons why such a change was adopted. Staff attitudes towards 
the change are explored as well as related cultural factors within each organisation.  Next the 
issues of communication, consultation and implementation are explored in order to 
understand how each organisation approached these issues with employees.  Finally, the 
effectiveness of the change in car parking strategy is investigated.  
Each organisation is considered individually in this chapter. An overall benchmarking 
analysis of the three non-airport case studies together with Heathrow Airport is undertaken 
in Chapter 8.  
Case Study 1: Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust  
7.1 Introduction  
Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust is located on the southern edge of Cambridge, approximately two 
miles from the city centre.  The site is currently 67 acres, with a greenbelt to the south and 
west and predominantly residential areas to the north and east. It directly employs over 
6,000 staff dedicated to the provision of a wide range of clinical and non-clinical services.  
(DfT, 2002)  
Addenbrooke’s is the local hospital for approximately half a million people who live in the 
Cambridge sub-region and the surrounding district.  The Hospital is also a national and 
regional centre for a number of specialist units as well as a leading international centre for 
biomedical and medical education.  It shares its site with the University of Cambridge, the 
Medical Research Council, the Wellcome Trust, the British Heart Foundation and 
GlaxoSmithKline. Altogether, therefore, there are six major employers on site, employing 
over 9,000 people in total, with approximately two thirds of this total on site at any one time.  
The number of patient and visitor trips accessing the site per day is approximately 10,000.  
On site accommodation is provided for some staff groups and students, creating a total of 
850 residents currently living on site. (DfT, 2002)  
In the following sections, the major issues relating to car parking and the introduction of a 
car parking charge are explored, based on a detailed interview conducted with the Service 
Development Manager at Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust.  
7.2 The Nature of the Problem and Reasons For Change  
The introduction of parking management strategies at Addenbrooke’s Hospital came about 
primarily as a means of gaining planning permission in order to expand the site. Due to the 
location of the site, with a greenbelt on one side and an “inadequate road network on the 
other side” it was recognised that in order to expand, car access and parking would have to 
be managed better, “any new development has not got to put any more pressure on the roads 
in terms of cars. So there’s a big incentive to actually having a means of access to the site.”. 
Stimulated by their plans to develop the site and the anticipated restrictions that would be 
placed on access following planning permission, the Trust began travel planning in 1993 and 
the first publication of a formal Travel Plan ‘Access to Addenbrooke’s Action Plan 1997-
2000’ was in 1997.    
This is reflected by external influences, particularly from the Government in the form of 
Public Policy Guidance 14 and Section 106 Agreements
2
 which have meant that for 
Addenbrooke’s to continue to develop they needed to address access issues, “since the 
Government has given more direction in planning, PPG14 and that type of thing, it’s a lot 
harder to get what you want without having to give something back.”.  
Targets relating to the Section 106 Agreement, signed in 2000, were to reduce the number of 
staff and visitors coming by single occupancy car from 50% in 2000 to 45% by 2005. In 
2003, the Trust signed up to a new target to reduce the number of patients or visitors coming 
to the site by car from 91% in 2002 to 86% by 2007, a one percent year on year decrease, 
irrespective of whether car sharing or not, “a one percent year on year you may think is not 
a lot, but one percent of 10,000 is a lot. Likewise, one percent of 6,000 staff is a big target to 
go for.”.  
The general congestion problem on the site and its hindrance to how critical departments of 
the hospital were able to operate was another major contributor to action being taken, “in 
1999 the parking situation was getting so ridiculous, it was a free for all, there was total 
chaos on site, blue light ambulances couldn’t get through…we needed to do something to 
manage access and the car parks.”.  This led to the introduction of ‘Access to 
Addenbrooke’s Phase Two’ which included the appointment of an Access Travel Manager 
and the introduction of a new parking management system.  
2
 A Section 106 Agreement is a function of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 used to ensure 
the drafting of agreements, or Planning Obligations, between the Council and developers.    
The decision to introduce a parking charge as a management tool was based on the need to 
finance various access initiatives contained within the Travel Plan,  
“organisations are very good at writing travel plans but then never deliver them because 
they’ve never got any money to…you can’t take money out of the clinical side here so we 
made a decision that the travel plan had to be self-funding.  We are giving incentives and 
discounts for the alternatives and you’ve got to fund that somehow. It’s only fair that 
anybody parking on site is subsiding someone else coming in by bus, especially because the 
bus can be more expensive than parking on-site.”.  
While it does not promote car use, the overall site development plan at Addenbrooke’s 
cannot be said to be anti-car.  The Trust has recently launched its ‘2020’ vision; a series of 
proposals designed to provide for the rapidly expanding population in the surrounding area 
and to develop Addenbrooke’s as a major centre for treatment and research on a European 
scale.  Within the site development plan is a proposal to build a multi-storey car park of 800-
1,000 spaces, as well as encouraging alternative modes of travel.  Therefore, while a 
reduction in car use is sought, the importance of the car as an access mode is still recognised.    
7.3 The Car Parking Strategy  
7.3.1 Overview of the Car Park System  
Staff and patient/visitor car parks are separate, with a capacity of 2,100 staff parking spaces, 
and 900 patient/visitors spaces.  Prior to October 1999, a ‘pay and display’ system was in 
operation and staff were issued with windscreen permits.  From October 1999 staff have 
been issued with identity smartcards which have a microchip ‘purse’ that can be credited 
with money.  Each time the card is used to exit the car park a daily charge is deducted from 
its purse.  For those directly employed by the Trust, money is deducted from their salaries.  
Patient and visitor car parks operate a Pay on Foot system.   
Each staff ID card is programmed to permit access into specific designated car parks. There 
are no reserved spaces for individual staff members on site, although five priority car park 
groups exist and members of these groups have a greatly increased chance of finding a 
parking space.  The five groups are:  
 Members of the Board  and consultants;  
 Late or extended shift workers;  
 Car sharers;  
 Special needs (staff with a child aged 7 or under or a dependant relative);  
 Business travellers and senior clinical staff.  
 
All staff who do not fit into any of the above categories are entitled to park in any standard 
car park on site. There is a restriction on staff who live within two miles of the site, for 
whom access into any of the car parks is not permitted until after 3.30pm every day. If a 
staff member lives within two miles but also fits into one of the priority groups, however, 
they are included in the priority group and permitted to park at any time during the day.  
7.3.2 Car Parking Charge  
The ‘pay and display’ parking charge for staff was first introduced in 1992, at a level of 20p 
per day. Patient and visitor parking charges were also introduced at this time. In 1998 the 
staff parking charge increased to 30p per day.  During the introduction of the new car park 
management system in 1999, the staff parking charge remained at 30p per day but changed 
to a seven days per week charge, where previously it had been six days. The staff parking 
charge is currently set at 60p per day.  
The parking charge for residents differs in that it is an annual charge based on the current 
staff daily charge multiplied by 229, which is the number of working days per year. This 
was implemented in December 2003.  Prior to this residents were charged the daily staff 
charge.  
Parking for visitors and patients is more expensive than for staff and increases with the 
duration of stay, although outpatients are charged a fixed rate of £2 for each visit and a 
concession of £20 for a 14 day ticket is made for people visiting patients regularly.  
7.3.3 Management and Security  
The car parks are managed by an external contractor, whose role includes staffing the car 
park intercom system and CCTV cameras, collecting and banking the cash from the car 
parks and dealing with technological problems.  Barriers are used to permit entrance and exit 
to all car parks.  The technology is capable of monitoring car park usage and it is used to 
produce reports on occupancy levels and turnover per space. Security costs approximately 
£300,000 per year, car park services about £150,000 and access management is about 
£150,000.  
The car park regulations are enforced through the use of fixed penalty notices for rule 
breaches such as parking on double yellow lines, parking out of bay and parking illegally in 
disabled bays. The fine is £25, reduced to £15 if paid within 7 days.  The current number of 
penalties issued per month is approximately 300.  
There are a total of seven staff involved with the administration of the car parking scheme 
and Travel Plan, working in a variety of roles including issuing ID passes, reconciling 
money and promoting public transport alternatives.  Such tasks form a part of the 
individual’s job role, rather than them being completely dedicated to the car parking 
strategy.  
7.3.4 Reasons for Selecting a Parking Charge Strategy  
Parking charges, as opposed to other strategies, were the favoured method of managing the 
access problems at Addenbrooke’s because of their ability to fund the alternative modes 
required, as stated in section 7.6.1.  All car parking money, from both visitors and staff is 
ring fenced and hypothecated for access schemes, security, CCTV and other associated 
expenses.  In 2003, £1.2 million was generated, of which approximately one quarter was 
from staff parking.  
Even though the parking charge was the disincentive introduced to reduce the number of 
people commuting by car, it is considered that in fact a restriction on parking spaces is the 
main factor discouraging many staff from driving into work, “if you provide more spaces, 
they will be filled, there’s no doubt about that, people will always prefer to drive. However, 
if you take capacity away, people have to adapt, they can always find an alternative way.”.  
This supports the reasoning that the charge is primarily a revenue generator to fund the 
alternative modes.  It is regarded, however, that if the parking charge continues to be 
increased, it will at some point become a disincentive. The threshold at which this will occur 
is currently unclear, but it is expected that it will be at a price greater than that of using 
public transport.  At present, the cost difference is regarded to still in favour of driving, for 
example a return bus ticket on Trumpington Park and Ride costs £1.40, compared to the cost 
of 60p per day to park on site, although there was recognition that this did not include all the 
costs associated with running a car.  It is expected that in the future the parking charge will 
become a disincentive to staff driving to work, “if we continue to discount tickets, which 
effectively means travel by bus is £1, and then you’ve got £1.50-£1.70 for parking on site, it 
is likely to encourage people out of their cars.  Management would like to increase charges 
by 40p by the year after next, 40p the year after that, and then whatever it takes to bring it to 
Cambridge Park and Ride prices the year after that. So the perceived differential between 
public transport costs and parking on site costs will have gone in three years.”.  
7.3.5 Impacts and Problems with the Parking Charge  
After implementing the parking charge there were a number of issues which needed to be 
resolved.  There was a time when the late shift car park was also occupied by part time 
workers that worked in the mornings and it was found that the part time workers were 
staying longer than they needed to and not vacating spaces in time for the late shift.  A 
decision was taken to move the part time workers out of the car park which meant that large 
numbers of staff walked past an empty car park every morning.  This led to complaints, but 
it was recognised that, “you just have to grin and bear it. There’s nothing you can do 
because as soon as you give an inch, you’ve had it.”  
Off-site parking has become a major problem in the residential areas surrounding the site 
since the charge was introduced. The Trust has recommended several solutions to this 
problem to the City and County Council, such as enforcing residents’ parking zones or 
double yellow lines on the surrounding streets, but none of these have been taken up, “the 
problem we’ve got is that once you get off the site, it’s public highway, and we can’t tell 
anybody what to do – it ends up being a matter for the Local Authorities to deal with… but 
we are very conscious of it.”.  There is also a problem in that the local residents do not want 
residents parking as most have driveways with their houses and so do not want to pay for an 
on-street parking permit, but at the same time they do not want others parking outside their 
houses.  
Introducing the parking charge has not been a straight forward process for Addenbrooke’s as 
shown by some of the initial attitudes to the change detailed in section 7.6. It was thought 
that some of these initial uncertainties were unavoidable but that it was important to stick to 
decisions made and not to make any deviations or exceptions, even if some employees were 
penalised more than others, as people would take advantage.  
The introduction of the parking charge has not resolved all of Addenbrooke’s’ car parking 
and congestion problems, however, and on some days the site can be gridlocked. “Even 
though we’ve been successful in a lot of things we’ve still got issues…however, the number 
of “bad” days are decreasing.”.  
It was also considered there could be a time when the hospital could theoretically have no 
parking, but it was regarded as unlikely to ever happen, “there’s going to come a time when 
we will reach the threshold below which we can’t do without parking. Where that will be, I 
don’t know, but then if you go to a London hospital there’s no parking provided there. So 
you think, ok, if it happens in London, it could happen elsewhere. Ultimately, somewhere 
down the line you could get away with not much parking at all, providing you had ways of 
getting people in.”.  
7.3.6 Focus on Individuals  
The planning, implementation and operation of the parking management strategies at 
Addenbrooke’s and of the Travel Plan overall, have given a significant amount of focus to 
individuals and the impact the various strategies have upon them.  Some of this focus is 
necessary to ensure that the hospital continues to operate efficiently, particularly where shift 
workers are concerned, “the issue is really about the lunchtime changeover over on the 
wards and the fact that if you don’t get them in on time to park, then you can’t get the shift 
handover.  These are the people that you’ve got to safeguard some spaces for, because they 
generally finish shifts after public transport have finished running, and the car’s the only 
option they’ve got.”.  
Employees commuting by public transport have also voiced their opinion that it is more 
expensive for them to travel by public transport than it costs to park on site, while those 
using car parks say that while it is cheaper than public transport they will continue to park. 
In such situations the Trust’s aim is to ultimately make the scheme fair for each individual, 
which presents an argument for continually increasing the charge.  
Other specific actions have been taken to ensure that the scheme is not seen to be 
unreasonable, for example changing the system of clamping those who did not pay the 
parking charge to a fixed penalty notice system, “the advantages of fixed penalty over 
clamping was that we were finding instances whereby the clamped person would be a 
mother going to pick a child up from school.  It would take an hour to unclamp the car, it 
gets very heated and stressful and we just had to move away and take out the 
confrontation.”.  
Another particular challenge to the Trust is to ensure they deliver the promises they make to 
staff, “if we don’t have this 15 minute Park and Ride service up and running soon, which 
has been asked for such a long time, then people will not be happy with any further changes. 
You’ve always got to have the carrot with the stick.”.  The impact on staff and how they 
access the site and park is also considered during any expansion to the hospital.  
7.3.7 Equality and Fairness  
There was a large amount of discussion during the face to face interview surrounding the 
concept of making the parking scheme as fair and equitable to all employees travelling to the 
Addenbrooke’s site, “it’s only fair that anybody parking on site is subsidising someone else 
coming in by bus.”. There is still a feeling by the Trust that the differential between car use 
and public transport use is in favour of car drivers, “we are in a position now that the modal 
split is such that people coming to the site by car are now less than half of all staff, and 
people coming by public transport have voiced their opinion that it’s more expensive for 
them to come by public transport than to park on site.”. This is something which the Trust 
wish to rectify and their future strategy involves reducing the differential and the cost of 
public transport to the site.  
A particular area in which issues of fairness needed to be addressed was that of charging 
staff who reside at the hospital site for their parking.  From December 2003 it was decided to 
charge residents on the basis of them parking for 299 days per year, equivalent to the 
number of working days.  The charge can be paid annually, six monthly or quarterly. Prior to 
this date many residential staff would come onto the site on a Monday after being away for 
the weekend, work on site for the week and then leave on the Friday, but the car parking 
charge would only be triggered once. The affected staff were opposed to the introduction of 
the annual charge, “they didn’t like it, but now it’s fair… it’s all about being equitable, you 
can’t treat one group different to another.”.  
Also in the area of equity and fairness is the decision by the Trust not to allow reserved 
parking for anybody other than disabled drivers, “we’ve made a very conscious decision not 
to. Some groups have a greater chance of getting a car park space than others, but we were 
always very clear that we don’t reserve parking spaces for anybody.”. This decision was 
made so as not to make some members of staff appear more important than others in terms 
of parking their cars.  
7.3.8 Flexibility and Choice  
The Travel Plan allows a wide range of choices in terms of how people access the 
Addenbrooke’s site, as detailed in section 7.4.  These choices complement the parking 
charge by providing alternative means of access to work.  
In terms of flexibility, with the exception of those people who reside within two miles of the 
site, employees are free to choose on a daily basis whether they drive to work and pay the 
parking charge or select another mode.  Only the availability of parking on each particular 
day will determine whether they are able to find a parking space. There are no exemptions 
from the parking charge as explained earlier in this section.  
Overall on the subject of flexibility and choice within the parking strategy, it was stated that, 
“there’s always a danger that you are going to wrap people in cotton wool. A lot of people 
come to me and say “you’ve taken my parking away, what are you going to do for me?” and 
I say “sorry, it’s your responsibility to get to work, these are the alternatives that we’ve put 
in place for you, so in fact we are providing you with a greater choice, by removing a 
choice.”.”  
7.4 Public Transport and Alternatives  
Alternative access modes are clearly important to the functioning of the Addenbrooke’s site, 
although it was recognised that when the parking charge was first introduced very few 
alternative options were in place, something regarded as being a mistake in hindsight.  
7.4.1 Public Transport  
A number of initiatives have been undertaken by the Trust to increase public transport usage. 
It was stated that, as a result, bus currently accounted for 23% of staff journeys to the site, 
compared to 4% when the Travel Plan was first introduced, “in  
terms of people coming here by bus, it provides access to more or less all areas of the city.”. 
Full modal split figures are shown in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2.  
Addenbrooke’s has its own dedicated bus station at the front of the hospital which was 
developed in conjunction with the County Council, who funded the development. The bus 
station site was previously a car park but was made available by the Trust to resolve severe 
congestion problems with buses at the entrance to the hospital site. Addenbrooke’s has 
negotiated with Stagecoach, the largest bus operator in Cambridge, for the provision of a 
joint subsidised weekly ‘MegaRider’ ticket which is available to all staff on site.  It is 
subsidised by both the Trust and Stagecoach and permits unlimited travel in Cambridge on 
any Stagecoach bus for one week, for a discounted price of £5.00. It has proved popular and, 
“helps to partly explain why the modal split for buses has increased so much.  We’ve 
actually increased the number of staff coming to the site by bus by over 800 per day, in two 
years.”. Addenbrooke’s is directly accessible from four of Cambridge’s existing five ‘Park 
and Ride’ sites.  The Park and Ride service from Trumpington to the City centre via the 
hospital is subsidised by the Trust, Cambridge City Council and Cambridgeshire County 
Council. The Trust Board has recently authorised additional spending to be spent on 
upgrading this service to every 15 minutes.  
While such initiatives are viewed positively, the Trust feels that its working relationship 
with the bus operators could be improved and they do not feel that they share the same 
objectives as Addenbrooke’s.  
The main Cambridge station is located 1.5 miles away nearer the city centre, although buses 
from the railway station do stop on site.  At the time of interviewing, discounted ticket 
schemes were under development.  Another future development includes the Cambridge 
guided bus system which will call at Addenbrooke’s.  
7.4.2 Cycling and Walking  
The site is accessible by bicycle, with on- and off-site cycle paths on all of the main routes 
feeding into the site.  There are currently 1,300 cycle parking spaces on site, which are at or 
over capacity in peak times.  In 2003, 25% of all staff arriving on site cycled. The provision 
of sufficient cycle parking, therefore, is beginning to become a problem and the Trust is 
currently considering innovative methods of cycle parking to meet demand.  The relatively 
high amount of cycling to the site can be attributed to the general culture within the 
Cambridge area.  Interest free bicycle loans are offered by the Trust repayable over 18 
months and motorcycle loans repayable over 36 months. The loans currently on offer equate 
to a value over £100,000.  A Bicycle User Group was established in 1997, and changing and 
shower facilities are provided.  
There are several footpath networks that pass through or near to the site, although some are 
discontinuous.  CCTV cameras, which cover most of the site, provide some personal 
security for pedestrians.  
7.4.3 Car Sharing  
The Trust has had a computerised car share scheme since 1998, which is available to any 
staff member working on site.  Database software is used to match staff using their postcode 
details and other relevant information.  In total there are 320 car share groups registered, 
which equates to roughly 740 individual staff members actively car sharing, as well as 
around 200 that are unmatched.  Car sharers are granted priority parking in two car parks; 
one is dedicated and the other is an overflow which is shared with other priority groups. 
Each car share group is provided with a swipe card programmed to permit access into the 
designated car parks.  Upon exiting, one group member must swipe their individual ID card, 
enabling the daily parking charge to be collected. There is no formal method for monitoring 
any abuse of the car share scheme; its operation is based on trust but, “as with everything 
else you do on trust, it is abused.”.  Random spot checks are carried out manually at the 
barriers and if anyone is caught breaking the rules their car share priority parking allowance 
is withdrawn. There is also a culture within the organisation of staff reporting on others who 
are abusing the system.  
7.4.4 Pool Cars  
The Trust currently has a fleet of 16 leased pool cars which can be booked for business 
mileage.  When the stock of pool cars reaches an adequate level the ability of staff to claim 
for business mileage will be reviewed.  This would be advantageous as the costs of running 
the pool cars are roughly half that of paying private mileage.  The opportunity would then 
also be present to take business travellers out of a priority parking group.  
7.4.5 Flexible Working Policies  
The Human Resources department at Addenbrooke’s promotes flexible working policies, 
enabling staff to have compressed working weeks.  All staff are able to request this practice 
providing it is not detrimental to service delivery.  A trial home working scheme is also in 
place for a selected number of staff.  
7.5 Management and Leadership  
There was a strong recognition that management support was important, something which 
Addenbrooke’s feel has been achieved, “they recognise that if we’re going to have this £500 
million plus development, we need to make sure we meet our Section 106 targets…unless the 
senior management support it, or it’s a priority for them, you might as well forget it.”.  
7.6 Attitudes to Change, Culture and Acceptance Issues  
When first introduced staff were reluctant to accept the new parking charge, “there were six 
months worth of near rioting when the charge was introduced at 20p, the car park 
management didn’t know what to do.”. Subsequent charge increases have also been fairly 
negatively received, “there was a protracted period of anger and attrition when the barrier 
control system was introduced in 1999 and the staff car parking charges were increased to 
30p a day,  it was an uncomfortable period for all involved.”.  
Staff opinions towards the parking charge are now much more balanced than at the outset, 
particularly since car users are now in the minority, “we recently had a meeting with the 
Unions to discuss the next charge increase and few issues were raised. We are in a position 
now that less than half of all staff are coming to the site by car, and people coming by public 
transport have voiced their opinion that it’s more expensive for them to come by public 
transport than to park on site.”.  New staff coming to the hospital to work are not thought to 
have any strong attitudes regarding the introduction of the charge as they do not know any 
different.  
A factor regarded as important in generating more positive attitudes is to clearly state and 
communicate the objectives of introducing a parking charge; this is discussed further in 
section 7.7.  
Although not discussed at length during the interview, it was made clear that there were no 
problems when gaining support of other organisations on site for the introduction of the 
parking charge.  
7.6.1 Hypothecation  
It was felt that a major factor in obtaining staff acceptance of the charge is the hypothecation 
of parking revenues.  It was thought that staff are more willing to pay the charge if they can 
see where the money is going, and where it will benefit,  
“you’ve got to be upfront as to where the money is going…a lot of hospitals collect money 
for car parks and it goes straight into meeting the bottom line, because they are so heavily in 
debt. If you are going to implement a charge, you have to ring-fence it.”.  
7.6.2 Culture  
The overall opinion relating to the staff culture at Addenbrooke’s is that, “experience tells 
me that if we had enough parking on-site for everybody, everybody would drive.”. It was 
considered that many people had an ingrained culture of coping with situations which 
required them to adapt. Even though the introduction of a charge, the restriction on some 
employees driving to work and the removal of some spaces during development were 
unpopular events, staff found solutions to their travel problems.  This was highlighted via 
examples, “during the previous on–site change associated with the development of the 
Addenbrooke’s bus station, over 100 spaces were lost from the ‘standard’ car parks and it 
was interesting to watch how staff adapted to the change. There was a sudden increase in 
demand for bus tickets and people wanting to car share and that is effectively how people 
cope with it.  They do find another way.”.  In another situation, a particular settlement had 
no public transport links to the hospital, but was within the two mile cordon which prevented 
staff members from driving to work, “they still came to work, I don’t know what they did, 
they couldn’t park on site during the day, they found a way to deal with it... we just left it 
and waited to see what happened, and people find an alternative way, like most things. 
There’s always a danger that you are going to wrap people in cotton wool. A lot of people 
come to me and say ‘ok, you’ve taken my parking away, what are you going to do for me?’, 
and I say ‘sorry, it’s your responsibility to get to work, these are the alternatives that we’ve 
put in place for you, so in fact we are providing you with a greater choice, by removing a 
choice.”.  
There was also a view raised in the interview that the parking charge had a varying effect on 
different groups of people. It was considered that some people would pay the charge at 
almost any level whereas for others even a small charge of ten pence per day was seen as too 
much.  So far Addenbrooke’s have not researched in any great detail where the various 
thresholds are that persuade people to stop using their car to commute. There was an overall 
feeling that a lack of spaces was more of a disincentive than the actual charge itself.  
7.7 Communication and Consultation  
Communication with staff is an important consideration at Addenbrooke’s Hospital, both 
when the charge was introduced and as an ongoing process.  When introducing the charge, 
clear reasons for its use were communicated to staff, and while the reaction was not 
favourable, there could not be said to be any hidden motives. As well as the apparent 
congestion problem, Addenbrooke’s communicated the objectives of the charge as being to 
maintain car parks to a higher standard and to fund public transport investment.  When 
parking charge increases are planned, staff are first informed approximately one year before 
the introduction of the charge and then further consultation is held nearer the time.  
Information regarding getting to the site and the car parking rules and policies are provided 
on the intranet for staff members to access.  
On-going communication of various travel alternatives is seen as important at 
Addenbrooke’s. The Trust has recently run a year long Travel Choice Project, whereby half 
of all new recruits were targeted with personalised travel information and half were not, the 
aim being to evaluate the effectiveness of personalised travel information in changing 
individuals’ travel behaviour, “it’s giving people information, and it’s making people feel 
valued because people are going out of their way to actually help them.”.  The findings of 
the study were that the project was well received by those taking part but was very resource 
intensive and as such may not prove to be an efficient way of securing travel behaviour 
change.  
In some instances, because the charge is well established and staff understand the situation, 
there is a reduced need for communication in some areas.  For example, after school 
holidays there tends to be increased congestion on the roads as people who have taken to 
driving during the more quiet period initially forget the added congestion of schools 
reopening. In such circumstances, people now adapt to the conditions and change their travel 
habits without any need for The Trust to communicate with them.  
Consultation with staff is seen as important to the successful operation of the car parking 
scheme and more general access issues for both car users and public transport users. The 
value of including staff in the consultation process when introducing the parking charge is 
clearly recognised, “we arranged some seminars for staff to come forward and provide their 
own solution to the problem. Once everyone started going through the process they realised 
it’s not as easy as just building another car park, we needed to provide some alternatives… 
but there was a need for a measure of control as well.”.  
Various groups exist which allow for communication and consultation between staff, 
stakeholders and the Trust. These include the Trust Board Access Steering Group (for 
members of the Board), the Access Management Working Group (for employers on site), 
and the Access Management Staff Forum Working Group (for Trade Union 
Representatives). The Staff Forum was established in 1993, and meets every six weeks. 
Discussions with the Trade Unions are seen to be balanced, with the Trade Unions fully 
understanding the situation at Addenbrooke’s regarding car parking,  
“they don’t support the charge, but they recognise why it’s done.  They will say if they think 
something is wrong but they don’t object for the sake of objecting”. Individual staff 
members can either submit their views through the Unions to be discussed at meetings, they 
can email the Access Office or submit thoughts via an internet form. Any external 
complaints that come in are then dealt through Patient Advice and Liaison Service which 
can become formal complaints in some circumstances.  
When increases in the parking charge are due to be introduced staff seminars are help 
approximately one month before the increase and the Trade Unions are consulted a further 
month prior to that.  The announcement of the proposal to increase charges is usually one 
year before the increase is due to take effect.  Such long lead times were seen as important 
and that employees should be given as much warning as possible, “never ever surprise them, 
because you’ll live to regret it.”. Staff consultation is also currently taking place regarding 
the opening of a new multi-storey car park, which is being built to replace an existing car 
park being demolished for the development of a new building.  
7.8 Implementation  
The initial six months following the introduction of the daily charge to staff were the most 
difficult to manage in terms of the reaction and acceptance of it, as stated in section 7.6. It 
was considered, however, that this initial “rocky” period was somewhat unavoidable and in 
Addenbrooke’s case that after approximately six months the aggravation subsided, “you’ve 
got to be prepared to go through a period of pain…and once you’ve made your decision, 
stick to it, no deviation.”.  The turning point was seen to be when one of the directors went 
out to listen to the abuse that car parking staff were receiving and threatened those acting 
abusively with being disciplined or dismissed.  
Stating clear objectives for introducing a parking charge was seen as important in gaining 
acceptance and implementing a scheme which could then be built upon, “If you’re thinking 
of introducing a charge, have a very good reason for doing it.  
Additionally, it was regarded as important to be clear about where the money is going and it 
was for this reason at Addenbrooke’s that it was decided to ring-fence all parking revenues 
and not allow money to be used elsewhere.  
It was felt that introducing a low charge was the best way of ensuring a smooth 
implementation, “introduce them quite low to begin with just to get the idea introduced. 
Once they’ve been introduced and they’ve been accepted, the issue of increasing them isn’t 
such a problem, but you could go in with 50p or whatever, it just depends how much pain 
you want to go through”.  
A further important lesson that Addenbrooke’s learnt was not to make exceptions to the 
scheme, something which became apparent during an issue relating to visitor parking when 
it was agreed to allow fathers of new born babies a concessionary parking allowance, 
“within minutes the news was around the hospital on email, and everyone was coming to me 
saying ‘if you’re doing it for them, then you’ve got to do it for all these other groups too’, 
and so I had to go back on my original decision…if you make exceptions, people will take 
advantage.  You have to make a decision and stick to it, even if there are some groups that 
are penalised by it – it’s not the intention but sometimes it happens.”.  
7.9 Impacts of the Parking Charge  
7.9.1 Targets and Effectiveness  
The Section 106 agreement signed in 1993 required that Addenbrooke’s would have to do an 
annual, 100% head count survey of people coming into the site at the same time each year.  
The surveys are conducted in October of each year and involve a number of research 
methods in collecting data.  
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show the results of the travel surveys carried out between 1993 and 2003 
and how the modal shift has been affected by the introduction of the parking charge and the 
promotion of public transport, for both staff and patients/visitors.  For staff, the figures show 
a large decrease in the number of single occupancy car drivers along with increases in all 
other modes since 1993.  
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Table 

 1993  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002
             
Pedal Cycle  697  17%  821  20%  1,066  20% 1,060  22%  815  18%  857  18%  1,09
Motor Cycle  53  1%  21  1%  92  2%  99  2%  64  2%  80  2%  106
Car (single occup)  2,962  74%  2,802  68%  2,487  48% 2,183  45%  2,327  50% 2,189  47% 2,45
Car (multiple 
occup)  
    819  16% 718  15%  498  11% 408  9%  407
Bus  144  4%  281  7%  537  10%  498  10%  548  12%  738  16%  1,08
Walk  136  4%  197  4%  209  4%  297  6%  349  8%  359  8%  689
 3,992  100%  4,122 100% 4,813 100% 4,856 100%  4,601  100% 4,631 100% 5,84
 
Table 7.2: Patient/Visitor Modal Choice for Journeys to Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust 
(1993-2004)  
 1993  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  200
             
Pedal Cycle  133  2%  205  2%  184  2%  211  2%  295  3%  184  2%  23
Motor Cycle  114  1%  72  1%  21  1%  17  0%  26  0%  13  0%  22
Car (single occup)  7,224  93%  8,765 91%  3,624 39%  3,886 40%  3,444  34%  3,608 36%  3,54
Car (multiple 
occup)  
    4,637 51%  4,790 50%  5,599  56%  5,349 54%  5,34
Bus  259  3%  340  4%  564  6%  612  6%  546  5%  539  6%  34
Walk  91  1%  255  2%  152  2%  199  2%  178  2%  193  2%  15
TOTAL  7,821  100%  9,637 100% 9,182 100% 9,715 100%  10,088  100% 9,886 100% 9,63
 
Source: Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust (2005)  
7.9.2 Recruitment and Retention  
The issues of recruitment and retention were of some concern to Addenbrooke’s when they 
introduced the parking charge, but overall it was not seen as a major barrier,  
“there were people threatening to leave and all that, but our recruitment issues are no 
different to any other organisation…you might have to go through a rocky period, but once 
everything’s been introduced, it then slowly becomes accepted.  New staff coming in don’t 
know any different anyway.”.  
It was suggested during the interview that recruitment and retention arguments were often 
used by organisations as an excuse for not sorting out their transport problems,  
“the average wage here is lower than the average and yet everybody pays, so the issue 
about recruitment is absolute rubbish…human resources departments are often the loudest 
voice unfortunately but it doesn’t mean you don’t bite the bullet and sort it out, once you’ve 
done it then you move on.”.  
7.10 Key Findings  
 Addenbrooke’s Hospital introduced a parking charge based on clear objectives which 
were the need to address congestion and access problems to the site, to enable better 
maintenance of car parks and to invest more in public transport and alternative modes to the 
car.  The need to gain planning permission to expand the site was also a key factor and as 
such a Travel Plan was required to detail what actions were in place to deal with congestion.  
 Addenbrooke’s chose to introduce a pay and display daily charge system. There is 
also a general lack of parking availability at the site which is regarded as being a major 
factor in determining what mode of transport employees use to commute.  
 The daily charging approach was taken because there was a need to fund alternative 
modes of transport and the hypothecation of parking revenues enabled this.  
 There is a strong focus on individuals, equality and fairness.  Nobody is allocated 
reserved parking spaces although there are priority car parks for employees who are more 
dependent on being able to drive to work.  Staff living within two miles of the site and not in 
a priority car park are not permitted to park on site until after 3:30pm.  
 The parking charge has led to a large number of employees parking in residential 
streets surrounding the site, something which Addenbrooke’s are working with local 
Councils to rectify.  There are also still some days when congestion at the site is particularly 
bad.  
 The are a wide range of alternative modes of transport which allow access to the 
Addenbrooke’s site. The human-orientated nature of a hospital means that staff are often 
unable to work from home and there is a great importance on being able to get to work on 
time.  It is recognised by the Trust that while a number of alternatives have been made 
available, ultimately it us up to each individual to take the responsibility of getting to work.  
 Support for the parking charge was present from top level management at the Trust 
which was seen as important in successfully implementing the charge.  
 The initial implementation was not well received and the first six months were a very 
trying time for those involved in the parking strategy.  The anger eventually subsided and 
staff began to cope with the charge, although there is still a negative reaction to each price 
increase.  Overall, there is a more balanced opinion towards the parking charge now; 
hypothecation of revenues for reinvestment in transport initiatives and car park maintenance 
have been important in gaining some acceptance of the charge.  There is still a feeling, 
however, that if the space was available then most people would choose to drive.  
 The need for the charge was clearly communicated to staff based on the specific 
reasons of reducing congestion and investing in public transport.  
 Consultation was extensive and lengthy before introducing the charge and continues 
to be so when price increases are proposed. There is a good relationship between the Trust 
and Trade Unions as well as various groups and means of communication between staff and 
Addenbrooke’s.  Information for staff is made freely available.  
 In terms of implementation, a small charge was first introduced to try and gain 
acceptance and understanding. This charge was then increased over time and the Trust plan 
to continue increasing it until car parking charges are equal to or greater than public 
transport charges.  Investment in alternative modes of transport did not occur until after the 
charge was in place, although it is recognised that ideally there should have been 
improvements earlier.  
 The parking charge has been effective in generating modal shift, although it is still 
considered that too many people still drive to the site and it is thought more would do so if 
the space was available.  
 The charge is not seen as a major barrier to recruitment and employee retention and it 
is thought that new staff accept the charge without any problem.  It was felt in the interview 
that some organisations used a recruitment and retention argument as an excuse not to sort 
out their transport problems.  
 
Case Study 2: The University of Bristol  
7.11 Introduction  
The main site at the University of Bristol is located within the Bristol city centre in the 
vicinity of the main shopping areas and offices.  This main site, known as ‘The Precinct’ is 
the focus of this case study and also of the University’s Transport Plan.  It contains over 70 
buildings, ranging in size from modern multi-storey department buildings smaller town 
houses with less than 50 staff.  The University has additional sites not included in the Travel 
Plan, in particular Langford School of Veterinary Science, located 15 miles from the centre 
of Bristol and the Halls of Residences in two key locations within two miles of the precinct.  
(Department for Transport, 2002)  
In total the University employs 5,300 staff, of which 70% work in the main precinct, and has 
12,000 students. The University staff profile is evenly balanced between male and females 
and a majority of staff are aged over 35 years.  In terms of distance from home to work, 20% 
live within one mile, 36% within two miles and 49% within three miles.  (Department for 
Transport, 2002)  
Five interviews were conducted at the University of Bristol with members of staff involved 
in various aspects of the scheme.  The codes associated with quotes are as follows:  
 Assistant Director – Facilities (main contact) (UoB 1);  
 234 Car Share Manager (UoB 2);  
 Security Office Administration Clerk (UoB 3);  
 Energy and Environmental Manager (UoB 4);  
 Payroll Manager (UoB 5).  
 
7.12 The Nature of the Problem and Reasons For Change  
There are a number of factors contributing to why the University of Bristol created a Travel 
Plan incorporating a parking charge.  Demand for car parking was higher than supply, 
“there were too many cars chasing too few spaces” (UoB 1) and it was recognised that a 
way of allocating this scarce resource was necessary.  Additionally, there were discussions 
about the creation of a controlled parking zone on the surrounding streets, which would have 
further increased pressure on the University’s car parks. The cost of providing car parking 
was also becoming an issue, with income not covering the running costs.  
Due to the constrained nature of the University site, the only space available for new 
developments is on existing car parks.  To build on this land, however, required the 
University to convince the council that a coherent Travel Plan existed which could address 
the loss of car parking space, “not just one that was on paper but one that was actually 
being implemented and having measurable effects.” (UoB 2).  It was recognised, however, 
that new developments did not necessarily mean more members of staff, “we’re not a 
University that’s looking to increase our student numbers so we’re not really thinking we’re 
going to have a huge boom of staff and students here to put more pressure on the car 
parking space.” (UoB 4).  
The previous car parking strategy in place at the University was also considered to be unfair 
and outdated
3
, “it was one of those situations where everybody was fed up with it. When you 
joined the University you had to wait 6 or 7 years to get your own reserved car parking 
space and otherwise you had to fight it out with the unreserved spaces which meant getting 
to work at half past 7.” (UoB 2).  
7.13 The Car Parking Strategy  
7.13.1 Overview of the Car Park System  
The main precinct in at the University of Bristol contains 950 car parking spaces, spread 
over 58 car parks which range in capacity from 2 to 70 spaces. The  
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 Prior to this there was a two tier system; people who had worked at the University for a long time 
were charged a percentage of salary which was collected as an annual sum, but the amount was 
minimal and employees had a guaranteed parking space at all times.  The remaining employees 
could apply for a parking permit which cost £20 per year but it was heavily oversubscribed.  
University’s Travel Plan was introduced in July 1999 and focuses on employees; students 
are not included and are not permitted to park at the main precinct.  It combines a permit 
allocation system and daily parking charge for those who drive with a range of incentives for 
using alternatives.  The new permit allocation and parking charge element of the Travel Plan 
was introduced in January 2001. (Loughborough University and Napier University, 2004)  
7.13.2 Parking Permits  
Under the new scheme all car parks were divided into three categories:  
 Category A – for staff or students with a disabled driver’s badge or 
temporary/permanent mobility impairment (medical evidence is required), registered car 
sharers and departmental vehicles.  
 Category B – for staff with caring responsibilities, dependants, those who live a long 
way from the University and those with poor access to public transport. Category B permits 
are allocated on a “limited oversell” basis which guarantees the holder a space, although not 
in any single car park.  
 Category C – known as a “license to hunt”, any employee with an annual permit is 
entitled to park in this category.  There is unlimited oversell and no guarantee of a space.  
 
Category B permit eligibility is assessed via an application questionnaire covering the 
criteria listed above. Poor access to public transport has to be proved by the applicant. Staff 
applying for a Category B permit are awarded points for these criteria and if the total points 
is over a required target then they are allocated the permit.  
The three category method of permit allocation is explained, “like many other organisations, 
the University’s car parking is a scarce resource and there are more people who wish to 
park than there are spaces.  We therefore have to allocate that scarce resource.  It was 
identified that there were different categories of users and depending on either individual 
circumstances or University need, there was a need for priority car parking.” (UoB 1).  
Every year the allocation of permits is reviewed because individual circumstances and 
public transport availability changes.  
In addition to the three parking categories each University department is allocated a number 
of parking spaces outside their building which are paid for on an annual basis. This amounts 
to approximately 100 spaces, and departments can use them at their own discretion. 28 
parking spaces are also available for visitors and must be booked in advance by the 
department hosting the visit.  
7.13.3 Parking Charge  
Vehicles parking at the University have to display a valid permit for the category they are 
allocated; each permit costs £10 per year. A daily parking charge is then applied which is 
calculated at 0.007% of gross salary (0.006% prior to 1
st
 August 2004) and paid direct from 
salary when employees purchase ‘scratch and display’ coupons, which also have to be 
displayed showing the relevant date.  Half-day parking charges are half the cost of full day 
charges.  
Registered car sharers pay the charge based on the lowest salaried member of the team, but 
are charged annually based on 225 working days to ensure that the allocated spaces are used 
on a regular basis.  Staff who are not salaried by the University (for example if they are paid 
by a Research Council) pay for coupons by cheque.  Visitor spaces are charged at £5 per day 
or £2.50 per half day which is paid by the department they are visiting.  
The number of coupons which can be purchased is limited to ten, although the University 
does allow an annual coupon to be purchased, “it costs the equivalent of 225 days parking, 
so you can lose money on it but some people have done that because they forgot their 
coupons and kept being fined and it was a hassle factor for them.” (UoB 1).  
Two groups are exempt from the charge – those who are disabled and contractors. Disabled 
people were felt to have less accessibility to alternative modes of transport and hence it was 
unfair to charge. The number of contactors parking is monitored  
closely. “It was not considered practicable to charge them because we would just get 
charged back, plus profit, plus VAT.” (UoB 1).  
7.13.4 Management and Security  
A comprehensive database system exists to manage the car parking strategy.  This includes 
sections for security staff to check who illegally parked vehicles belong to and to check if 
there is a history of rule breaking by the individual.  The finance department also use the 
database system to manage the charges paid.  There is a lot of pressure placed on staff when 
permits have to be renewed each year, so much so that the security office, who deal with the 
administration, are unable to conduct other areas of their job description and are considering 
contracting the process out to a third party.  
Car park controllers and a supervisor are responsible for ensuring that the car parks are 
secure and the rules of the scheme are not being abused.  There is also an element of self 
policing by members of staff, “if they see a car that is clearly not authorised to park they 
will phone security, there’s a definite element of that.” (UoB 1).  
Those caught abusing the car parking rules are warned a number of times before being 
subject to a fixed penalty fine of £5, which is deducted directly from salary.  There are 
usually only two or three fines administered per month.  Having a series of warnings which 
are stored on the individuals file in the database is thought to reduce the number of 
complaints should a fine eventually be issued.  In the most serious cases, an individual can 
have their right to park removed, although this is rare.  Illegal parkers who are not on the 
University of Bristol payroll are clamped because it is not possible to trace the individual 
through the computer system.  It is recognised that some members of staff view the fines as 
an “occupational hazard” (UoB 3) and risk collecting them because they can benefit 
financially based on the number of times they avoid paying the fine compared to if they 
were to buy parking coupons. Situations like this are considered to be rare.  
7.13.5 Reasons for Selecting a Parking Charge Strategy  
The reason for selecting a daily charge approach is explained by UoB 1, “that was the only 
way we were going to encourage people to really think about whether on a particular day 
they drove to work. I was also very informed by the staff travel surveys that identified that 
people were quite multi-modal already and so clearly an annual permit didn’t deal with that 
issue.” It was also acknowledged that the decision for a daily charge was intuitive to an 
extent and it was agreed at the outset that the charge should be related to salary.  
Prior to the salary related daily charge being approved, a proposal for a high fixed charge 
was presented based on the principle, “if you could afford to pay you parked and if couldn’t 
afford it you didn’t park”. (UoB 1).  This approach was rejected unanimously in favour of a 
strategy based on ability to pay.  It was also recognised that the University had different 
categories of users and so some type of priority system was required, hence the development 
of the three tier permit allocation.  
7.13.6 Impacts of the Parking Charge  
The University recognises that, “you will always get people who will never pay; all it will do 
is push people further out”. (UoB 5). There is free on-street parking on the roads near to the 
University, which many staff park in and then walk the remaining distance to work. The 
introduction of a Controlled Parking Zone on such streets is being considered by the City 
Council and is fully supported by the University. During the course of the interviews it was 
stated that local businesses and residents had not complained vociferously about University 
staff parking in the streets surrounding The Precinct. It was also considered that it may be 
difficult to introduce a parking zone which charged residents because of the high number of 
students living in the streets and the difficulty of monitoring parking with such a high 
turnover of tenants.  
A concern was also raised about a situation whereby as more parking spaces were eroded by 
building developments, there would eventually come a time when car parking space could 
not be reduced any further without hindering the operation of the University. To this end, 
some initial discussions have begun as to whether an underground car park could be 
constructed.  
It was not considered that the parking charge had had any bearing on where employees 
chose to live.    
7.13.7 Focus on Individuals  
It was decided to deduct the parking charge from employees’ salary so as to increase the 
efficiency of how revenues were collected and because, “it’s a lot less emotive, you never 
see the money as it gets directly deducted form your salary.  It also means you never have 
issues with change and hassle.” (UoB 1). A pay and display system was initially considered 
but ruled out because of the risk of vandalism, potential breakdown of machines, cost 
effectiveness of having to place them in all of the car parks and because it was considered 
emotive as stated above.  Additional features were incorporated to make the scheme “as 
painless as possible” (UoB 1), such as the ability to order parking coupons online and then 
have them delivered through the internal post system. rather than having to pay money.  Any 
fines are also collected directly from salary, “we again tried to reduce bureaucracy.” (UoB 
1).  
Applications for category B permits are treated on an individual basis but it is felt that many 
people who attempt to gain a category B permit are not always in need of one. The issues 
they have are often those faced by several other people who find a way of managing the 
situation, “I think “well I can deal with those same things” but we’re trying to be as 
egalitarian as possible to deal with a system that is so complicated.” (UoB 4).  
The overall situation with regard to focusing on individuals within the parking strategy was 
summarised as “you have to be flexible with members of staff, whereas if you’re heavy with 
them all you do is escalate the problem.” (UoB 5).  
7.13.8 Equality and Fairness  
The nature of the scheme has meant that everything is done in an even and fair manner, so 
there can be no real dissatisfaction from employees about the allocation of permits or the 
level of charges, “you don’t just get parking allocation because you’re an important person, 
it doesn’t work like that. People couldn’t really complain, they couldn’t publicly say, “I earn 
more than you, therefore it is unfair that I should pay more car parking charges.” Arguably 
it’s perfect price discrimination.” (UoB 1). As the parking charge is salary based, it 
increases each year as salaries increase.  “I think it’s important that the University treats all 
car users the same, so even if you’re car sharing you’re still paying for the space but you 
can split it obviously.” (UoB 2).  
It is considered that in developing the parking strategy the University attempted to detach 
itself from personal issues for the overall strategy design, but then address the individual 
issues to ensure that the whole scheme runs effectively.  When a problem was discovered 
then specific measures were taken to overcome that particular problem.  
All of these specific problems have been treated as fairly as possible.  For instance it was 
discovered that anybody taking a child to school was being allocated a category B permit, 
but those caring for adults were not being allocated the same permit because they did not 
have to take them anywhere.  Therefore the points system had to be,  
“tweaked, because it was felt that a caring responsibility was a caring responsibility.” (UoB 
3).  There is also an appeals committee but it is recognised that some people do not want to 
have to explain all their reasons and emotional issues to an anonymous committee.  Another 
example is that the number of coupons which can be purchased is limited to ten because they 
are non-refundable and it is recognised that peoples’ circumstances change.  “If people lose 
them we have to say “sorry it’s like cash” but there have been a couple of cases where 
people’s desks have been broken into or bags have been snatched so in those situations you 
try and be a bit sensible and reimburse them.” (UoB 5).  
7.13.9 Flexibility and Choice  
There is some flexibility within the University of Bristol’s parking scheme in that all 
employees are able to purchase a category C parking permit and park at drive to work when 
they choose. The use of a daily charge means that individuals can decide their commuting 
mode on a daily basis, “it’s all about perception of need and because we have a daily rather 
than an annual charge for almost all of these categories, it means that that preference 
changes depending on what people are doing on a particular day.” (UoB 1).  Due to the 
lack of spaces, however, there is not complete flexibility as driving in at certain times makes 
it very difficult to park.  A number of public transport options are available, although as 
described in section 7.14.1, these are not regarded to always be suitable.  Overall, the 
University of Bristol have “steered very clear of nannying staff, the choice is up to 
individuals and one hopes they make an informed decision.” (UoB 1).  
7.14 Public Transport and Alternatives  
7.14.1 Public Transport  
Several bus routes from the city centre pass close by the main University precinct with some 
offering staff discounts.  Interest free loans are available to aid staff in purchasing bus and 
rail season tickets. Perceptions of public transport are not high, however, and it has been 
described as “adequate”, “fairly flaky” and “useless”.  The University also fund the Hospital 
and University Bus Shuttle (HUBS) in conjunction with the United Bristol Healthcare Trust, 
which is free for employees and visitors to the hospital and University.  
The local bus operator, First Group, are considered difficult to co-operate with due to their 
business-case orientated approach with every decision being made on a cost basis. This 
makes it difficult for the University to suggest improvements to services without having a 
large number of employees requesting the change.  
Travel information is made available via the University’s website and timetables for the 
HUBS service are distributed to all staff.  The University are also trying to find out more 
about perceptions of bus use via its travel surveys which ask questions about what specific 
problems are encountered and what could be improved.  
7.14.2 Cycling and Walking  
Cycling and walking are regarded as key target areas due to the number of people who live 
in close proximity to the main precinct.  Secure cycle parking spaces have been provided, as 
well as freestanding spaces and improved shower and changing facilities. The University 
offers interest free loans to purchase bicycles, discounts in local shops, and several groups 
and workshops are offered.  A mileage allowance for cycling in the course of work is 
available at a rate of 10p a mile.  Pedestrian access to the main precinct has been improved 
with better on-site lighting and footpaths. Walking has been promoted using health messages 
and branded umbrellas.  
7.14.3 Car Sharing  
The University has developed its own web-based car share matching service, 234car. 
Registered users are matched with other users who live on the same route to work, rather 
than just by area of residence and the system allows other companies to sign up to the 
scheme, increasing the potential number of matches.  There are approximately 120 car share 
teams at the University, accounting for 250-300 members of staff.  Car sharers are given 
priority parking and guaranteed a space at the main precinct.  They are also guaranteed a ride 
home for unforeseen emergencies, which is assessed by the team administering the scheme.  
The annual spend on taxi fares is in the region of £100 to £150, revealing that paying for taxi 
fares is a rare occurrence.  
7.15 Management and Leadership  
The University of Bristol established the Travel To Work Implementation Group (TWIG) so 
oversee the development, consultation, implementation and on-going guidance of the Travel 
Plan and parking strategy.  TWIG also play a role in approving the apportionment of monies 
generated by the parking charge.  The members of TWIG are nominated and the whole 
group represents a cross section of grades, transport users, ages and those with caring 
responsibilities.  The nature of the group is considered to have made implementation of the 
parking scheme smoother and helped acceptance to be gained, “nobody could really 
question their motives because they were representative.” (UoB 1).  TWIG have the 
authority to make decisions on the parking scheme which are then ratified by more specific 
committees at the University. Departments involved with the management of the Travel Plan 
and parking strategy report to TWIG on a quarterly basis regarding progress.  
It is considered that the system of having a representative group to drive the scheme works 
well for the University; the arrangement allows the strategy to be run in a way the whole 
University community want to see it operated, rather than following the objectives of an 
individual. It was considered by the interviewees that it was still important to have a strong 
leader however.  To this end the Chair of TWIG is chosen to be somebody who can 
articulate the scheme to a wide range of individuals and who is an individual of standing 
within the University.  Senior management at the University were not heavily involved in 
the development of the scheme but supported the objectives of both the parking charge and 
the Travel Plan.  
In one of the interviews there was some brief discussion about the potential to introduce a 
new role of a Travel Plan Co-ordinator who would focus on developing alternative modes of 
transport.  This was mainly due to the amount of time and resources it demanded from the 
Energy and Environmental department who currently dealt with such transport issues.  The 
appointment of a position would have to be approved by TWIG and the funding would have 
to come from hypothecated parking revenues. and that having a single position to co-
ordinate the parking charge and Travel Plan initiatives would not be so successful.  
7.16 Attitudes to Change, Culture and Acceptance Issues  
There was a conflict of views when discussing the staff reaction to the new parking scheme.  
Some consider the charge to have been well accepted, particularly after the lengthy 
consultation process, “by the time the new scheme actually started everyone had accepted 
it.” (UoB 1). Others, however, state that it was unpopular, “it changed from £20 a year to 
£20 in two weeks in some cases.  The cost implications were horrendous, and that’s why it 
was so unpopular.” (UoB 05).  
Overall, the reaction of staff was expected to be varied and a unanimous show of support or 
objection was anticipated to be unlikely, “it’s the same with everything, some people get on 
and accept it, some people will never accept it.  The only people who will always accept it 
are those who have never known any different, they take it on board and that’s it.” (UoB 5).  
There was also regarded to be an acceptance of the principles of the scheme, “it is an issue 
in a sense that if you spoke to members of staff they would say “I object to the pay”, 
“sometimes I can’t park when I want too”, “there aren’t enough car parking spaces”, but 
people won’t say it doesn’t work.” (UoB 1). Subsequent loss of parking spaces at the 
University due to building developments are now accepted without opposition.  
Some members of staff who previously had found it difficult to park were positive towards 
the scheme as it greatly increased their chances of finding a space, particularly those car 
sharing or those who were eligible for category B permits. Amongst the toughest members 
of staff to achieve acceptance from were those who had worked at the University a long time 
with a guaranteed parking space and those who felt that their position entitled them to 
parking priority.  “If you get an individual who is 60 years old and they’ve been here for 30 
years, then they are suddenly told they’re only going to get a category C space, then it’s 
hard.” (UoB 5). “When the charge was introduced there were a group of people that thought 
status should count for something and they can still be quite vociferous.”  (UoB 3).  
When the charge was introduced, the staff administering the scheme experienced some 
abuse via telephone calls.  A certain amount of abuse had been expected during the initial 
introductory period, but it carried on longer than anticipated.  There is recognition of some 
of the potential reasons for this, “many people were very stressed and offloaded a lot of it 
over the telephone.  There was a lot of emotion which was hard to be prepared for.” (UoB 
3). The situation was rectified by installing recording equipment on the telephone lines.  
7.16.1 Hypothecation  
The hypothecation of parking revenues is considered to have been an important factor in 
generating acceptance for the introduction of a car parking charge.  Up until 2009 all 
revenues from the car parking charge will be ring fenced and used exclusively on transport 
related issues including alternative modes of transport, maintaining the car parks and 
providing staff to administer the Travel Plan.  Prior to the charge being introduced, car 
parking cost the University approximately £100,000 per year although it was recognised 
that, “it’s very difficult to say what the costs of just car parking are because there is a lot 
wrapped up in it, for example there are three secretaries within Security Services who deal 
with car parking, but all of their time isn’t devoted to just car parking.” (UoB 3).  
The overall revenue generated by the car parking charges is in the region of £250,000 per 
year. Initially, there was a fear that charges were being introduced as a money generating 
scheme but that was shown not to be the case.  A key finding from the consultation process, 
discussed in more detail in section 7.17.1 was that employees wanted to see where the 
parking revenue was being spent.  Now that the parking charge has been in operation for 
approximately five years and employees have been able to see the improvements made from 
the ring fenced money, it is regarded that people can clearly see the benefits.  
7.16.2 Culture  
During the interviews it was stated that he believed the overall culture of people in general 
was one of a reluctance to change of any type.  This impacted on the way in which the 
parking charge was implemented at the University, as explored in section  
7.18. It was also considered that people had a “change curve” in terms of adapting to new 
circumstances.  For this reason, a lengthy consultation process was devised, as explored in 
more detail in section 7.17.  
The introduction of a daily charge rather than an annual one is considered to have been 
important in changing culture to some extent as it gave the system a degree of flexibility and 
enabled individuals to make a decision on a daily basis about how they travelled to work, 
“gradually as the system has been refined people have become more to use the method of 
transport which suits them on that particular day whereas in the past you felt “well I’ve paid 
for my parking space, I’m going to use it”.  That’s no longer the case. (UoB 2).  
There is a recognition, however, that some people are very reluctant to pay to park and will 
choose to park for free further away and walk in.  This even applies to some members of 
staff who are directly involved with the scheme, “I don’t pay where I park at the moment. If 
a controlled parking zone was introduced around here I think I’d play it by ear to see how 
far it extended.  I’d keep trying to park for free and walk before taking up a permit, but if it 
got to the point where I had to walk for 20 minutes then it defeats the point of why I come in 
so early so I might as well just accept it and pay up.” (UoB 5).  
It is considered that employees now understand the pressures facing the University in terms 
of car parking and the lack of any other available space to expand.  This culture change 
became apparent when a car park was closed to enable the development of a new sports 
centre and no complaints were received by TWIG about the loss of spaces.  
7.17 Communication and Consultation  
The reasons for the parking charge at the University have always been communicated with a 
strong focus on the lack of car parking availability at The Precinct, “success has come from 
dealing with it holistically and transparently; we articulated we had a problem and that we 
needed to solve it.” (UoB 1). For this reason the parking charge does not apply to other sites 
owned by the University which do not have car parking problems.  
Care has been taken not to focus on environmental concerns as it was felt it could cloud the 
main issue of resource allocation, “we can’t all park, that’s just the way it is and to be 
honest I think that’s a lot easier to accept.” (UoB 1).  It was also considered that using 
environmental arguments could have a detrimental impact on other environmental initiatives 
at the University if people decided not to comply with these in protest of the parking 
charges.  
The University of Bristol do not regard the parking charge to be anti-car and have avoided 
the use of the term “deterrent” in communicating the parking charge.  Rather, they focus on 
encouraging alternatives.  It is argued that people will make the most appropriate choice 
based on the options available and that the parking charge “cajoles them into making the 
most informed decision” (UoB 1).  
Communication in terms of the day to day operation of the scheme is conducted mainly via 
the internet and telephone.  Employees can access their own user area via the internet where 
they can change personal details, purchase parking coupons and view any fines they may 
have incurred.  There is also a formal complaints procedure although generally problems are 
rectified before this stage.  
Communicating the availability of alternative transport modes is done in a number of ways. 
Public transport timetables are available on the internet and also around The Precinct. The 
car share scheme is administered over the internet and information has been sent out with all 
pay slips to promote it.  
Information from staff is also communicated to the University via travel surveys which 
allow for modal split figures to be assessed and for staff to put forward any suggestions 
about public transport and other alternative modes.  Staff are also able to put forward 
suggestions via the internet and some user groups exist for pedal cycles and motorcycles.  
These suggestions can then be acted upon if appropriate although it is recognised that in 
many cases they are one off initiatives and a consensus of opinion is required to make an 
implementation worthwhile.  The University also operate mailing lists for various types of 
public transport, for example users of the HUBS.  
7.17.1 Consultation  
The process of developing the Travel Plan began in August 1998 with the formation of a 
University Working Group, over two years before the new parking initiatives were 
introduced. During this time 15 open meetings were held and attended by approximately 
1,000 staff members.  
In March 1999, a first draft Travel Plan was presented following a staff travel survey and 
fact finding trips to other Universities.  At this early stage a parking scheme was proposed 
which would cost employees an average of £400 per annum, with no assessment of need and 
would generate approximately £75,000 annual profit for the University proposed. This 
scheme was strongly opposed by staff, but because it aroused opinions it is considered to 
have helped ensure a high level of participation in the consultation process that followed. 
Between March and May of 1999, public meetings were held and the minutes were posted 
on the University website.  Staff were also encouraged to post their views on the draft travel 
plan via an electronic bulletin board. This input allowed for revisions to be made to the 
Travel Plan before it was approved by University Council in July 1999.  One key finding, as 
reported earlier was that people wanted to know that all of the money they were paying was 
being reinvested into transport.  
TWIG were central to the consultation process; their role was to determine the workings of 
the scheme, based on its main principles.  “TWIG were critical to the  
success of the scheme, because they were truly independent.  They had been given certain 
parameters but fundamentally they had to say how car parking charges were related to 
salary, the permit allocation rules and how parking income should be spent, so it meant we 
were able to demonstrate it was transparent…it was very effective, nobody could really 
question their motives because they were representative.” (UoB 1).  TWIG continues to play 
an active role and consultation is on going. “TWIG is really driving it all, everything has to 
go through TWIG.” (UoB 4).  
Extensive consultation was regarded as extremely important in implementing the scheme 
effectively and in gaining acceptance from staff.  Ensuring transparency and information 
flow at all stages of the consultation process is also considered to have helped in introducing 
the new parking scheme, as has the use of lengthy timescales, totalling almost two years.  “If 
you are going to get meaningful change that is going to stick then you need to give staff 
sufficient warning that it’s going to happen and doing it in three months wouldn’t have 
worked here, it would have been rejected. I also think being transparent was critical, all the 
papers, minutes and finances went up on the web and everyone could see there was no 
hidden agenda.” (UoB 1).  
7.18 Implementation  
The University of Bristol introduced a relatively high parking charge because it was felt it 
would be more likely to generate a change in travel behaviour.  The University call this the 
“big bang” approach and explain the reasoning, “if they see a little fence they will jump over 
it, but if they see a brick wall that they can’t possibly break through then they will change…I 
think humans don’t really like the idea of change, although the reality is quite different, 
therefore if you are going to make a small change then the dissatisfaction with that may 
actually be as great as with a big change and therefore why have that continual thorn in 
your side if you can get it out.” (UoB 1).  As well as generating a meaningful modal shift the 
charge had to be at a level whereby the scheme was self financing and there was enough 
additional money to invest in alternative modes of transport.  
Many of the public transport initiatives, car sharing and improvements to cycling and 
walking facilities were in place before the parking charge was introduced. There was a gap 
of approximately 16 months between the implementation of the Travel Plan and associated 
travel initiatives before the introduction of the parking charge.  This strategy of 
implementation was not initially planned but the initial administration of the parking charge 
and the allocation of permit categories took a little longer than expected and so there was 
more time for other initiatives to be developed.  This delay in implementing the charge is 
thought to have been beneficial, however, from the perspective of allowing people more 
time to accept and understand the changes.  
The introduction of the charge was fronted by TWIG rather than being driven by a top level 
management team, which was regarded as being less bureaucratic due to the representative 
nature of the group.  
7.19 Impacts of the Parking Charge  
7.19.1 Targets and Effectiveness  
Table 7.3 shows modal split figures for employees who “usually” use each mode of transport 
from staff travel surveys carried out in November of 1998, 2001 and 2003. The Travel Plan 
and new parking scheme were both introduced after the 1998 survey but before the 2001 
one. The figures show a decrease in the percentage of people travelling to work by car and 
an increase in the number pedal cycling and walking to work. Car sharing also accounts for 
6% of all journeys to work, where previously a formal scheme had not been in place.  Public 
transport usage has remained fairly stagnant over the duration of the three surveys.  
Table 7.3: University of Bristol Travel Survey Results: Percentage of Staff who 
“Usually” use each Mode of Transport  
Mode of Transport  1998 (%)  2001 (%)  2003 (%)  
Bus  12  12  11  
Train  2  3  1  
Hospital and University Bus Shuttle  - 2  2  
Car Driver  44  32  33  
Car Passenger  6  4  2  
Car Sharer (formal)  - 6  6  
Park and Ride  0.5  1  1  
Motorcycle/Moped/Scooter  2  2  2  
Pedal Cycle  7  8  13  
Walk  19  23  28  
 
( - denotes no data available because mode of transport not in operation)  
Source: University of Bristol, 2004  
Employees who changed their travel behaviour were asked what had influenced this change. 
The four most important factors were “increases in the cost of car parking”, “introduction of 
different categories of permit”, “ease of being able to park at the University” and “daily 
rather than annual charge” demonstrating that the new parking strategy has been 
instrumental in generating change.  It was also recognised that it was necessary to have 
alternative modes in place in order to make the change in travel behaviour possible.  
Travel surveys have also revealed, however, that more people state that the charge has not 
changed their travel behaviour than those who have changed.  It is also felt that the 
opportunity to change behaviour has now reached a saturation point and further modal shift 
will require more work to be done in “personal terms” (UoB 4) rather than physical 
incentives such as installing better facilities.  “Personal terms” was said to include liaising 
with bus companies over routes and the Council over cycle routes. Short staff interviews 
conducted at the University also demonstrated that several people had not changed their 
travel mode due to the parking charge.  Some staff were existing public transport users from 
before the charge and others arrived early to park in nearby streets for free.  
The University of Bristol is not subject to achieving any targets.  There were some mixed 
views about this in the interviews; one respondent thought it was surprising but welcomed it 
and another view was that the scheme achieved its objective of addressing the car parking 
problem and generating modal shift, so there was little point in introducing targets.  It was 
also regarded that since the University was making such positive steps in terms of travel 
planning, local councils and authorities would not feel obliged to impose any targets, for 
example when granting planning permissions.  
7.19.2 Recruitment and Retention  
Issues of recruitment and retention were not thought to be affected in any major way by the 
introduction of the parking charge. The overall consensus was “car parking is an issue but 
are people really going to make decisions about whether they were going to come and work 
here based on car parking?” (UoB 1).  The University’s position as a leading UK academic 
institution was regarded to far outweigh the potential drawbacks that the parking situation 
generated.  
There was a recognition that some individuals such as parents or carers may be more 
impacted by not being able to park.  Those with a need, however, are able to apply for 
category B parking permits so it was not considered to be a problem in terms of recruitment 
and retention.  
Interviewees said that the fear of a negative impact on recruitment and retention had been 
raised a number of times as a drawback of the scheme both during consultation and 
afterwards. There was a recognition that it was not possible to tell if somebody had chosen 
not to apply for a position because of the parking charge, but there did not appear to have 
been any decline in the number of people applying for jobs.  Employee exit surveys 
conducted by the University revealed that car parking was periodically cited as a reason for 
people leaving their jobs, but that it was usually one of a number of factors.  
There was also a view raised that several large businesses located in Bristol city centre had 
far less parking availability for staff than the University and did not appear to suffer 
recruitment or retention problems.  
7.20 Key Findings  
 The University of Bristol introduced a parking charge and permit allocation system 
because the demand for parking spaces was higher than supply, car parking cost too much to 
provide and there was no space for future developments other than on existing car parks.  An 
active Travel Plan was required in order to gain planning permission and there was a need to 
update the existing car parking strategy which was considered to be outdated.  
 The car parking strategy combines a daily parking charge which is related to salary 
with a permit allocation system assessed on individual need. The charge is deducted from 
salary for efficiency reasons but primarily because it is less emotive than making people pay 
cash on a daily basis.  Applications for parking permits are considered on an individual 
basis.  
 A parking charge was chosen because it was considered to be the only way of 
encouraging employees to really think about their journey to work. Introducing a daily 
charge allowed for decision about travel mode to be made on a daily basis and the 
University has tried to make the scheme as flexible as possible to cope with each persons 
individual circumstances.  
 The scheme is considered to be fair and equitable in that no employees are allocated 
a reserved space and as the charge is a percentage of salary it is the same for everybody in 
relative terms.  
 A number of public transport initiatives are in place but in general they are not 
considered to be very good. The University has provided improved facilities for cyclists and 
walkers and offers interest free loans on cycle purchase and public transport season ticket 
purchase.  
 A representative group was formed to direct the new parking strategy.  This helped to 
gain acceptance from employees and within the TWIG group a strong leader was also 
chosen to articulate the scheme to staff. Senior management were not heavily involved in the 
planning and implementation of the parking strategy but supported its objectives.  
 • When introduced there was a mixture of those who supported the scheme and 
those who did not, although this varied reaction was expected as some people benefited from 
the change while others lost out.  The principles of the scheme  
 are generally considered to have been accepted even though not all employees like it. 
The transparent approach adopted by TWIG and the hypothecation of revenues are regarded 
to have increased acceptance.  
 Clear reasons were communicated for the implementation of the charge which 
focussed on the specifics of why it was required. Issues such as the environment and green 
travel were not focussed upon as they were not considered to be important factors.  Adopting 
this approach has been more transparent and accepted by employees as they can relate to the 
issues first hand.  
 The consultation process was lengthy and there was a high level of employee 
participation who had numerous ways of stating their opinions.  This extensive consultation 
was seen as important in gaining both acceptance and understanding.  
 The implementation of the charge was a “big bang” approach with charges being set 
at relatively high levels, which is considered to have generated considerable modal shift.  
The culture of people in general was considered to be one which was adverse to change an 
so this approach allowed the University to only deal with the negative staff reaction once, 
rather than several times if they had chosen to gradually increase a parking charge.  
 The new parking strategy has been successful in reducing the number of single 
occupancy vehicle trips to the site. The charge has been seen to be a major contributing 
factor to those who have changed their mode of travel but in many cases it has not changed 
employees’ travel mode and they continue to commute by car. It is felt that further work is 
required to develop the use of alternative modes.  
 The parking strategy is not thought to have had a major impact on recruitment and 
retention although it is often cited as one of a number of reasons for those who have left 
their employment at the University.  Overall, the University of Bristol consider that the 
benefits of working for a leading UK University outweigh any disadvantages of having to 
pay to park.  
 
Case Study 3: Pfizer  
7.21 Introduction to Pfizer  
Pfizer is a global, research based pharmaceutical company; the focus of this case study is 
their site in Sandwich, Kent, a large site of 352 acres located in rural surroundings 
approximately one mile from Sandwich town centre.  The site’s operations are split between 
Pfizer’s Research and Development and Manufacturing Divisions. There are approximately 
7,000 staff employed on site, of which roughly 3,000 are contract staff. About 5,000 use the 
site each day and approximately five percent of the workforce are part time.    
The workforce is well-paid, generally well above average salaries for the East Kent region. 
They are also relatively young and academically well qualified, with 35% aged between 25-
34 and 35% aged 35-44.  Figures from 2002 revealed that approximately 16% of staff live 
within five miles of the site (Department for Transport, 2002).  
Pfizer have developed a Travel Plan which covers their site at Walton Oaks in Surrey as well 
as the Sandwich site. Walton Oaks has approximately 400 members of staff on site and 
houses the Pfizer Head Office and UK Sales and Marketing Division.  
In the following sections, the following references are used for quotations from the 
interviews:  
 Consultant on Travel Planning (Pfi 1)  
 Parking Cash Out Administrator (Pfi 2)  
 Community relations Manager (Pfi 3)  
 
7.22 The Nature of the Problem and Reasons For Change  
The development of a new parking strategy within it’s Travel Plan at Pfizer was largely a 
result of an increasing congestion problem on the local road network, particularly to the 
north of the site, in the late 1990’s, “people queued all the way back to Ramsgate and it just 
wasn’t moving”. (Pfi 1). This led to staff complaints over long journey times and a lack of 
parking (Parking Review, 2002).  It was recognised that building roads was not a viable 
option and so alternative measures were required.  
Another major reason for change at Pfizer was linked to gaining planning permissions, “if 
you can’t develop a site because you can’t get planning requirements then you’ve got to do 
something about it and so that was it.” (Pfi 1).  A planning proposal for a major 
development on site was granted by Dover District Council in 1998, on the condition that a 
Travel Plan was produced and regular reports on its progress and implementation were 
given.  The Travel Plan gained further importance in autumn 2000 when a new planning 
application was given permission on the condition that certain modal shift targets were 
achieved.  The Travel Plan also played a key role in obtaining planning permission to build 
the new site at Walton Oaks.  
Other reasons cited for the need to develop a Travel Plan included the perceived requirement 
for influential companies such as Pfizer to “tow the line” (Pfi 1) taken by Government.  It 
was felt that it was beneficial for Pfizer to support the UK Government’s integrated transport 
plan.  Issues such as sustainability, pollution, global warming, making efficient use of the 
site and movement of staff and wider community issues were regarded as important.  The 
document entitled “The Future of Transport at Pfizer” (Pfizer, 1999) also states that a 
reduction in road accidents was an important factor in deciding to develop a Travel Plan.  
7.23 The Car Parking Strategy  
7.23.1 Overview of the Car Park System  
There are 13 car parks on site containing 3,800 car park spaces in total.  Staff are permitted 
to park in any of these car parks, except for the visitor car park. Access and egress to car 
parks is controlled by barriers activated by staff ID proximity cards.  
Some members of staff including top directors, the site nurse and disabled people are 
allocated a reserved parking space, accounting for approximately 60 spaces in total. The 
reasoning behind this was that, “it’s pretty difficult to take things away from people” (Pfi 1). 
‘Green travel bays’ are also made available for car sharers as it is thought they offer an extra 
incentive to share.  
7.23.2 Parking Cash Out System  
In June 2001 Pfizer introduced a ‘parking cash out’ scheme; prior to this date there was no 
formal demand management of car parking.  Staff are credited using a daily points system 
with points being turned into money and added to the employees’ salary each month.  When 
staff access the building each day and swipe their ID badge they are credited with 20 points 
and for each day they use the car park 20 points are deducted. 20 points is equivalent to £2 
before tax, which is approximately £1.40 after tax had been deducted from the salary.  The 
scheme costs Pfizer approximately £0.5 million per year in financial payments to employees.  
All Pfizer employees are automatically registered for the scheme, although everybody has 
the option to opt out. At the time of interviewing, two employees chose not to take part in 
the scheme, the reasons for which were not known.  Those people with reserved parking 
spaces are automatically disqualified from the scheme.  No financial incentive is given for 
working at home as it is believed that the benefits in terms of zero travel costs is sufficient. 
In addition, contracted staff, who at times can account for approximately 40% of the 
workforce at Pfizer are not included in the scheme because they are not on the organisation’s 
payroll.  Employee’s who work at Pfizer satellite sites around Sandwich are not included in 
the parking cash out system, but if they visit the main site then manual adjustments can be 
made so that they receive the money.  
The parking cash out scheme gives an incentive for people to car share as only one person 
needs to use their ID card to exit the car park and the other employees in the car retain their 
20 point credits.  The more people who car share, the more financially beneficial it is. Car 
share groups tend to rotate who uses their ID card so as to evenly distribute the financial 
benefits. If contract staff car share with Pfizer employees then the contracted employee can 
use their card to exit the car park and the Pfizer employee can benefit.  
7.23.3 Management and Security  
All car parks are managed by Pfizer which requires cooperation between a number of 
departments including Human Resources (for the employee code), Security (for the badge 
number), Payroll (for payments with salary) and the department dealing with the direct 
administration of the scheme.  There are, however, no staff devoted entirely to 
administrating the scheme.  The car park barrier technology and ID card access system has 
proved effective in enforcing and administrating the parking cash out scheme, resulting in 
low administration costs.  The most labour intensive administration elements of the scheme 
are enrolling new employees and contract staff who subsequently become full time staff.  
Further administrative problems can arise when temporary badges are issued, for example if 
an employee has forgotten their pass the temporary pass can sometimes remain in the system 
rather than converting points to the original pass number of the employee.  These problems 
and the manual changes they require are “manageable, but inconvenient.” (Pfi 2).  
Security staff play a role in managing and policing the car parks, “they used to do a very 
good job when I first arrived because they used to own the car parks and the barriers but 
that ownership got taken away.  Ownership is a key issue in Travel Plans in a large 
organisation.” (Pfi 1).  
Abuse of the parking cash out scheme is minimal.  Car park barriers are monitored by video 
cameras and are alarmed if a barrier fails so that a member of staff can attend. The computer 
system has formulas built in which can check whether the system is being abused; 
employees found to have a monthly points total above a predetermined level are highlighted 
and their case is investigated.  The computer system also highlights any cards being used in 
quick succession to exit the car park, for example in a situation where one person swipes 
their car to let others out.  Any individuals recognised to be abusing the system can be 
penalised by having their points zeroed for that month, or in extreme cases they can be 
deactivated completely from the PCOS. Employee’s cannot, however, be penalised with 
negative points.  In practice, action has only been taken in a very small number of cases and 
due warning is always given.  
7.23.4 Reasons for Selecting a Parking Cash Out Strategy  
The philosophy behind introducing the parking cash out system was to deliver an incentive 
that could target every individual employee.  The basic concept is straight forward, “if 
you’re giving people a free parking space when they drive, why don’t you give the people 
that don’t park a free parking space?” (Pfi 1). The parking cash out system is seen as the 
central part to the company’s Travel Plan, “it cements the whole lot together” (Pfi 1).  
Rather than offering specific incentives such as providing free bus travel, it was considered 
that parking cash out could “work on all of them, car share, pedestrian, cyclist, everything 
else.  We’re not fussed if you do it every day but we want a little bit of a change. A small 
change delivers traffic reduction targets; you’re not going to change people to get 100% out 
of cars like that but just down a bit.” (Pfi 1).    
The £2 per day bonus was based on the cost of providing a car parking space, which 
included factors such as capital cost, maintenance, security, planting and lighting amounting 
to approximately £500 per year.  A level of £2 was also considered substantial enough to 
impact on behaviour. There was an argument raised that 25% of staff were already 
commuting by non-car modes and introducing the cash out payments was rewarding people 
who did not need to be rewarded.  This was countered with the argument that if those people 
started to drive then there would be an even greater problem.  
The report prepared by Eco-Logica in 1998 had also ruled out the possibility of parking 
charging as a viable alternative. The reasons stated for this decision were that Pfizer wanted 
to be seen as a caring employer and the potential staff backlash was too big a risk to take. It 
was also considered that a parking charge would have to be set at a relatively low level to 
gain acceptance and hence may not deliver any change in behaviour.  
7.23.5 Impacts and Problems with the Parking Cash Out System  
The £2 paid to employees for each day they do not drive to work is taxed, meaning that 
employees only receive approximately £1.40.  Pfizer have, and continue to campaign for a 
tax change, but as there is no full time champion of the parking cash out scheme any more it 
is proving difficult to pursue.  “We’ve had some meetings with high places but I understand 
it’s difficult for the treasury to say “this is another way of a company paying people more 
money untaxed.  I think they could seal the loopholes up but it is a bit complex.” (Pfi 1).  It 
was regarded by Pfi 3 that the parking cash out system works well but requires some 
changes on the taxation side to increase the amount of money paid out in order to maintain 
its effectiveness.  
The tax issues also pose problems for including contract staff in the parking cash out scheme 
because the employee is not on Pfizer’s direct payroll.  If the parking cash out payment were 
tax free then it would be much easier to give contract staff direct cash payments.  It was also 
considered that including contract staff could prove too expensive for the organisation. A 
view was also raised that Pfizer may be “unwilling to award contractor staff cash incentives 
as they are not their employees.” (Pfi 2). Contract staff, on the whole, were regarded to be 
“greener than full time staff anyway because a lot are secretaries and poorer people.  
Overall we found that the car:people ratio was better than for staff of ours.” (Pfi 1).  
There is also an issue with the monitoring of shift workers’ car usage which can result in 
inaccurate calculations of parking cash out points. If, for example, a single occupancy car 
driver starts a shift on Thursday afternoon, finishes early on Friday morning and then comes 
in to work again on Friday evening. As the car park software only registers the car as it 
drives out of the car park the driver would be classified as not driving on Thursday and 
driving on Friday when in fact they drove on both days.  
Relatively few issues have been experienced with staff parking off-site.  A controlled 
parking zone was introduced in Sandwich before the parking cash out scheme became 
operational.  Pfizer also communicated the message that “travelling green” did not include 
parking in the town and actively encouraged the local Council to report those found to be 
doing so. There were also “myths that people were parking ten miles away then sharing cars 
to come in” (Pfi 1) but this was found not to be the case due to the inconvenience factor of 
doing so.  
7.23.6 Other Applications of the Parking Cash Out System  
Although not used in this way, the points awarded and deducted by the scheme could be 
altered to allow different car parks to be run with differential rewards, for example if an off 
site car park was developed then it’s users could have 10 points deducted when they exited, 
rather than 20, or different levels could be set at different times of the day to reward people 
who did not drive during the most heavily congested periods.  
The parking cash out system has the capability to enforce negative charging if required, “the 
idea of parking charges is being batted about” (Pfi 2), mainly due to the financial impact of 
the scheme on the organisation, “there is no intention to introduce parking charges at the 
moment but it is realised parking cash out is a drain.” (Pfi 1).  Currently it is considered that 
negative staff reactions would decrease any chance of a charge being introduced, together 
with the fact that people living in many of the surrounding rural areas may feel punished if 
they were unable to commute realistically by other modes.  A potential solution could be for 
the scheme to run on a cash neutral basis.  
7.23.7 Focus on Individuals  
The parking cash out scheme is targeted at individual employees in the sense that the aim is 
to encourage a decision making process on the part of every employee.  This then brings 
about individual behaviour change. The level of £2 per day was considered a sufficient level 
by those designing the cash out initiative to make this decision making process a worthwhile 
one, whereas a lower level may not have had the same impact.  
7.23.8 Equality and Fairness  
Offering the cash alternative to each employee means that all employees are entitled to 
receive the same benefit, rather than specific incentives being targeted at individual modes 
of transport or groups of employees.  
No problems have arisen with contract staff who feel they should also benefit financially 
from the scheme.  Similarly, no complaints have been raised by shift workers, who work 
longer hours but spread over four days per week.  Certain allowances are made in some 
situations, “for instance if you have somebody that’s on call out and they have come in by an 
alternative mode during the day and earned their points, but then have to come again that 
night to fix something it’s only reasonable they should be able to drive in.” (Pfi 1).  There is 
a manual points adjustment process in such situations.  
A small number of staff have reserved spaces, as detailed earlier in section 7.23.1, but these 
staff are automatically excluded from the parking cash out scheme.  Those with reserved 
spaces have the option of giving up their space and taking part in the scheme, but very few 
choose to do this. It is also considered that excluding those with reserved spaces from 
receiving the cash incentives reduced the number of people who apply for disabled spaces 
when they do not really need one.  
Anybody found to be abusing the scheme can be excluded from it and disciplined for fraud, 
although such cases are extremely rare.  So far only one person has been removed from the 
scheme for abuse, around the time it was first introduced.   
7.23.9 Flexibility and Choice  
As it is calculated on a daily basis, the parking cash out scheme is extremely flexible in 
allowing staff to decide whether they drive to work or travel by other means.  Any member 
of staff is free to opt out of the parking cash out scheme if they so desire although there 
appear to be no benefits in doing so.  A wide range of alternative modes of transport to the 
car are available to choose from and are discussed below.  
7.24 Public Transport and Alternatives  
7.24.1 Public Transport  
A number of bus services provide access to the Pfizer site. At the time of interviewing 23 
services stopped on site between eight and nine o’clock every morning, most of which are 
contracted by Pfizer from Stagecoach or Hayden Logistics. Passengers pay fares of which 
the contractor retains 30% and the rest is paid to Pfizer. This helps fund up to half of the cost 
of contracting the services. Pfizer also operate a free shuttle bus service from Sandwich town 
centre and train station to the site. Pfizer has a bus user group which enables discussion to 
take place regarding the provision and quality of bus services.  
At the time of interviewing Pfizer were in the process of changing their contracted service 
from Stagecoach to Buzz Lines, a coach company, “the service offered by Stagecoach was 
poor – the Pfizer contracted services were alright but in general the whole of the network 
needed large improvements.” (Pfi 3).  
Work is ongoing in partnership with Kent County Council to widen the local road between 
Ramsgate and Sandwich to a dual carriageway with one lane reserved for buses and high 
occupancy vehicles. Progress is relatively slow however.  An increase in the number of bus 
routes is also regarded as being a key way of encouraging greater modal shift, “currently the 
buses only cover 3 main corridors from the site to  
Thanet, Dover and Canterbury. We need improvements to the bus services in terms of route 
extensions and new routes.” (Pfi 3).  
Bus shelters on site have increased the quality of public transport and timetables are made 
available both on the intranet and in paper form in reception areas.  Visitors to the site are 
provided with public transport information ahead of their visit.  
There is one train station in Sandwich which offers some level of access. The station is on a 
branch line and poorly served, however, thus limiting its impact.  
The response received when interviewing staff members about their views on public 
transport were that alternatives offered were good and it would be difficult to improve them, 
although one or two stated that the service offered by Stagecoach was poor.  
7.24.2 Cycling and Walking  
A number of cycle lanes from the major surrounding residential locations feed into the 
Pfizer site. Pfizer have contributed finances to develop some of these routes and have 
worked in conjunction with Dover District Council and Kent County Council. The company 
also involves itself in campaigns such as “Cycle to Work Week”. Cycle racks and shower 
facilities are provided on site and a Cycle User Group has been formed.    
On site walking facilities have been improved by offering zebra crossings and direct routes 
between buildings to reduce the number of people driving around the site.  The pavements 
between Sandwich and the Pfizer site are also being improved to increase safety levels.  
7.24.3 Car Sharing  
Pfizer operates a car sharing service over their intranet, which allows registered users to find 
partners. Registered car sharers then obtain a green permit allowing them to park in 
designated car share bays closer to the buildings.  Checks are also made to ensure that 
registered car sharers in the bays are actually car sharing and employees tend to be willing to 
report any abuse that they witness.  There are 740 registered car sharers, although it is 
apparent that not all car sharers are registered; the exact number of “unofficial” car sharers is 
unknown.  
Shift workers are considered to be good car sharers because their colleagues have exactly the 
same start and finish times.  In the interviews with staff members, however, one person 
commented that car sharing was difficult as it was sometimes necessary to work late and 
start and finish times could vary considerably on a daily basis.  
7.24.4 Other Demand Management Policies  
Cash payments are offered instead of company cars and employees with company cars are 
allowed to make business trips by train.  Staff are offered the option of a compressed nine 
day fortnight working week, “it was an aside line and not part of a main core. People 
valued the informal contact and presence.” (Pfi 1). Video conferencing is promoted, 
particularly for communications with colleagues in North America.  Staff are also provided 
with public transport information during the recruitment and retention process and there is 
some advice available to staff about where they could consider living.  
7.25 Management and Leadership  
Management support was considered crucial to the success of any scheme, “if you’ve got full 
level support, the world is everything.” (Pfi 1).  This management support was gained from 
the very outset of the planning process for the parking cash out scheme and the Travel Plan, 
“a key thing happened at my interview; they asked if I had any questions and I asked, “are 
you right behind the strategy?” and a supplementary “what will you personally do to set 
examples to everyone else?” and I had satisfactory answers from all eight who interviewed 
me and I knew that was a fundamental to do the job and I think that’s what made it 
successful.” (Pfi 1).  
This support from the UK was not reflected by top level management in the United States. 
At Sandwich it was originally planned to create off-site parking, but the Vice President of 
Pfizer in the USA insisted that parking was provided on site. “That shot away the ground 
from people completely here and I think we haven’t finished paying the costs of that, its 
brought traffic in at all the wrong places.  It was almost a decision taken before I even had a 
chance to speak to him, all I did manage to convince him was that we had to do a lot more 
work and spend a lot more money on trying to mitigate the effects of that decision.” (Pfi 1).  
It was felt that if parking had not been provided so conveniently close to the buildings then 
more people would have switched to other modes, or used a park and ride service, thus 
reducing congestion on the local road network.  
7.26 Attitudes to Change, Culture and Acceptance Issues  
Staff reactions to proposal of the parking cash out scheme and its subsequent introduction 
were extremely positive.  The lack of complaints from ordinary employees was such that 
individual negative responses can be recalled, “I got an email saying “why have you 
removed some spaces in car park A”, because we’d previously squeezed some in but for 
safety reasons I thought we’d better take them out again. He wrote letters to the top 
directors but he got short shrift.” (Pfi 1).  
In terms of ensuring that the attitudes to change of the senior management were positive, the 
following core business reasons for implementing the Travel Plan were strongly emphasised:  
 Efficiency of movement of staff and goods;  
 Responsibility to community values;  
 To make better use of the land on site, and;  
 Planning requirements.  
 
Convincing some more senior members of staff proved a little difficult, although they were 
again isolated incidents. One example is related to the initial plans to remove reserved 
parking spaces, where views such as, “I’ve climbed the greasy pole, this is my perk” and “I 
work all hours, I should be entitled to a reserved space” (Pfi 1) had to be contended with. 
As a result, reserved spaces were maintained by Pfizer.  
The attitudes towards the parking cash out scheme and the Travel Plan overall are supported 
by a strong communications strategy which is explored in section 7.27.  As well as providing 
information about how the scheme would work and on alternative modes available, the 
communications strategy focussed on changing attitudes towards car use.  
7.26.1 Culture  
As has already been discussed in section 7.23.4, the £2 per day payment was selected in part 
because it was considered a sufficient level to impact upon behaviour.  In addition it was 
aimed to achieve a change in the general culture of driving to work, to ultimately reach a 
position where employees were of the opinion, “you mean to say you drove to Pfizer today? 
How selfish of you!” (Pfi 1).  It was recognised that the company was nowhere near to 
achieving such a culture change, but parallels were drawn to the culture changes which have 
taken place in terms of drink driving and smoking and it was considered that driving could 
potentially be viewed in the same way if the correct message was communicated.  
It was also recognised that advances needed to be made in terms of the general culture of 
using alternative modes of transport.  Where cycling was concerned, a member of senior 
management voiced an opinion to Pfi 1 that “I couldn’t be seen walking around in shorts 
and a t-shirt.”  It was felt that if senior management were to whole heartedly adopt changes 
then a respect would be gained and others would follow.  
After large amounts of initial success, the parking cash out scheme has more recently lost 
some of its impact.  Part of the reason for this is that the top level managers who originally 
supported the scheme have either retired or been replaced by new managers who do not 
afford it the same level of importance.  Additionally, the fact that there is no longer a 
‘Project Champion’ Pfizer (Pfi 1 now only works one day per week as a consultant to the 
organisation) is a clear reason why the parking cash out scheme and Travel Plan has lost 
impetus.  At the time of interviewing, however, it was felt that another recent change in top 
level management would lead to an increase in support for the scheme.  
The changes in management and the lack of support from Pfizer in the United States is felt 
to have restrained the full potential of the parking cash out scheme and Travel Plan, “I do 
not think we’d have had any trouble getting our car:people ratio down to 50% under the old 
management and certainly if we’d have off site parking as we were planning.” (Pfi 1).  
7.27 Communication and Consultation  
Communication of the parking cash out system and alternative modes of transport was a 
crucial part of the scheme’s introduction.  Communication is constantly ongoing. The core 
message communicated by Pfizer is a colour coded hierarchy of various transport modes:  
 Green – walk, public transport and bicycle  
 Amber – car share and motorcycle  
 
• Red – single occupancy car This hierarchy is included in all Travel Plan promotional 
material and gives a clear message to employees regarding the various transport modes that 
are available to them, “the message here is not quite subliminal but it’s “red – full stop”, 
“amber – ok”, “green – go.” (Pfi 1).  
Information is provided to all new recruits about the scheme and alternative travel options 
available to them.  Additionally, all public transport timetables are provided both on the 
Pfizer intranet and in the reception areas of buildings.  During the introduction of the 
parking cash out system a road show travelled around to the different sites promoting and 
explaining the scheme.  
A key part of Pfizer’s communication strategy is focussed on changing attitudes and the 
general culture towards travelling by modes other than car.  The overall aim is to convey a 
message that “the pedestrian, or public transport user, is up on a platform and cars are 
outcast.” (Pfi 1).  The issue of health is strongly promoted by Pfizer, an area they feel staff 
are aware of due to the business the organisation operates in.  Non-car modes are promoted 
on the strength that people who walk or cycle further are benefiting their health and that 
exercising while travelling to or from work negates the need to go to the gym outside of 
work hours. Time re-use is also promoted; the message communicated is that if travelling by 
bus or train you have the opportunity to read, write, relax or catch up on sleep, whereas if 
you are driving then it is “dead time” (Pfi 1). Finally, Pfizer promotes initiatives such as 
cycle and motor cycle training which are communicated and advertised with a focus on 
safety.  
The press associated with the Pfizer Travel Plan was strong, particularly for the parking cash 
out system as it was something new and different.  It is now, however, regarded as an “old” 
initiative and the public relations value is waning.  It is felt that something new is required to 
“kick start” the Travel Plan. (Pfi 3).  
Prior to the parking cash out scheme being introduced extensive meetings and focus groups 
were held with various stakeholders and regular presentations were made to senior staff and 
other groups of employees.  This consultation lasted approximately two and a half years, 
from the approval of the scheme in January 1999 to its implementation in June 2001.  On-
going consultation takes place through the company’s intranet, where all staff members have 
the opportunity to email their comments to those involved in managing the scheme.  
Feedback is also available from bicycle and bus user groups. An estimated 40% of 
employees have attended some kind of meeting about travel plan initiatives (Department for 
Transport 2002b).  
7.28 Implementation  
The various initiatives contained in the Travel Plan were introduced in stages coordinated by 
Pfi 1. This began with public transport alternatives, initially the free shuttle bus to Sandwich 
and the rail station.  Once these alternatives were in place the parking cash out scheme was 
introduced, “there was a view there must be everything in place first to make it easy.” (Pfi 
1).  
7.29 Impacts of the Parking Cash Out  
7.29.1 Targets and Effectiveness  
Pfizer last undertook a Travel Survey in April 2001.  These results are displayed in Table 7.4 
with a comparison to the previous travel survey conducted in April 1998. The initial travel 
survey conducted in 1998 identified 67% of staff were single occupancy car drivers and 18% 
were car sharers, accounting for an overall car:people ratio of 75:100. It was identified at 
this time that for the local road network to work effectively with the predicted growth of the 
site, a traffic reduction target of 10-20% was necessary over five years.  At the time of the 
Second Travel survey in April 2001, before parking cash out was introduced, there was a 
reduction of 9% in total car use of which single occupancy car use had reduced by 
approximately 12%, accounting for an overall car:people ratio of 68:100.  
No subsequent travel surveys have been carried out because the parking cash out computer 
system provides daily figures on car park usage.  Figures provided during the interview 
revealed that when parking cash out was first introduced the car:people ratio dropped to 
60:100 but soon began to climb again and through out 2002 and 2003 it remained fairly 
constant at around 67:100, a similar level to that achieved just before the introduction of 
parking cash out.  This level remained at the time of interviewing. Pfizer are required to 
report the people:car ratio on a regular basis to Dover District and Kent County Council 
although the current agreed target of 62% is proving difficult to maintain.  
Table 7.4: Results from the Pfizer Travel Surveys  
Mode  April 1998 (%)  April 2001 (%)  % change from 1998 
base level  
Bus  6.7  11.8  +76  
Bicycle  5.7  5.2  -8.8  
Car (SOV)  66.7  58.8  -11.8  
Car share  17.7  20.4  +15.2  
Foot  1.5  1.4  -6.6  
Motorbike  1.6  2.0  +25  
Train  0  0.3  >+100  
 
Source: (Department for Transport 2002b).  
A number of staff members were interviewed to investigate their views on whether the 
parking cash out scheme had been effective.  On the whole, the people who were arranged 
for interview represented a biased group; the vast majority were public transport users from 
before the parking cash out was introduced and so it had had no direct impact on their travel 
behaviour.  The two interviewees who were car users commented that £2 per day was not 
enough of an incentive to persuade them to change modes.  
7.29.2 Recruitment and Retention  
The parking cash out scheme is thought to have had no impact on recruitment or retention at 
Pfizer because it allows each individual to opt in or out and a greater range of alternatives to 
the car have been provided.  
7.30 Key Findings  
 A wide range of objectives were stated for introducing the Travel Plan and Parking 
Cash Out Scheme at Pfizer, namely the need to reduce congestion on the surrounding road 
network, to promote green travel, to support wider community issues and to increase road 
safety.  Gaining planning permission to expand operations was another key reason although 
this was not focussed up so strongly when communicating the scheme to staff.  
 The scheme introduced by Pfizer incentivises employees not to drive to work by 
paying them £2 per day when they do not use car parks.  
 The Pfizer system was introduced on the principle that people who did not drive to 
work did not receive a benefit equivalent to that of a free parking space. Hence the price per 
day was determined based on the daily cost of providing a car parking space.  The parking 
cash out scheme includes all employees and so is considered more effective than targeting 
specific car reduction initiatives.  
 The main drawback of parking cash out is that the £2 daily payment is taxed. Pfizer 
are campaigning for a change in this rule.  Contract workers are not included in the scheme 
due to them not being on the Pfizer payroll, although it was considered that if they were 
included the company may not be able to bear the additional expenditure.  
 As the scheme includes all employees directly employed by Pfizer there is equality in 
terms of everybody being entitled to the same benefit.  A small number of staff are allocated 
reserved spaces but they are not included in the scheme.  It also allows each individual 
employee complete flexibility to opt in and out on a daily basis.  
 The Pfizer site is well served by public transport although there have been some 
problems with the working relationship the company have with bus operators. Cycling, 
walking and car sharing are promoted and various other demand management initiatives are 
in place.  
 Management support has varied during the course of the parking cash out scheme 
being in place.  The initial UK management were strongly in favour of the scheme but 
subsequent changes have led to a loss of impact.  Management in the United States were in 
support of cash payments but undermined the scheme to an extent by insisting that parking 
must be provided on site.  
 There is now a lack of a project champion at Pfizer; nobody is driving the scheme 
forwards and its effectiveness is decreasing.   
 Staff reactions to the parking cash out system were positive with no opposition.  
Some senior members of staff were more sceptical and an agreement was reached whereby 
they retained their reserved parking spaces but opted out of the parking cash out scheme.  
 The communications strategy associated with the introduction of the parking cash out 
scheme was comprehensive, focussing on the pedestrian over the car driver and consultation 
was extensive, beginning two and a half years before it was introduced.  The public relations 
benefits associated with the scheme were also strong due to the unique nature of the 
implementation.  
 The introduction of the parking cash out scheme at Pfizer was carried out after 
alternative modes of transport and access were in place, so as to increase the potential modal 
shift.  The £2 per day payment to employees has remained at the same level as when 
introduced on 2001.  
 The parking cash out scheme at Pfizer was initially successful in generating modal 
shift.  Even before the cash out was introduced the promotional activity around its 
introduction and the provision of alternatives had generated considerable travel behaviour 
changes.  Over time the impact of the scheme has decreased and it is widely felt that 
something is needed to renew the impact of the scheme.  There was also discussion of 
developing the scheme into a parking charge at some stage due to the current financial drain 
on the company.  
 There was not considered to have been any impact on recruitment and retention as a 
result of the parking cash out scheme being implemented.  
 
7.31 Conclusion  
This chapter has fulfilled the objective of investigating the innovative strategies being used 
in the non-airport sector in order to manage the demand for employee car parking. It has 
used in-depth interviews to demonstrate all aspects of how Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust, The 
University of Bristol and Pfizer have sought to address their car parking problems.  The 
findings have ranged from the details of the day to day operation of the scheme through to 
the more strategic considerations such as communication, consultation and implementation.  
Focus has been placed on the issues seen to be most important to BAA Heathrow in terms of 
their need to address their employee car parking issues allowing a comparison and analysis 
based on benchmarking methodology to be undertaken.  
Chapter 8 utilises the concept and methodology of benchmarking detailed in Chapter 4 to 
undertake a discussion of the lessons BAA Heathrow could learn from the non-airport best 
practice cases studies detailed in Chapter 7.  The relevance of the literature (see Chapter 2) 
to this discussion is explored.  
Chapter 8. Benchmarking BAA Against the Non-Airport 
Organisations: A Discussion  
8.0 Introduction  
The previous two chapters have explored in detail the current employee car parking issues at 
Heathrow Airport, the potential ways of addressing these issues as perceived by both key 
decision-makers and employees and  the way in which three best practice non-airport 
organisations have sought to address their car parking issues.  The aim of this chapter is 
twofold; first to draw together the findings of the previous two chapters and undertake a 
comparison based on benchmarking methodology and, second, to relate the findings to the 
literature review, as detailed in Chapter 2, in order to determine whether the findings support 
or refute the literature.  
This chapter follows the structure set out in the design of the benchmarking template 
detailed in section 6.25. The template was developed from the areas considered to be of 
importance at Heathrow Airport in terms of issues that would need to be addressed should it 
be decided to develop the current employee car parking strategy to include a financial 
incentive or disincentive measure.  In this chapter each area is considered in turn, exploring 
the situation at Heathrow Airport and how the non-airport organisations have sought to 
address the similar issue.  In each section a table is presented in order to provide an 
overview of the issues followed by a discussion of how the findings from the non-airport 
case studies relate to those from Heathrow Airport. Findings from the literature review are 
included to support the case study findings or to identify where it is perceived there is a gap 
in the knowledge base. Throughout the chapter the non-airport case studies are considered 
holistically, essentially forming a single case of best practice knowledge.  The template of 
areas to facilitate the benchmarking of BAA against the non-airport organisations is 
presented in Figure 8.1.  
Figure 8.1: Template of Areas to Facilitate the Benchmarking of BAA against the Non-
Airport Organisations  
Selecting the most Suitable Measures to deal with the Car Parking Problems  
 A Package Approach  
 The Core Element of the Strategy  
 Direct and Daily Charging  
 The Level of a Parking Charge or Cash Payment  
 Parking Permit Allocation  
 Alternative Working Practices  
 Availability of Car Parking Spaces  
 Flexibility and Choice  
 Equity, Fairness and Exemptions  
 
Management Support  
 Management Understanding  
 A Desire to Change  
 The Importance of a Project Champion  
 
Gaining Acceptance  
 Employee Recognition of the Problem  
 Overcoming Cultural Barriers and Attitudes to Change  
 Parking Hierarchy  
 Recruitment and Retention  
 Communicating Clear and Transparent Objectives  
 Consultation  
 
Implementation  
 The Process of Implementation  
 Implementation of the Core Element of the Strategy  
 
8.1 Conducting the Benchmarking Comparison  
The benchmarking methodology explored in Chapter 4 stated that the same processes should 
be compared between the comparator organisations, which in the case of this research is 
BAA Heathrow and the non-airport organisations.  These processes have been defined as 
those areas which are most important to BAA Heathrow in the area of employee car parking.  
It is important to remember, however, that while the benchmarking exercise is being 
conducted between BAA Heathrow and the non-airport organisations, many of the issues 
relate to Heathrow Airport as a whole and not just BAA Heathrow. For this reason the 
terminology used in the chapter refers to BAA Heathrow when the benchmarking exercise is 
discussed and Heathrow Airport when wider implications are considered.  This chapter uses 
the topic areas defined in the benchmarking template detailed in section 6.25 as the 
processes around which the comparison is conducted.  There are four main areas addressed, 
with sub-areas as listed in Figure 8.1 above.  
The benchmarking process followed was detailed in Chapter 4 and is displayed again below 
in Figure 8.2. Throughout the thesis this process has been adhered to and this chapter 
concentrates on stages five, six, seven and eight of the process.  To this end, the analysis 
conducted in each section of this chapter will allow for the gaps in performance and 
understanding between BAA Heathrow and the non-airport organisations to be better 
understood, for improvement areas to be highlighted and for provisional findings and 
conclusions to be drawn as to how the situation at Heathrow Airport could be improved in 
terms of introducing an employee car parking measure such as a direct parking charge or 
financial incentive.  
Figure 8.2: The Benchmarking Process Used in the Research  
1. Identify benchmarking subject  
Planning  
1 Identify benchmarking partners  
2 Determine data collection method  
3 Collect data  
 
Analysis  5. Determine gaps  6. Highlight where 
improvements could be made  
Integration  7. Establish what is to be improved 8. 
Communicate results  
Action  9. Develop action plans  
 
The Benchmarking Comparison and Discussion  
8.2 Selecting the most Suitable Measures to deal with the Car Parking 
Problems  
 
A Package Approach  Feeling that a package approach  New parking strategies introduced 
as  
 should be adopted.  a package of measures.  
The Core Element of  Unsure what to pursue but  A core element used in all cases  
the Strategy  recognised that a core incentive or  whether a parking charge or 
parking  
 disincentive necessary.  cash out.  
Direct and Daily  Currently employers pay for an  Charges or cash payments  
Parking Charges or  annual permit.  Individual charging  administered on a daily basis.  
Cash Payments  complicated by the large number of   
 employees.   
The Level of a 
Parking  
Levels constrained due to employee  High charges (University of 
Bristol)  
Charge or Cash  parking being regulated.  and high cash payments (Pfizer) to  
Payments  Interviewees said a direct employee  generate more meaningful modal  
 charge should be sufficient to  shift. Low charges (Addenbrooke’s  
 generate a meaningful modal shift.  NHS Trust) to gain initial  
  acceptance.  
Parking Permit  No real restrictions on permit  Both organisations who charge  
Allocation  allocation.  The high proportion of  employees to park incorporate  
 shift workers was expected to have a  permit allocation strategies.  
 bearing on any potential scheme.   
Alternative Working  Alternative modes and working  Alternatives are important as part 
of  
Practices  practices are regarded as being  a package approach but a core  
 successful at Heathrow Airport.  element is required to deliver 
greater  
  modal shift.  
Availability of Car  Expected to have an important  Regarded as being a major  
Parking Spaces  bearing on travel choices.  contributor to changing travel 
mode  
  choice.  
Flexibility and 
Choice  
Any new strategy should contain  Employees can make a decision on 
a  
 flexibility in terms of allowing  daily basis about how to commute.  
 employees to make a decision on   
 how they travelled to work.   
Equity, Fairness and  Any strategy should be as ‘fair’ as  Equitable approach taken overall.  
Exemptions  possible and exemptions should be  Exemptions minimised, although  
 minimised.  Pfizer retained some reserved  
  parking spaces.    
 
8.2.1 A Package Approach  
The interviews conducted at BAA Heathrow revealed a mixed response regarding what was 
believed to be the most suitable approach to resolving the car parking problem.  A parking 
strategy already exists with BAA charging employers for parking permits.  An overall 
‘Travel to Work’ strategy also exists alongside the parking strategy including a wide range 
of incentive measures such as public transport, promotion of cycling and walking, promotion 
of alternative working policies and car sharing. A range of views existed as to whether a 
parking charge or financial incentive should be incorporated into the strategy or not.  There 
was a consensus, however, that any solution should involve a combination of measures if it 
was to be successful in reducing the number of people driving to work.  Such a package 
approach was also considered to be the most suitable solution by participants in the staff 
focus groups, although they were strongly opposed to the introduction of a financial 
incentive or disincentive related to car parking as part of the strategy. Overall there was no 
definitive position on what should be included in any car parking strategy.  
The employee car parking strategies in use at the non-airport organisations adopt a package 
approach with either a financial incentive or disincentive forming the core of the strategy.  A 
package designed to reduce car commuting can be seen to currently exist at Heathrow 
Airport but without there being a core incentive or disincentive aimed directly at employees.  
The measures in place at Heathrow Airport are aimed at a more general reduction in car 
commuting rather than any specific initiatives targeted at encouraging employees not to park 
their cars.  All three case study organisations have achieved a reduction in employee car use 
whether they have utilised a parking charge or financial incentive and there have been a 
wide range of supporting strategies, ranging from promotion and subsidisation of public 
transport travel to the development of flexible working policies and teleworking.  
A key finding from the literature review was that a package approach to implementing a new 
traffic restraint strategy incorporating pricing, be it a road user charge or parking charge, 
was the most suitable way forward and significantly increased willingness to contemplate 
traffic restraint (Jones, 1991, Thorpe et al, 2000, Ison and Wall, 2002). Jones highlighted 
three main elements to the package approach as being: a simple but fair method of vehicle 
restriction; improvements in public transport, and; some re-allocation of road space to modes 
such as cycling and walking. In all of the non-airport organisations this approach has been 
followed and aided the implementation and acceptance of the strategy, highlighting that it 
could be a suitable model to adopt as the basis of a strategy at Heathrow Airport.  
8.2.2 The Core Car Parking Measure  
A key consideration for BAA Heathrow is whether a financial incentive or disincentive 
should form the core of their employee car parking strategy or whether further development 
of the ‘soft’ measures currently in place will achieve the objective of reducing car parking so 
that it is within the constraints of the 17,500 space employee car parking cap.  It was widely 
accepted by the interviewees at BAA that something had to be done and that doing nothing 
was not a viable option, although there was no definitive view on what type of incentive or 
disincentive measure should be introduced; some favoured a parking charge while others did 
not agree with the principle of charging employees to park at work.  
Heathrow has approximately 70,000 employees and, by comparison, the scale of the 
schemes implemented at the non-airport organisations is relatively small.  This does not, 
however, preclude the principles of the non-airport organisation schemes from providing 
useful lessons. All three of the non-airport organisations have shown that their respective 
strategies, whether a fixed rate low daily charge, salary related daily charge or daily payment 
to employees, can achieve results in terms of reducing the number of employees commuting 
solo by car.  The large number of employees at Heathrow Airport may, however, make some 
schemes more suitable than others. Perhaps the most simple in design is that operated by 
Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust whereby all employees pay the same daily rate.  The measures 
implemented at Pfizer and the University of Bristol would require more careful thought in 
terms of their implementation at Heathrow Airport because they require employees to be 
charged based on individual income or for each individual employee to be credited when 
they do not use a car park. At Heathrow Airport the large number of organisations and 
employees would make the administration of either of these schemes a difficult undertaking. 
Parking cash out payments could also have major financial implications on many companies 
at Heathrow Airport, particularly if they were to amount to more than the current charges for 
annual parking permits.  Some companies have already approached BAA Heathrow about 
wanting to reduce car use; actions which have been driven by their financial need to reduce 
the amount spent on parking permits each year. Introducing parking cash out which resulted 
in a higher financial outlay could pose difficulties.  
The literature review on the strategies that have been used to manage the demand for car 
parking and commuting more generally was discussed in section 2.14 and explored the 
merits of each.  Parking charges were regarded as a first-best solution for dealing with the 
allocation of a scarce number of spaces (Verhoef et al, 1995), as is the case at the University 
of Bristol and Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust where the introduction of charges can be seen to 
have been effective in reducing the number of single occupancy vehicles. The impact of 
parking charges upon reducing congestion on the local road network is mixed (Button and 
Verhoef, 1998), although it must be remembered that the ultimate aim at both the Trust and 
the University was to deal with a specific car parking problem, rather than to reduce 
congestion on the road network per se. At Heathrow Airport, such are the numbers of 
employees who commute by car, that a reduction in the numbers parking could also result in 
a positive impact on localised network congestion.  
Offering free parking to employees, as is currently the case with the majority of employers 
at Heathrow Airport, has been shown to significantly increase the probability of solo driving. 
When a charge is introduced, however, the number of solo drivers decreases while car 
sharing and public transport usage increase (Shoup and Willson, 1992, Willson, 1992).  This 
would lend support to the use of a direct employee parking charge at Heathrow Airport.  
Research has also revealed that parking charges have a positive impact on the urban 
environment and a significant impact on promoting public transport and encouraging car 
sharing (OECD, 1994), something which has been seen at the non-airport organisations.  
Parking charges have also been seen to shift travel during the peak hour and trips away from 
congested zones. While this may be the case in urban applications, it is less likely that travel 
times or routes will be shifted at Heathrow Airport, or indeed at the non-airport sites, due to 
the requirement for employees to be at work on time and at a specific location.  
The literature review highlighted that in the airport sector there are a number of ways of 
improving parking efficiency using existing measures, of which one was to modify parking 
rates (FHA and FAA, 1995). Other suggestions included building more car parks, something 
which is not feasible at Heathrow Airport and to redesign existing car parks, a strategy 
which again is not wholly feasible for BAA given that the main issue is capacity rather than 
efficiency.  Reallocating spaces from passengers to employees is a potential option but 
would create problems with passenger parking. Off-airport car parking for employees was 
also considered a potential solution to car parking problems at an airport.  At Heathrow, 
much of the employee car parking is already located at the airport perimeter and BAA are 
unable to develop more car parks on site beyond the 42,000 limit or off the airport site.  No 
detailed work existed on the implementation of new strategies except for the system of cash 
payments by KLM to its employees at Schiphol Airport (Schreffler and de Vreede, 2000).  
Parking cash out schemes are shown by the literature to be successful in reducing the 
number of people driving solo to work and that it has a greater impact than providing 
subsidies to public transport and car sharing when parking continues to be subsidised. This 
was seen to be the case at Pfizer to a certain extent, although the introduction of public and 
alternative transport improvements also generated a large decrease in car commuting before 
the parking cash out scheme was introduced. While the introduction of parking cash out at 
Pfizer did generate some additional modal shift, it was not much greater than that achieved 
by the transport improvements, although it is recognised that there was a great deal of 
promotion of public transport and other alternative modes which was based on the 
impending introduction of cash payments. Parking cash out is regarded by the literature as 
being suitable for solving site specific problems but not for wider scale congestion issues 
(Enoch, 2002).  The situation at Heathrow Airport is specific to the site and so this potential 
drawback is not a major concern. Parking cash out is also regarded as being considerably 
cheaper than constructing new car parks. Again, this is of limited concern at Heathrow 
Airport due to the limit on the number of spaces that can be constructed and it is likely that 
parking cash out payments would outweigh the costs of developing new car parks due to the 
number of employees at the site.  
8.2.3 Direct and Daily Parking Charges or Cash Payments  
While targeting employees individually with charges or payments has proved possible at the 
non-airport organisations it would be a much larger undertaking at Heathrow Airport. At the 
non-airport sites car parking spaces are owned by the organisation and any other companies 
on site are generally small in size, meaning that the management of car parks and the 
administration of parking permits is relatively straight forward. This is not the case at 
Heathrow Airport where BAA own the majority of car parking spaces and sell annual 
permits to companies on site.  It is therefore made more difficult for BAA to control parking 
spaces once they have sold permits to another organisation.  In the interviews at BAA 
Heathrow the concept of charging companies and not individuals on a daily basis, rather 
than annually, was discussed and considered that it could encourage more organisations to 
become proactive in reducing commuting by car. At Heathrow Airport such an approach, 
focussed on organisations, could overcome some of the administrative problems of having to 
deal with 70,000 employees.  There is a possibility, however, that adopting this approach 
could result in employees not thoroughly considering their choice of transport mode as they 
are not directly impacted financially.  This is supported by a view from one of the BAA 
Heathrow interviews that once the individual is divorced from the decision making process 
then impact is lost.  Therefore the strategy may not be as successful in reducing commuting 
by car compared to direct employee car parking charges although it could form a useful 
interim step to direct charging.  
8.2.4 The Level of a Parking Charge or Cash Payments  
A further key consideration with a parking charge, or indeed a financial incentive, is the 
level at which it is set.  Interviewees at BAA Heathrow regarded this as being fundamental 
to the success of the scheme and that the monetary value has to be substantial enough to 
deliver a meaningful modal shift.  At both the University of Bristol and Pfizer, this too was 
an important consideration.  The University related the charge to salary and set it at a level 
whereby it immediately made employees consider their mode of travel to work.  At Pfizer, 
the parking cash out payment was set at a level which reflected the cost of providing a 
parking space, therefore those who chose not to park received the same benefit in financial 
terms of those who chose to park. At Addenbrooke’s a lower charge was introduced initially 
but the plan was to increase this to a level above public transport fares.  
A potential drawback of introducing a direct employee parking charge at Heathrow Airport 
is that employee parking is a regulated activity and as such BAA are not allowed to return a 
profit on it. This would mean that employees could not be charged any more than companies 
are currently charged to park.  For the majority of parking spaces this cost is still significant 
and would prove a large cost to employees, but the situation does somewhat restrict the 
ability BAA would have to alter charges. If parking revenues are to be ring-fenced and 
reinvested in public transport initiatives, as well as car park management and maintenance, 
then it may allow BAA a greater level of flexibility; the interviewees were unsure how 
monies reinvested in public transport and alternative modes would impact upon the financial 
calculations for parking as a specified activity and whether reinvestment could be accepted 
as a cost.  
Rye and Ison (2005) advocate the use of low, income related parking charges.  At the non-
airport organisations, the charge at Addenbrooke’s is relatively low but it is a fixed charge 
for everybody, while at the University of Bristol the charge is considered to be relatively 
high and is related to salary.  The University support their relatively high charge with the 
argument that it enabled a meaningful shift to be generated from the day of introduction and 
that, because it naturally increases with salary, it removes future periods of unrest when 
charges need to be increased.  Supportive of this is the fact that at Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust 
there is staff opposition every time a charge increase is proposed. The Trust stated, however, 
that a major reason for their charge was to generate revenues to fund alternative modes and 
not just to directly reduce the demand for parking.  
8.2.5 Parking Permit Allocation  
Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust and the University of Bristol both incorporate a system of permit 
allocation into their car parking strategies; the University’s is based on a number of factors 
(see section 7.13.2) and the Trust’s is based on the distance employees live from the site.  
Introducing a strategy such as the one at Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust, whereby some 
employees are effectively barred from parking, requires a range of alternative modes to be in 
place.  It is feasible to think that some strategy of parking permit allocation could be 
introduced at Heathrow if the alternative transport links in place were strong enough. A key 
outcome of the focus groups was the finding that a large number of jobs at the airport are 
time critical, as is also the case at Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust, and rely on employees being 
able to arrive on time. Therefore, any restriction in terms of permit allocation would have to 
be very carefully designed to ensure the operation of the airport did not suffer.  
8.2.6 Alternative Working Practices  
In addition to further developing public transport links as discussed earlier in this section, a 
potential option is for BAA Heathrow to concentrate on improving the alternative working 
practices currently in place at Heathrow Airport to reduce car use. Both the interview and 
focus group findings highlighted a number of improvement areas and it was considered that 
if BAA was to invest resources into such initiatives then reductions in car use could be 
achieved.  
At the non-airport organisations some alternative working practices have been implemented 
but they do not form a major part of the car parking strategy.  The strategies introduced 
include teleworking, compressed working weeks and cash payments instead of company 
cars.  Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust is most comparable to Heathrow in the sense that they have 
a large proportion of shift workers who undertake jobs which require them to be at their 
place of work in order to perform their function.  In such situations, alternative working 
policies are extremely difficult to implement.    
BAA Heathrow already has a range of alternative working policies in place which are more 
advanced than those at the non-airport organisations and so the development of these 
policies and a wider expansion to other companies on site at the airport may be a more 
suitable route to pursue than following the initiatives from the non-airport organisations.  
The non-airport organisations have demonstrated, however, that having a financial 
disincentive or incentive as the core of the whole strategy is beneficial in generating a modal 
shift.  All believed that without this central part of the strategy they would not have achieved 
the same level of car reduction.  
8.2.7 Availability of Car Parking Spaces  
Experience from the non-airport organisations suggests that a major contributor to changing 
employee travel mode choices is the availability of car parking spaces.  At Heathrow Airport 
too this was considered to be a factor which would have an important bearing on travel 
choices.  This is the case at both Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust and the University of Bristol 
and at each organisation it is felt that the physical lack of available spaces can encourage 
people to travel by a mode other than car.  At Heathrow Airport, the focus groups revealed 
that there was a lack of appreciation of any parking problems at present.  As the airport 
continues to grow however and the parking cap is approached, it is likely that the added 
congestion and difficulty in finding a parking space may generate modal shift.  It was felt by 
the interviewees that this was a situation they did not wish to occur and that a more 
favourable approach was to address parking problems directly before a gridlock situation 
was encountered.  
The literature raised the issue of regulatory parking policies whereby the number of spaces is 
restricted (see section 2.14.2).  This is the case at Heathrow Airport with the 42,000 space 
car parking cap associated with the development of Terminal Five.  At Addenbrooke’s NHS 
Trust and the University of Bristol, the number of spaces is also restricted, but through 
issues concerning availability of space rather than external regulation. Verhoef et al (1995) 
and Ison and Wall (2002) state that where parking restrictions are in place they are usually 
found to be complemented by charges.  This can be seen to be the case at the University of 
Bristol and Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust. It is also considered in the literature that a restriction 
on spaces without an associated parking policy is likely to lead to the emergence of a chaotic 
situation (Verhoef et al, 1995). This finding which is of crucial importance to Heathrow 
Airport, given the high numbers of commuters by car and supports the claims by the 
interviewees that the situation will not simply sort itself out and needs to be addressed before 
car parking problems deteriorate.  Research also suggests that as regulatory parking policies 
only impact upon terminating traffic it can lead to road space being filled by through traffic. 
While there is the possibility of this at Heathrow Airport, it is likely to be only marginal due 
to the local road network being used primarily to serve the airport.  
8.2.8 Flexibility and Choice  
At Heathrow Airport there was a strong focus, both from the interviewees and the focus 
group members, on introducing a strategy which allowed for flexibility and choice. The 
current car parking strategy at Heathrow Airport does not encourage people to vary their 
commuting modes; once an individual has a parking permit it grants access to the car parks 
for a full year.  It was considered by the interviewees that a strategy which encouraged the 
use of different modes on a regular basis was favourable. Likewise, focus group participants 
stated that a more flexible approach to car parking would make them more likely to try 
alternative modes where possible.  
All of the non-airport organisations introduced schemes which allow the individual 
employee to decide on a daily basis how they travel to work.  This was most strongly 
emphasised by the interviewees at the University of Bristol who saw ‘flexibility’ as a key 
advantage of their scheme.  It was felt that by giving people the freedom to decide their 
travel mode every day then there was a greater chance of an employee deciding not to use 
the car on a day when they did not need to. At Pfizer it was felt that it was easier to 
encourage people to change their travel mode on one or two days a week than five days a 
week, a view reflected by all three of the non-airport organisations. The current annual 
permit scheme at Heathrow Airport is more likely to encourage employees to drive every 
day once they have a permit and therefore requires a change if employees are to be 
encouraged to introduce more flexibility to how they commute.  
At Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust, however, a degree of the flexibility and choice is taken away 
from some employees who are not permitted to park until after 3.30pm each day if they live 
within two miles of the site.  Unless they are in a group deemed to be deserving of priority 
parking then any member of staff who needed to use their car on a particular day would not 
be able to park it at the hospital site.  While the University of Bristol also operate a system 
of permit allocation, it is used to determine who is entitled to priority parking. Those not 
qualifying are still able to park in the remaining staff car parks if space is available and 
therefore the decision making process surrounding how to travel to work is retained for each 
individual.  The development of a priority parking scheme at Heathrow Airport is a possible 
recommendation, especially as it is considered that some groups of staff, such as those 
working nightshifts, have less access to public transport than office workers. Introducing 
such a scheme could have complications however due to the large numbers of employees 
and the wide range of circumstances and requirements present. Heathrow Airport and 
Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust are similar in the respect that many employees are in customer 
facing and time critical jobs.  Both sets of employees work on shift patterns and need to be 
on site at the time required which can, in some cases, increase the dependence on the private 
car and being able to park. A parking priority scheme could prove to be extremely unpopular 
at Heathrow if such considerations were not taken into account. The pursuit of such an 
initiative would require large improvements to public transport, particularly at unsociable 
hours, or the devotion of priority parking to shift workers as is the case at Addenbrooke’s 
NHS Trust.  
At Heathrow Airport, the issue of flexibility was also considered in terms of job role and 
which employees actually needed to be on site every day as was discussed earlier in this 
section. There was a feeling that many staff, particularly those based in offices, could work 
from home on certain days.  Similarly, it was considered that if a financial disincentive or 
incentive measure was to be introduced at Heathrow Airport then it would be important to 
ensure that alternative modes of transport were first in place to enable the modal shift to 
occur.  At both Pfizer and the University of Bristol work began on improving and promoting 
public and alternative forms of transport before the central element of the parking strategy 
was introduced.  At Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust the charge was introduced first, but it was 
considered during the interview that developing alternative modes before the charge’s 
implementation would have been advantageous. All three organisations have continued to 
develop alternative modes over time through a range of initiatives, something which also 
needs to continue progressing at Heathrow Airport.  
8.2.9 Equity, Fairness and Exemptions  
Linked closely to the components of any car parking strategy was the belief by both 
interviewees and focus group participants at Heathrow Airport that it should be ‘fair’ in its 
design. Car parking is regarded as a highly emotive subject and so it was felt important that 
any new strategy was equitable, while at the same time effective in achieving its objectives. 
Ideas discussed included charging employees based on salary and a system whereby those 
with the greatest need to park were given priority. Who should be exempted from the rules 
of any car parking measure introduced was also discussed, with interviewees believing 
exemptions should be kept to a minimum.  
In principle that parking cash out initiative at Pfizer is equitable as it offers those who do not 
drive to work the same benefit in financial terms as those who do drive to work. When 
raised with interviewees at BAA Heathrow, some agreed with the principle that non-car 
users should be entitled to the same benefit, while others argued that users of public 
transport did not incur the same costs as car drivers and so there was already equality. From 
a charging perspective, the University of Bristol’s scheme is more equitable than that at 
Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust as it is based on salary and hence more closely linked to each 
individuals’ ability to pay.  Therefore, if BAA Heathrow decided to introduce either a 
parking charge or cash payment system, the experiences of Pfizer and the University of 
Bristol both offer good examples of the two different approaches they could consider in 
terms of ensuring a degree of equity.  
The three non-airport organisations have ensured that exemptions from their parking 
strategies have been kept to a minimum. At Pfizer there were complications with certain 
managers who wanted to retain their reserved parking spaces and it was also felt that certain 
critical members of staff, such as the site nurse, should be allocated reserved spaces.  Both 
Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust and the University of Bristol exempt only disabled drivers from 
their parking charges; the Trust chose not to exempt others because they did not want any 
particular group to be deemed more important than another and the University exempted 
only disabled drivers because it was felt they did not have the same opportunity to use public 
transport as able bodied people. Contractors are also exempted at the University of Bristol 
for financial and administrative reasons.  Rye and Ison (2005) state that exemptions should 
be kept to a minimum but those which are made should be justified by clear and transparent 
criteria. This is seen to be the case at all of the non-airport organisations and should also 
occur at Heathrow should they introduce a scheme requiring any exemptions.  
8.3 Management Support  
Table 8.2: Issues Surrounding Management Support for Changes to Current Car 
Parking Strategy and the Potential Introduction of an Employee Direct Financial 
Incentive or Disincentive Measure  
 
Management  Top level managers do not recognise  Management support was total and  
Understanding  the problems facing the airport and  considered crucial to the success of  
 are unwilling to address them.  the scheme.  
A Desire To Change  It is felt that a crisis point or major  Clear ‘drivers’ for change existed.  
 development is needed to bring   
 about a desire to change.   
The Importance of a  There is no Project Champion.  All had a Project Champion.  
Project Champion    
 
8.3.1 Management Understanding  
The consensus amongst the BAA Heathrow interviewees was that there was a lack of 
understanding by top level managers as to the car parking problems facing the airport and 
their potential impact.  It was felt that managers were not currently willing to address the 
problems, that there was a lack of preparedness and that many believed that any problems 
would sort themselves out.  
All of the non-airport organisations stated that having management support was crucial to 
the success of the parking scheme and that there would have been little point in proceeding 
with an implementation had top level managers not fully supported the strategy. Each of the 
three non-airport organisations had differing experiences on the issue which is beneficial 
from BAA Heathrow’s perspective as it allows a range of situations to be explored.  At 
Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust, managerial support was strong as they recognised the need to 
achieve Section 106 targets in order to develop the site.  At the University of Bristol, the 
support was not so direct but managers fully supported the objectives of the scheme and the 
representative Travel To Work Implementation Group was formed to oversee the 
development, consultation, implementation and on-going guidance of the Travel Plan and 
parking strategy. At Pfizer, UK management support for the parking cash out scheme was 
gained from the outset of the Travel Plan’s development.  Support from the Head Office in 
the United States undermined the objectives of the Travel Plan to an extent, however, by 
insisting all parking was provided on site.  Subsequent managerial changes at Pfizer have led 
to a decreased impact of the parking cash out strategy, as the new managers do not support 
the scheme so strongly. This emphasises the importance of managerial support to the success 
of any newly introduced employee car parking measure and as something that needs to be 
achieved at BAA before any new initiative is proposed.  
Management support for a new parking strategy, initially from BAA Directors, would prove 
a positive step towards implementing a measure such as an employee direct car parking 
charge or financial incentive. Support would then have to be gained from management at 
other organisations on site in order for an airport wide implementation to be successful. A 
small number of companies have already approached BAA regarding reducing the number 
of employees parking at work, demonstrating that there is some willingness to change.  
8.3.2 A Desire To Change  
In all of the non-airport organisations a major driver for a new employee car parking strategy 
was the desire to expand the site and the knowledge that any planning permission to do so 
would contain requirements to address transport access.  This mirrors the expected situation 
at BAA Heathrow where it was considered that it would be necessary for a crisis point to be 
reached or for a major development at the airport, such as a third runway or a sixth terminal, 
to be granted planning permission before any serious consideration was given to new car 
parking strategies.  It may be that in terms of the process of expanding, the non-airport 
organisations were at a more advanced, and certain, stage of gaining planning permission 
than currently is the case at Heathrow Airport.  If BAA Heathrow becomes more certain of 
expanding the airport site then that may be the trigger for car parking issues to be taken more 
seriously. A concern of some of the interviewees, however, is that action needs to be taken 
now before the current problems with car parking can escalate further.  It can be argued, 
however, that a condition of the Terminal Five development was the parking cap of 42,000 
spaces and that has not thus far generated a change in thinking from directors.  
Rodier and Johnston (1997) stated that in the USA, local governments were sometimes 
unwilling to implement new programmes of traffic reduction because of the negative 
political impact it could have.  A similar phenomenon can be seen within BAA Heathrow’s 
management who are regarded as not wanting to implement anything which may upset staff 
and in turn make BAA appear in a negative light.  It was pointed out by one interviewee, 
however, that the political kudos associated with introducing a strategy such as a parking 
charge could be significant for BAA.  Both of these factors will have an impact on the desire 
to change within BAA.  
8.3.3 The Importance of a Project Champion  
All of the non-airport organisations had a ‘Project Champion’ who oversaw the 
implementation of the scheme.  At Bristol this took the form of the TWIG group although 
the ‘Assistant Director – Facilities’ (UoB 1) was a major influence on the development of 
the Travel Plan and parking strategy.  At Pfizer the Project Champion no longer works full 
time for the company and has not been replaced which has led to a loss of impact, again 
emphasising that strong leadership is crucial.  Currently BAA Heathrow has no Project 
Champion or any group to figurehead the scheme, something which would need to be 
addressed should they proceed with the introduction of a financial incentive or disincentive 
measure as part of their employee parking strategy. During the interviews some 
consideration was given to who should figurehead the scheme and it was generally agreed 
that the company would have to lead by example from the very top levels of management.  
8.4 Gaining Acceptance  
 
Table 8.3: Issues Surrounding Gaining Acceptance for a Car Parking Measure such as 
a Financial Incentive or Disincentive  
Recognition of the  Lack of recognition of any parking  Different situation to Heathrow  
Problem by 
Employees  
problems or awareness of the  Airport as there were more clear  
 parking cap.  operational issues.  
Overcoming Cultural  Adversity to change meant that  Initial negativity which subsided  
Barriers and Attitudes  reactions were expected to be  after a period of time.  
Consultation  
to Change  negative should a new strategy be  helped achieve acceptance in some  
 introduced.  cases.  
Parking Hierarchy  Potentially difficult to overcome  Two of the organisations removed  
 hierarchies which have been in place  all reserved spaces, and one 
retained  
 for several years.  them as it was regarded as being 
too  
  sensitive an issue.  
Hypothecation of  View that revenues accrued from a  All revenues arising from parking  
Parking Revenues  charge should be reinvested in  charges are hypothecated.  
 transport initiatives.   
Recruitment and  Strong view from employees that  New parking strategies had 
minimal  
Retention  they would look for work elsewhere  impact on recruitment and 
retention.  
 if incentive or disincentive measures   
 were introduced to car parking.   
 More mixed views from   
 interviewees.    
Communicating Clear  Large number of organisations  Clear reasons for change  
and Transparent  makes communication difficult and  communicated to employees.  On- 
Objectives  many employees were unaware of  going communication channels 
also  
 all current initiatives or the car  available to employees.  
 parking pressures facing the airport   
 in the future.   
Consultation  Recognised that extensive  Extensive and transparent  
 consultation target at individuals was consultation conducted with focus  
 required.  A structure is in place at  on employee involvement.  
 the airport for this.   
 
8.4.1 Recognition of the Problem by Employees  
There was a lack of awareness of the car parking problems at Heathrow Airport amongst 
staff who attended the focus groups; most believed the current situation to be fine from their 
personal experiences, except for a small number of minor operational complaints.  The focus 
group participants were also largely unaware of the 42,000 space car parking car associated 
with the development of Terminal Five and while they were aware of the presence of air 
quality limits, there was no knowledge of what these limits were and how they impacted on 
the airport.  On the whole, the interviewees at BAA Heathrow appreciated the car parking 
problems facing the airport.  
In terms of recognition from employees, the non-airport organisations differ from Heathrow 
Airport because at all three there was a clear problem that there was either not enough car 
parking spaces for staff or there were high levels of congestion on the local roads. Therefore, 
staff were aware of the problems and even though they were not supportive of the parking 
charge at either Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust or the University of Bristol, it is thought that 
they generally understood the underlying reasons for change. At Heathrow Airport, while 
there is some car park congestion at certain locations and times, there is not yet any major 
perceived problem, meaning that staff are less likely to understand the need for change as 
was highlighted by the focus groups.  
8.4.2 Overcoming Cultural Barriers and Attitudes to Change  
The general adversity to change in human beings and the reliance on the car that people have 
were expected to be attitudinal barriers to introducing a new car parking strategy at 
Heathrow Airport. Some interviewees thought that while initial reaction to a new parking 
strategy may be negative, the opposition would reduce over time.  
Research into the acceptability of different measures revealed that the instruments regarded 
as being the most effective at reducing congestion and the demand for parking, such as road 
pricing, parking charges and restraints on the number of spaces were also those most 
opposed, making the measures more difficult to introduce (Thorpe et al, 2000, Schade and 
Schlag, 2003).  People were also found to be far more opposed to measures of restraint than 
they were to public transport improvements.     
At the University of Bristol some interviewees considered that acceptance was gained during 
the consultation stage whereas others stated that there was still a great deal of negativity 
towards the charge when it was implemented.  At Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust there was a six 
month period of unrest when the charge was first introduced and the Trust still face negative 
responses each time a charge increase is proposed.  At both sites this initial negativity has 
now subsided considerably and a much more balanced attitude is apparent, reflecting the 
view of the BAA interviewees.  At Pfizer, attitudes towards the change were positive due to 
the cash payments being made available to those who did not drive to work. This is 
interesting as it is in contrast to the views of focus group participants at Heathrow Airport 
who were strongly opposed to the idea of cash incentives not to park.  Rye and Ison (2005) 
emphasise the highly emotive nature of an employee parking charge.  The focus groups 
conducted at Heathrow Airport also indicate that there would be a great deal of unhappiness 
should a new parking strategy be introduced, particularly one that included a measure of 
restraint. It is expected that at Heathrow too, initial unrest would subside, something which 
was commented on by a number of the interviewees.  
Consultation is believed to have helped in gaining acceptance towards the new strategies 
introduced; even if charges were still not well accepted, the consultation process and 
transparent communications used by the University of Bristol and Addenbrooke’s NHS 
Trust reduced the level of negativity and helped in generating an understanding of the 
strategies by employees.  Consultation and communication are discussed in more depth later 
in this section.  
An interesting point raised in the Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust case study, but equally 
applicable to the other case studies is that even though people may not like the idea of 
change in general, they also have an ability to cope with situations which require them to 
change. In situations where employees are prevented from driving to work, as is the case 
with some of the Trust’s staff members, they still find a way to commute.  In some respects 
this may give credence to the argument that if BAA Heathrow were to do nothing about their 
car parking problems then the situation may simply sort itself out. Perhaps more realistic, 
however, is the view from the University of Bristol that people will make the most informed 
choice based on the situation they are faced with, but that sometimes they need to be cajoled 
into making an appropriate choice through the use of a measure such as a parking charge.  
At BAA Heathrow it was felt that action needs to be taken soon so that car parking problems 
do not escalate further and the airport is in a better position to deal with the increased 
pressure that will be placed on parking when Terminal Five opens.  
A further important factor is that it is unlikely to be possible to change all members of staff 
and that a parking charge or financial incentive will have different impacts on different 
groups of people; some will pay a charge at any level or refuse to accept a financial payment 
at any level, whereas others will refuse to pay a charge at any level or will accept a financial 
incentive no matter how small.  There are also likely to be differing opinions depending on 
how individuals are impacted by the charge, for example there may be some people who are 
currently unable to park, perhaps because their shift starts at a time when car parks are 
already full, but who would be willing to pay to park if it increased their opportunity of 
finding a space.  
The presence of “captives”, those people who are unable to use alternative modes due to 
their personal circumstances, is considered by Gantvoort (1984).  The number of captives 
has an impact on the success of any strategy and would have to be carefully considered by 
BAA Heathrow. Indications from the non-airport organisations are that most people are able 
to cope with change and that the impact of captives has not been large. At Heathrow Airport, 
however, there are a large number of shift workers, many of whom stated in the focus 
groups that there were no realistic public transport alternatives available to them, particularly 
at unsociable hours.  Therefore, significant investment in appropriate modes of travel may be 
needed to cater for those people who feel they are in a situation where the car is the only 
option.  Captives are different to those people who refuse to stop using their car through 
personal choice.  
8.4.3 Parking Hierarchy  
The view was raised that a hierarchy of permit allocation currently existed at Heathrow 
Airport which would have to be overcome.  There was also perceived to be a culture within 
BAA of not wanting impose anything which could potentially upset employees.  
In terms of any parking hierarchy, at both the University of Bristol and Addenbrooke’s NHS 
Trust reserved parking spaces were taken away. This was greeted with some negativity but 
did not prove to have any lasting impact due to the fair and open approach. At Pfizer, the 
unrest it would have caused to remove reserved spaces was considered to be too large and so 
they were retained for those senior managers who wanted them.  At Heathrow Airport much 
of the current hierarchical structure is out of BAA’s control and it would depend on what 
measure was introduced as to how it would be impacted upon.  The evidence from the non-
airport organisations suggests that it is possible for a new strategy to be introduced without 
too much negative backlash.  
8.4.4 Hypothecation of Parking Revenues  
The interviewees at BAA Heathrow favoured the idea of ringfencing any revenues generated 
by a parking charge for reinvestment in car parking and alternative modes of transport.  It 
was considered that such an approach could help increase acceptance should a parking 
charge be introduced at the airport.  The literature review agreed that an important part of the 
package approach to strategy implementation is regarded as being the need to hypothecate 
revenues, something which has been found to increase the acceptability of new schemes.  
The ringfenced money should be spent on initiatives such as improvements in parking, 
security and alternative transport to the site (Jones, 1991, DETR, 1998, Thorpe et al, 2000, 
Ison and Wall, 2002, Rye and Ison, 2005). Hypothecation of parking revenues at 
Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust and the University of Bristol is considered to have generated 
acceptability amongst employees as they were seen to respond well to being able to see 
where their money had been invested, particularly when able to experience the changes first 
hand.  At Pfizer, there is no income from parking but money is still spent on providing 
alternatives so that people who do not wish to use the car have other options.  
As mentioned in section 8.2.4, however, there are issues surrounding charging for employee 
car parking at Heathrow Airport and the fact that it is a specified activity and, as such, the 
costs of providing employee parking must equal the income.  
8.4.5 Recruitment and Retention  
The Heathrow Airport focus group participants strongly expressed that the introduction of 
financial disincentives or incentives related to parking, or parking permit reallocation, would 
force people to look for work elsewhere.  The interviewees had more mixed opinions; some 
agreed with the employee view that recruitment and retention would suffer while others 
considered that there were several other factors which contributed to why somebody worked 
at the airport.  
The findings from the non-airport organisations were that recruitment and retention had not 
been seen to suffer after the new parking strategy had been introduced. This was expected to 
be the case at Pfizer as those who continued to drive were no worse off financially as a result 
of the parking cash out payments.  Employee exit surveys at the University of Bristol 
identified that the car parking charge was a commonly cited reason for those leaving 
employment at the University, but that it was always in combination with other factors.  
Similar figures were not available for Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust but it was not felt that there 
had been any detrimental impact as a result of the charge. Indeed, at Addenbrooke’s it was 
regarded that a number of organisations with car parking problems used recruitment and 
retention fears as excuses not to introduce rectifying strategies.  This may be the case at 
Heathrow Airport; indeed it was mentioned in some of the interviews that recruitment and 
retention were often over emphasised as an argument when any strategy requiring change 
was proposed.  
At Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust and the University of Bristol there was a recognition that it 
was difficult to tell whether recruitment had suffered as those who chose not to apply for 
jobs due to the parking charge did not communicate this information.  A view was also 
raised at the University of Bristol that as a leading UK University then car parking would be 
unlikely to have a major bearing on whether somebody chose to apply for a job there. At 
Heathrow Airport, however, salaries are generally not as high and there are a large number 
of workers who could potentially apply for employment elsewhere. Addenbrooke’s NHS 
Trust, however, with lower paid workers and a high proportion of shift workers did not 
appear to have suffered any negative effects on recruitment from the parking charge.  
A concern was raised during the BAA interviews that it may not be straightforward to 
introduce parking charges direct to employees due to contractual issues.  The full extent of 
this concern was not known but it was not raised as having been a problem at any of the non-
airport organisations.  
8.4.6 Communicating Clear and Transparent Objectives  
Communication at Heathrow Airport can be difficult because of the large number of 
companies and employees on site.  It was considered by the interviewees that while some of 
BAA’s communications were good, there was room for improvement.  This included 
communicating within the company, to other companies and to employees. Many employees 
did not understand some of the current public transport and alternative mode initiatives 
implemented by BAA and there was a feeling that a new car parking strategy was under 
consideration because of financial motivations, rather than wanting to reduce car use for 
other reasons.  Employing a clear and transparent approach to communicating any new 
parking strategy and the reasons for it was considered crucial by the interviewees.  
The non-airport organisations all regarded communication to be important when introducing 
a new parking measure.  This began with a clear communication of the reasons for why a 
change was necessary. Adopting a transparent approach was a strategy adopted by all three 
with the main reasons for the change being emphasised as a lack of parking spaces and 
congestion on the surrounding roads. This approach is believed to have helped gain some 
acceptance with staff as it focused on the problems they witnessed every day. At the 
University of Bristol and Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust care was taken to avoid the use of 
environmental reasons which were not believed to be major factors and which may have 
decreased the message about the need for a charge. At Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust there was 
a clear message communicated by explaining to staff that additional revenue was required to 
fund public transport alternatives and to maintain car parks better.  
There is limited literature on the need for communication but Rye and Ison (2005) do list as 
one of their six factors to assist implementation of a workplace parking charge as being the 
need communicate clear site specific reasons for introducing parking charges. Enoch (2001) 
also states that any scheme should be as simple as possible to understand and that as much 
information as possible should be supplied to help educate people. Both of these points have 
been demonstrated by the three non-airport organisations and require consideration by BAA 
should they introduce such a measure.  
At Heathrow Airport communicating the objectives of the need for a new parking strategy is 
complicated by the fact that there is not yet recognition of the problem, as explored earlier in 
this section.  In order for staff and top level managers to understand the impending problems 
and the need for a change then a clear and transparent communication of the key reasons 
needs to be maintained.  Experience from the non-airport organisations suggests that BAA 
should concentrate on the key issues of the 42,000 space parking cap and the air quality 
limits.  As these are externally imposed on BAA it may be easier to deflect negative 
feedback from staff. It is likely that the constraint on spaces will be the most readily 
understood reason because it is something which directly impacts upon staff, whereas air 
quality limits are further removed from employees’ day to day activities.  BAA should also 
stress that changes are not being made for financial gain; adopting a transparent approach in 
this area via an explanation of the figures could prove beneficial.  Should the option to 
further expand the airport progress further then this could also form a key reason to 
communicate to staff, although it may not be so readily accepted due to the perception that it 
is a financial decision.  
On going communication is maintained by the non-airport organisations.  All of the sites 
have methods of allowing staff to leave their views of raise queries, mainly in online format 
or via the telephone. Travel surveys are conducted whereby employees can input views 
which will be acted upon if necessary and information about alternative travel modes to the 
car is made available in a number of formats.  Various groups also exist at the organisations 
to allow for communication and consultation between staff and stakeholders. Only at Pfizer 
has this on-going communication subsided somewhat, although information is provided 
online and in reception areas for staff. Similar communication modes are currently in place 
at Heathrow Airport and should continue if any change to the parking strategy is made.  
Communication with Trade Unions was raised as an important area at Addenbrooke’s NHS 
Trust and is also likely to be of high importance at Heathrow Airport due to the unionised 
nature of the workforce. At Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust the relationship with the Trade 
Unions is regarded as being good and while they do not fully support the parking charge 
they recognise the reasons for it and do not raise complaints for insignificant reasons. At 
Heathrow a similarly good working relationship with Trade Unions needs to be found if the 
introduction of a new parking strategy is to be done so effectively.  
8.4.7 Consultation  
Linked to the need to clearly communicate any new strategy was a recognised importance of 
conducting an extensive consultation process prior to any new strategy being introduced. It 
was considered that this process needed to reach each individual employee so they were 
aware of the need for change, could see the reasons and were able to feed in their opinions. 
BAA Heathrow have a structure in place for airport-wide consultation although it was 
considered that the introduction of a new parking strategy would require a consultation 
process greater than any other used before at the airport.  
Rye and Ison (2005) highlight consultation as one of a number of factors to assist parking 
charge implementation at the workplace, stating that it will take some time and that it should 
not be expected to resolve all opposition.  They add that once the scheme is introduced then 
opposition will reduce. This was seen at both the University of Bristol and Addenbrooke’s 
NHS Trust, although the period of reduction took some time at the Trust.  It is expected that 
opposition to a charge would be large at Heathrow and that consultation would need to be a 
long process.  
All of the non-airport organisations conducted lengthy consultation processes, some in 
excess of two years, prior to introducing the core element of their parking strategy. The use 
of detailed consultation is advocated by Beroldo (1990) who considers that it is important to 
look beyond factual information such as commute patterns when implementing a demand 
management strategy and to explore personal opinions, attitudes and preferences so that the 
scheme is more positively accepted.  This emphases the need for extensive consultation and 
a careful consideration of the views of those directly impacted by any new strategy.  
The findings from all three organisations are similar and the consultation included meetings 
at a high level between key stakeholders initially, followed by a much wider undertaking of 
staff forums, discussion groups, meetings and road-shows.  Staff at the sites were also able 
to feed in their views via online forms, bulletin boards and email. Conducting a long, 
thorough and transparent consultation process, whereby all information was made available 
to employees, was considered by all the non-airport organisations to have been important in 
the overall implementation of their parking initiatives and, in the case of the University of 
Bristol in particular, it is regarded to have generated a much higher level of staff knowledge 
and acceptance which aided the implementation considerably.  Consultation is also on-going 
at the non-airport organisations; for example at Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust a series of 
meetings and seminars are conducted before parking charge increases are introduced.  
In some ways the interviews carried out at BAA Heathrow and the focus groups conducted 
with staff can be viewed as the beginning of a consultation process as they represent the first 
real investigation at the airport into the views surrounding the car parking situation and any 
potential strategies to address recognised problems.  BAA appear to have a structure in place 
that would allow for a successful and well thought out consultation process should they 
decide to implement a new car parking measure such as an employee direct charge or 
financial incentive.  
8.5 Implementation  
Table 8.4: Issues Surrounding the Implementation of a Car Parking Measure such as a 
Financial Incentive or Disincentive  
 
The Process of  Felt that BAA should lead  Alternative modes introduced 
before  
Implementation  implementation then roll out to rest  the core element, although not the  
 of airport. Implementation should be  case at Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust.   
 led by “real business owners”.  Non-airport organisations did not  
  have the same issues with multiple  
  employers.  
Implementation of 
the  
Mixed views over whether a  Mixture of ‘big bang’ and ‘gradual’  
Core Element of the  ‘gradual’ or ‘big bang’ approach was  approach. Big bang seen to have  
Strategy  most suitable  more initial impact and reduce 
future  
  unrest.  
 
8.5.1 The Process of Implementation  
The interviewees at BAA Heathrow felt that the most suitable way of implementing a new 
parking strategy was to do so within BAA first and then expand the scheme to the rest of the 
airport. In doing so this would enable BAA to lead by example and demonstrate to the rest 
of the Heathrow site how the new car parking measure would operate. It was considered that 
the implementation in other companies should be led by the ‘real business owners’ such as 
terminal managers.  It was also considered that alternatives to driving should be provided 
before a financial incentive or disincentive was introduced. It was regarded that nothing had 
been implemented at the airport on such a scale before.  
Implementation is an area where the experiences from the non-airport organisations may 
differ slightly from Heathrow Airport due to the huge scale of the Heathrow implementation 
that would be required and the wide range of organisations which would need to be 
included. There are, however, several overriding principles regarding the format of the 
implementation which are transferable.  
The three non-airport organisations have all pursued different implementation strategies, 
although they also share similarities.  In all cases, implementation of the strategy did not 
begin until extensive consultation and communication has been carried out. In the case of 
Pfizer and the University of Bristol, public transport and other alternative modes were 
improved before either the parking cash out or parking charge elements were introduced.  In 
doing this, when the core element of the strategy was implemented employees had a range of 
options they could switch to if they desired. At Pfizer, modal shift was achieved even before 
the parking cash out element was introduced purely through the improvements made to 
alternative modes of transport and the associated promotional activity.  At Addenbrooke’s 
NHS Trust public transport improvements were not made until after the parking charge was 
in place although it was recognised that in hindsight doing so would have been a better 
approach.  
8.5.2 Implementation of the Core Element of the Strategy  
In the BAA Heathrow interviews, views were split over whether the core element, if one was 
to be used, of the employee car parking strategy should be implemented gradually or more 
suddenly.  
In terms of the implementation of the strategy’s core element, different approaches were 
taken by the three non-airport organisations all of which were successful in generating 
modal shift. The University of Bristol adopted a “big bang” approach whereby parking 
charges were set at a relatively high level from the first day of implementation.  The 
reasoning behind this approach is that as people do not like the idea of change then it is more 
worthwhile to introduce something which achieves its objective quickly, rather than the 
University having to increase charges over time and having to deal with a negative reaction 
on every occasion.  The parking charges increase relatively as salary increases, although a 
small increase in the percentage of salary charged for parking was made in 2004.  At 
Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust a low daily charge was first implemented and has been gradually 
increased over time with further increases planned. The Trust adopted this approach as they 
felt it was important to initially introduce a charge to help gain an understanding from staff 
and then more gradually achieve their ultimate objective over a longer time frame.  The 
Trust have found that each price increase is greeted with a great deal of discontent and 
negative reaction from employees.  At Pfizer the implementation was generally more 
straight forward as there was no negative reaction from staff.  At Pfizer no subsequent 
increases or decreases in the parking cash out payments have been made since its 
introduction.  
As mentioned in section 8.2.4, Rye and Ison (2005) stated that low parking charges should 
be implemented as a way of generating acceptance and understanding from employees.  The 
evidence from Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust and the University of Bristol suggest that this may 
not necessarily be the case.  The University’s “big bang” approach to implementation 
generated a meaningful modal shift from the outset and also removed the potential future 
unrest caused by charge increases, whereas at Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust there is a period of 
unrest with each charge increase. Other than this literature which is specific to parking 
charges, there is little published on how parking strategies should be implemented.  
At Heathrow Airport, overall the most suitable approach to implementation would have to 
be based upon the overall strategy selected and its components, combined with the findings 
of the consultation process.  Experience from the non-airport organisations would suggest 
that public and alternatives modes of transport should be improved first.  It is expected that 
BAA would introduce the new strategy in its own company first to generate an 
understanding and appreciation of how it would work, before rolling it out more widely 
across the airport.  The involvement and support of some large companies at the airport, 
such as British Airways, in the early stages could also prove beneficial.  
8.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has presented a discussion of the findings from the case study conducted at 
Heathrow Airport in comparison to those conducted at the University of Bristol, 
Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust and Pfizer. The discussion has been structured around a 
benchmarking template which addressed the issues found to be of importance to BAA 
Heathrow and Heathrow Airport more generally in terms of designing and implementing a 
car parking measure incorporating a financial incentive or disincentive. The chapter has 
addressed the objective, as set out in section 3.5 to:  
• explore whether good practice in the non-airport sector can be transferred to an 
airport context and in particular Heathrow Airport.  
Four main areas were addressed: selecting the most suitable measures to deal with the car 
parking problem; management support; gaining acceptance, and; implementation. Within 
each section the findings from the interviews conducted at BAA Heathrow and the focus 
groups conducted with members of staff from across the whole airport were presented and 
compared to the findings from the non-airport organisation.  This allowed for differences in 
each area of interest to be identified.  This discussion helps to formulate the suggestions 
made to BAA should they decide to introduce a financial incentive or disincentive car 
parking measure direct to employees and the conclusions contained in Chapter 9.  
The literature review contained in Chapter 2 has also been referred to in the discussion 
contained in this chapter where relevant.  Attention has been given to whether the findings 
from the original research and subsequent discussion support the literature or refute it and 
vice versa.  It has been found that the literature is focussed on two main areas: the elements 
of a parking strategy and; the acceptance of different strategies. There appears to be a dearth 
of literature in other areas which has been reflected throughout the discussion.  
Chapter 9. Conclusions  
9.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents concluding remarks on the research and aims to fulfil the objective set 
out in section 3.5 to:  
• recommend good practices from the non-airport sector that could be implemented at 
airports and in particular Heathrow Airport.  
The problem faced by Heathrow Airport is reviewed with regards the expected future 
growth, the car parking cap, air quality targets and the current situation in terms of 
addressing the problem is detailed.  The issues which would need to be addressed by BAA 
and Heathrow Airport, should they decide to introduce an employee direct financial 
incentive or disincentive car parking measure are then considered in the key areas of 
adopting a package approach, a requirement for management support, gaining acceptance 
from employees and the implementation process.  The suggestions draw on the findings 
from the case studies and discussion chapter.  The relative importance of each of the key 
areas is considered.  
The chapter also aims to explore the areas in which the research has contributed to the 
existing body of knowledge on benchmarking and research in the field of airport car parking. 
In the research, benchmarking has been used as a tool to facilitate the comparison of 
Heathrow Airport to organisations in the non-airport sector. Contributions are considered 
first and it is argued that a contribution has been made through the use of functional 
benchmarking in the airport sector.  Benchmarking has also been applied with a subtly 
different approach to more traditional implementations, suggesting that it has a potential 
wider application.  The potential extension of the research to airports other than Heathrow is 
also highlighted.  It is recognised, however, that some limitations may exist in terms of how 
the benchmarking exercise has been conducted, including the comparability of the non-
airport organisations to BAA Heathrow and the situation at Heathrow Airport. Finally, 
potential areas for further research are highlighted.  
9.1 The Issues at Heathrow Airport  
The research carried out at BAA and Heathrow Airport has shown that there are issues in the 
area of surface access and in particular car parking which need to be addressed. There are 
three main factors that contribute to the problem being faced by the airport, namely the 
expected growth in air transport in future years which will generate more surface traffic, the 
car parking cap of 42,000 spaces for passengers and employees imposed as a condition of 
the Terminal Five development and the air quality targets which have to be met, of which 
surface access is a major contributor. A review of academic, Government and BAA 
literature, alongside interviews at BAA Heathrow has revealed that targeting employees is 
likely to be an effective approach to addressing the problems given the repetitive peak hour 
nature and frequency of employee trips and the relative ease by which employees can be 
targeted.  
A wide range of initiatives are currently in place at Heathrow airport including public 
transport provision, a free public transport service on site, interest free loans on public 
transport ticket purchase, cycling and walking facilities, a car sharing scheme, pool cars, 
teleworking facilities and promotion of alternative working practices, all of which are 
communicated to employees.  These initiatives can all be regarded as being ‘soft’ in nature 
and while they have had some impact in terms of encouraging employees to use cars less 
there is a need for a greater amount of modal shift in order for the airport to continue to 
function efficiently and for air quality targets to be met as the airport grows.  
A number of more direct measures to bring about a reduction in employee car commuting 
have been explored, namely the introduction of direct employee car parking charges, often 
with an element of parking permit allocation, and a parking cash out scheme.  The research 
has been undertaken through the use of a literature review and in-depth case studies at three 
best practice non-airport organisations and interviews and focus groups at BAA and 
Heathrow Airport.  These focussed on the potential introduction of such measures at the 
airport.  The findings revealed that at present it would appear Heathrow Airport may not be 
at a stage where it is necessary to introduce a policy option such as a direct financial 
incentive or disincentive measure for employee car parking.  A key reason for this is that top 
level managers do not currently appear to regard the surface access situation as being in 
crucial need of any change and there is a feeling that the current ‘soft’ initiatives have not 
yet been fully exhausted. Employee unrest at the introduction of a more direct measure is 
also a concern for BAA, along with any impact it may have on employee recruitment and 
retention.  
It would appear to be the case, however, that before long a ‘harder-hitting’ approach may be 
required as the airport continues to grow.  If a third runway at Heathrow Airport was to be 
approved then it is expected that it would be accompanied by stringent surface access and 
car parking requirements and, as such, could provide the catalyst for the introduction of an 
employee car parking measure such as a financial incentive or disincentive.  If such a 
measure was to be introduced then there are a number of areas which would be of 
importance to the airport:  
 The need for a package approach and the core element;  
 A requirement for top management support;  
 A need to gain acceptance from employees;  
 Issues surrounding the process and structure of implementation to be followed.  
 
These four areas are detailed below. While the particular issues covered thus far in this 
chapter are specific to Heathrow, it is by no means the only airport which is facing 
challenges in terms of surface access and as detailed in Chapter 3, relatively smaller UK 
airports such as London Luton are also in need of addressing surface access problems, 
perhaps through the use of financial incentive or disincentive measures.  Heathrow is ‘at the 
forefront’ in UK and possibly world-wide terms, given its location, passenger and employee 
numbers and expected growth, in the need to address surface access via more stringent car 
parking policies.  The overall growth in air transport from both a UK and worldwide 
perspective, however, means that other airports are likely to experience similar problems in 
the near future.    
9.2 Issues to be Addressed by BAA and Heathrow Airport should they 
decide to Introduce a Financial Incentive or Disincentive Employee 
Car Parking Measure  
9.2.1 A Package Approach and the Core Element  
At Heathrow Airport it was considered that the introduction of any financial incentive or 
disincentive measure for employee car parking should be just one element in a wider 
package or measures that made up the strategy, something supported by the findings from 
the non-airport organisations.  This allows for a greater level of flexibility and choice when 
employees are making travel decisions.  At Heathrow Airport there is already a package of 
measures in place to provide alternative options to the private car, including various public 
transport initiatives, cycling and walking facilities, car sharing and alternative working 
practices.  If a direct employee financial incentive or disincentive car parking measure was 
to be introduced then it would form part of this overall strategy, with other elements 
supporting the new measure and providing options for those who wished to change their 
mode of travel.  
The BAA interviewees were unsure as to what the most suitable solution would be in terms 
of a financial incentive or disincentive measure.  It was felt that the financial cost associated 
with introducing a parking cash out scheme including approximately 70,000 employees 
would be so great that it would prove unviable.  Several companies at Heathrow Airport 
have already approached BAA Heathrow with concerns over the cost of their employee car 
parking and so any additional financial outlay is likely to be problematic.  
A system of car parking permit allocation currently exists at Heathrow Airport although 
there is no formal structure to it; BAA issues permits to any company who pay for them and 
the individual organisations then allocate those permits to their employees.  A more 
structured process of permit allocation could perhaps be introduced at the airport although 
there are several issues, most notably the high number of shift workers who require punctual 
access to the airport, often at unsociable hours when public transport is not so well provided.  
Additionally, the current annual permit at Heathrow Airport does not encourage flexibility in 
making travel decisions as the permit allocation system operates on an annual basis.  
The introduction of a direct parking charge to employees is an option BAA could consider in 
the future at Heathrow Airport.  As outlined above, BAA currently charge employers for 
parking permits on an annual basis and the majority of employers do not pass this charge 
onto their employees.  It is therefore made more difficult for BAA to control parking spaces 
once they have sold permits to another organisation.  A direct charge to employees would 
give each individual a personal financial decision as to whether to drive to work or not. It 
would also remove the financial strain which some organisations at the airport are facing.  
Evidence from the non-airport organisations suggests that charges should be made on a daily 
basis, as it allows for a greater level of flexibility in each individual’s travel mode decision.    
The interviewees at BAA considered that any parking charge should be significant enough to 
generate a meaningful modal shift.  Employee parking charges are currently regulated at 
Heathrow Airport, however, meaning BAA cannot make any profit on them.  The 
implications on how employee direct parking charges would impact on this regulation was 
unknown and would need to be investigated by BAA. In terms of setting the level of a 
parking charge, in order to take account of equity issues it was suggested that salary related 
charges could be a potential solution, as is the case at the University of Bristol; whether they 
are set at a high or low level depends on the objectives of the parking strategy.  High charges 
and cash payments exist at the University of Bristol and Pfizer although Addenbrooke’s 
NHS Trust adopted a relatively low charge in order to elicit initial acceptance.  In addition, it 
was regarded that any exemptions to the scheme should be kept to a minimum so that it was 
as fair and equitable as possible.  
It must be remembered, however, that Heathrow has 70,000 employees which would make 
the administration of individual charges or cash payments significant in terms of resources.  
In the interviews at BAA Heathrow the concept of charging companies, rather than 
individuals, on a daily basis instead of annually was discussed and considered that it could 
encourage more organisations to become proactive in reducing commuting by car. At 
Heathrow Airport such an approach focusing on organisations could overcome some of the 
administrative problems of having to deal with 70,000 employees.  There is a possibility, 
however, that adopting this approach could result in employees not thoroughly considering 
their choice of transport mode as they are not directly impacted financially.  
The large number of employees present at Heathrow Airport can be compared to those in a 
large town or small city and, as such, benchmarking against a town or city council who have 
to deal with a similar number of people wishing to park and a similarly wide range of 
organisations could have been a suitable approach to take, rather than benchmarking against 
other organisations.   
9.2.2 A Requirement for Top Level Management Support  
The general consensus amongst the interviewees at BAA Heathrow was that surface access 
and car parking issues needed to be addressed.  While those interviewed are key decisions 
makers within BAA a major reform such has the introduction of a financial incentive or 
disincentive car parking measure for employees would require permission and support from 
the top level management and ultimately the Chief Executive. Currently within BAA, the top 
level managers do not appear to fully recognise surface access car parking as an area in need 
of such a major reform and, as such, are unwilling to consider more radical solutions at this 
point in time.  This is in contrast to the non-airport organisations researched where, on the 
whole, top level management support was considered to be crucial to the success of the 
scheme. Proceeding with the implementation of a financial incentive or disincentive measure 
related to employee car parking at Heathrow Airport would prove more difficult without 
support from top level management and thus some intermediate steps are possibly required 
in order to make those managers more aware of the impending problems and the likely 
consequences if action is not taken.  
In order to bring about recognition of car parking issues and surface access in general, it was 
felt by the interviewees that a major development at the airport, such as seeking permission 
to develop a third runway, is required to act as a catalyst for change in this area. At the non-
airport organisations clear reasons for change existed, often related to the desire to expand 
and the related need to show that transportation issues were being addressed in order to gain 
planning permission.  There was also a clear problem at the non-airport sites in terms of car 
parks having reached capacity or congestion on the local road network. The 42,000 car 
parking cap at Heathrow Airport could be regarded as being a catalyst for change which is 
already in place, but at present the problems it presents do not appear to be severe enough 
for a policy such as a financial incentive or disincentive to be considered by top level 
managers.  
Currently there is no ‘Project Champion’ within BAA Heathrow in terms of highlighting the 
need for a more radical policy with relation to employee car parking. It was stressed by the 
interviewees that the impact of an employee direct financial incentive or disincentive car 
parking measure would have on the airport population would require a strong leader, such as 
a senior member of staff, potentially the Chief Executive. This was expected to assist in 
achieving the required level of interest and importance from all employers and employees 
across the Heathrow site.  The non-airport organisations demonstrated that a strong leader 
was important whether it was in the form of an individual or a representative group of 
people as was the case at the University of Bristol. As such, the designation of a Project 
Champion, whether in the form of an individual or a representative group, would appear to 
be of importance should BAA Heathrow consider the introduction of a direct financial 
incentive or disincentive measure as part of an employee car parking strategy.  
9.2.3 Gaining Acceptance from Employees  
The majority of focus group participants at Heathrow Airport displayed a lack of recognition 
of any parking issues facing the airport.  There was limited knowledge of the 42,000 space 
parking cap or the implications for car use of air quality limits.  All three non-airport 
organisations had clear problems, either in terms of a lack of car parking spaces or 
congestion on the surrounding road network, which were witnessed on a daily basis by 
employees.  Therefore, at Heathrow there is a need for the likely future problems to achieve 
recognition and acceptance at the present time, through education and communication to 
employees, otherwise it could prove more and more difficult for employees to begin to 
consider using alternative modes or accept a new car parking measure such as a financial 
incentive or disincentive.  Should it be decided to introduce such a measure for employee car 
parking then there are a number of issues which need to be considered, as discussed 
throughout this section.  
The non-airport organisations who introduced a daily employee parking charge found that 
there was initial negativity towards it, but that over time the opposition subsided. The BAA 
interviewees expected a similar situation to occur at Heathrow Airport should a charge be 
introduced as it was considered that individuals had a natural adversity to change. This was 
reflected in the focus groups where there were strong views that either a parking charge or 
financial incentive scheme would be negatively received. Conversely, at Pfizer the parking 
cash out payments were welcomed by employees and it was unclear why this was not 
mirrored by the BAA focus groups, except that they may have been adverse to a change of 
any kind.  
At the non-airport organisations, both communication and consultation were regarded as 
important when introducing the financial incentive or disincentive element of the parking 
strategy and in gaining acceptance for it.  A clear structure of conducting consultation is in 
place at Heathrow Airport and it was considered by the BAA interviewees that should it be 
decided to introduce a charge or financial incentive, then there was a need for it to be 
focused on individual employees.  Similar consultation processes were seen to have taken 
place at the non-airport sites and it would appear suitable for BAA to follow their already 
established approach to consultation, which a view to ultimately targeting individuals.  
Following the implementation of the charge or financial incentive on-going communication 
channels were in place at each of the non-airport organisations to continue collecting 
employee opinions and feedback. At Heathrow Airport communication is recognised to be 
more difficult due to the large number of organisations and employees on-site; if a financial 
incentive or disincentive measure is to be introduced at Heathrow Airport, however, it would 
seem important that clear and specific reasons for the change are communicated to all 
stakeholders.  
An important finding from the non-airport organisations where a charge has been introduced 
was that ring-fencing all generated revenues for reinvestment into car parking and public 
transport improvements was considered to increase acceptance for it, particularly if tangible 
improvements could be seen.  The BAA interviewees also stated that they believed any 
revenues from car parking should be hypothecated.  The notion of hypothecation needs to be 
explored as a key way of generating acceptance were BAA to introduce a parking charge.  
A number of focus group participants at Heathrow Airport strongly expressed the view that 
should a financial incentive or disincentive car parking measure be introduced then they 
would seek employment elsewhere.  While the interviewees were also concerned about 
recruitment and retention issues, there was a view that many more characteristics than car 
parking determined why a person chose to work somewhere.  This view was mirrored at the 
non-airport organisations where all three organisations noted little or no impact on 
recruitment and retention.  At Heathrow Airport, should a financial incentive or disincentive 
measure be introduced then consideration should be given to the high proportion of shift 
workers and the alternative modes available to them.  It may not be the case that large 
numbers of employees would seek work elsewhere as there are many factors which 
determine choice of employment, but it is an issue for Heathrow Airport nevertheless.  
9.2.4 Issues Surrounding the Process of Implementation  
At BAA it was felt by the interviewees that BAA should be the first in terms of any 
implementation of a financial incentive or disincentive measure for employee car parking, 
effectively ‘leading by example’ and that the new initiative could then be extended to other 
organisations across the airport by those managers who have a closer link to the day to day 
running of the airport, such as terminal managers.  It was also regarded that improvements to 
alternative modes should ideally be made before the central financial incentive or 
disincentive measure was introduced.  Improving alternative modes before introducing the 
core element was an approach followed by Pfizer and the University of Bristol, while 
Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust introduced their charge first, but considered that improving 
alternatives would have been a more suitable approach. Heathrow Airport, however, already 
has a wide range of public transport and alternative working practices in place so it would 
not be necessary to make wholesale changes to these before a financial incentive or 
disincentive measure was introduced.  
At the non-airport organisations either ‘big bang’ and ‘gradual’ approaches were initiated in 
introducing the financial incentive or disincentive measure.  The ‘big bang’ approach, as 
used at the University of Bristol, was seen to generate a greater level of initial modal shift 
and considered to reduce potential future resistance from employees, whereas the more 
gradual implementation, as used at Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust, did not generate such a large 
initial modal shift and when price increases are proposed there is unrest amongst employees.  
It is difficult to quantify whether a ‘big bang’ approach generates a greater level of 
negativity in the first instance, however, and there is likely to come a time in such schemes 
where it is not possible to maintain the level of modal shift required, resulting in either the 
scheme losing effectiveness or a requirement for the charge or payment to be increased 
again.  In the BAA interviewees there was a mixture of opinions over the most suitable way 
forward; overall the implementation strategy will dependent on the measures to be included 
and whether the main objective is to create a meaningful initial modal split or just to get a 
new measure ‘in place’ in the first instance.  
9.3 The Relative Importance of the Issues to be Addressed by BAA and 
Heathrow Airport  
This section aims to allocate some relative level of importance to the various issues detailed 
in section 9.2, based on both the characteristics of BAA Heathrow and Heathrow Airport 
and the findings from the non-airport organisations.  The areas regarded as being most 
important are focussed upon.  The selection of these factors is not to suggest that the other 
factors are unimportant, but rather these areas should be given priority as they are likely to 
have a greater bearing on the effectiveness of a new implementation in achieving its aim and 
objectives.  It is considered that these areas of key importance are likely at some level to be 
applicable to other airports and organisations in other sectors. Three key areas of importance 
are regarded to exist:  
 Management support and the presence of a Project Champion;  
 Communication and consultation, and;  
 Flexibility and choice in determining travel mode, in terms of encouraging a decision 
by individuals on which mode to use on a daily basis and in terms of having a range of 
alternative modes present.  
 
Crucial to the success of any scheme is support from senior managers and a strong desire to 
achieve the ultimate aim and objectives of the overall parking strategy.  The evidence from 
the non-airport organisations was that without support from the top level there would have 
been little point in proceeding with the implementation of a financial incentive or 
disincentive measure.  At BAA Heathrow no new radical measures could be introduced 
without top level managers sanctioning it.  In addition to management support the presence 
of a Project Champion, whether an individual or group, is important to lead the scheme and 
drive its implementation.  Having this focused approach is likely to allow for greater 
progress to be made and the aim and objectives to be met more effectively.  
Communication is an important consideration when introducing a car parking measure such 
as a financial incentive or disincentive, particularly one which could be unpopular and will 
impact on every employee.  Extensive and transparent communication via a range of media 
can assist in achieving understanding and acceptance from employees, as was found from 
the non-airport sites.  This is a large undertaking at Heathrow Airport due to the number of 
organisations and employees, perhaps making it even more important an issue.  
Communication should cover specific reasons for change, along with the new initiatives 
being introduced and how they will directly impact on individuals.  Linked with 
communication is the issue of consultation, which should also be approached in an extensive 
and transparent manner, targeting individuals and allowing for as much feedback as possible 
if it is to be done so successfully.  
Finally, any financial incentive or disincentive car parking measure should allow for a 
flexibility and choice on the part of the individual employee.  Charges or cash payments are 
likely to be more effective if they are daily and direct to the employee so that the decision 
whether to drive to work or use an alternative mode can be made on a daily basis and 
directly by the individual.  Supporting measures in the overall parking strategy such as 
public transport and alternative working practices should also allow for as much flexibility 
and choice in the decision making process as possible.  
9.4 Contributions of the Research  
Throughout the research benchmarking has been used as a tool to facilitate the comparison 
between Heathrow Airport and the non-airport organisations.  This section details the 
contributions made by the research to the application of benchmarking techniques, 
particularly in the airport sector.  Five areas are covered: functional benchmarking in the 
airport sector; the number of organisations in the exercise; the comparison of new processes; 
the objective viewpoint taken while benchmarking, and; the potential wider implications of 
the research.  
The following academic papers and conference proceedings have been published as a result 
of conducting this research:  
Aldridge, K., Carreno, M., Ison, S., Rye, T. and Straker, I., 2006.  Car Parking Management 
At Airports: A Special Case?, Transport Policy, vol. 13, no 6. (Forthcoming)  
Straker, I.A., Aldridge, K.T., Humphreys, I.M., Ison, S.G., Carreno, M and Rye, T., 2005. 
Car Parking: What Can Airports Learn From Universities?, TRB 2005 (CD-Rom).  
Straker, I.A., 2005. Airport Car Parking: Lessons From The University Sector. Proceedings 
of the UTSG Conference, Bristol, January.  
Straker, I.A., 2004. Airport Car Parking Strategy: Lessons From The Non-Airport Sector. 
Proceedings of the UTSG Conference, Newcastle Upon Tyne, January.  
9.4.1 Functional Benchmarking by Airports  
Research into the use of benchmarking in the airport sector revealed that it was widely used 
as a performance improvement technique but that airports almost exclusively benchmarked 
with similar organisations, almost invariably other airports.  It was stated by Fry et al (2005, 
p. 135) that “further benefits from benchmarking may be realised if airport managers 
consider looking for exemplar practices of the processes they are trying to manage and 
improve at dissimilar airports or even generic examples within other industries”. This is a 
key contribution of the research as it provides a rare in-depth example of benchmarking 
being conducted by an airport with non-airport organisations and therefore adds to the 
knowledge base in the area.   
9.4.2 The Number of Organisations  
The approach taken to benchmarking in the research differs to the traditional approach in 
that it drew together the findings about certain processes from three organisations rather than 
a traditional benchmarking approach which compares process in one organisation directly 
with those in another individual organisation.  The use of three non-airport organisations 
allowed for a range of best practice experiences to be explored by BAA Heathrow, 
something which is especially important in a field where they do not yet know the approach 
they wish to take to address their car parking problems.  Due to the wide range of issues 
apparent from conducting the interviews and focus groups at Heathrow Airport, the use of 
three non-airport organisations allowed for those areas regarded as being important to be 
benchmarked as thoroughly as possible at the comparator organisations.  
9.4.3 The Comparison of ‘Innovative’ Processes  
Several of the areas highlighted as being important at Heathrow Airport were those which 
the airport had limited experience of in the area of car parking.  Examples of this include the 
processes surrounding how best to consult upon, gain acceptance for, communicate and 
implement the introduction of direct financial incentive or disincentive measures to the 
employee car parking strategy.  The non-airport organisations had extensive knowledge in 
such areas and as such they could be considered to exemplify innovative process from 
BAA’s point of view as they allowed BAA an insight into processes they had little 
experience of, in terms of employee car parking at least.  Generally benchmarking occurs 
when an organisation wishes to improve upon a current process and so they look to best 
practice organisations to facilitate the improvement. To this end, some processes addressed 
in the benchmarking exercise in this research could be considered to use generic 
benchmarking, rarely used in the airport sector.  
9.4.4 Conducting Benchmarking from an Objective Viewpoint  
The benchmarking exercise was conducted from an objective viewpoint in that it was carried 
out by a researcher not employed by the benchmarking organisation, BAA. This helped to 
remove any bias which may have existed had a similar benchmarking exercise been 
conducted by a member of BAA’s management.  It can be argued that this may be a 
limitation because a member of staff from the benchmarking organisation would have a 
greater understanding of the processes being benchmarked. In the case of the research 
undertaken for the thesis, however, a great deal of time was spent at BAA Heathrow, and the 
airport more generally, to understand the issues and processes that were of importance.  
Additionally, time was spent conducting original research at four other airports, as explored 
in Chapter 3, and conducting an extensive literature review, as detailed in Chapter 2, which 
helped in gaining a wider understanding of the salient issues.  It was found that the 
introduction of a financial incentive or disincentive employee car parking measure at 
Heathrow Airport would require for a wide range of issues to be addressed by BAA.  
Therefore the involvement of an impartial researcher may well have facilitated the 
benchmarking exercise due to being equipped with an in depth knowledge of all the various 
and wide ranging relevant issues, potentially in excess of that held by some managers at 
BAA Heathrow. Therefore the approach taken suggests that best practice benchmarking 
does not have to be conducted by employees from the organisation wishing to learn and that 
an objective approach may prove beneficial in some circumstances if the individual, or 
individuals, conducting the benchmarking exercise have a wider knowledge base and an 
unbiased viewpoint.  
9.4.5 Wider Implications  
Due to the constrained nature of the site at Heathrow Airport, the constraints placed on it in 
terms of air quality limits and the Terminal Five parking cap, its position as the UK’s largest 
airport and the growth in passenger numbers, the airport is in a unique position, particularly 
in UK terms, of facing car parking problems before other airports, particularly on a large 
scale.  Therefore the research offers an initial insight to the potential strategies which could 
be used by Heathrow Airport to resolve the problems it faces with employee car parking.  As 
other airports continue to grow it is likely they too will be faced with similar problems and 
so the research could hold valuable lessons for them in the future.  Indeed, some airports 
such as London Luton Airport, as explored in Chapter 3, are already beginning to face 
problems with car parking capacity; although the size of the site and the number of 
employees and passengers is smaller than Heathrow Airport, the findings of this research are 
likely to be of interest. In more general terms, the thesis provides an addition to the under 
researched area of surface access to airports and more specifically employee car parking. 
The approach of best practice benchmarking with non-related organisations may also assist a 
wider array of organisations who are facing car parking problems.  
9.5 Limitations of the Research  
This section explores the potential limitations of the way in which best practice 
benchmarking was conducted in the research.  Five areas are addressed: the continuous 
nature of benchmarking; the issue that benchmarking only allows an organisation to catch up 
to another; target setting; the team approach to conducting benchmarking, and; the 
comparability of the selected non-airport organisations to BAA and the issues at Heathrow 
Airport.  
9.5.1 The Benchmarking Process: A Continuous Cycle  
An adaptation of the benchmarking process has been used throughout the research due to the 
presence of conditions which have meant it is not possible to conduct the complete 
benchmarking cycle, as discussed in section 4.10.  These conditions include the limitations 
on the resources available both in terms of time and money and the nature of the research as 
a PhD rather than a full benchmarking exercise as would be undertaken by an organisation. 
The full benchmarking process is a continuous cycle and after recommendations are made 
and implemented then the process of comparison begins again to allow the organisation to 
investigate whether the new implementations are successful and whether the performance 
gap with the best practice organisations has been closed. The benchmarking process in the 
research is also incomplete because it is only possible to recommend actions to managers at 
BAA Heathrow, but not to implement those recommendations.  The next immediate stage of 
any further research would have been to return to BAA with the final results and gather 
opinions on these.  
Spendolini states “benchmarking is not a one-time event” (1992) but in the case of this 
research it is argued that certain elements of the benchmarking exercise do not conform to 
the position of benchmarking as a continuous activity.  Areas such as implementation of a 
parking charge or a cash payment system are likely to be singular activities and once the 
implementation has occurred there is a reduced need to continue benchmarking the process 
of how best to conduct such an implementation.  
9.5.2 Benchmarking Only Allows Imitation  
The theory and nature of best practice benchmarking is regarded by some authors to be 
lacking in the sense that it only allows the benchmarking organisation to catch up to the best 
practice organisation in the short term and it does not encourage the benchmarking 
organisation to innovate (Zairi and Leonard, 1994, McAdam and Kelly, 2002). There is also 
a concern that processes from one organisation may not be applicable to another (Cox and 
Thompson, 1998, Hinton et al, 2000).  The research has sought to overcome these concerns; 
the suggestions to BAA made earlier in the chapter do not simply take the processes from 
one organisation and directly recommend them to BAA Heathrow, rather recommendations 
and potential solutions are stated based on the findings from a range of comparator 
organisations.  The research has been focussed on facilitating ideas for an implementation at 
Heathrow Airport rather than allowing Heathrow Airport to ‘catch up’ with the non-airport 
organisations.  
9.5.3 Target Setting  
An important area of benchmarking is to set targets for improvement which can then be 
measured against best practice organisations to determine any changes in the performance 
gap.  This is an area which has not been possible to address in the research because the 
various elements of a parking strategy containing a financial incentive or disincentive 
measure have not been developed and implemented by BAA Heathrow, hence it is not 
possible to set any meaningful targets for comparison. Should a financial incentive or 
disincentive be implemented as part of the employee car parking strategy at Heathrow 
Airport then the development of targets would be important and would help in measuring 
performance.  
9.5.4 Team Approach  
Some authors, most notably Spendolini (1992) and Vasilash (1994) state that benchmarking 
achieves the best results when conducted by a team of investigators. This is something 
which has not been possible in the research due to the nature of PhD research.  
9.5.5 Comparability of Case Studies  
As explored in section 4.8.1, finding ‘best practice’ has been questioned by some authors, 
most notably Cox and Thompson (1998), who argued that ‘best practice’ differs for each 
organisation depending on their individual circumstances and the particular point in time.  It 
was also stated that the ‘best’ companies may not wish to take part in the benchmarking 
exercise (Anderson et al, 1999).  While this potential limitation is important, it is considered 
that the selection of the organisations was justified on sound methodological grounds.  The 
comparability of BAA Heathrow to the non-airport organisations was explored in section 5.3 
and the approach taken in selecting the non-airport comparator organisations was justified.  
Table 5.6 was also presented which summarised the recognised similarities and differences 
between Heathrow Airport and each non-airport organisation.  Within the airport sector there 
are only a limited number of relevant implementations of employee car parking strategies 
which have been reported, but they tended not to be airport wide, for example the use of 
parking cash out by KLM at Schiphol Airport reported in section  
2.11.1. Additionally, as stated above in section 9.4.1 and earlier in the thesis, airports have 
been recommended to look outside their sector when conducting benchmarking exercises.  
Despite the problems that have been noted with the way in which benchmarking has been 
conducted in the research, it can still be seen to be a useful tool, particularly when used 
together with the other methodologies seen in this thesis such as the use of case studies 
incorporating interviews and focus groups and the coding and analysis of the data which 
facilitated the benchmarking comparison.  
9.6 Further Research  
The research presented in this thesis has focussed on addressing the issues at Heathrow 
Airport by looking to specific examples of how other organisations have addressed similar 
issues.  A number of areas for further research exist which would widen the potential use of 
the findings and techniques used.  
9.6.1 The Regulated Nature of Employee Car Parking at Heathrow Airport  
As stated on a number of occasions throughout the thesis, employee car parking is a 
regulated activity at Heathrow Airport and as such BAA are not allowed to return a profit on 
it; all revenues must balance with the cost of providing car parks.  The implications of 
introducing a direct employee car parking charge, particularly if there was a desire to ring-
fence revenues for public transport reinvestment, were unclear to the BAA employees 
interviewed and as such further research in this area is required to see whether reinvesting 
car parking revenues in public transport would be considered a cost of car parking within the 
constraints of the regulation.  
9.6.2 Wider Range of Organisations  
The research has considered Heathrow Airport in depth and Chapter 3 detailed the findings 
of interviews at four airports with differing characteristics.  It is considered that the findings 
of the research can already provide lessons for a wide range of airports and that further 
research looking in depth at a greater number of airports would allow for the findings to be 
of even wider interest.  An investigation into the situation at different airports around the 
world could be of benefit, thus including a wider range of issues in areas such as shift 
patterns, location and employee mix, thus further increasing the reach of the findings.  It 
should be remembered, however, that each airport’s characteristics and issues are unique and 
so any general recommendations and conclusions would still need to be supported by 
specific actions for each individual airport.  
The non-airport organisations selected for the benchmarking exercise with BAA Heathrow 
were done so on clearly justified grounds and it may be advantageous for any further 
research to include additional ‘best practice’ organisations to uncover a wider range of 
knowledge on dealing with employee car parking issues.  It would be beneficial to look to 
organisations who had used innovative measures other than those used by Addenbrooke’s 
NHS Trust, the University of Bristol and Pfizer.  
9.6.3 Further Interviews and Focus Groups  
Conducting selected interviews with top level management at Heathrow Airport would have 
allowed for more views to be obtained on the issues surrounding employee car parking and 
in particular the current thinking on the car parking situation at the airport from a top level 
strategic viewpoint.  Additionally, at Heathrow Airport all interviews were conducted at 
BAA Heathrow.  This was beneficial in terms of conducting the benchmarking exercise as it 
allowed for a direct comparison between the processes in BAA Heathrow with those in the 
non-airport organisations, but further research which included interviewees from other 
organisations at the airport would allow for a more detailed airport-wide perspective on 
employee car parking to be obtained. In terms of focus groups it would be beneficial to 
conduct groups at the non-airport organisations to gather employee views on the parking 
strategy in place.  
9.6.4 Investigation of Other Strategic Measures  
The research has concentrated on the use of an employee direct parking charge or financial 
incentive. Restrictions on parking and permit allocation have also been considered where 
they form part of an overall parking or travel strategy at an organisation. There are other 
measures which could be investigated by further research, most notably a road user charge.  
The issues surrounding the introduction of such a measure at Heathrow Airport could be 
explored along with an investigation into the impact of road user charging in other locations.  
9.6.5 Implementation of Recommendations  
It was not possible to implement an employee direct financial incentive or disincentive car 
parking measure at Heathrow Airport as part of the research but at some point in the future 
should such a measure be introduced, a key piece of further research would be to monitor the 
subsequent improvement or deterioration in the situation with employee car parking.  As 
well as allowing the recommendations to be justified or refuted, it would allow for the 
benchmarking cycle to be completed.  The recommendations put into place could then be 
investigated further through the use of further benchmarking in order to allow for 
improvements to be made.  
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Appendix 1  
The Benchmarking Process: Vignettes  
This section examines four example vignettes of benchmarking exercises all of which have 
been selected because they have relevance to this research.  Examples are chosen from the 
service sector and in one case from the aviation industry.  The examples help to highlight 
where organisations have adapted benchmarking models to best suit their own needs and 
where outside consultants or researchers have aided the benchmarking exercise.  
Benchmarking at Post Office Counters Limited  
Of particular interest are the benchmarking activities carried out by Post Office Counters 
Limited and Royal Mail.  Like airports, both organisations are in a service industry rather than 
manufacturing and so they share a stronger focus on people.  
Benchmarking at Post Office Counters Limited has been introduced with a strategic company-
wide focus, with the aim of improving quality in areas of the organisation where a need is 
recognised. After a decision to introduce the concept of “quality”, Post Office Counters 
Limited launched the “Customer First” initiative in 1987, initially amongst managers before 
expanding it to Post Offices and Sub Post-Masters. To the organisations, Customer First 
means managing the business in a way that continually focuses on the customer and harnesses 
everybody’s commitment.  (Zairi, 1996)  
The Customer First “Circle Of Improvement” contains a rim, various spokes and a hub. The 
rim of the wheel highlights the main factors driving the scheme, namely customer focus, 
management by fact, people based management and continuous improvement.  The hub of the 
wheel represents the quality improvement process which is the engine driving the 
improvement efforts.  The spokes of the wheel, of which benchmarking is one, are the 
elements that need to be managed, improved and controlled to ensure effectiveness in 
delivering the objectives of Customer First. (Zairi, 1996)  
Post Office Counters Limited consider the benchmarking spoke to be important because it is 
the tool for establishing “parameters of competitiveness”.  It is used to strengthen Customer 
First internal improvement programmes and prevent complacency.  The benchmarking 
approach taken at Post Office Counters was not a simple “off the shelf” package, it was 
introduced after investigation, experimentation, need identification and development. Parallels 
can be seen with the use of benchmarking for allowing airports to learn from non-airport 
organisations, where the benchmarking process needs to be adapted to best suit the 
circumstances it is to be used in, rather than directly using a model such as that developed by 
Camp or Spendolini.  
Initially, benchmarking within the Customer First initiative went no further than company 
visits and exploratory tours but it was soon realised that a process of structure and discipline 
was required. It was decided to develop a process for benchmarking which was based on that 
adopted by leading companies such as Xerox, AT&T and IBM. The approach used by Post 
Office Counters Limited is also compatible with that used by Royal Mail, another division of 
the Post Office.  A training programme was developed, a key part of which was to thoroughly 
explain to staff the difference between a benchmark and benchmarking.  
The strategy used for benchmarking at Post Office Counters Limited was to first examine best 
practice internally across the seven regions of the UK and then to look externally, only 
targeting best practice.  The organisation has also developed a database of “best of breed” 
external companies, “best of breed” internal processes, benchmarking partners and 
benchmarking studies.  This helps to provide data on potential partners and studies and to 
speed up the project.  
Post Office Counters Limited developed a nine-step benchmarking process, containing the 
following steps:  
1 Choose the process to be benchmarked and map the process concerned;  
2 Shortlist potential partners, obtain information and research data, target companies for 
partnership, identify contact names and initiate discussions;  
3 Identify known gaps in performance and determine the expected outcome from 
benchmarking with the target company;  
4 Form team, appoint members and define roles clearly;  
5 Communicate with partners on team, determine format of visit and confirm in writing;  
6 Prepare questions, checklists, a detailed itinerary and reciprocal answers;  
7 Interact with benchmarking partner, follow systematic route for questions, note new 
information, clarify any outstanding points and summarise information;  
8 Team meeting to de-brief, evaluate visit and develop action plan, and;  
9 Measure and review progress to see if gap is closing.  (Zairi, 1996)  
 
While the process is very similar to that developed by Camp, Post Office Counters Limited 
rewrote it in their own language, something which Zairi (1996) states is important as it can 
facilitate the process of ownership and make the application much easier. In a similar fashion, 
the benchmarking process model developed for the research, as shown in section 4.12, will be 
written in a way which best suits the needs of the research.  
A specific example of where benchmarking has been used successfully at Post Office 
Counters Limited can be seen in their “Customer Advisor Project”.  This project follows a 
step-by-step approach to benchmarking with a robust methodology.  Within the Customer 
Advisor Project the objective was to find new and better ways of improving the service at 
retail outlets without incorporating any additional costs.  The process was documented to 
understand all the activities and tasks that took place within a Post Office Counters retail area.  
The service customers received at the counter was then selected as a sub-process to focus on.  
Potential partners were selected for benchmarking, including banks and building societies, 
who were recognized to have similar processes, and fast food retailers who were recognized to 
be leaders in dealing with customers quickly and efficiently. Information was gathered 
including: research from local business schools; suppliers’ customers and personal contacts; 
ex-employees of other companies and currently employees of Post Office Counters Limited, 
and; professional associates.  The data analysis was conducted on a “need to know” basis, 
focusing closely on uncovered practices in order to establish the gap. Benchmarking visits 
then took place to gather knowledge and the findings from one of the benchmarking partners 
were used to redesign the process at the service counter and close the gap.  It also enabled Post 
Office Counters Limited to realize that recruitment and training were areas that needed to be 
improved.  
The new process, whereby customers were greeted as they entered the Post Office was 
launched at ten offices initially with emphasis being placed on overall communication. 
Performance was monitored using several measures including recording waiting times and 
customer satisfaction studies which allowed Post Office Counters to both review the 
benchmarking project, its impact and also review the robustness of the methodology used.  
Significant improvements in waiting times and customer perception were found. (Zairi, 1996)  
Zairi (1996) states that the Post Office Counters benchmarking project is beneficial in several 
ways. If the various stages and steps of a benchmarking process are adhered to then the 
robustness of the methodology is seen to be sound.  He also states that focus is very important 
and the area selected should support a corporate objective.  In the case of this thesis it is an 
objective of BAA to reduce car journeys to Heathrow Airport, not least because of 
environmental pollution limits and the car parking cap imposed as a condition of Terminal 
Five being developed.  The Post Office Counters Limited benchmarking project also 
highlights that in a large organisation it is important to pilot the “first experiment” before 
launching it more widely.  The first attempt must also be seen to be successful.  This is advice 
that may prove to be a useful recommendation to BAA.  
Benchmarking at Royal Mail  
Royal Mail is the largest component of the Post Office.  Like Post Office Counters Limited 
they also adopted the Customer First initiative in the late 1980’s with the objectives being to 
improve focus within the company, encourage better teamwork, increase commitment and 
sharpen focus on customers.  Royal Mail’s overall mission is to be recognized as the best 
organisation in the world distributing text and packages. A business improvement model has 
been designed to deliver this mission with benchmarking playing a part.  (Zairi, 1996)  
Royal Mail became interested in benchmarking in 1990 after directors and senior managers 
witnessed some companies in the USA that excelled at total quality management.  A visit to 
these companies alerted the directors and senior managers to the importance of benchmarking 
as a management activity.  
Royal Mail state that for benchmarking to be effective the following rules should be observed:  
 It needs to be established why benchmarking is to be used;  
 The project or process needs to be in line with business objectives;  
 Benchmarking itself is used as a process, and;  
 Benchmarking is an integral element of a larger process improvement.  (Zairi, 1996)  
 
The use of benchmarking for the research in this thesis can be related to some of these “rules”. 
It has been established that benchmarking is to be used as the tool to allow BAA to learn from 
best practice elsewhere in the area of employee car parking. Although the benchmarking 
exercise is being conducted from an outside perspective it is still possible to see some ties 
with the objectives of BAA, one of which is to meet environmental pollution limits and reduce 
employee car parking due to the Terminal Five parking cap. Benchmarking is also to be used 
as a process in the research.  In this research, the benchmarking exercise cannot be seen to be 
an integral element of a larger process improvement because of the nature of the exercise and 
the outside viewpoint.  
The Royal Mail benchmarking process contains eight steps following a similar pattern to 
Camp’s model, which can be summarized into the following phases:  
 Steps 1 and 2 – process and target organisation definition;  
 Steps 3 to 6 – visit preparation, interaction, debrief and evaluation;  
 Steps 7 and 8 – integration of learning points within Royal Mail.  (Zairi, 1996)  
 
Royal Mail implement their benchmarking process on a number of levels: 
organisational/strategic; business-wide processes, and; group/individual tasks.  They also use 
it to look at improvement opportunities and as an integral part of the improvement process 
(Zairi, 1996).  This highlights that benchmarking can be applied in many different ways and 
can be adapted to suit individual circumstances, something which supports the way in which it 
is being used in the thesis.  
Royal Mail prefer to use the terminology “good practice” to “best practice” to signify that it is 
possible for more than one approach to be suitable for addressing a task or problem.  They 
define good practice as “any proven working practice which is far enough ahead of the norm 
to provide significant performance gains if implemented” (Zairi and Whymark, 2000a, p.66). 
This approach can be seen in the research at BAA and the non-airport sites, where three 
“good” or “better” practice organisations will be selected for the benchmarking exercise with 
BAA and not just one organisation perceived to be “the best”.  
Nationwide Building Society  
The benchmarking exercise in this research is being conducted from an outside perspective.  
An approach which is similar in some ways can be seen at Nationwide Building Society where 
consultants were involved in the benchmarking exercise (Zairi and Whymark, 2000b).  Market 
research at Nationwide had revealed that customer satisfaction fell short in the areas of 
reliability, speed and quality of advice. The company launched an internal benchmarking 
exercise to learn from the branches which were better in the three highlighted areas.  While 
the benchmarking exercise was still owned, managed and deployed in-house, consultants were 
used to provide the framework and offer expertise gained from similar approaches in other 
organisations. This demonstrates that external personnel can be used in benchmarking 
exercises and hence goes some way to support the approach taken in the thesis.  
Benchmarking in Air Cargo  
Lobo and Zairi (1999a and b) conducted a competitive benchmarking exercise with air cargo 
operators using a questionnaire and interviews.  The results were used to allow comparisons to 
be made and detailed the specific practices used by the different operators. The aim of the 
research was to select key benchmarks that the industry could use to allow for performance 
comparisons.  While there are some differences to the thesis research it demonstrates that 
benchmarking has been conducted by researchers from an outside perspective which is 
important in justifying the approach taken in.  
